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FOREWORD

To contemporaries no less than to later generations, the military achievements of Nikephoros II Phokas (963–969), John I Tzimiskes (969–976), and Basil II (976–1025) marked their reigns as the heroic age of the Byzantine empire—“*l'épopée byzantine*,” as Gustave Schlumberger dubbed it over a century ago. Each of the three soldier-emperors left a storied legacy of military triumph: Nikephoros Phokas, “the white death of the Saracens,” whose armies achieved the conquest of Crete and Cyprus, the Cilician towns, and Antioch, thus breaking the power of the Hamdanid emirate of Aleppo, the Muslim archenemy of Byzantium in the east; John Tzimiskes, who withstood the challenge of the Kievan prince Svyatoslav for control of the Balkans, and carried Byzantine arms into Palestine; and Basil II, “the slayer of the Bulgars,” who extended Byzantine domination over the Armenian principalities and northern Syria, and who, in the course of a thirty-year struggle, succeeded in subjugating the Bulgar state, the empire's rival for supremacy in the Balkans and northern Greece.

[The subject of this book is the theory and conduct of Byzantine warfare during the age of the soldier-emperors.] The scope of the subject has been defined by the two sources on which this study is based: the tactical treatise known as the *Praecepta militaria* (ca. 965), attributed to Nikephoros Phokas, and the revised, expanded version of the treatise written by Nikephoros Ouranos as chapters 56–65 of his *Taktika* (ca. 1000). The military historical value of these treatises lies in their composition by experienced soldiers who wrote for their peers and thus presented a firsthand account of current military organization, equipment, and tactics. Yet despite their considerable military historical interest, neither the *Praecepta* nor the later version of the treatise has attracted a great deal of scholarly attention, for two reasons. One has been the inaccessibility of the texts, as the *Praecepta* has hitherto been available only in an edition published in 1908 by the Russian Byzantinist J. A. Kulakovsky, while to date only a few parts of the voluminous *Taktika* of Nikephoros Ouranos have been published. The other has been the preference of scholars to concentrate on the institutional and administrative history of the Byzantine army rather than on its operations or tactics—in other words, on what the army *was* as opposed to what it *did*. [My purpose in this book is therefore twofold: first, to publish a new

edition of the *Praecepta militaria* with a translation and notes, accompanied by an edition and translation of chapters 56–65 of the *Taktika* of Nikephoros Ouranos (Part I); and second, to place the two treatises in their military historical context and to examine the tactical system that they prescribe for Byzantine armies in battle and on campaign, with reference to the contemporary handbooks on guerrilla warfare (*De velitatione*) and campaign tactics (*De re militari*), and to the historical sources that cover the military events of the period and provide evidence by which to elucidate or confirm the use of the instructions given in the military treatises (Part II).]

It is a pleasure to offer my thanks to the following individuals and institutions for their help and support as I prepared this work, first as a doctoral dissertation at the Université de Montréal, and then as a volume in the Dumbarton Oaks Studies series. My greatest debt of thanks is to my adviser, Professor Nicolas Oikonomides, who suggested the topic to me in the first place and, with his customary patience and courtesy, offered much valuable advice during its development. A year at the Byzantijns-Nieuwgrieks Seminarium in Amsterdam, through the kindness of Professors W. G. Brokkaar and J. -L. van Dieten, together with a Junior Fellowship (1987–88) and a Summer Fellowship (1989) at Dumbarton Oaks, enabled me to do most of the research and writing. I have also profited greatly from discussions at various stages with a number of friends and scholars, among whom I would like to express my sincere thanks to George Dennis, Alexander Kazhdan, Gilbert Dagron, Alice-Mary Talbot, Pierre Bogli-
oni, John Nesbitt, Frank Trombley, Malcolm Wallace, Virginia Brown, Joseph Goering, and N. K. C. A. in't Veld. My thanks also extend to Professor Angeliki Laiou, who invited me to submit this work to the Dumbarton Oaks Studies series; to the readers for their comments and suggestions; to Glenn Ruby, Susan Higman, Robin Surratt, and Matthew Rieck for the care they devoted to the manuscript; to Joe Mills for his help with the photographs, to Brad Walton for the illustrations, and to Alvin Shaw for the maps.

Toronto
April 1994

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Listed here are the primary sources commonly cited; all others are given with full bibliography where they occur in the text.

Military Treatises

- Byz. Anon.* *Byzantinus anonymus*: (sixth century?) ed. and tr. G. T. Dennis, *Three Byzantine Military Treatises*, CFHB 25 (Washington, D.C., 1985), 1–135 (under the title “Anonymous Byzantine Treatise on Strategy”).
- De obsid.* *Anonymus de obsidione toleranda* (ca. 950): ed. H. van den Berg (Leiden, 1947).
- DRM* *De re militari* (ca. 990): ed. and tr. G. T. Dennis, *Three Byzantine Military Treatises*, CFHB 25 (Washington, D.C., 1985), 241–335 (under the title “Campaign Organization and Tactics”).
- DV* *De velitatione* (ca. 975): ed. and tr. G. Dagron and H. Mihăescu, *Le traité sur la guérilla (De velitatione) de l'empereur Nicéphore Phocas (963–969)* (Paris, 1986), 29–135; ed. and tr. G. T. Dennis, *Three Byzantine Military Treatises*, CFHB 25 (Washington, D.C., 1985), 137–239 (under the title “Skirmishing”). All references are to Dagron's text.
- LT* *Taktika* of Leo VI (ca. 900): the only full edition is found in PG 107, cols. 671–1094.
- Onasander, Strategikos* *Onasander, Strategikos logos: Aeneas Tacticus, Asclepiodotus, Onasander*, with an English translation by members of the Illinois Greek Club (New York, 1923), 342–526.
- Parecbolae* Ed. J.-A. de Foucault, *Strategemata II: Parecbolae* (Paris, 1947).
- PM* *Praecepta militaria* (ca. 965): ed. and trans. infra, pp. 12–59.
- SM* *Strategikon* of Maurice (ca. 600): ed. G. T. Dennis, *Das Strategikon des Maurikios* (with a German translation by E. Gamillscheg), CFHB 17 (Vienna, 1981).
- ST* *Sylloge tacticorum* (ca. 950): ed. A. Dain, *Sylloge tacticorum, quae olim Inedita Leonis Tactica dicebatur* (Paris, 1938).

List of Abbreviations and Bibliography

TNO *Taktika* of Nikephoros Ouranos (ca. 1000): chapters 56–65, ed. and trans. infra, pp. 88–163.

Primary Sources

- Greek
 Attal. Michael Attaleiates: *Michaelis Attaliothae Historia*, ed. I. Bekker (Bonn, 1853).
 Bryennios Nikephoros Bryennios: *Nicephori Bryennii Historiarum libri quattuor*, ed. P. Gautier, CFHB 9 (Brussels, 1975).
De admin. Constantine Porphyrogenitus *de administrando imperio*, ed. G. Moravcsik, tr. R. J. H. Jenkins, CFHB 1 (Washington, D.C., 1967).
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 Kek. *Strategikon* of Kekaumenos: *Sovety i Rasskazy Kekavmena*, ed. G. G. Litavrin (Moscow, 1972).
 Leo diac. Leo the Deacon: *Leonis diaconi Caloensis historiae libri decem*, ed. C. B. Hase (Bonn, 1828).
 Prokopios, *Wars* Procopii *Caesariensis opera omnia*, ed. J. Haury, editio stereotypa correctior addenda et corrigenda ad. G. Wirth (Leipzig, 1963), vol. I: *De bellis libri I–IV*; vol. II: *De bellis libri V–VIII*.
 Psellos, *Chronographia* Michael Psellos: *Chronographia*, ed. A. Rambaud, 2 vols. (Paris, 1967²).
 Skyl. John Skylitzes: *Ioannis Scylitzae Synopsis Historiarum*, ed. I. Thurn, CFHB 5 (Berlin-New York, 1973).
 Theophanes *Theophanis Chronographia*, vol. I, ed. C. de Boor (Leipzig, 1883).
 Theoph. cont. *Theophanes continuatus*, ed. I. Bekker (Bonn, 1838).
 Zon. John Zonaras: *Ioannis Zonarae Epitomae historiarum*, ed. M. Pinder and M. Büttner-Wobst (Bonn, 1841–97).

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- Ibn Hauqal, *Configuration de la Terre* Ibn Hauqal, *Configuration de la terre (Kitab surat al-ard)*, tr. J. H. Kramers and G. Wiet, 2 vols. (Paris, 1964).
 Yahya, PO "Histoire de Yahya-ibn-Said d'Antioche, continuateur de Said-ibn-Bitriq," ed. and tr. I. Kratchkovsky and A. A. Vasiliev, PO 18 (1924), 705–833; PO 23 (1932), 349–520.

Periodicals

- BAR International Series British Archaeological Reports (International Series)
 BMGS *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies*
 ByzF *Byzantinische Forschungen*
 BZ *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*
 CRAI *Comptes-rendus des séances de l'Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres*
 DOP *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*
 'Επ. 'Ετ. Βυζ. Σπ. 'Επετηρίς 'Εταιρείας Βυζαντινῶν Σπουδῶν
 EHR *English Historical Review*
 GOTR *Greek Orthodox Theological Review*
 GRBS *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies*
 JESHO *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*
 JÖB *Jahrbuch der österreichischen Byzantinistik*
 JRS *Journal of Roman Studies*
 PEQ *Palestine Exploration Quarterly*
 PO *Patrologia orientalis*
 PP *Past and Present*
 REB *Revue des études byzantines*
 RSBS *Rivista di studi bizantini e slavi*
 TM *Travaux et mémoires. Centre de recherche d'histoire et civilisation byzantine*
 VV *Vizantijskij Vremennik*
 ZIAN *Zapiski Imperatorskoi Akademii Nauk*
 ZRVI *Zbornik Radova Vizantološkog Instituta*

Reference Works and Collections

- CFHB *Corpus fontium historiae byzantinae*
 CSHB *Corpus scriptorum historiae byzantinae*

List of Abbreviations and Bibliography

- DHPLB H. Hunger, *Die Hochsprachliche Profane Literatur der Byzantiner*, 2 vols. (Vienna, 1978)
- EI; EP² *Encyclopaedia of Islam; Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd edition
- JGR J. and P. Zepos, *Jus graecoromanum*, 8 vols. (Athens, 1931; repr. Aalen, 1962)
- PG Patrologiae cursus completus, Series graeca, ed. J.-P. Migne
- Schilbach, *Metrologie* E. Schilbach, *Byzantinische Metrologie* (Munich, 1970)
- TIB *Tabula Imperii Byzantini*

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6. Dura Europos graffito (from P. Brown, *The World of Late Antiquity* [London, 1971], 162)
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PART I

TEXTS AND TRANSLATIONS

The *Praecepta militaria* of the Emperor Nikephoros II
Phokas (963–969)

(Στρατηγικὴ Ἐκθεσις Καὶ Σύνταξις
Νικηφόρου Δεσπότης)

INTRODUCTION

DATE: ca. 965

MANUSCRIPT: *Gosudarstvenyi istoričeskii muzei* (State Historical Museum)
(Moscow) 436/298/285 (fourteenth century), fols. 115^v–136^v

PREVIOUS EDITION: J. A. Kulakovsky, "Strategika imperatora Nikifora,"
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(1908), 1–21 (Greek text); 23–58 (commentary and index).

The Codex

The *Praecepta militaria* is preserved in a single codex, now in Moscow, the State Historical Museum 436/298/285. Since renovations at the museum have made the codex inaccessible to scholars, the present edition is based on a microfilm provided by the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris. As this is also the sole codex to have preserved the text of Kekaumenos, it has been carefully studied by Russian scholars, most recently by B. L. Fonkič and G. G. Litavrin, whose findings will be summarized here.¹

The codex contains 577 folios and has been shown to be a composite of two main parts, each in a different hand (fols. 6–350; 351–577), with three small

¹B. L. Fonkič, "O rukopisi *Strategikona* Kekavmena," *VV* 32 (1971), 108–20; G. G. Litavrin, *Sovety i Rasskazy Kekavmena* (Moscow, 1972), 11–35.

pieces added afterwards (fols. 1–5; 58; 492–493).² Apparently an instructional military manual such as the *Praecepta* appealed to the collector's interest, since the other texts assembled in the first main part (Aesopica, sayings of famous philosophers, refutations of heresies, Kekaumenos) reveal a taste for didactic material.³ The second main part also contains works in this vein. Fonkič concluded that the two parts were copied separately by two contemporary scribes in fourteenth-century Trebizond and later joined together.⁴ Their common origin in Trebizond seems certain for two reasons. Texts found in the two main parts of the codex (*Tales of Syntipas*, *Life of Aesop*) are held to have been copied from the same models used for these texts in the *Monacensis graecus* 525, known to have been copied in Trebizond in 1361,⁵ while invocations imploring divine protection for the ruling dynasty of Trebizond, the Grand Komnenoi (on fols. 250–251), and of a Trapezuntine princess (κέρα Χατοῦ[v] on fol. 101, probably a daughter of John IV Komnenos [1429–58]) connect the codex with Trebizond before its fall to the Turks in 1461.⁶

At an unknown date the codex was brought to the monastery *ton Iviron* on Mt. Athos where it passed through the hands of the librarian Abessalom (active ca. 1607–35), who read and annotated this and other codices.⁷ The codex was sold shortly afterwards to the Russian monk and traveler Arsenii Sukhanov, who had been sent to Athos by the Muscovite Patriarch Nikon in 1654 to buy books and manuscripts for the newly founded Patriarchal Library,⁸ which was to become the Synodal Library after 1721, and the State Historical Museum after 1917. The codex first received the catalogue number 140, but was renum-

²Fonkič, "O rukopisi," 109, noting as proof of their originally separate states that the first and final pages of both main parts are heavily stained.

³A full list of the texts included in the first and second parts of the codex is given by Fonkič, *ibid.*, 109–13.

⁴Dates ranging from the thirteenth to the fifteenth century have been proposed for both parts of the codex; during a discussion in Moscow in July 1987, Fonkič assigned the first part (containing the *Praecepta*) to the fourteenth century.

⁵Fonkič, "O rukopisi," 110–12, 118.

⁶*Ibid.*, 118, and Litavrin, *Sovety i Rasskazy*, 12. The inscription on folio 101 reads: μοισθητη κε καὶ συνχώρισον τὴν δοῦλὴν τοῦ καὶ πατρὸς (i.e., μνήσθητι κ(ύρι)ε καὶ συγχώρισον τὴν δοῦλὴν σου κέρα Χατοῦ[v]). On the identification of this woman as the daughter of John IV Komnenos, see G. Moravcsik, *Byzantinoturcica*, II (Budapest, 1943), 287–88, with additional references.

⁷Fonkič, "O rukopisi," 118–20.

⁸On Arsenii Sukhanov and his mission of 1653–55 to purchase books and manuscripts for the Patriarchal Library, see the account of the Arkhimandrite Savva, *Ukazatel' dlya obozreniya Moskovskoi Patriaršei (nyne Sinodal'noi) biblioteki* (Moscow, 1858), 6–9; B. L. Fonkič, *Grečesko-russkie kul'turnie svyazi v XV–XVI vv: Grečeskie rukopisi v Rossii* (Moscow, 1977), 68–104.

bered in the nineteenth-century catalogues of C. F. Matthaei (no. 285), the Arkhimandrite Savva (no. 298), and the Arkhimandrite Vladimir (no. 436).⁹

Descriptions of the codex supply the following details:¹⁰ the first main part measures 230/233 x 153/165 mm, the second, 233 x 167; the folios are paper, of eastern origin; signatures by a later hand (fifteenth or sixteenth century) are found in the lower right (but occasionally the left) corner of the first folio of each quaternion; titles and initial capitals were done in red (cinnabar), which in some cases has badly faded; the codex is filled with decorations, done in red, in the design of interwoven serpents or dragons, or lines and dots; they are used to fill in the spaces between successive texts and chapters, or between the end of a line and the margin.

The *Praecepta* occupies folios 115^v–136^v of the first part of the codex, and the features listed above appear in these folios. The signatures by a later hand are found on folios 116^r, 124^r, and 132^r; it is possible that the same hand is responsible for the word ἀναστάσεως written in the lower left corner of 131^r. An unknown hand has also added corrections in the margins and text of the opening folios 115^v–116^r, which are perhaps the work of the monk Abessalom, whose brief possession of the codex was noted above. The main title and chapter titles were done in red, as was one capital in the text (Δεῖ on fol. 130^v), but the titles of chapters II (fol. 120^r; Fig. 1) and IV (fol. 127^v) have faded and are now barely legible. Decorations adorn the beginning and end of the text and of each chapter: these include a dragon (115^v), interwoven lines (125^v), a pattern of linked ovals (127^v), dots and half-circles (133^v), interwoven lines (135^v), and entwined dragons (136^v).

The Trapezuntine copyist prepared the manuscript with evident care. The borders marking the generous margins along the top, bottom, and sides are clearly visible, and each folio consistently contains twenty-five lines. The script, in the same hand throughout, is a large, easily legible minuscule, although some folios (117^r or 129^r) display a slightly cramped style with more frequent recourse to abbreviations and letters written above the line. The scribe wrote neither final *sigma* (ς) nor iota subscripts. Many letters are rendered in different shapes and

⁹C. F. Matthaei, *Accurata codicum graecorum mss bibliothecarum Mosquensium Sanctissimae Synodi notitia et recensio*, I–II (Leipzig, 1805); Arkhimandrite Savva, *Ukazatel'*; and Arkhimandrite Vladimir, *Sistimatičeskoe opisanie rukopisei Moskovskoi Sinodal'noi (Patriaršei) biblioteki. Čast' pervaya: Grečeskie rukopisi* (Moscow, 1894).

¹⁰These details are compiled from the descriptions given by Fonkič, "O rukopisi," 109; Arkhimandrite Vladimir, *Opisanie*, 664; M. A. Šangin, *Catalogus codicum astrologorum graecorum*, XII (Brussels, 1936), 78.

Β. α. ρ. ε. ο. υ. σ. ταὶ δὲ σὺρ ταῖς αἰς πῶν ὁ κτλ. ἦν αἰς τ
 καὶ μὲν σὺν τοῖς τοῦ λδωρ. ἰ. ἀθ. μ. αἰδὶ καὶ ὁ δδ. υ. κα
 θῶς. ἔκ. αὐτοῖς τῶν μακ. αἰ. ἦ. ἦ. ἰ. αὐταῖς. πρὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ
 πρὸς τῶν δὲ ἔ. ρ. χ. ε. σ. τ. αἰ. μὲν ὁ δδ. μ. καὶ ποιεῖν τῶν
 τ. αἰ. πῶν. καὶ ἀπὸ φέρει καὶ τῶν ἀποκρίσις.
 τὸ μὲν λαοὺς μ. αἰ. π. φέρει τῶν πολλὰς σεφ. μα. αἰ.
 καὶ φέρει τῶν χι. δ. α. οὐ. λα. οὐ. ἀλλὰ τῶν μ. β. τῶν τὸ λ. ε. μ. α.
 ἦ. ὁ. μ. α. τ. α. σ. τ. α. σ. εἴ. τ. α. ρ. κ. ο. υ. σ. τ. α. σ. χ. ρ. εἴ. α. σ. ἰ. π. φ. ε. ρ. ε.
 θ. α. καὶ αἰ. τῶν μ. α. τ. α. ρ. μ. α. τ. ρ. οὐ. χ. ρ. ἦ. σ. τ. α. σ. οὐ.
 χι. δ. ἔ. μ. α. τ. α. α. τ. λ. ἦ. τ. α. σ. καὶ τ. ρ. οὐ. φ. α. σ. τ. οὐ. δ. ἔ. π. οὐ. λ. υ.
 π. λ. ἦ. θ. ο. σ. τ. οὐ. χ. υ. δ. α. οὐ. λα. οὐ. καὶ τῶν σεφ. μα. αἰ. ὡ. μ. πῶν
 πολλῶν. ἔ. μ. τῶν λ. ε. μ. α. τ. ρ. α. ἦ. καὶ τ. α. λ. ε. ἰ. μ. π. α. μ. ε. σ. τ. α. σ.

sizes, and the large-style β , ζ , θ , ξ , and ϕ , or the combinations $\theta\epsilon$ and $\epsilon\iota$, dominate the page. Examples may be found in the reproduction of folio 120^r.

The Edition of J. A. Kulakovsky

The *Praecepta militaria* has been edited once before, by the Russian scholar J. A. Kulakovskiy (1855–1919), who published the Greek text with a commentary and index in 1908.

In his introduction to the text, Kulakovsky briefly described the manuscript and the principles of his edition. Confronted with a text full of errors and corruptions, he attempted to strike a balance between introducing the corrections necessary for the coherence of the text and treating the *Praecepta* as an example of medieval Greek which should not be made to conform to the rules of classical style. He freely emended the text according to his own judgment and, given the limited means at his disposal—the existence of the *Taktika* of Nikephoros Ouranos was unknown in his time, and the *Sylloge tacticorum* was not yet published—succeeded in clarifying the text at many points. In his commentary, Kulakovsky summarized the text and discussed its place among the contemporary Byzantine military treatises, completing his study with an annotated index. Written in Russian, Kulakovsky's commentary on the *Praecepta* is not often cited, but his attention to technical terminology coupled with his knowledge of the military literature then available make his work still useful today.

The State of the Text and the Principles of the Edition

The manuscript of the *Praecepta* contains many erroneous and corrupted readings. The main categories of the errors and corruptions affecting the text, and the steps taken to deal with them, are as follows. ⁶

Orthographical errors abound. These include the usual homophonic confusions between $\epsilon\iota$, ι , η , $\omicron\iota$, and υ (itacism) or between other homophones such as \omicron and ω , $\alpha\iota$ and ϵ , or β and consonantal υ ; in one instance, β and ϕ have been confused ($\phi\upsilon\rho\sigma\omega\acute{\nu}$ for $\beta\upsilon\rho\sigma\omega\acute{\nu}$ on fol. 126 ν). A handful of errors appear to have resulted from visual confusions between certain letters, among which the following may be noted: \omicron for α and vice versa: $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\alpha\tau\omicron\nu\tau\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\alpha\varsigma$ for $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\alpha\tau\omicron\nu\tau\alpha\rho\chi\omicron\varsigma$ (115 ν); $\kappa\rho\alpha\tau\eta\theta\epsilon\iota$ for $\kappa\rho\omicron\tau\eta\theta\eta$ (119 γ); $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\delta\rho\omicron\varsigma$ for $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\acute{\epsilon}\delta\rho\alpha\varsigma$ (120 ν); $\kappa\acute{\alpha}\tau\omicron$ for $\kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\alpha}$ (124 γ); ω for α , as in $\kappa\upsilon\beta\epsilon\rho\nu\omega\acute{\nu}$ for $\kappa\upsilon\beta\epsilon\rho\nu\acute{\alpha}\nu$ (119 γ)—even in our copyist's script the α with tail curling upwards closely resembles ω ; and ν for κ , as in $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\theta\epsilon\sigma\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ for $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\theta\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ (115 ν). The copyist often wrote \omicron and σ preceding π as small loops on the upper left bar of the π , making $\omicron\pi$ and $\sigma\pi$ difficult to distinguish; it would appear that his model showed the same ligatures, as suggested by the erroneous readings $\pi\iota\theta\alpha\mu\iota(\omega\acute{\nu})$ (116 γ) for $\sigma\pi\iota\theta\alpha\mu\omega\acute{\nu}$ and $\pi\acute{\lambda}\iota\tau\alpha\iota$ for $\omicron\pi\acute{\lambda}\iota\tau\alpha\iota$ (117 γ). Also wide-

1. State Historical Museum, Moscow, MS. 436/298, folio 120^r

spread are mistakes in breathings and accents, and the false division of compound words: ὑποστρέφωσιν (117^r), κατὰφράκτους (118^r; 120^v), ἀποφέρειν (120^r). All such errors are corrected automatically.

Another orthographical irregularity is the occurrence of single consonant spellings (especially in words of Latin origin), for example, καμελαύκια, καβαλάριος, σαγίτα, σέλα, κασίδα, etc. The single consonant spellings which are attested in other treatises are left alone, while others are doubled automatically (καβαλλάριος, καβαλλαρικός). I must emphasize that in such cases as ὀπισθεν / ὀπιθεν or φυλάσσειν / φυλάττειν, usage has not been standardized, nor has the movable *v* been supplied where this convention is expected. The orthography in these cases is that of the manuscript.

The errant readings μοναύλιον / μόναυλον and μοναυλάτος have also been corrected automatically (μεναύλιον / μέναυλον and μεναυλάτος). The neuter singular forms mistakenly rendered by the scribe as τοῦλδος and βάνδος have been standardized as τοῦλδον and βάνδον.

In his study, Fonkič stated that the great number of orthographical errors indicated that the copyist could not have been a professional, but was in all probability a monk with rudimentary training in book preparation. Consistent with this diagnosis is the copyist's constant mishandling of abbreviations.¹¹ The number and diversity of these errors (including *nomina sacra*, abbreviated articles, terminations, and prepositions) suggest that the model came to him in a heavily abbreviated (perhaps even a tachygraphic) version that he tried, with evident difficulty, to write out in full.

A number of problems and corruptions impair the meaning of the text in several places. Lacunae and erasures are evident in the manuscript itself, while other errors can be identified on the basis of context. Fortunately, the paraphrase of the *Praecepta* found in chapters 56–62 of the *Taktika* of Nikephoros Ouranos provides a reliable basis for comparison and helps to identify a number of omissions and corruptions in the text of the *Praecepta*.

The manuscript shows three lacunae and one erasure. The readings at two of the lacunae (on fols. 122^r, 123^r) and the erasure (on fol. 134^v) are easily restored, but a lacuna indicated on folio 131^v represents a substantial loss to the text (see the linear commentary on chapter IV.¹⁵⁰). Also found are one gloss (fol. 116^v), an insertion (fol. 130^r), and a repetition (fol. 123^r).

Corruptions in the text are treated in two ways. Where a corrupted word

or passage can be restored on the basis of the context or the corresponding reading in the *Taktika*, it has been corrected and noted in the apparatus. This principle applies to the following words or passages surviving in part, or showing some resemblance to Ouranos' paraphrase:

1. *PM* I.⁷¹: ἄλλοις ἐπινοίας ἐχθρόν τῷ—ἄλλαις ἐπινοίαις ἐχρῶντο; cf. *TNO* 56.^{73–74}: ἐποίουν. . . ἄλλας ἐπινοίας
2. *PM* I.¹⁰⁵: ἔμνομονοῖς—μεμονωμένους
3. *PM* I.¹⁰⁶: συγκολυμένον—συγκεκολλημένους
4. *PM* I.¹²⁴: δεῖ εἰδέναι τοὺς τοιαῦτας μεναυλάτας—δεῖ δὲ εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους μεναυλάτους; cf. *TNO* 56.^{122–123}: ἀρμόζει δὲ εἶναι τοὺς μεναυλάτους
5. *PM* I.¹⁴⁸: τὴν τῶν ἀγομένων δίψαν—τὴν τῶν ἀγωνιζομένων δίψαν; cf. *TNO* 56.^{152–153}: τὴν δίψαν τῶν ἀγωνιζομένων . . .
6. *PM* II.^{16–17}: οἱ μ(ὲν) οἰπέρχονται—εἰ μὲν οἱ ἐχθροὶ ἐπέρχονται . . . ; cf. *TNO* 57.^{32–33}: ἂν μὲν ἐπέρχονται οἱ ἐχθροὶ . . .
7. *PM* II.¹⁰⁸: ὀφθαζόντε—οὐ φθαζονται; cf. *TNO* 57.¹²⁹: οὐ καταλαμβάνονται
8. *PM* IV.¹³: ποτηρι—τοποτηρητήν
9. *PM* IV.¹²⁶: κουρατόρων—προκουρσατόρων
10. *PM* IV.^{172–173}: τροπὴν ποιήσητε—ἡ τοῦ Θεοῦ βοήθεια ἵνα ποιήσῃ τὴν τροπὴν αὐτῶν; cf. *TNO* 61.^{248–249}: ἡ τοῦ Θεοῦ Βοήθεια ἵνα ποιήσῃ τὴν τροπὴν αὐτῶν.
11. *PM* V.²⁴: ἡρύθησαν—ἐρρυθμίσθησαν; cf. *TNO* 62.²⁶: ἐτυπώθησαν

No less than ten defective passages can be identified in the manuscript of the *Praecepta* through comparison with Nikephoros Ouranos' paraphrase. The following lacunae are indicated { . . . } in the text, and the reader will be referred to the discussion of each one in the linear commentary:

1. *PM* I.⁸⁴—*TNO* 56.^{82–85}
2. *PM* I.¹³²—*TNO* 56.^{127–133}
3. *PM* I.¹⁶⁴—*TNO* 57.^{9–12}
4. *PM* IV.¹⁷—*TNO* 61.^{19–21}
5. *PM* IV.⁶⁷—*TNO* 61.^{104–111}
6. *PM* IV.⁷⁶—*TNO* 61.^{120–123}
7. *PM* IV.¹²⁴—*TNO* 61.^{175–180}
8. *PM* IV.¹³³—*TNO* 61.^{186–188}
9. *PM* IV.¹⁵⁷—*TNO* 61.^{230–232}
10. *PM* V.³⁹—*TNO* 62.^{49–55}

¹¹ Fonkič, "O rukopisi," 113 and 118, esp. 113, where he comments on the contradictory nature of the codex: a remarkable collection of texts, but a low quality of script and many errors of iota-cism, "a phenomenon which we would never see in such quantity in the work of professional copyists."

Corrections made by Kulakovsky which can be confirmed with reference to the *Taktika* or which are justified by the context (e.g., *PM* I.⁷⁸, where he emended ἀμφίκομον to ἀμφίστομον) have been kept and are signaled (K) in the apparatus. His readings that have been rejected are not recorded. All other corrections are mine.

It is worth remarking that the text has not suffered from scribal intervention. Nothing in the manuscript suggests that at some stage a copyist tried to revise or update the treatise by altering or glossing the names of the peoples mentioned (Ἀρμένιοι, Ῥῶς, Ἀραβίται) or the technical terminology used in a specific sense (μεναύλιον, ταξιαρχία, ζάβα). In this important regard the fourteenth-century copy of the *Praecepta* preserves the historical value of the tenth-century original.

There has been no attempt in the translation to use English equivalents for the many technical terms in the treatise. These have been transliterated and their derivation and meaning are discussed in the notes to the text; readers may wish to consult the Glossary (on pp. 369–70), which lists and briefly defines the technical terms used in the *Praecepta* and the *Taktika* of Nikephoros Ouranos.

LIST OF SIGNS

- K = J. A. Kulakovsky
TNO = *Taktika* of Nikephoros Ouranos
< > = addenda
< . . . > = aliqua verba deesse videntur
{ } = delenda
() = compendia soluta (in apparatu)

Στρατηγικὴ Ἐκθεσις Καὶ Σύνταξις Νικηφόρου Δεσπότη

I. Περί πεζῶν

1. Πρέπον ἄρα καὶ ὀφειλόμενόν ἐστιν ἀπὸ τε Ῥωμαίων καὶ Ἀρμενίων στρατιώτας ἐκλέξασθαι ἄνδρας ὀπλίτας εὐμήκεις τὰς ἡλικίας καὶ πλεῖον τῶν τεσσαράκοντα μὴ ὄντας χρόνων, εἴθ' οὕτως γυμνάσαι τούτους πρεπόντως ἀσπιδηφορεῖν καὶ πρὸς πάντα
5 πολεμικοὺς καὶ ἐπιτηδείους ὑπάρχειν καὶ μετὰ τῶν δοράτων κινεῖσθαι καὶ φυλάσσειν αὐτοὺς καλῶς καὶ ἀντιμάχεσθαι τοῖς ὁμοτέχνοις αὐτῶν ἀσπιδηφόροις. καταστήσαι δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ ἄρχοντας, δεκάρχας, πεντηκοντάρχους καὶ ἑκατοντάρχους, ὅπως ὁ μὲν ἑκατόνταρχος ἴσταται μέσον τῶν ἑκατὸν, ὁμοίως καὶ ὁ πεντηκοντάρχης ἐν μιᾷ τῆς παρατάξεως ἄκρᾳ καὶ ὁ ἕτερος ἐν τῇ ἑτέρᾳ. 2. ὀφείλουσιν δὲ εἶναι καὶ τὰ κοντουβέρνια αὐτῶν κατὰ συγγένειαν καὶ
10 φιλίαν ἐν τε ἀπλήκτῳ καὶ παρατάξει καὶ ὁδοιπορίᾳ καὶ ἐπὶ παντὸς πράγματος. συστήναι δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν τοιούτων ὀπλιτῶν χιλιάδας ἑνδεκα καὶ διακοσίους χωρὶς τῶν ψιλῶν. 3. ὀφείλουσιν
15 δὲ ἐπιταγῆναι καὶ καβάδια κοντὰ μέχρι τῶν γονάτων διήκοντα, ἔχοντα δὲ βαμβάκιν καὶ κουκούλιν. τὰ δὲ μανίκια αὐτῶν εἶναι κοντὰ καὶ πλατέα, ἔχοντα εἰς τὰς μασχάλας σχίσματα πρὸς τὸ ῥαδίως ὁμοῦ καὶ εὐκόλως τὰς αὐτῶν χεῖρας ἐκβάλλειν καὶ μάχεσθαι. τὰ δὲ μανίκια αὐτῶν ὀπισθεν εἰς τοὺς ὤμους ὑπὸ κομποθη-
20 λυκίων κρατεῖσθαι. ἐχέτωσαν δὲ, εἰ μὲν δυνατόν, καὶ ὑποδήματα κοντὰ, διπλὰ μέχρι τῶν γονάτων, εἴτε καὶ μονοπλὰ μέχρι τῶν μηρῶν, ἢ καὶ σανδάλια ἡγουν μουζάκια, εἴτε τὰ λεγόμενα ἐν τῇ συνηθείᾳ τζερβούλια. ἔχειν δὲ καὶ αὐτοὺς καὶ καμελαύκια ἀπὸ

Tit. ἔκθεσις K: ἐνθεσις cod. 1 πρέπον K: πρέπο cod. 4 ἀσπιδηφορεῖν K: ἀπηδηφορεῖν cod.: in marg. sin. corr. man. rec. ἀσπιδη 6-7 ὁμοτέχνοις: ὁμοτέχνοῖς cod.: acc. supra e suppl. man. rec. 8 ἑκατοντάρχους: χιλιάρχους cod. 8-9 ἑκατόνταρχος: ἑκατοντάρχας cod. 10 ἄκρᾳ K: ἄκρας cod.: in marg. sin. corr. man. rec. ἄκρᾳ 15 καὶ καβάδια: syll. κα suprascr. man. rec. 16 καὶ κουκούλιν: syll. κου superscr. man. rec.

Presentation and Composition on Warfare of the Emperor Nikephoros

I. On the Infantry

1. It is both best and necessary to pick out foot soldiers from Byzantines and Armenians, heavy infantrymen large in stature and no more than forty years of age, then train them properly to use their shields, to be warlike and fit for all occasions, to maneuver with their spears, to defend themselves capably, and to fight against infantry with the same skills as theirs. Appoint officers for them, dekarchs, pentekontarchs, and hekatontarchs, so that the hekatontarch stands in the middle of one hundred men and, correspondingly, one pentekontarch is at one end of the line, the other at the opposite. 2. Their *kontubernia* should be according to kinship and friendship in camp, battle formation, on the march and in every situation. The number of these infantrymen should come to 11,200, apart from the light infantry. 3. Short tunics reaching to the knees are to be required, made of cotton or coarse silk. Their sleeves have to be short and broad with slits up to the shoulder joints so they can put their arms through easily and comfortably to fight. Their sleeves should be fastened with loops and buttons back on the shoulders. If possible, let them also have short footwear folded up to the knees or unfolded up to the thighs, or else sandals, that is, *mouzakia*, or those called *tzerboulia* in colloquial speech. They must have thick caps of felt to be fastened over their heads with

25 κενδούκλων παχέα καὶ ἐπάνω αὐτῶν ὑπὸ φακιολίων κρατεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ σπαθία ζωστήκια καὶ τζικούρια ἢ καὶ σιδηροράβ- K2
 δια, ὅπως ὁ μὲν τούτῳ, ὁ δὲ μετ' ἐκείνου, καθὰ εὐχερῆς ἕκαστος, μάχεται. πάντες δὲ καὶ τὰ σφενδοβόλα ἐν ταῖς ζώναις αὐτῶν ἐχέτ-
 30 εῖναι αὐτὰ παχέα καὶ ἰσχυρὰ ἀπὸ τριάκοντα σπιθαμῶν εἴτε καὶ ἀπὸ εἴκοσι πέντε τὸ | μῆκος. καὶ τὰ ξιφάρια αὐτῶν ἐπιτήδεια καὶ 116'
 τὰ κουσπία. 4. ὀφείλουσιν δὲ ἐκλεγῆναι καὶ τοξόται ἐπιτήδαιοι, οἱ λεγόμενοι παρὰ τοῖς παλαιοῖς ψιλοί, χιλιάδες τέσσαρες καὶ ὀκτακόσιοι, οἵτινες ὀφείλουσιν ἔχειν ἀνὰ δύο κούκουρα, τὸ μὲν
 35 ἐν ἔχον σαγίτας σαρακοντα, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον ἐξήκοντα, καὶ ἀνὰ τοξά- ρια δύο καὶ κόρδας τέσσαρες καὶ σκουτάρια μικρά, χεροσκοῦτ-
 40 αρα, καὶ σπαθία ζωστήκια καὶ τζικούρια, καὶ σφενδοβόλα ὁμοίως βαστάζειν εἰς τὰς ζώνας αὐτῶν. εἶναι δὲ αὐτοὺς ὑπὸ δεκάρχους καὶ πεντηκοντάρχους καὶ ἑκατοντάρχους. 5. ἡ δὲ τοιαύτη παρά-
 45 ταξις τῶν εἰρημένων πεζῶν ἔστω τετράγωνος διττή, οὕτω λεγομένη παρὰ τοῖς παλαιοῖς τετράπλευρος, ἔχουσα καθ' ἕκαστον μέρος ἀνὰ παραταγὰς τρεῖς, ὥς εἶναι ὁμοῦ διὰ τῶν τεσσάρων πλευρῶν
 50 παραταγὰς δώδεκα. εἶναι δὲ αὐτὰς διακεχωρισμένας ὅσον ἐστὶν δυνατὸν χωρεῖν καθ' ἕκαστον χωρίον καβαλλαρίους δεκαπέντε
 45 εἴτε καὶ δώδεκα τοῦ εἰσέρχεσθαι καὶ ἐξέρχεσθαι τοὺς πολεμοῦν-
 50 τας. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐστὶν τὸ καβαλλαρικὸν πολὺ καὶ οἱ ἐχθροὶ πεζικὸν ὅμοιον οὐκ ἐπιφέρονται, ὀφείλουσιν ἐαθῆναι, ὥς εἴρηται, χωρία δώδεκα ἐν οἷς τὰς εἰσαγωγὰς καὶ ἐξαγωγὰς μέλλουσιν ποιεῖσθαι οἱ πολεμοῦντες. | εἰ (δέ) ἐστὶν τὸ καβαλλαρικὸν στράτευμα ὀλί- 117'
 50 γον, ἐπιφέρονται δὲ οἱ ἐχθροὶ πεζικόν, ὀφείλουσιν ἐαθῆναι χωρία ὀκτὼ πρὸς τὸ εἶναι ἐν πολλῇ ἀσφαλείᾳ. 6. εἰς δὲ τὰ εἰρημένα χωρία, εἰ μὲν εἰσὶν ἀκοντισταί, εἴτε Ῥῶς εἴτ' ἕτεροι ἐθνικοί, ὀφείλουσιν καθ' ἕκαστον χωρίον ἵστασθαι (εἰς) τὸ ὀπιθεν μέρος
 55 τῆς παρατάξεως τῶν ὀπλιτῶν πρὸς τὸ τοῦ χωρίου στόμα κατ' εὐ-
 55 θεϊαν πεντήκοντα ἢ τεσσαράκοντα ἢ καὶ τριάκοντα, κατὰ τὴν δύ-
 ναμιν τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ. εἶναι δὲ ὀπισθεν αὐτῶν καὶ τοξότας πεζοὺς καὶ σφενδοβολιστὰς κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν τῆς ποσότητος τοῦ λαοῦ, ἵνα, ὅταν ὑποστρέψωσιν οἱ καβαλλάριοι διωκόμενοι παρὰ τῶν πο-
 λεμίων καὶ εἰσέλθωσιν εἰς τὴν σύνταξιν, ἐκπηδήσουσιν οἱ ἀκον-

28 σπιθαμῶν K: πιθαμ(ών) cod. 33 παρὰ τοῖς K: πάντας cod. 42 post τρεῖς scr. cod. καβαλλαρικῶν quod delevi 46 πολὺ K: πολλὴν cod. 49 δὲ suppl. K 51 εἶναι K: ἐναι cod. | εἰς K: εἰ cod. 52 εἴτ' ἕτεροι K: εἰτέροι cod. 53 εἰς supplevi 56 αὐτῶν: αὐτοὺς cod. 58 παρὰ τῶν K: παντῶν cod.

bands of cloth, and certainly swords girded at the waist, axes or iron maces, so that one man fights with one weapon, the next with another, according to the skill of each one. They should all have slings in their belts. Their shields must be no less than six *spithamai* and, if possible, should be even larger. Their spears must be thick and sturdy, from twenty-five to thirty *spithamai* in length. Their points should be fit for the task, as should their fastenings. 4. Proficient archers, called light infantry by the ancients, also have to be selected, 4,800, who should have two quivers each, one with forty arrows, the other with sixty, as well as two bows each, four bowstrings and small handheld shields, swords girded at the waist, and axes, and they must likewise carry slings in their belts. They, too, should be under dekarchs, pentekontarchs, and hekatontarchs. 5. The formation of the infantrymen under discussion is to be a double-ribbed square, thus called "a four-sided formation" by the ancients, which has three units on each side so that all together there are twelve units on the four sides. They must be set apart, to the extent possible, to allow space for twelve to fifteen cavalrymen in each interval so that the combatants can move in and out. In case the cavalry force is quite large and the enemy does not bring along a similar number of infantry, twelve intervals should be left open, as noted, through which the combatants can move back and forth. If, on the other hand, the cavalry force is not large and the enemy does bring infantry along, eight intervals should be left open so as to be in a very secure position. 6. Inside the aforementioned intervals, if there are javeliners, whether *Rhos* or other foreigners, fifty, forty, or thirty of them, depending on the strength of their unit, must be stationed in each interval at the back of the infantry unit directly facing the opening of the interval. Archers on foot and slingers, in numbers corresponding to the strength of the quantity of the host, must be behind them so that whenever the cavalry wheels about under pursuit from the enemy and enters the formation, the javeliners will press forward into the opening and turn the

60 τισαὶ κατὰ στόμα καὶ ἀποτρέπωσιν τοὺς ἐχθροὺς, εἰς τοῦτο συνεργούντων καὶ τῶν τοξοτῶν καὶ τῶν σφενδοβολιστῶν τῶν ἐγκατελεγμένων αὐτοῖς. 7. οἱ δὲ ὀπλίται ὀφείλουσιν ἵστασθαι ἀμφίστομοι διπλοὶ καὶ ἔχειν τὸ μέτωπον δύο ὀπλίτας καὶ τὸ οὐραῖον δύο, καὶ μέσον αὐτῶν ἵστασθαι τοξότας ψιλοὺς τρεῖς, ὥς εἶναι
 65 τὸ βάθος τῆς παρατάξεως ἀνδρῶν ἐπτά. εὐρίσκομεν γὰρ τοὺς παλαιοὺς Μακεδόνας δεκαεὶ ἀνδρῶν ποιοῦντας τὸ πάχος τῆς φάλαγγος, | ὅτε δὲ καὶ δώδεκα καὶ δέκα. ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν διὰ τὸ ἀντιμάχους ἔχειν ὑπὸ ἐλεφάντων βασταζομένους, ἀπολυομένων καὶ θηρίων ἐν ταῖς παρατάξεσιν, | καθὼς εὐρίσκομεν ποιήσαντας τοὺς Αἰθίο-
 70 πας πρὸς τὸν τῶν Μακεδόνων Ἀλέξανδρον. πρὸς τούτοις δὲ καὶ ἄλλαις ἐπινοίαις ἐχρῶντο ἐν πολέμοις καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ταῖς τοιαύταις παρατάξεσιν ἐχρῶντο. νυνὶ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων παρατάξεων μὴ χρηματιζουσῶν ἄχρηστός ἐστιν ἡ τοιαύτη φάλαγξ. κατὰ τοὺς παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν πολέμους, κατὰ πολὺ καὶ Ἀγαρηνοὶ ἡλαττώθησαν.
 75 8. οἱ δὲ ταξίαρχοι ὀφείλουσιν ὑπὸ τὴν ἐξουσίαν αὐτῶν ἔχειν ἄνδρας ὀπλίτας μὲν τετρακοσίους, ψιλοὺς δὲ τριακοσίους, ἥγουν πρὸς τὸ ἀπαρτίζειν παράταξιν μίαν, καθὼς ἀνωτέρω δεδήλωται, ἀμφίστομον, ἔχουσαν εἰς τὸ μέτωπον ὀπλίτας δύο καὶ εἰς τὸ οὐραῖον δύο. καὶ μέσον αὐτῶν ἵστασθαι τοξότας ψιλοὺς τρεῖς πρὸς τὸ
 80 ἀπαρτίζειν ἐκ τῶν δώδεκα παρατάξεων παράταξιν μίαν. ἐπέχειν δὲ τοὺς ταξίαρχας καὶ ἐτέρους ἄνδρας τριακοσίους πρὸς ἀναπλήρωσιν τῶν χιλίων, ἵνα οἱ μὲν διακόσιοι εἰσὶν ἀκοντισταὶ καὶ σφενδοβολισταί, οἱ δὲ ἑκατὸν ἔχουσιν μεναύλια παχέα ἔχοντα τὸ μῆκος (. . .) ἀνὰ δύο ἡμισυ σπιθαμὰς ἢ καὶ δύο, ὅπως, πολέμου
 85 κροτουμένου, ἀσκύλους καὶ ἀταράχους ἵστασθαι τὰς παρατάξεις, αὐτοὺς δὲ ἐξέρχεσθαι ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων χωρίων καὶ μάχεσθαι τοῖς ἐναντίοις. καὶ πάλιν οἱ τε τῷ καμιάτῳ ἀτονούντες καὶ οἱ πληγάδες εἰσέρχονται διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν χωρίων καὶ φυλάττονται ὑπὸ τῶν παρατάξεων καὶ προσαναπαύονται. 9. τοὺς δὲ αὐτοὺς ἀκον-
 90 τιστάς καὶ τοὺς ἐκ περισσοῦ τοξότας καὶ σφενδοβολιστάς χρὴ φυλάττειν τὰς τῶν χωρίων εἰσόδους, μὴ μέντοι γε ἵστασθαι αὐτοὺς κατ' ἰσότητα τῶν προμάχων ὀπλιτῶν, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἰσότητα τῶν οὐραίων ὀπλιτῶν ἵστασθαι τοὺς τῶν ἀκοντιστῶν προμάχους, τῆς λοιπῆς τάξεως αὐτῶν ὀπιθεν ἱσταμένης. οἱ δὲ μεναυλάτοι σηκέτωσαν ἐν

K3

117^v118^v

62 ἐγκατελεγμένων: ἐγκαταλεγμένων cod. | ὀπλίται K: πλίται cod. 66 ποιοῦντας K: ποιοῦντ(ων) cod. 71 ἄλλαις ἐπινοίαις ἐχρῶντο K: ἄλλοις ἐπινοίας ἐχθρόν τῷ cod. 72 παρατάξεσιν K: περιτάξεσιν cod. 75 ταξίαρχοι K: ταξίαρχος cod. 78 ἀμφίστομον K: ἀμφίκομον cod. | ἔχουσαν K: ἔχουσα cod. 84 vide comm. | σπιθαμὰς K: σπιθαμὴν cod. 92-93 οὐραίων K: οὐνόν cod.

enemy away, with the archers and slingers ranked in with them cooperating in this task. 7. The heavy infantrymen must be deployed two deep in a double-faced formation, and keep two infantrymen in front and two in the back. Between them are three light archers, so that the depth of the formation is seven men. We do find the ancient Macedonians making their phalanx sixteen men deep, occasionally twelve or ten. But because their adversaries were borne by elephants with wild beasts set loose among their formations, as we find the Ethiopians did against Alexander the Great, they also employed other methods in their wars in addition to these and for these reasons made use of such formations. In our own day, however, such formations are no longer employed and this type of phalanx is impractical. When compared with the wars of the ancients, even the offspring of Hagar have greatly reduced the depth of their formations. 8. The taxiarchs are to have under their command four hundred heavy infantry and three hundred bowmen, so as to make up one taxiarchy, which, as explained above, is double-faced, keeping two infantrymen in the front and two in the back. Three bowmen must be stationed between them in order to make up one division out of the twelve divisions. The taxiarchs should have another three hundred men to make a full complement of one thousand, of whom two hundred are javeliners and slingers and one hundred have thick *menavlia* . . . with a length of two or two and a half *spithamai*, so that when the fighting begins, the taxiarchies can form up without hindrance or disturbance as these men make their way out through the intervals to engage the enemy. On the other hand, men worn out with fatigue and the wounded return through these same intervals and find relief under the protection of the units. 9. These javeliners and the extra archers and slingers must defend the entrances to the intervals, but by no means should they be positioned alongside the infantrymen in the front lines; instead, the front ranks of the javeliners must be alongside the infantrymen in the back lines with the rest of their unit behind them. The *menavlatoi* must take their place in the front line of the infantry so that

- 95 τῷ μετωπαίῳ τῶν προμάχων, ὡς εἶναι τὸ βάθος ἀνδρῶν ὀκτώ. πάν-
τας δὲ τοὺς μεναυλάτους καὶ ἀκοντιστὰς ἔχειν σκουτάρια σεμνόν-
τερα τῶν ὀπλιτῶν, τὴν δὲ ἐξόπλισιν ἐπ' ἴσης αὐτοῖς. τοὺς δὲ τοιού-
τους μεναυλάτους χρηματίζειν ἵνα—ἴσως ἐὰν οἱ ἐχθροὶ
ἀκούσωσιν περὶ τῶν τοιούτων παρατάξεων καὶ βουλευθῶσιν
100 ὁμοίως διεγερθῆναι καὶ παρασκευάσαι καταφράκτους καβαλλα-
ρίους, ὥστε καὶ αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἵππους αὐτῶν ὑπὸ καταφράκτων
ἐν ἀσφαλείᾳ τηρεῖν, ὡς ἂν ἐκ τούτων τὰ κοντάρια τῶν ὀπλιτῶν
συνθλασθῶσιν καὶ δι' αὐτῶν παραλύσωσι τὰς παρατάξεις—εἶναι
ἐξ ἐτοίμου τοὺς μεναυλάτους ἱσταμένους ἔμπροσθεν τῆς παρατά-
105 ξεως τῶν ὀπλιτῶν, μὴ | μέντοι μεμονωμένους ἀπ' αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ μάλ-
λον συγκεκολλημένους. 10. καὶ τότε ὀφείλει καὶ ἡ παράταξις
τριπλωθῆναι οὕτως. ἕνα ὄρδινον τῶν ὀπλιτῶν τοῦ οὐραίου (διαβι-
βάσαι) διὰ τῶν χωρίων εὐτάκτως κατὰ τὰ σημεῖα, ἃ ἔχουσι διδαχ-
θῆναι ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίοις. ἀπὸ πρώτης λαλιάς ὁ μὲν εἰς πεντηκόντ-
110 αρχος μετὰ τοῦ λαοῦ αὐτοῦ διὰ τοῦ δεξιοῦ χωρίου, εὐτάκτως συν-
ακολουθοῦντος αὐτῷ τοῦ ὑπ' αὐτὸν λαοῦ, εἰσέλθῃ ὀπισθεν τῶν
μετωπαίων ὀπλιτῶν. ὡσαύτως καὶ ὁ ἕτερος πεντηκόνταρχος, ὁ τοῦ
ἀριστεροῦ μέρους, διὰ τοῦ ἀριστεροῦ χωρίου εἰσέλθῃ καὶ αὐτὸς
εὐτάκτως ὀπιθεν τῶν μετωπαίων ὀπλιτῶν. καὶ τριπλώσουσιν τὴν
115 παράταξιν, ὡς μετὰ τῶν μεναυλάτων τετραπλὴ γένηται. καὶ ἐὰν
συμβῇ—ὁ οὐκ ἐλπίζομεν—συντριβῆναι τὰ τρία κοντάρια τῶν
ὀπλιτῶν παρὰ τῶν καταφράκτων τῶν ἐναντίων, τότε οἱ μεναυλά-
τοι, στερεοὶ ὄντες, ἴστανται γενναίως δεχόμενοι τὴν τῶν κατα-
φράκτων ὁρμὴν καὶ ἀποστρέφουσιν αὐτούς. 11. τὰ δὲ μέναυλα
120 αὐτῶν μὴ εἶναι ἀπὸ πελεκητῶν ξύλων, ἀλλὰ ἀπὸ νεακίων δρυῶν
ἢ κρανειῶν ἢ τῶν λεγομένων ἀτζηκιδίων. εἰ δὲ καὶ αὐτοφυῆ ξύλα
οὐχ εὐρίσκονται, γενέσθωσαν ἀπὸ πελεκητῶν, πλὴν ἔστωσαν ἀπὸ
ἰσχυρῶν ξύλων καὶ παχέα τοσοῦτον, ὅσον δύνανται χεῖρες κυβ-
119* ερνᾶν. δεῖ δὲ εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους μεναυλάτους ἀνδρείους καὶ
125 στερροὺς τῇ δυνάμει. 12. οἱ δὲ ἀκοντισταὶ ἵνα ἐξέρχωνται διὰ τῶν
ἀμφοτέρων χωρίων ἐξ ἐκατέρων μερῶν καὶ συμβάλλωσι μετὰ τῶν
καταφράκτων ἐναντίων καὶ περισπῶσιν αὐτούς. δεῖ δὲ καὶ (τὴν)
πεζικὴν παράταξιν τετράπλευρον τῶν ὀπλιτῶν τριπλωθῆναι. καὶ

95 μετωπαίῳ: μεσω τόπον cod. 96 μεναυλάτους: μεναυλάτας cod. hic et alibi 105 μὴ iter. in init.
f. 118* | μεμονωμένους K: μεμονομένους ὁμοῦ cod. 106 συγκεκολλημένους: συγκολλημένους cod.
107 ὄρδινον: ὄρδινος cod. 107–108 διαβιβάσαι propositi: cf. infra IV.¹⁰¹ 118 τὴν K: τῇ cod.
121 αὐτοφυῆ: αὐτοφυῖα cod. 123–124 κυβερνᾶν K: κυβερνῶν cod. 124 δεῖ δὲ εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους
K: δεῖ εἰδέναι τοὺς τοιαύτας cod. cf. TNO 56.^{122–123} 126 μερῶν K: χωρίων cod. 127 δεῖ K: εἰ cod.
127–128 τὴν πεζικὴν παράταξιν: πεζικὴν παράταξις cod.

the depth is eight men. All the *menavlatoi* and javeliners ought to have shields more modest in size than the heavy infantrymen, but the rest of their equipment should be the same as theirs. The function of these *menavlatoi*—in the likely event that the enemy gets word of these formations and in turn chooses to react with equal force and outfit heavy cavalrymen, to keep both themselves and their horses safe by means of armor, so that the spears of the infantrymen will be smashed to pieces by these men, and by using these horsemen the enemy will shatter the infantry units—the *menavlatoi* must be at the ready in front of the infantry division, by no means isolated from them, but instead closely ranked in with them. 10. At this point the formation must be tripled in depth. Send one of the rear lines of infantry forward through the intervals in good order [when the signals, which they have been taught in training exercises, are given.] At the first command, one pentekontarch with his men comes in behind the front lines of infantry through the interval on the right, his men following him [in good order.] In like fashion, the other pentekontarch, the one on the left side, also comes in behind the front lines of infantry through the interval on the left, also in good order. They will make the formation three deep, so that with the *menavlatoi* it will become four deep. [If it should happen, and we hope it does not, that the three deep spears of the infantrymen are smashed by the enemy *kataphraktoi*, then the *menavlatoi*, firmly set, stand their ground bravely to receive the charge of the *kataphraktoi* and turn them away. 11. Their *menavlia* must not be made from wood cut into sections, but from saplings of oak, cornel or the so-called *atzekidia*. If saplings in one piece cannot be found, then let them be made from wood cut into sections, but they must be made of hard wood and just so thick that hands can wield them. The *menavlatoi* themselves must be brave and stalwart. 12. The javeliners should go out through the two intervals on both sides to join battle with the enemy *kataphraktoi* and divert them.] The four-sided infantry formation must be tripled in depth

οἱ μεναυλάτοι ἐξερχέσθωσαν ἐκ τῶν χωρίων καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἀκον-
 130 τιστῶν. 13. καὶ ἐὰν οὐκ ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν ἐχθρῶν παράταξις τετρά-
 πλευρος, τότε ἐξ ἐκατέρων ἐν τάξει γινέσθωσαν φάλαγγες (. . .)
 καὶ αὐτοὶ γίνονται (. . .) εἰσελθόντες διὰ τῶν ἀμφοτέρων πλαγίων
 τῶν ἐχθρῶν εὐτάκτως παραλύσωσιν αὐτούς. ἐὰν δὲ ἡ τῶν ἐν-
 135 μεναυλάτοι καὶ οἱ ἀκοντιστῶν τὸ μέτωπον ἐκεῖνο, ἐν ᾧ ἡ μάχη
 κροτηθῇ, βοηθεῖν καὶ συναγωνίζεσθαι τοῖς ὀπλίταις πρὸς τὸ μὴ
 παραλυθῆναι αὐτούς. 14. δεῖ δὲ ὀπισθεν τῶν οὐραίων ὀπλιτῶν
 ἀκολουθεῖν σαγμάρια βαστάζοντα τὰς βασιλικὰς σαγίτας ἐκάστης
 140 παρατάξεως, χιλιάδας δεκαπέντε, τοῦ δοθῆναι τοῖς τριακοσίοις
 τοξόταις ἀπὸ πεντήκοντα βελῶν ἄνευ τῶν ἰδίων κουκούρων. δεῖ
 δὲ τὸν χιλιάρχην προδιαιεῖσθαι αὐτὰς καὶ συνδῆσαι μίαν ἐκάστην
 πεντηκοντάδα καὶ ἀποθέσθαι αὐτὰς εἰς τὰς | θήκας αὐτῶν, εἴτε
 145 ἄρκλαι εἰσὶν εἴτε βουτία. ἀφορισθῆναι δὲ ἐκ τῶν περισσῶν το-
 ξοτῶν καὶ σφενδονιστῶν ἄνδρας ἐκ μιᾶς ἐκάστης παρατάξεως,
 ὅκτῳ εἴτε καὶ δέκα, πρὸς τὸ ἀποφέρειν τοῖς τοξόταις σαγίτας καὶ
 μὴ σκῦλαι αὐτούς τὸ σύνολον ἐκ τῆς ἰδίας τάξεως. οἱ δ' αὐτοὶ καὶ
 ὕδωρ διὰ τῶν ἀσκῶν κομίζέσθωσαν, ἐπιφερόμενοι καὶ βαυκάλια
 150 πρὸς τὸ παραμυθῆσαι τὴν τῶν | ἀγωνιζομένων δίψαν. ἕτεροι δὲ
 ἀφοριζέσθωσαν πρὸς τὸ κομίζειν τοῖς σφενδοβολισταῖς λίθους.
 15. δεῖ δὲ τὸν ἀρχηγὸν τοῦ στρατοῦ ἔχειν καὶ χειρομάγαννα μι-
 κρά, ἡλακάτια τρία καὶ στρεπτὸν μετὰ λαμπροῦ καὶ χειροσί-
 φουνα, ἵνα, κἂν ἴσως καὶ οἱ ἐχθροὶ τῇ ὁμοίᾳ καὶ ἴσῃ παρατάξει
 155 χρῆσονται, διὰ τε τῶν χειρομαγγάνων διὰ τε τοῦ σκευαστοῦ καὶ
 κολλητικοῦ πυρὸς ἐπικρατέστεροι γίνονται (αἱ παρατάξεις ἡμῶν)
 τῶν ὑπεναντίων καὶ παραλύσωσιν αὐτούς. 16. αἱ δὲ τοῦ καβαλ-
 λαρικοῦ παρατάξεις ὀφείλουσιν ἴστασθαι ὀπισθεν τῶν πεζῶν εὐ-
 τάκτως κεχωρισμένοι, αἱ μὲν τῶν ταγμάτων ἰδίως, (αἱ δὲ τῶν
 θεμάτων) μετὰ τῶν τουρμῶν αὐτῶν. δεῖ μέντοι γε αὐτοὺς ἴστασθαι
 160 πλησίον τοῖς πεζοῖς, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τεσσάρων ὀργυιῶν ἢ καὶ τριῶν
 ἐαθῆναι ἀπὸ τοῦ οὐραίου τῶν πεζῶν τόπον μέχρι τῶν καβαλλαρ-
 ῶν, καὶ ἔσωθεν τῶν πεζῶν καὶ γύρωθεν ἴστασθαι τοὺς αὐτοὺς
 πολεμιστὰς καὶ βαλλαρῖους, τὰ δὲ συρτὰ αὐτῶν ὀπιθεν αὐτῶν, καὶ

119^v

K5

120^r

131–132 vide comm. 132 εἰσελθόντες K: εἰσελθότες cod. 136 κροτηθῇ K: κρατηθεῖ cod. 137 δεῖ K: εἰ cod. 138 βαστάζοντα K: βασταζον cod. 142 αὐτὰς: αὐτὰ cod. 142–143 εἴτε K bis: εἴτα cod. 148 ἀγωνιζομένων K: ἀγομένων cod. 149 σφενδοβολισταῖς K: σφενδοβονίτες cod. 152 κἂν K: καὶ cod. 153 διὰ τε τῶν K: διατατῶν cod. 154 αἱ . . . ἡμῶν supplēvi: cf. TNO 56.¹⁵⁷ 157–158 αἱ . . . θεμάτων supplēvi 158 δεῖ: αἰ cod. 159 ἀλλ' ὥσπερ: ἀλλωσσει cod. 160 τόπον K: τόπου cod.

and the *menavlatoi* must move out through the intervals with the javelin-
 13. If the enemy formation is not four-sided, then have units form up
 in order on both flanks . . . and when they are formed . . . advancing in
 good order against both enemy flanks and break them up. If, on the other
 hand, the formation of enemy infantrymen is four-sided, the *menavlatoi*
 and javeliners must come to the aid of that front line on which the battle
 has been joined and fight alongside the infantrymen so that they are not
 broken up. 14. The baggage animals must follow behind the rear ranks
 of the infantry, carrying the “imperial” arrows of each infantry division,
 fifteen thousand, so as to provide the three hundred bowmen with fifty
 arrows each apart from their own quivers. It is up to the chiliarch to count
 them out beforehand and bind together each bundle of fifty, then put them
 away in their containers, either boxes or casks. Eight or ten men from the
 extra bowmen and slingers in each unit should be detailed to supply
 arrows to the archers so as not to take them away from their station. [The
 same men should also fetch water in waterskins, carrying around gourds
 as well so as to relieve the thirst of the combatants. Still others should be
 assigned to bring stones to the slingers. 15. The commander of the army
 must also have small *cheiromangana*, three *elakatia*, a swivel tube with
 liquid fire and a hand pump, so that, if the enemy is using the same deploy-
 ment in equal strength, our men can gain the upper hand over the foe and
 break them up by using both the *cheiromangana* and the artificial liquid
 fire. 16. Behind the infantry the cavalry units should be deployed sepa-
 rately in proper order, those of the *tagmata* by themselves and those of
 the *themata* in their *tourmai*. They must certainly be close by the infantry
 but a distance of three or four *orguias* must be maintained between the
 back row of the infantry and the cavalry. The cavalrymen should be posi-
 tioned inside the surrounding infantry, with their horses behind them and

μέσον τὸ τοῦλδον. ἐαθῆναι δὲ καὶ ὁδοὺς, καθὼς ἕκαστον τάγμα
καὶ θέμα ἴσταται, πρὸς τὸ ἀνεμποδίστως διέρχεσθαι (. . .) τὴν
165 ὁδὸν καὶ ποιεῖν τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν καὶ ἀποφέρειν καὶ τὰς ἀποκρίσεις.
17. τὸν δὲ λαὸν μὴ ἐπιφέρεισθαι πολλὰ σαγμάρια καὶ φῦρσιν χυ-
δαίου λαοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐν μὲν τῇ πολεμίᾳ γῇ ὄντας τὰς αὐταρκούσας
χρείας ἐπιφέρεισθαι καὶ αὐτὰς μετὰ συμμέτρου χρήσεως, οὐχὶ δὲ
μετὰ ἀπληστίας καὶ τρυφῆς. τὸ δὲ πολὺ πλῆθος τοῦ χυδαίου λαοῦ
170 καὶ τῶν σαγμαρίων τῶν πολλῶν ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ γῇ καταλιμ-
πάνεσθαι.

II. Περὶ τῶν ὀπλιτῶν

1. Εἰ δυνατόν, περιπατεῖν αὐτοὺς πεζοὺς πανταχοῦ ἐπιφερο-
μένους σύνδου ἡμίονον ἓνα πρὸς τὸ βαστάζειν τὰ σκουτάρια καὶ
τὰ κοντάρια καὶ τὰς χρείας αὐτῶν. ἔχειν δὲ καὶ συντέσσαρσιν
αὐτῶν ἄνθρωπον τὸν ὀφείλοντα ἐν καιρῷ πολέμου φυλάττειν τὰ
5 τε ἄλογα καὶ τὰ πετζιμένα αὐτῶν καὶ τὰς χρείας. ὅσοι δὲ οὐκ
ἐξικανοῦσι διὰ τὸ τῆς ὁδοῦ μήκος καὶ διὰ τὸν κόπον ἐπακολουθ-
εῖν τοῖς καβαλλαρίοις πεζοί, ἐχέτωσαν εἰς ἕκαστος αὐτῶν πρὸς
ἓνα ἡμίονον τοῦ καβαλλικεύειν αὐτὸν καὶ ἐπιφέρεισθαι καὶ τὰς
χρείας αὐτῶν. φορεῖν δὲ ἕκαστος καὶ τὸ ἴδιον σκουτάριον, βασ-
10 τάζειν δὲ καὶ τὸ κοντάριον | καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἄρματα. οἱ δὲ ὑπουρ-
γοὶ αὐτῶν ἀκολουθεῖτωσαν πεζοί. 2. σκοπεῖν δὲ χρὴ τὸν ἀρχηγὸν
τοῦ στρατοῦ τοῦ πλησίον τοῦ ὕδατος | ποιήσασθαι τὰς παρατάξεις
ἐν τῇ τοῦ πολέμου ἡμέρᾳ, ἵνα μὴ πως εἰς ἀσκόπους καὶ ἀνύδρους
τόπους τὰς παρατάξεις ποιησάμενος διαφθεῖρη τὸ στράτευμα.
15 οὕτως οὖν χρὴ τὴν ἀνάμικτον παρατάξιν τῶν πεζῶν καὶ καβαλλα-
ρίων ἀπαρτίσαι, καθὼς ἤδη προλαβὼν ὁ λόγος ὑπέγραψεν. 3. καὶ εἰ
μὲν οἱ ἐχθροὶ ἐπέρχονται κατὰ τῶν ἡμετέρων παρατάξεων, χρὴ
προαποσταλῆναι καβαλλαρίους παρὰ τοῦ ἀρχηγοῦ τοῦ στρατοῦ
πεντακοσίους ἢ τριακοσίους ἐλαφροὺς, τοὺς λεγομένους παρὰ
20 τοῖς παλαιοῖς προκουρσάτορας, φοροῦντας τὰ κλιβάνια αὐτῶν—
μὴ μέντοι γε εἶναι αὐτοὺς καταφράκτους καὶ βαρεῖς, ἀλλὰ κού-
φους καὶ εὐσταλεῖς—πρὸς τὸ ἀπαντῆσαι τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις καί, εἰ

163 τὸ τοῦλδον: τὸν τοῦλδον cod. 164 vide comm. 166 πολλὰ K: πολλάγα cod. 167 αὐταρκούσας
K: εὐταρκούσας cod.

15 ἀνάμικτον K: ἀνάμακτον cod. 16–17 εἰ μὲν οἱ ἐχθροὶ ἐπέρχονται: οἱ μὲν οἱ ἐπέρχονται cod. cf.
TNO 57.^{32–33}

the baggage train in the middle. Pathways must be left open according to
the position of each *tagma* and *thema* so that . . . can move along the path
without hindrance to perform their duties and carry messages. 17. The
host must not bring along a multitude of baggage animals or noncomba-
tants, but when in enemy territory, should take along enough supplies to
last, and they should be used in moderation and certainly not in excess or
luxury. The majority of the noncombatants and most of the baggage ani-
mals should be left behind in our own territory.

II. On the Heavy Infantry

1. If possible, they should travel everywhere on foot, each pair of men
with one mule to carry their shields, spears, and provisions. Each group
of four must have one man whose responsibility it is in time of battle to
watch over their animals, baggage, and provisions. Those on foot unable
to keep up with the cavalry because of the length of the march or fatigue
should have an extra mule each to carry him and bring along their provis-
ions. Each man must wear his own shield and carry his spear and re-
maining equipment. Their attendants must follow on foot. 2. [The com-
mander of the army must take care to deploy close by a source of water
on the day of battle lest he bring ruin on the army by somehow deploying
his forces in unexplored, waterless regions.] This, then, is the way to ar-
range the combined deployment of infantry and cavalry, exactly as out-
lined in the preceding account. 3. If the enemy is advancing in the direc-
tion of our forces, the commander of the army must send out ahead five
hundred, or three hundred, light horsemen, called *prokoursatores* by the
ancients, wearing their *klibania*—not heavily armored and weighted
down, but light and agile instead—to seek contact with the enemy and set

γε ἐνδεχόμενον ἐστί, καὶ ἐνέδρας ποιῆσαι, ἵνα, ἐὰν ἀτάκτως καὶ
 25 προκουρσάτορας αὐτῶν τραυματίσωσιν τοῦ ἐξ αὐτῶν δειλίαν τὸ
 φοσσᾶτον αὐτῶν καταλαβεῖν. καὶ ἐκ τῶν συλληφθέντων δεσμίων
 δυνηθῆς ἀναμαθεῖν τὰ διαβούλια αὐτῶν καὶ τὸν παρεπόμενον τῷ
 στρατεύματι αὐτῶν ἀριθμόν. 4. καὶ τῶν τοιούτων καβαλλαρίων |
 30 προῦπαντάντων τοὺς ἐναντίους καὶ συμβαλλόντων, κραυγῆς γε-
 νομένης, ἐὰν καταδιῶξαι βουληθῇ καὶ ὁ λοιπὸς λαὸς τῶν ἐναντίων
 τοὺς ἡμετέρους, καὶ ἐπικεῖνται αὐτοὺς καὶ συνέχωσι, ὀφείλει ὁ
 ἀρχηγὸς τοῦ στρατοῦ, πρὸς τὸ μὴ κινδυνεῦσαι, δευτέραν καὶ
 35 τρίτην (παράταξιν) καβαλλαρίων ἀπολῦσαι, συνέπεσθαι δὲ καὶ
 αὐτὸν ὀπιθεν τῶν παρατάξεων εὐτάκτως μεθ' ὧν ἔχει, τεσσάρων
 παραταγῶν, καθὼς κατωτέρω δηλωθήσεται τὰ περὶ τῆς καβαλλα-
 ρικῆς τάξεως. καὶ παρέξει βοήθειαν τοῖς διωκομένοις καὶ τραυματι-
 40 σαι τοὺς ἐχθρούς. 5. εἰ δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐχθροὶ συνέχουσιν αὐτούς,
 ὀφείλει ἐᾶσαι αὐτοὺς ἕως οὗ πλησιάσωσιν ταῖς πεζικαῖς
 παρατάξεσιν. καὶ τότε αἰφνιδίως ἐξερχέσθωσαν ἐκ τῶν χωρίων
 τῶν πεζῶν καβαλλαρικαὶ παρατάξεις τρεῖς καὶ ὁρμάτωσαν κατὰ
 τῶν ἐναντίων εὐτάκτως. καὶ ἀπ' αὐτῶν, ἐὰν ᾧσι, καὶ ἄλλαι παρα-
 45 τάξεις ἐξερχέσθωσαν. εἴθ' οὕτως ὀπιθεν ἐξέλθῃς καὶ σύ, ὁ
 στρατηγὸς τοῦ λαοῦ, μετὰ τῶν τεσσάρων παρατάξεων τῶν καβαλ-
 λαρικῶν ἐπακολουθοῦντων εὐτάκτως. καὶ εἰ μὲν Θεοῦ συνεργίᾳ
 50 τραπῶσιν οἱ ἐχθροί, διαφυλάττειν τὰς τέσσαρας παρατάξεις ἀπαρα-
 σαλεύτους μέχρις ἂν ἴδῃς τὴν τελείαν αὐτῶν ἀποστροφὴν. καὶ
 ὅτε Θεοῦ ἐπινεύσει ἴδῃς αὐτοὺς τελείως ἀνατραπέντας | καὶ
 55 μάθῃς καὶ παρὰ δεσμίων καὶ παρὰ προσφύγων ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἑτέρα
 δύναμις τῶν ἐχθρῶν, οὔτε καβαλλαρικοῦ οὔτε πεζικοῦ, ἀλλ' οἱ
 τραπέντες καὶ μόνοι, τότε ὀφείλεις τὰς δύο παρατάξεις ἀποστεῖ-
 λαι πρὸς καταδιώξιν αὐτῶν, τὰς δὲ ἑτέρας δύο ἀπαρασαλεύτους
 ἔχειν μετὰ σεαυτοῦ εἰς σωτηρίαν παντὸς τοῦ διώκοντος λαοῦ τοὺς
 ἐχθρούς. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ πεζικὸν καὶ τὸν λοιπὸν λαὸν ἀκολουθεῖν
 ὀπιθεν παρατεταγμένως εὐτάκτως πρὸς τὸ μὴ φυρθῆναι τὰς παρα-
 60 τάξεις αὐτῶν. | 6. ἐὰν δὲ οἱ καταδιώκοντες ἐχθροὶ τοὺς προκουρ-
 σάτορας ἡμῶν οὐ πλησιάσωσιν ταῖς πεζικαῖς παρατάξεσιν, ἀλλὰ
 μήκοθεν αὐτῶν ἐστώσι σεσωρευμένοι, δεῖ ἀποστεῖλαι τὸν ἀρχη-
 γὸν τοῦ στρατοῦ τὰς δηλωθείσας καβαλλαρικὰς τρεῖς παρατάξεις

121^r

121^v

K7

23 ἐνέδρας K: ἐνεδρος cod. 28 ἀριθμόν K: ἀριθμὸς cod. 33 παράταξιν supplevi 34 ἔχει K: ἔχειν cod. 38 ἕως οὗ K: ἕως σου cod. 44 ἐπακολουθοῦντων K: ἐπακολουθοῦντως cod. 47 τελείως K: τελείους cod. 52 μετὰ σεαυτοῦ: μετασέ cod.

ambushes if they can, so that [if the enemy is advancing in disorder] without
 proper reconnaissance they can intercept them and strike against their
prokoursatores to cause their panic to overcome their main force. From
 those taken prisoner you will be able to find out their intentions and the
 number of men following their force. 4. When these cavalymen intercept
 and engage the enemy and the alarm goes up, should the rest of the enemy
 host decide to go after our men and they bear down on them and stay
 after them, the commander of the army should detach a second and a
 third cavalry unit to keep them out of danger while he himself follows
 along in good order behind these units with the four units he has with
 him, as will be outlined below in the section on cavalry deployment. He
 will provide support to those under pursuit and strike against the enemy.
 5. If the enemy stays with them, he should let them come on until they
 approach the infantry formations. At this point three cavalry units should
 suddenly make their way out from the intervals between the infantry and
 [in proper formation] charge the enemy. Other units, if there are any, should
 also head out from these intervals. Then you too, the commander of the
 army, should move out behind them with the four cavalry units following
 [in proper formation. If, with the help of God, the enemy turn in flight,
 keep the four units where they are until you see them completely routed.
 When, with God's assent, you see them in headlong flight and learn from
 both prisoners and deserters that, except for those in flight, there is no
 other enemy force of either cavalry or infantry, then send out two units to
 pursue them and keep the other two as they are with you for the protection
 of all the host in pursuit of the enemy. The infantry and the remaining
 host must follow behind lined up in proper formation so as not to throw
 their units into confusion. 6. If the enemy chasing after our *prokoursatores*
 do not approach the infantry formations but stay packed together at a
 distance from them, the commander of the army must send the three cav-

ἐπακολουθούσας μίαν τὴν ἄλλην πρὸς ἓν μέρος. ὥσαύτως καὶ ἐκ
 60 τοῦ ἐτέρου μέρους ἐξέλθωσιν ἕτεραι τρεῖς παρατάξεις, καὶ πλησι-
 άσαι τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, σταθήτωσαν πλησίον αὐτῶν ὡς ἀπὸ σαγιτο-
 βόλου. εἰ δὲ καὶ ὧσι καὶ ἕτεραι καβαλλαρικαὶ παραταγαί, ἀπολυ-
 θῶσι καὶ σῶσι πλησίον τῶν προαποσταλειςῶν. τὰς δὲ
 65 προδηλωθείσας τέσσαρας παρατάξεις, τὰς συνεπομένας τῷ
 ἀρχηγῷ τοῦ στρατοῦ, χρή ἔχειν σέ, τὸν ἀρχηγόν, μετὰ σεαυτοῦ
 καὶ ἐξελθεῖν ἐσχάτως εὐτάκτως. 7. καὶ εἰ μὲν τραπῶσιν οἱ ἐν-
 70 ἀντίοι, ὀφείλουσι καταδιώκειν αὐτοὺς οἱ προκουρσάτορες καὶ αἱ
 λοιπαὶ παρατάξεις μετὰ συστάσεως μέχρι οὗ εἰς τέλος τραπῶσι
 καὶ παραλυθῶσιν. καὶ μέχρι τῆς καθολικῆς τροπῆς τῶν ἐναντίων
 αἱ παρατάξεις ἡμῶν τὴν τάξιν μὴ λυέτωσαν, ἀλλὰ καθὼς προδε-
 δῆλωται, οὕτως εὐτάκτως ἀκολουθεῖτωσαν (.) παραγ-
 75 γελίαν ἔχοντες οἱ τε προκουρσάτορες καὶ αἱ δηλωθεῖσαι παρατά-
 ξεις, ἵνα μηδεὶς ἐκ τῶν ἀρχόντων ἢ τῶν πολεμιστῶν μήτε δεσμίους
 κρατήσωσιν μήτε ἵππους μήτε ἄρματα μήτε σκύλον ρούχων ἀπεν-
 80 ἐγκῶνται, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἄρχοντες καὶ οἱ πολεμισταὶ ἀσχοληθῶσιν
 εἰς τὸν πόλεμον, οἱ δὲ ἄνθρωποι αὐτῶν καὶ οἱ στρατιῶται τοὺς
 δεσμίους κρατεῖτωσαν. δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐπιτιμίας τιμωρικὰς ἐκθέσθαι,
 ἵνα τὸν παραβαίνοντα τὴν τοιαύτην πρόσταξιν ποινῇ ὑποβάλλεσ-
 85 θαι. 8. εἰ δὲ αἱ τῶν ὑπεναντίων παρατάξεις, τῶν ἡμετέρων παρατά-
 ξεων πλησιαζουσῶν, ἐδραῖαι καὶ ἀμετάτρεπτοι μένουσιν, ὀφεί-
 λουσιν οἱ προκουρσάτορες κινηθῆναι καὶ ταραῖαι τὸν πόλεμον.
 90 εἴθ' οὕτως ἐπ' εὐθείας εὐτάκτως ἐπεσθαι τὰς ἐτέρας ἐξ | παρα-
 τάξεις καὶ συμβάλλειν μετὰ τῶν πολεμίων. ὥσαύτως καὶ αἱ
 δηλωθεῖσαι τέσσαρες παρατάξεις εὐτάκτως κινεῖσθωσαν πρὸς
 βοήθειαν τῶν ἐμπροσθεν. ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ πεζικαὶ παρατάξεις ἐπακο-
 λουθεῖτωσαν καὶ εὐτάκτως πλησιαζέτωσαν. καὶ ἐὰν τοσοῦτον οἱ
 ὑπεναντίοι, εἴτε ἐκ θάρσους τῶν καταφράκτων αὐτῶν εἴτε ἀπὸ
 πλήθους στρατοῦ, οὐ καταπτήξωσιν καὶ τραπῶσι, τότε ὀφείλει
 ἀκοντιστὰς πεζοὺς καὶ τοξότας καὶ σφενδοβολιστὰς διὰ τῶν
 90 χωρίων τῶν ὀπλιτῶν πεζῶν ἐξακολουθεῖν καὶ παροτρῦναι πρὸς
 συμμαχίαν τῶν καβαλλαρίων. εἰ δὲ ὥσαύτως ἀμετάτρεπτοι καὶ

122'

122'

59 ἐπακολουθούσας K: ἐπακολουθείσας cod. 60-61 πλησιάσασαι K: πλησιάσαι cod. 62 ὧσι: ὦσαι cod. 62-63 ἀπολυθῶσι K: ἀπολυθῶσιν cod. 63 προαποσταλειςῶν K: πρὸς ἀπὸ σταλειςῶν cod. 71-72 post ἀκολουθεῖτωσαν spat. 12 fere litt. | παραγγελίαν K 73 μήτε K: εἴτε cod. 77 post κρα-
 τεῖτωσαν iterum μήτε ἵππους μήτε ἄρματα μήτε σκύλον ρούχων ἀπενέγκονται. ἄλλοι μὲν quod K
 delevit 78 πρόσταξιν: παρατάξιν cod. cf. TNO 57.⁹⁴ 81 ταραῖαι: παρατάξαι cod. cf. TNO 57.⁹⁸
 91 ὥσαύτως: ὡς οὕτως cod.

alry units already indicated out to one side, proceeding one after the other. Likewise another three units should head out from the other side, and, as they draw near the enemy, have them come to a halt close by them but out of bowshot. If there are still more cavalry units, they should be detached to take up positions near the ones already sent ahead. You, the commander, must keep with you the four units designated above as those attending the commander of the army and head out last of all in proper formation.) 7. If the enemy does turn and run, the *prokoursatores* and the remaining units must pursue in close order until they are routed and broken up once and for all. Until the enemy is in general flight, our units must not break ranks but should follow up in proper formation in the manner discussed above, both the *prokoursatores* and the units indicated under orders that none of the officers or cavalrymen is to secure prisoners or horses nor seize equipment or garments as spoils. The officers and the cavalrymen must keep their minds on the battle, and their attendants and the soldiery must secure the prisoners. It is necessary to proclaim punitive measures to the effect that anyone transgressing this order will be subject to punishment. 8. If the enemy formations remain in place with no thought of turning as our units approach, the *prokoursatores* should move ahead and stir up battle. Then the other six units must follow directly in good order and join battle with the enemy. Similarly, the four units noted above should move ahead in proper formation in support of the ones in front, while the infantry units should also follow behind and stand by in proper formation.) And if the enemy, emboldened by their *kataphraktoi* or by the sheer size of their army, still do not flinch or turn away, it is then necessary for javeliners on foot accompanied by archers and slingers to follow up through the intervals between the heavy infantry and hasten to the aid of the cavalry. If the enemy remains as resolute and unmovable as

ἀμετακίνητοι διαμένουσιν οἱ ἐχθροί, παραπλησίως καὶ οἱ ἡμέτεροι καρτερεῖτωσαν ἀγωνιζόμενοι ἀμετάτρεπτοι μέχρις ἢ τοῦ Θεοῦ χεῖρ συνείση καὶ καταπτοηθῶσιν οἱ ὑπεναντίοι. | 9. εἰ δὲ
 95 συμβῇ καὶ αἱ τῶν ἐθνῶν παρατάξεις τὰς ἡμετέρας καβαλλαρικὰς τραυματίζουσι καὶ ἀποστρέψουσιν—ὃ μὴ δῶη ὁ Θεὸς γενέσθαι—δεῖ καταφεύγειν αὐτὰς ἐνδοθεν τῶν παρατάξεων τῶν ὀπλιτῶν πεζῶν καὶ σώζεσθαι. καὶ εἴθ' οὕτως ἐξορμήσαι εὐτάκτως
 100 τοὺς πεζοὺς ὀπλίτας μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων μεναυλάτων κατὰ τῶν ἐναντίων, ἐνδοθεν ἔχοντας τοὺς καβαλλάρους πρὸς βοήθειαν αὐτῶν. 10. καὶ ἐὰν οἱ ἐχθροὶ μετὰ συστάσεως καὶ | παραταγῶν
 123^r εὐτάκτως ἔλθωσιν ἐπιφερόμενοι πλῆθος καβαλλαρικοῦ λαοῦ καὶ πεζικοῦ, καὶ αἱ μὲν παραταγαὶ αὐτῶν πρὸς ἓν μέρος τῶν ἡμετέρων παρατάξεων διέλθωσιν, οἱ δὲ Ἀραβῖται ἀτάκτως, ὡς ἔθος αὐτοῖς
 105 ἐστίν, περικυκλώσουσι τὴν ἡμετέραν παράταξιν τετράπλευρον οὖσαν, θαρροῦντες τοῖς ἵπποις αὐτῶν, οὐ χρὴ πρὸς καταδίωξιν αὐτῶν τοὺς καβαλλάρους ἐξέρχεσθαι διὰ τὴν τῶν ἵππων αὐτῶν ταχυτητα, ὅτι καταδιωκόμενοι οὐ φθάζονται καὶ ταχὺ συνεπιστρέφονται καὶ αὐτοί, ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἵππων αὐτῶν ταχυτήτος βοηθούμενοι,
 110 καὶ τραυματίζουσι τοὺς ἡμετέρους. καὶ οὐ χρὴ τὸ σύνολον καταδιώκειν αὐτούς. 11. δεῖ οὖν τὸν ἀρχηγὸν τοῦ στρατοῦ ἐξ ἐτοίμου ἔχειν τὴν τρίγωνον παράταξιν τῶν καταφράκτων καὶ τὰς ἐτέρας παρατάξεις, τὰς δύο οὖσας μετ' αὐτῆς, καὶ εἰς οἷον μέτωπον ἵσταται ἢ τῶν ἐχθρῶν παράταξις, δι' ἐκείνων τῶν χωρίων ἐκβάλλειν αὐτὰς εὐτάκτως μετὰ πολλῆς γαληνότητος. καὶ κἂν τε πεζικὴ
 115 ἐστὶν ἢ τῶν ἐχθρῶν παράταξις, ἥγουν ὀπλίται, οὐ χρὴ τοὺς καταφράκτους δειλιάειν, ἀλλὰ μετὰ πολλῆς γαληνότητος ἐπελθεῖν {καὶ κἂν τε πεζικὴ ἐστὶν ἢ τῶν ἐχθρῶν παράταξις, ὡς εἴρηται} καὶ τὴν τρίγωνον παράταξιν τῶν καταφράκτων { } | ὀρθῶσαι ἐν ᾧ
 120 ἵσταται ὁ ἀρχηγὸς τοῦ στρατοῦ τῶν ἐναντίων. καὶ τότε τὰ μὲν κοντάρια τῶν ἔμπροσθεν πεζῶν τῶν ἐναντίων συνθλασθήσεται ὑπὸ τῶν καταφράκτων, αἱ δὲ σαγίται αὐτῶν ἀνεέργητοι ἔσονται, ὡσαύτως καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀκοντιστῶν μέναυλα. καὶ τότε συνεργίᾳ Θεοῦ τραπήσονται. 12. τρεπομένων δὲ αὐτῶν, οὐκ ὀφείλουσιν οἱ
 125 κατάφρακτοι διώκειν, ἀλλ' αἱ μετ' αὐτῶν οὖσαι δύο παρατάξεις καὶ ὀπιθεν αὐτῶν ἀκολουθοῦσαι. ὡσαύτως καὶ αἱ λοιπαὶ παρατά-

before, our men must likewise persevere in fighting with no thought of flight until the hand of God intervenes and the enemy recoils. 9. If it should happen that the enemy hits our cavalry units hard and repels them—God forbid—they must retire inside our heavy infantry units for protection. The heavy infantry must then hasten forward in good order with the rest of the *menavlatoi* against the enemy with the cavalry on the inside for their support. 10. If the enemy proceeds in close order with their forces in proper formation, bringing along a vast host of cavalry and infantry, and their forces move in against one side of our units, the *Arabitai* will encircle our four-sided formation in a swarm, as they usually do, confident in their horses. There is no need for the cavalry to head off in pursuit of them because of the speed of their horses, for when pursued they are not overtaken and, aided by the speed of their horses, they quickly counterattack and strike against our men. It does no good at all to go chasing after them. 11. It is necessary for the commander of the army to have the triangular formation of *kataphraktoi* at the ready and the other two units which accompany it, and, on whichever front the enemy is facing, have them move out through those intervals very calmly in proper formation. Even if the enemy formation is made up of infantry, that is to say heavy infantry, the *kataphraktoi* should not be apprehensive but should proceed to the attack very calmly {even if the enemy formation is made up of infantry, as mentioned} and aim the triangular formation of *kataphraktoi* right at the spot where the commander of the enemy army is standing. And then the spears of the enemy infantry in the front lines will be smashed by the *kataphraktoi*, while their arrows will be ineffective, as will the *menavla* of their javeliners. Then, with the help of God, they will turn to flight. 12. When they do turn to flight, it is not the *kataphraktoi* who should undertake the pursuit but their two accompanying units trailing behind them. Likewise, the remaining units should move out through

98 ἐξορμήσαι K: ἐορμήσε cod. 105 ἐστίν K: ἐστω cod. 107 τὴν supplevi 108 οὐ φθάζονται K: ὀφθάζοντε cod. 109 ταχυτήτος K: τραχυτήτος cod. 116 οὐ χρὴ τοὺς K: οὐ χῆ τ(ας) cod. 117 δειλιάειν K: δουλῖαν cod. 119 post καταφράκτων habet cod. rasuram 5 fere litt. 123 τὰ suppl. K

130 ξεις ἐξ ἐκατέρων τῶν χωρίων ἐξέλθωσι πρὸς τὸ διασκορπίσαι
 τοὺς Ἀραβίτας τοῦ μὴ ὀπιθεν τῶν καταδιωκόντων εἰσελθεῖν καὶ
 τραυματίσαι αὐτούς. μὴ καταδιώκειν τοὺς Ἀραβίτας. ὁ δὲ ἀρχι-
 γὸς τοῦ στρατοῦ ἅμα ταῖς τέσσαρσι παρατάξεσιν ὀφείλει ἐξελθεῖν
 135 ὀπιθεν τῶν δύο παρατάξεων (μετὰ) τῶν καταφράκτων καὶ ἀκολου-
 θεῖν, τοὺς δὲ καταφράκτους ἴστασθαι καὶ ἅμα τῶν πεζικῶν παρα-
 τάξεων τῷ ἀρχηγῷ τοῦ στρατοῦ ἀκολουθεῖν. 13. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἡ τῶν
 ἐχθρῶν παράταξις ταχύνει καὶ συμβάλλει μετὰ τῶν ἡμετέρων
 135 πεζῶν ὀπλιτῶν καὶ οὐχ εὐρίσκεται εὐρυχωρία τοῦ διὰ τῶν χωρίων
 | τῆς συντάξεως τοὺς καταφράκτους ἐξέρχεσθαι, δεῖ ἐξέρχεσθαι K9
 αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐκ τῶν πλαγίων χωρίων εὐτάκτως, ἔχοντας ἐπακολου-
 124' θούσας, ὡς | εἴρηται, καὶ τὰς δύο καβαλλαρικὰς παρατάξεις πρὸς
 ἀφανισμόν καὶ κατάλυσιν τῶν ἐχθρῶν. 14. εἰ δὲ τὸ καβαλλαρικὸν
 140 τὸ ἡμέτερον εἰς πλῆθος λαοῦ ἐστὶν καὶ οὐ χωροῦντες ἔσωθεν τῆς
 τετραπλεύρου παρατάξεως, ὀφείλει ὁ ἄρχων τοῦ στρατοῦ διατά-
 ξασθαι τοῖς χιλιάρχοις τὸν ἓνα ὀρδινον τῶν οὐραίων ὀπλιτῶν,
 ἥτοι τὴν μίαν ἐκατονταρχίαν, ἐκβάλλει καὶ εἰς μῆκος τῶν μετω-
 145 παίων παρατάξεων προσθεῖναι ἀνὰ τριάκοντα τρεῖς ἄνδρας, ὡς
 γενέσθαι πάσας τὰς παρατάξεις τῶν προμάχων ἀνὰ ρλγ' ἄνδρας.
 ὡσαύτως καὶ αἱ δευτέραι, αἱ οὐραῖαι, ὀφείλουσιν οὕτως προσθε-
 ῖναι, ὁμοίως καὶ οἱ τριακόσιοι ψιλοὶ τοξόται. κάλλιστον δὲ τοῦτο
 150 ἔσται, ἐὰν καὶ ἄρματα περισσὰ ἐπιφέρονται, ἥγουν κοντάρια,
 μεναύλια καὶ σκουτάρια, ὥστε δι' αὐτῶν καὶ ἐτέρων πεζικῶν παρ-
 ατάξεων σχήματα φαίνεσθαι, ἅτινα ἐπωφελῇ τυγχάνοντα οὐκ ὀκ-
 νητέον ἐκτίθεσθαι. 15. ἐὰν δὲ ὁ τόπος, ἐν ᾧ ὁ πόλεμος μέλλει συν-
 ἄπτεσθαι, κατὰ πολὺ πεδιάσιμός ἐστι καὶ οἱ ἐχθροὶ ἐπιμήκει
 τὰς τάξεις αὐτῶν ποιοῦσιν, εἰ μὲν βούλη καὶ σύ, ὁ στρατηγὸς τοῦ
 155 στρατοῦ, ἐκτεῖναι τὴν τάξιν, χρὴ μέτωπον παρατάξεις ποιῆσαι
 τέσσαρας εἴτε καὶ πέντε. τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ καὶ ὀπιθεν ποιῆσαι. εἰς δὲ
 τὰ ἐξ ἐκατέρωθεν πλάγια εἶσαι ἀνὰ δύο παρατάξεις εἴτε καὶ
 124' μίαν. καὶ ἀπλῶς, ὡς | συνορᾷς εἶναι τὸ καλὸν τε καὶ εὐσχημον.
 καὶ εἰ μὲν ποιήσης τέσσαρας παρατάξεις ἔμπροσθεν καὶ τέσσαρας
 ὀπιθεν καὶ ἐξ ἐκατέρωθεν τῶν πλαγίων ἀνὰ δύο, ἐαθήσονται
 160 χωρία ἐν ταῖς τέσσαρσιν γωνίαις πρὸς ἓν, τρία δὲ ἐν ταῖς ἔμπρο-
 σθεν παρατάξεσιν καὶ τρία ἐν ταῖς ὀπισθεν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἐκατέρ-

131 μετὰ supplevi 142 τοῖς K: ταῖς cod. 145 ρλγ': λγ' cod. 151 ἐκτίθεσθαι: ἐκτίσασθαι cod.
 152 κατὰ K: κάτω cod. 160 ταῖς . . . γωνίαις: τοῖς . . . γωνίοις cod. | ταῖς K: τοῖς cod. 161 ταῖς' K:
 τοῖς cod.

the intervals on both flanks to scatter the *Arabitai* lest they come up be-
 hind the pursuers and strike against them. Do not go chasing after the
Arabitai.] The commander of the army together with his four units should
 move out behind the two units escorting the *kataphraktoi* and follow them
 while the *kataphraktoi* take their place with the infantry units and follow
 the commander of the army. 13. In case the enemy formation moves
 quickly and joins battle with our heavy infantry with the result that there
 is not enough room for the body of *kataphraktoi* to go out through the
 intervals, they must head out through the intervals on the flanks in proper
 formation with, as noted, the two cavalry units trailing, to annihilate and
 destroy the enemy. 14. If our cavalry force is quite plentiful and cannot fit
 within the four-sided formation, the leader of the army must direct the
 chiliarchs to take out one of the rear lines of heavy infantry, one *hekaton-*
tarchia exactly, and add thirty-three men to the length of the front lines so
 that all the lines in the front ranks will be 133 men. Likewise the second
 lines, the ones in the back, must be lengthened in this way and so too the
 three hundred light archers. It is best of all if they bring along extra equip-
 ment such as spears, *menavlia*, and shields with which to create the ap-
 pearance of even more infantry units—one should not be slow to point
 out things that are quite advantageous. 15. If the terrain on which the
 battle is to be joined is quite flat and the enemy set up their formations
 along a broad front, if you, the commander of the army, wish to lengthen
 your formation, make the front four or five units across. Do the same in
 the back. Allow two units, or just one, on both flanks—in a word, just as
 you deem right or appropriate. If you put four units in front, four in the
 back, and two on both flanks, one interval will be left open in each of the
 four corners, three between the units in front and three between the ones
 in the back, and in the units on both flanks—in between them, to be

ωθεν πλαγίαις, τουτέστιν ἐν τῇ μέσῃ αὐτῶν, πρὸς ἓν χωρίον, ὡς
 ὁμοῦ ἀποτελεσθῆναι τὰ ἀμφοτέρω χωρία δώδεκα, καὶ ἐν τοῖς
 δώδεκα χωρίοις δώδεκα παρατάξεις (τοῦ) καβαλλαρικοῦ ἵστα-
 165 σθαι. εἰ δὲ ἀσφαλεστέρας βούλῃ ποιῆσαι τὰς παρατάξεις τοῦ ἔχ-
 ειν ἀπὸ πέντε παρατάξεων τὴν ἔμπροσθεν σύνταξιν καὶ τὴν ὀπι-
 θεν, καὶ ἐκ πλαγίων πρὸς μίαν, εἰ μὲν καὶ τοῦτο κάλλιον σοι
 φαίνεται, ἑᾶσαι τῶν τεσσάρων γωνιῶν τὰ χωρία, καὶ ὡσαύτως
 ἀποτελεσθήσονται δώδεκα. εἰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα βούλει ἀποφράξαι,
 170 ἐαθήσονται τέσσαρα χωρία ἔμπροσθεν. 16. εἰ δὲ ὁ τόπος κατὰ
 πολὺ ἐστὶ στενός, δεῖ τὸ ἀναπάλιν ποιῆσαι, ἵγουν δύο παρατάξεις
 ἐκτανθῆναι εἰς μέτωπον πρὸς τὸ ἀποτελεσθῆναι χωρίον ἓν,
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ οὐραίῳ, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐκατέρωθεν τῶν πλαγίων
 ἀνὰ τέσσαρας παρατάξεις. καὶ ἀπλῶς, ὡς ἡ τοῦ τόπου θέσις φέρει,
 175 οὕτω δεῖ καὶ τὸν ἀρχηγὸν τοῦ στρατοῦ διεγερθῆναι. 17. ἔστι δὲ
 καὶ ἑτέρας πεζικῆς παρατάξεως εἶδος, οὔσης μὲν καὶ αὐτῆς τετ-
 τραγώνου καὶ τετραπλεύρου καὶ ἔσωθεν φυλαττούσης τὸ καβαλ-
 λαρικόν. | δεῖ οὖν ἐν ταύτῃ ἐαθῆναι ἐν τῷ μετώπῳ χωρία δύο,
 ἵγουν μέσῃ ἀφετῇ παρατάξιν καὶ ἐξ ἐκατέρωθεν αὐτῆς ἐαθῆναι
 180 ὁμοίως τὰ χωρία. ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων χωρίων παραταχθήτωσαν
 τετραγωνοειδῶς αἱ λοιπαὶ παρατάξεις συγκεκολλημέναι ἀλλ-
 ήλαις καὶ διάστασιν χωρὶς μὴ ἔχουσαι πρὸς τὸ ἀποτελεσθῆναι τὴν
 ὅλην φάλαγγα τετράγωνον, εἰ μὴ μόνως ὀπιθεν τῶν οὐραίων παρα-
 τάξεων ἐξ ἐκατέρωθεν τῶν γωνιῶν ἐαθήτωσαν χωρία, ἐνδοθεν τοῦ
 185 ὅλου καβαλλαρικοῦ κατὰ τάξιν ἱσταμένου. ἐν μὲν ταῖς διεξόδοις
 τῶν τεσσάρων χωρίων κατ' εὐθείαν καὶ κατὰ τάξιν τῶν τε ταγ-
 μάτων καὶ θεμάτων οἱ καβαλλαρικοὶ πολεμισταί, ἐν δὲ ταῖς γωνί-
 αῖς τὸ τούλδον καὶ τὸ ἀπόλεμον πλήθος. ἔχειν δὲ καὶ ἀκοντιστὰς
 πεζοὺς καὶ ψιλοὺς, καὶ τούτους ἱστασθαι ἔμπροσθεν τῶν καβαλ-
 190 λαρίων ἐν ταῖς τῶν χωρίων διεξόδοις κατὰ (τὰ) ἀνωτέρω εἰρη-
 μένα. 18. οὕτως ὁ τῶν πεζικῶν καὶ ἀναμίκτων παρατάξεων ῥυθμὸς
 διὰ τῆς παρούσης γραφῆς ἀπαρτισθεὶς τὸ πέρας εἴληφε, φέρε δὴ
 καὶ περὶ τῶν καβαλλαρικῶν διατάξεων, Θεοῦ διδόντος, τὴν
 ἀρχὴν ποιησόμεθα.

164 τοῦ supplevi 165 εἰ K: εἰς cod. | ἀσφαλεστέρας K: ἀσφαλεστέρους cod. 172 ἀποτελεσθῆναι K: ἀπολεσθῆναι cod. 174 τέσσαρας: τεσάρων cod. 181 τετραγωνοειδῶς K: τετράγων εἰ δως cod. | συγκεκολλημέναι: συγκεκολλημένοι cod. 183 οὐραίων K: ὀραίων cod. 185 ταῖς K: τοῖς cod. 187 θεμάτων K: θαμά των cod. 190 τὰ suppl. K 193 καβαλλαρικῶν: καβαλαρίων cod.

more precise—there will be one interval each, so that all together twelve
 intervals will be created all around and twelve units of cavalry can be
 stationed in the twelve intervals. If you wish to make the units even more
 secure with the front and back formation having five units and one on
 both flanks, if this seems best to you, keep the intervals in the four corners
 and twelve intervals will be created just as before. If you prefer to close
 them off, four intervals will be created in the front. 16. If, on the other
 hand, the terrain is quite narrow, it is necessary to do just the opposite,
 that is, stretch out two units in front to create one interval, doing the same
 in the back, and four along both flanks. Plainly and simply, the com-
 mander of the army must be alert to the lay of the land. 17. There is one
 more kind of infantry formation which is also four-cornered and four-
 sided and protects the cavalry inside. In this formation two intervals
 should be allowed in the front, or to say it this way, there should be a
 freestanding unit in the center with two intervals alike to be allowed on
 both sides of it. Aside from these aforementioned intervals the remaining
 units must be deployed in the shape of a square and joined to one another
 without any gap between them in order to make the entire formation
 square, the only exception being that intervals should be left open in the
 back units in the corners on both sides, with the entire cavalry force ar-
 rayed on the inside. In the thoroughfares between the four intervals, facing
 them directly in formation, are the cavalymen of both the *tagmata* and
themata, while in the corners are the baggage train and the crowd of non-
 combatants. Get some javeliners on foot and some light infantry and sta-
 tion them in front of the cavalry in the thoroughfares of the intervals in
 the manner described above. 18. And so the disposition of infantry and
 combined formations, treated in full by the present text, has reached its
 end. Now, God willing, we shall take up the discussion of cavalry tactics.

III. Περὶ τῶν καταφράκτων |

125^v

1. Χρὴ εἰδέναι ὅτι ἡ τρίγωνος τῶν καταφράκτων παράταξις, εἰ μὲν λαοῦ πολὺ ἐστὶν πλῆθος, ὀφείλει εἶναι ἀνδρῶν πεντακοσίων τεσσάρων ὁ ἀριθμὸς αὐτῆς, τὸ βάθος αὐτῆς ἀνδρῶν δώδεκα, ἡγουν ὁ πρῶτος ὄρδινος τῆς ἀκίας ἀνδρῶν εἴκοσι, ὁ δεῦτερος ἀνδρῶν κδ', ὁ τρίτος ἀνδρῶν κη', ὁ τέταρτος ἀνδρῶν λβ', ὁ πέμπτος λς', ὁ ἕκτος ἀνδρῶν μ', ὁ ἑβδομος ἀνδρῶν μδ', ὁ ὄγδοος ἀνδρῶν μη', ὁ ἕνατος ἀνδρῶν νβ', ὁ δέκατος ἀνδρῶν νς', ὁ ἐνδέκατος ἀνδρῶν ξ', ὁ δωδέκατος ἀνδρῶν ξδ', ὥς εἶναι ὁμοῦ τῆς ὅλης φάλαγγος τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἀνδρῶν πεντακοσίων τεσσάρων. 2. εἰ δὲ τοσοῦτου λαοῦ εὐπορία οὐκ ἐστὶν, ὀφείλει ἡ τοιαύτη παράταξις γενέσθαι σεμνοτέρα, ὥς ἔχειν τὴν πρώτην ἀκίαν ἀνδρας δέκα, τὴν δευτέραν ἀνδρας δεκατέσσαρες, τὴν τρίτην ἀνδρας ιη', τὴν τέταρτην ἀνδρας κβ', τὴν πέμπτην ἀνδρας κς', τὴν ἕκτην ἀνδρας λ', τὴν ἑβδόμην ἀνδρας λδ', τὴν ὀγδόην ἀνδρας λη', τὴν ἐνάτην ἀνδρας μβ', τὴν δεκάτην ἀνδρας μς', τὴν ἐνδεκάτην ἀνδρας ν', τὴν δωδεκάτην ἀνδρας νδ', ὁμοῦ πᾶς ἀριθμὸς τῆς φάλαγγος ἀνδρῶν τριακοσίων τεσσάρων καὶ ὀγδοήκοντα. 3. εἰ δὲ πλέων ἐστὶν ὁ στρατὸς ἢ ἐλάσσων, ὀφείλει τὸ στόμα τῆς παρατάξεως, ἡγουν τὸ μέτωπον, ὥς συνορᾶ καὶ ἀρέσκεται ὁ στρατηγὸς τοῦ λαοῦ, ὑπὸ ἀριθμοῦ ποσότητος ποιῆσαι λαοῦ. | ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς δευτέρας ἀκίας καὶ ὀπιθεν μία ἐκάστη | ἀκία δεχέσθω προσθήκην ἀνδρῶν δύο ἐκ τοῦ δεξιοῦ μέρους καὶ δύο ἐκ τοῦ ἀριστεροῦ πρὸς τὸ ἀπαρτισθῆναι τὴν φάλαγγα τρίγωνον. τοὺς δὲ αὐτοὺς καταφράκτους εἶναι ὑπὸ μίαν κεφαλὴν ἔχουσιν διηρημένους ἄρχοντας. 4. εἶναι δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην παράταξιν ὑπὸ τῶν καταφράκτων καβαλλαρίων, ἔχειν δὲ καὶ τὴν στολὴν αὐτοὺς τοιάνδε. ἕκαστον ἀνδρα μαχητὴν φορεῖν κλιβάνιον. τὸ δὲ κλιβάνιον μέχρι τῶν ἀγκῶνων ἐχέτω τὰ μανίκια. ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν ἀγκῶνων φορεῖν τὰ μανικέλια, ἔχοντα καὶ αὐτὰ καὶ τὰ κρεμάσματα τῶν κλιβανίων ζάβας, καὶ ἀπὸ κουκουλίου καὶ βαμβακίου παχέα εἶναι (τοσοῦτον), ὅσον ἐνδέχεται καταρραφῆναι αὐτά. καὶ ἔξωθεν τῶν κλιβανίων φορεῖν ἐπιλώρικα μετὰ κουκουλίου καὶ βαμβακίου. καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν μασχάλων ἐξέρχεσθαι τὰς χεῖρας αὐτῶν. τὰ δὲ μανίκια αὐτῶν ὀπιθεν εἰς τοὺς ὤμους αὐτῶν

126^r
K.11

2 πολὺ K: πολοῦ cod. 6 ὄγδοος K: ὄγδος cod. 11 σεμνοτέρα K: σεμνοτέραν cod. 14 ἀνδρας² K: ἀνδρας ἀνδρ(ας) cod. 15 δεκάτην K: ι' cod. 16 νδ' K: νβ' cod. 22 ἀπαρτισθῆναι K: ἀπαρτηθῆναι cod. 23 εἶναι K: εἶνα cod. 26 αὐτοὺς K: ἀβτοῦ cod. | μαχητὴν: μαχητὸν cod. | φορεῖν K: φορεῖ cod. 28 φορεῖν K: φορεῖ cod. 29 κουκουλίου K: κουκούληα cod. 30 τοσοῦτον supplevi 32 μασχάλων K: μσχάλω cod.

III. On the *Kataphraktoi*

1. Take note that the triangular formation of *kataphraktoi*, if there is a very large body of men, its total must be 504 men, its depth twelve men, which means that the first row of the line is twenty men, the second, twenty-four men, the third, twenty-eight men, the fourth, thirty-two men, the fifth, thirty-six men, the sixth, forty men, the seventh, forty-four men, the eighth, forty-eight men, the ninth, fifty-two men, the tenth, fifty-six men, the eleventh, sixty men, the twelfth, sixty-four men, so that together the number of men in the whole formation is 504. 2. If such a number of men is not available, this formation must become more modest, so that the first row has ten men, the second, fourteen men, the third, eighteen men, the fourth, twenty-two men, the fifth, twenty-six men, the sixth, thirty men, the seventh, thirty-four men, the eighth, thirty-eight men, the ninth, forty-two men, the tenth, forty-six men, the eleventh, fifty men, the twelfth, fifty-four men, and the entire total of the formation 384 men. 3. No matter if the contingent is larger or smaller, it is necessary to make the first line, that is, the front, conform to the number of the quantity of the host, just as the commander of the host sees fit or prefers. From the second row on down to the back each row must receive an additional two men on the right side and two on the left to make up the triangular formation. 4. The *kataphraktoi* are to be under one commander with assorted officers. This type of formation should consist of *kataphraktoi* and they should have the following equipment. Each warrior must wear a *klibanon*. The *klibanon* should have sleeves down to the elbows. Down from the elbows they should wear arm-guards which—both these and the skirts hanging from the *klibania*—have *zabai* and are made of coarse silk or cotton as thick as can be stitched together. Over their *klibania* they should wear *epilorika* of coarse silk or cotton. Their hands should go out through the

35 κρεμάσθαι. ἔχειν δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ κασίδας σιδηρᾶς καὶ πάνυ ὠχυρ-
 ωμένας, ὥστε καλύπτεσθαι τὰ πρόσωπα αὐτῶν ὑπὸ τῶν διπλῶν καὶ
 τριπλῶν καὶ παχέων ζαβῶν καὶ μόνους τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς αὐτῶν
 φαίνεσθαι. φορεῖν δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ χαλκότουβα. 5. ἔχειν δὲ αὐτοὺς
 καὶ στερροὺς ἵππους καταφράκτους, εἴτε ἀπὸ κεντούκλων καὶ
 40 νεύρων κεκολλημένων | μέχρι τῶν γονάτων, ὥστε τὸ πᾶν σῶμα τοῦ
 ἵππου μὴ φαίνεσθαι, εἰ μὴ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰς ῥίνας,
 ὡσαύτως καὶ τοὺς πόδας αὐτῶν ἀπὸ τῶν γονάτων καὶ τὰ κάτω
 ἄσκεπεῖς τε καὶ ἀκαλύπτους, εἴτε ἔχειν αὐτοὺς κλιβάνια ἀπὸ
 45 βουβαλείων βυρσῶν ἐξεργασμένα πρὸς δὲ τὸ στήθος τοῦ ἵππου,
 ἀπὸ τῶν βραχιόνων καὶ τὰ κάτω εἶναι σχιστὸν πρὸς τὸ ἀκωλύτως
 φέρεσθαι τοὺς πόδας αὐτῶν. ἔχειν δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ σκουτάρια πρὸς
 ἀποτροπὴν τῶν βελῶν. 6. δεῖ δὲ συνεῖναι τοῖς καταφράκτοις ἐν τῇ
 μέσῃ καὶ τοξότας, ὅπως ὑπ' αὐτῶν φυλάσσωνται. καὶ οἱ μὲν πρό-
 50 μαχοι αὐτῶν καὶ οἱ δεῦτεροι καὶ οἱ τρίτοι καὶ οἱ τέταρτοι μὴ ἔστ-
 ωσαν τοξόται, ἀλλὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ πέμπτου ὀρδίνου καὶ ἕως τῶν οὐραί-
 ων. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐστὶ πεντακοσίων τεσσάρων ὁ ἀριθμὸς τῆς
 παρατάξεως τῶν καταφράκτων, ἔχειν αὐτοὺς ἑκατὸν πεντήκοντα
 τοξότας. εἰ δὲ ἐστὶ τριακοσίων (τεσσάρων καὶ ὀγδοήκοντα), ἔχειν
 55 αὐτοὺς ὀγδοήκοντα τοξότας. 7. τῶν δὲ καταφράκτων ἔστωσαν τὰ
 ὄπλα τοιαῦτα. σιδηροραβδία ὀλοσίδηρα ἔχοντα κεφάλια—καὶ τὰ
 κεφάλια αὐτῶν ἐχέτωσαν γωνίας ὀξείας τοῦ εἶναι αὐτὰ τρίγωνα
 ἢ τετράγωνα ἢ ἐξάγωνα—ἢ καὶ ἕτερα σιδηροραβδία ἢ δὲ τὰ παρα-
 60 μήρια. πάντες δὲ αὐτῶν ἐχέτωσαν καὶ σπα|θία. καὶ τὰ μὲν σιδηρ-
 οραβδία καὶ τὰ παραμήρια κρατεῖτωσαν εἰς τὰς χεῖρας αὐτῶν, ἕτ-
 ερα ραβδία σιδηρᾶ εἴτε εἰς τὰς ζώνας αὐτῶν εἴτε εἰς τὰς σέλας
 ἐχέτωσαν. καὶ ὁ μὲν πρῶτος ὀρδινος, ἡγουν τὸ στόμα τῆς παρατά-
 65 ξεως, καὶ ὁ δεῦτερος καὶ ὁ τρίτος καὶ ὁ τέταρτος ἐχέτωσαν τὴν |
 ὁμοίαν κατάστασιν, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ πέμπτου ὀρδίνου οἱ ἀπὸ πλαγίων
 κατάφρακτοι ἵνα ἰστώνται οὕτως, εἰς κονταράτος καὶ εἰς σιδηρο-
 ραβδάτος ἢ καὶ ἐκ τῶν τὰ παραμήρια βασταζόντων. καὶ μέχρι τῶν
 οὐραγῶν ἔστωσαν οὕτως. 8. οἱ δὲ τοξόται ἐχέτωσαν τὰ κλιβάνια
 καὶ τὰ κασίδια μόνα. εἰ δυνατόν δέ, ἔστωσαν καὶ οἱ ἵπποι αὐτῶν
 κατάφρακτοι. εἰς δὲ τὰς ζώνας αὐτῶν φορεῖτωσαν οἱ τοξόται κα-
 βάδια πρὸς τὸ σκέπεσθαι μέρος τι τῶν ἵππων αὐτῶν, φυλάττεσθαι

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shoulder slits. Their sleeves should be hung behind on their shoulders. They must have iron helmets heavily reinforced so as to cover their faces with *zabai* two or three layers thick so that only their eyes appear. They should also wear leg-guards. 5. They must have sturdy horses covered in armor, either of pieces of felt and boiled leather fastened together down to the knees³⁸ so that nothing of the horse's body appears except its eyes and nostrils—likewise their legs below the knees and their undersides should remain uncovered and unconcealed—or they can have *klibania* made of bison hides over the chest of the horse which should be split at its legs and underneath to permit the unhindered movement of their legs. The men should also have shields to turn away arrows. 6. There must be archers with the *kataphraktoi*, in the middle where they can be protected by them. The men in the first, second, third, and fourth lines should not be archers, but from the fifth row on back to the rear. If the total number of *kataphraktoi* in the formation is 504, they must include 150 archers. If it is 384, they must include eighty archers. 7. The *kataphraktoi* should have the following weapons: iron maces with all-iron heads—the heads must have sharp corners and be three-cornered, four-cornered, or six-cornered—or else other iron maces or sabers. All of them must have swords. They should hold their iron maces and sabers in their hands and have other iron maces either on their belts or saddles. The first line³⁹, that is, the front of the formation, the second, third, and fourth lines must have the same complement, but from the fifth line on back the *kataphraktoi* on the flanks should set up like this—one man armed with a lance and one armed with a mace or else one of the men carrying a saber, and so they should be all the way to the back lines. 8. The archers should wear *klibania* and helmets only. If possible, their horses should be covered with armor. The archers should wear *kabadia* on their belts to cover a part of their horses and protect

38 καταφράκτους: καταφράκτων cod. 41 τὰ κάτω: τὴν κάτω cod. 43 βυρσῶν K: φυρσῶν cod. 44 τὰ κάτω: τὴν κάτω cod. 46 τοῖς καταφράκτοις K: τοὺς καταφράκτους cod. 47 φυλάσσωνται K: φυλάσσοντες cod. 52 τεσσάρων καὶ ὀγδοήκοντα supplevi 63 ἰστώνται: οἷσαντε cod. 63–64 εἰς κονταράτος καὶ εἰς σιδηροραβδάτος: εἰς κονταράτους καὶ εἰς σιδηροράβδους cod. cf. TNO 60.⁷⁴

70 δὲ αὐτοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς ζώσεως καὶ κάτω. 9. ἐὰν δὲ ἐξ αὐτῶν καὶ ἀκον-
 τισταὶ εἰσιν, δεῖ ἴστασθαι αὐτοὺς ἔσωθεν τῶν καταφράκτων. οἱ δὲ
 κονταράτοι καὶ οἱ σιδηροαβδάτοι καὶ οἱ τοξόται καὶ οἱ ἀκοντισ-
 ται ὀφείλουσιν ἔχειν καὶ αὐτοὶ σπαθία. πάντες δὲ καὶ σκουτάρια
 75 ἐχέτωσαν χωρὶς τῶν τοξοτῶν. 10. εἶναι δὲ αὐτῶν τῶν κατα-
 φράκτων τὰ κοντουβέρνια κατὰ φιλίαν καὶ συγγένειαν ἐν τε παρ-
 ατάξει καὶ ἀπλήκτοις καὶ ὀδοιπορίαις. καὶ μία ἐκάστη ἀκία ἐχ-
 80 ἔτω ἀρχηγόν, αἱ δὲ μεγάλαι αὐτῶν ἀκίαι καὶ ἀνὰ δύο ἀρχηγούς
 ἐχέτωσαν συναπληκεύοντας καὶ συνδιαιωμένους καὶ συνοδοι-
 ποροῦντας μετ' αὐτῶν. καὶ οὐ μόνως αὐτοί, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ὅλον τάγμα
 ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐξάρχοντος ἀρχηγοῦ ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀπληκευέτωσαν καὶ συνοδοι-
 πορεῖν αὐτῶν. 11. ἐπεὶ δὲ τῆς πεζικῆς τετραπλεύρου διατά-
 ξεως καὶ τῆς ἀναμίκτου ὁ ἀπαρτισμὸς τὸ πέρας εἴληφεν, ὡσαύτως
 (τῶν) καταφράκτων καβαλλαρίων, (φ)έρε δὴ, Θεοῦ συνεργοῦντος,
 καὶ τῆς καβαλλαρικῆς παρατάξεως τὸν ρυθμὸν ἐν τάξει ἐκθή-
 σομεν.

IV. Διάταξις περὶ καβαλλαρικῆς συντάξεως

1. Τῶν καβαλλαρικῶν διατάξεων οἱ ἀρχηγοὶ ἐχέτωσαν
 βάνδα. τὰ δὲ βάνδα αὐτῶν εἶναι ἀνὰ ἄνδρας πεντήκοντα. καθ' ἐν
 δὲ ἕκαστον βάνδον κατὰ συγγένειαν καὶ φιλίαν εἶναι αὐτοὺς ἐν
 5 τε ἀπλήκτοις καὶ ὀδοιπορίαις καὶ ἐν τῇ παντοίῳ ὁμοδιαίτους καὶ
 ὁμοδιαγώγους. καὶ ἴστασθαι αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐν παρατάξει οὕτως, ὡς
 ἂν δύο βάνδα ἀποπληρῶσιν ὄρδινον ἕνα. ἐχέτωσαν δὲ τὰ κλιβάνια
 αὐτῶν καὶ κοντάρια καὶ σπαθία καὶ ῥαβδία. 2. διαιρεθῆναι δὲ
 10 προκουρσάτορες ἄνδρες καβαλλάριοι πεντακόσιοι. ἐξ αὐτῶν δὲ
 χρῆ εἶναι τοξότας ἐπιτηδεῖους ἄνδρας ρι' εἴτε ρκ' φοροῦντας
 15 καὶ αὐτοὺς κλιβάνια καὶ κασίδια εἴτε λωρίκια καὶ σπαθία καὶ
 ῥαβδία. οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ πάντες | ἔστωσαν κονταράτοι. ἐχέτω δὲ εἰς
 ἕκαστος αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς ἕν συρτόν. οἱ αὐτοὶ ἐχέτωσαν κεφαλὴν,
 εἴτε στρατηγὸν εἴτε τοποτηρητὴν ἢ ἄλλον ὃν ὁ βασιλεὺς προχειρ-
 ἰζεται. εἰ δὲ ὀλιγοστοῦ ὄντος τοῦ στρατοῦ οὐκ ἐξικανοῖ ὁ στρατὸς
 πρὸς πεντακοσίους, εἶναι αὐτοὺς τριακοσίους, ἐξ αὐτῶν οἱ ἐξή-

75 ἀκία K: ἀκίδα cod. 80 ἐπεὶ K: ἐπὶ cod. 81 ἀναμίκτου K: ἀμήκτου cod. 82 τῶν supplevi | φέρε K: ἔρε cod. 83-84 ἐκθήσομεν K: ἐκθύσομεν cod.

2 βάνδα¹: βάνδοι cod. hic et alibi 2-3 καθ' ἐν δὲ ἕκαστον: καθ' ἐν δὲ ἕναν ἕκαστον cod. 13 τοποτηρητὴν K: ποτηρι' cod. | ἄλλον K: ἄλλος cod. 15 πεντακοσίους K: πεντακοσίου cod.

themselves from the waist down. 9. If some of them are light horsemen, they must be placed inside the *kataphraktoi*. The men armed with lances or maces and the archers and the light horsemen must also have swords. All should have shields except for the archers. 10. The *kontubernia* of the *kataphraktoi* must be arranged according to friendship and kinship in battle array, in encampments, and on the march. Each line should have a commander, the bigger lines two apiece, who quarter, live, and march together with them. Not only these officers, but the whole unit, should be under the command of one head officer and the men should quarter and march together with him. 11. Now that the full account of the regulation of the four-sided infantry formation and the combined deployment has reached an end, as well as that of the *kataphraktoi*, let us now, with the help of God, set forth an organized presentation on the disposition of cavalry.

IV. Ordinance on Cavalry Deployment

1. The officers of the cavalry units should have *banda*. Their *banda* are to be fifty men. In each *bandon* the men should be arranged according to kinship and friendship in camp and on the march, and must share the same quarters and daily routine in every way possible. In battle formation they must be set up in such a way that two *banda* make up one line. They should have their *klibania*, lances, swords and maces. 2. Five hundred horsemen should be set aside as *prokoursatores*. One hundred ten or 120 of them must be proficient archers also wearing *klibania* and helmets, or else *lorikia*, as well as swords and maces. All the rest should be lancers. Each of them should have an extra horse. They must have a commander, either a *strategos* or a *topoteretes*, or whomever the emperor appoints. If, because the army is not large, it is not enough for five hundred, they should be three hundred, of whom sixty are to be archers. These *prokour-*

κοντα ἔστωσαν τοξόται. οὗτοι δὲ οἱ προκουρσάτορες μὴ ἐν τῇ τά-
 ξει τῶν παραταγῶν συναριθμήτωσαν διὰ (. . .) τὴν τοῦ πολέμου
 ἀρχήν. ὁ δὲ ἀρχηγὸς αὐτῶν, εἰ μὲν εἰσι πεντακόσιοι, ὀφείλει ἔχ-
 20 εῖν μεθ' ἑαυτοῦ εἰς (τὸν) ἴδιον φοῦλκον βάνδα τρία, ἥτοι ἄνδρες
 ρ', τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς διαιρῆσαι, καθὼς δύναται, διαγνῶναι τὴν
 δύναμιν τῶν ἐχθρῶν. εἰ δὲ εἰσι τριακόσιοι, ἔχειν μεθ' ἑαυτοῦ ρ',
 τοὺς δὲ διακοσίους ὁμοίως ποιεῖτω. 3. δεῖ δὲ διαιρεῖσθαι τοῦ κα-
 βαλλαρικοῦ τὰς παρατάξεις οὕτως. εἰ μὲν ἐπιφέρονται πεζικὸν
 καὶ τοῦλδον, διαιρεθῆναι αὐτοὺς εἰς τάξεις δεκαεξί. καὶ πρῶτον
 25 μὲν διαιρῆσαι τρεῖς παρατάξεις κεχωρισμένας κατ' εὐθείαν πρὸς
 ἓν μέτωπον, δεξιὰ καὶ ἀριστερὰ καὶ μέσον. καὶ ἡ μὲν δεξιὰ παρά-
 ταξις ἐχέτω εἰς τὸ ἔμπροσθεν δεξιὸν ἄκρον τοὺς παρὰ τῶν πα-
 λαιῶν λεγομένους ὑπερκεραστάς, κονταράτους τε καὶ τοξότας ἄν-
 30 δρας ρ'. οἱ πλείους δὲ αὐτῶν ἔστωσαν ψιλοί, οἱ λεγόμενοι τοξό-
 ται, πρὸς τὸ περικυκλοῦν τὴν τῶν ἐναντίων παράταξιν καὶ διὰ τῶν
 βελῶν κατατιτρώσκειν αὐτούς. ὡσαύτως καὶ (ἡ) ἀριστερὰ παρά-
 ταξις εἰς τὸ ἐξ ἀριστεροῦ αὐτῆς ἄκρον ἐχέτω ὁμοίως ἄνδρας ρ'
 πρὸς τὸ ἀποσοβεῖν τοὺς τῶν ἐχθρῶν ὑπερκεραστάς. αἱ δὲ αὐταὶ
 35 τρεῖς παρατάξεις, αἱ μὲν δύο, ἡ τε δεξιὰ καὶ ἀριστερά, ἐχέτωσαν
 ἅνα ἄνδρας πεντακοσίους. ἐξ αὐτῶν οἱ τ' κονταράτοι καὶ οἱ δια-
 κόσιοι τοξόται. πάντες δὲ αὐτῶν ἐχέτωσαν καὶ σκουτάρια, μὴδὲ
 μέντοι γε οἷα τῶν πεζῶν ὀπλιτῶν, ἀλλὰ σεμνότερα, εἴτε ἀπὸ τεσ-
 σάρων σπιθαμῶν ἔχοντα εἴτε ἀπὸ πέντε, ὡσαύτως καὶ κλιβάνια
 καὶ σπαθία. παραταχθήτωσαν δὲ οὕτως. δύο βάνδα ἐκ τῶν κονταρ-
 40 ἄτων ἀπαρτιζέσθωσαν (τὸ) μέτωπον μιᾶς παρατάξεως, ἥγουν ἄν-
 δρας πολεμιστὰς ρ'. ὀπιθεν δὲ αὐτῶν ἕτερα δύο βάνδα, ὁμοίως
 κονταράτοι, πρὸς τὸ διπλὴν γενέσθαι τὴν παράταξιν, ἐπακολουθ-
 οῦντες ὁ καθεὶς τῷ ἐνὶ εὐτάκτως. καὶ ὀπιθεν αὐτῶν ἐκ τῶν το-
 ξοτῶν βάνδα τέσσαρα, ἥγουν παρατάξεις δύο, καὶ ἀπ' αὐτῶν δύο
 45 βάνδα κονταράτων ἀνδρῶν ρ', ὡς ὁμοῦ διὰ τῶν δέκα βάνδων
 ἀπαρτισθῆναι παράταξιν μίαν ἀνδρῶν πεντακοσίων ἔχουσαν τὸ
 βάθος ἀνδρῶν πέντε, τριῶν κονταράτων καὶ δύο τοξοτῶν. | μέσον
 δὲ τῶν προειρημένων δύο παρατάξεων παραταχθήτω ἡ προειρη-
 μένη τρίγωνος τῶν καταφράκτων παράταξις ἔχουσα ἀπαράλειπτον
 50 τὴν ποσότητα τῶν πεντακοσίων τεσσάρων ἀνδρῶν. ὡσαύτως καὶ

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satores should not be included in the battle array of the cavalry units since
 . . . the opening stages of the battle. If there are five hundred, their com-
 mander must keep three *banda* with him in his own *phoullkon*, that is to
 say 150 men, and distribute the rest as best he can to find out the enemy's
 strength. If there are three hundred, he should keep one hundred with
 himself and use the other two hundred for the same purpose. 3. The units
 of the cavalry force must be divided as follows. If they are bringing along
 an infantry force and a baggage train, they should be split up into sixteen
 units. First, divide off three separate units facing along one front, on the
 right, left, and in the center. The unit on the right must have (what the
 ancients called outflankers ahead on the right wing, one hundred men,
 both lancers and archers. The majority of them should be light cavalry,
 called archers, whose role it is to outflank the enemy formation and hit
 them with arrows. Likewise, the unit on the left should also have one hun-
 dred men on its left wing to fend off the enemy outflankers. These three
 units, or the two rather, the ones on the right and the left, should have five
 hundred men each. Three hundred of them are lancers and two hundred
 are archers. All of them must have shields, certainly not like those of the
 heavy infantry, but more modest, of either four or five *spithamai*, and like-
 wise *klibania* and swords. Have them drawn up so: two *banda* of lancers
 are to make up the front of one unit, one hundred cavalrymen, to be pre-
 cise. Following them are another two *banda*, also lancers, so that the unit
 is two men deep, one following right behind the other (in proper formation).
 Behind them are four *banda* of archers, that is to say, two lines, and behind
 them two *banda* of one hundred lancers, so that out of all ten *banda* one
 whole unit of five hundred men is formed with a depth of five men, three
 lancers, and two archers. The (triangular formation of *kataphraktoi*) out-
 lined above is to be positioned between the aforementioned two units with
 its full complement of 504 men. The rest of the units must likewise have a

16 τοξόται K: τοξότας cod. 17 συναριθμήτωσαν: συνήριθμήτωσαν cod. | vide comm. 19 ἑαυτοῦ K:
 εἰς τὸν cod. | τὸν supplevi 28 λεγομένους K: λεγομένων cod. 31 κατατιτρώσκειν K: κατὰ τρωσκειν
 cod. | ἡ supplevi 33 ὑπερκεραστάς K: ὑποκεραστάς cod. 40 τὸ supplevi | μιᾶς παρατάξεως K: μίαν
 παρατάξε(ων) cod.

depth of five men. 4. Another four units should be positioned behind the three units just described, which also have the same composition of five hundred men as the units in front, three hundred lancers and two hundred archers, keeping to the pattern of the units just described. No matter if the cavalry force is very small or even larger, the order of a five-man depth must be maintained, two archers and three lancers. The length of the line may be stretched out according to the quantity of the host. These four units must be set apart from one another with spacious intervals between so that the rear units can easily make their way forward through them without interference and the forward units can go back, neither the units at rest nor the ones moving through being hindered there. 5. Another three units, the same as those in front, should be positioned behind the four units mentioned. If it is possible, have other . . . units directly facing the intervals between the four units ahead of them at the distance of a bow-shot, so that, whenever they are ordered forward into battle, they can go through the intervals in proper order without interference, with the result that neither these three units are hindered nor are the four units indicated above disturbed. 6. It is necessary to position the baggage train behind the three units just discussed, and a further three units should be placed behind the baggage train. Even if the army is larger, the pattern of these formations . . . 7. The spare horses of each unit must be arranged in order and have a commander with a pennant—they must not bring along a great many reserve horses because they might get in the way—so that, in case a horse happens to be injured, its rider can head off toward the pennant designated for his own unit's spare horses, exchange the horse and ride back to take his place in the line. Each *bandon* must have its own pennant but should not bring any more. The pennants must have symbols serving as recognizable markings. 8. The outflankers and their counterparts, the so-called flankguards opposite the enemy outflankers, must be

αἱ λοιπαὶ παρατάξεις ἐχέτωσαν τὸ βάθος ἀνδρῶν πέντε. 4. ὀπι-
σθεν δὲ τῶν προειρημένων τριῶν παρατάξεων παραταχθήτωσαν
ἕτεραι τέσσαρες παρατάξεις ἔχουσαι καὶ αὐταὶ τὴν ὁμοίαν σύν-
ταξιν τῶν ἔμπροσθεν παρατάξεων ἀνὰ ἄνδρας πεντακοσίους, τρι-
55 ακοσίους κονταράτους καὶ διακοσίους τοξότας φυλάττοντας τὸν
τύπον τῶν προλεχθειῶν παρατάξεων. εἰ δὲ ὀλιγοστός ἐστὶν ὁ
στρατὸς τοῦ καβαλλαρικοῦ εἴτε καὶ πλείων, φυλαττέσθω ἡ τάξις
τοῦ βάθους τῶν πέντε ἀνδρῶν, τῶν δύο τοξοτῶν καὶ τῶν τριῶν
60 κονταράτων. τὸ δὲ μήκος τῆς παρατάξεως κατὰ (τὴν) τοῦ λαοῦ πο-
σότητα ἐκτιθέσθω. ἔστωσαν δὲ αἱ τοιαῦται τέσσαρες παρατάξεις
διακεχωρισμέναι ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ἔχουσαι τὰ χωρία αὐτῶν εὐρύχωρα
πρὸς τὸ εὐκόλως καὶ ἀνεμποδίστως διέρχεσθαι δι' αὐτῶν τὰς ὀπι-
σθεν παρατάξεις ἔμπροσθεν καὶ τὰς ἔμπροσθεν ὀπισθεν, μὴ ἐμποδ-
ιζομένας ἐν αὐτοῖς μήτε τὰς ἱσταμένας παρατάξεις μήτε τὰς διερ-
65 χομένας. 5. ὀπιθεν δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων τεσσάρων παρατάξεων
παραταχθήτωσαν ἕτεραι τρεῖς παρατάξεις ὁμοίαι τῶν ἔμπροσθεν.
καὶ εἰ μὲν δυνατόν ἐστίν, ἔχειν καὶ ἑτέρους (. . .) παρατάξεις κατ'
εὐθείαν τῶν χωρίων τῶν ἔμπροσθεν αὐτῶν τεσσάρων παρατάξεων
ὡς ἀπὸ σαγιτοβόλου, ἴν', ὅταν προσταχθῶσιν ἐξελθεῖν καὶ αὐταὶ
70 πρὸς μάχην, εὐτάκτως καὶ ἀκωλύτως διὰ τῶν τοιούτων χωρίων
διέρχωνται, ὡς ἂν μήτε (αἱ) αὐταὶ τρεῖς παρατάξεις ἐμποδίζονται,
μήτε αἱ προδηλωθεῖσαι τέσσαρες παρατάξεις κωλύονται. 6. ὀπι-
σθεν δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων τριῶν παρατάξεων δεῖ ἵστασθαι τὸ τοῦλδον,
καὶ ὀπισθεν τοῦ τοῦλδου ἵστασθαι τρεῖς ἑτέρας παρατάξεις. εἰ δὲ
75 καὶ πλέων ἐστὶν ὁ στρατός, ὁ μὲν τύπος τῶν τοιούτων παρατάξεων
(. . .) 7. ὀφείλουσι τὰ συρτὰ ἵστασθαι μιᾶς ἐκάστης παρατάξεως
παρατεταγμένα καὶ αὐτὰ ἔχοντα καὶ ἀρχηγὸν μετὰ φλαμούλου—
μὴ ἐπιφερέσθωσαν δὲ πλῆθος συρτῶν διὰ τὸν ἐμποδισμόν—ὡς ἂν,
εἰ συμβῇ πληγωθῆναι ἵππον, ἀπέρχεσθαι τὸν ἐπιβάτην αὐτοῦ πρὸς
80 τὸ γνωριζόμενον φλάμουλον τῆς ἰδίας παρατάξεως τῶν συρτῶν καὶ
ἀλλάσσειν τὸν ἵππον καὶ πάλιν ἔρχεσθαι καὶ ἵστασθαι ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ
ὀρδίνῳ. ἐν δὲ ἑκαστὸν βάνδον ἐχέτω τὸ ἴδιον φλάμουλον, πλέον
δὲ μὴ ἐπιφέρεισθαι. ἔχειν δὲ καὶ τὰ φλάμουλα καὶ γνωρίσματα
ἀπὸ στοιχείων. 8. οἱ δὲ ὑπερκερασταὶ καὶ οἱ ὅμοιοι αὐτῶν, οἱ
85 λεγόμενοι ἀποσοβηταὶ | τῶν ἐναντίων ὑπερκεραστῶν, ἔστωσαν

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59 τὴν supplevi 60 τοιαῦται K: τοιαῖτοι cod. 62–63 τὰς ὀπισθεν: ὀπισθεν τὰς cod. 64 αὐτοῖς K: ἀβ(αι)ς cod. 67 ἑτέρους: ἑτέρας cod. | vide comm. 69 προσταχθῶσιν: προσαχθῶσιν cod. 71 αἱ supplevi | αὐταὶ K: οὔτε cod. 75 post στρατός scr. cod. καὶ quod deleui 76 vide comm. 84 στοιχε-
ίων K: στοιχείων cod. 85 ἀποσοβηταὶ K: ἀπόσοβη(ας) cod.

86 ἀνὰ ἑκατὸν ἄνδρας εὐτάκτως ἰστάμενοι. | 9. ἡ δὲ τρίγωνος φάλαγξ
 καὶ (αἱ) ἕτεραι δύο αἱ σὺν αὐτῇ, ἥτοι ἐκ τοῦ δεξιοῦ αὐτῆς μέρους
 καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἀριστεροῦ, μὴ ἔστωσαν ἡνωμένοι ἀλλήλαις, ἀλλὰ δια-
 90 κεχωρισμένοι στήκετωσαν πρὸς τὸ εἰς τὸν ἀναμεταξὺ αὐτῶν τό-
 πον ἀποτελεῖσθαι δύο χωρία. στήκετωσαν δὲ οὕτως. τὰ μέτωπα
 τῶν δύο παρατάξεων ἰσαζέσθωσαν μετὰ τῆς τῶν οὐραγῶν ἀκίας
 τῆς τριγώνου παρατάξεως. τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν σύστημα τῆς τριγώνου
 παρατάξεως προῦχέτω πρὸς τὸ ἔμπροσθεν μέρος. 10. οἱ δὲ προ-
 95 ρρηθέντες προκουρσάτορες, τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἐπερχομένων, δεῖ αὐτοὺς
 προαπαντῆσαι μετὰ ἐνεδρῶν καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων τραυματίσαι αὐ-
 τοὺς, εἴ γε καὶ ἀτάκτως τὴν ὁρμὴν ποιοῦνται αὐτῶν. εἰ δὲ εὐτάκ-
 τως μετὰ παραταγῶν καὶ συστάσεως γένηται ἡ τοῦτων ἐπέλευσις,
 δεῖ τοὺς προκουρσάτορας ἐπανελθεῖν πάλιν πρὸς τὰς ἡμετέρας
 παρατάξεις. καὶ τότε δεῖ τὸν ἀρχηγὸν αὐτῶν διαχωρίσαι αὐτοὺς
 100 εἰς δύο παρατάξεις καὶ διὰ τῶν προειρημένων χωρίων, τῶν ὄντων
 ἔνθεν κάκειθεν τῶν καταφράκτων, διαβιβάσαι αὐτοὺς καὶ στήσαι
 ὀπιθεν τῶν προειρημένων κατ' εὐθείαν δύο χωρίων. τοῦτο δὲ προ-
 μεμελετημένον καὶ διατετυπωμένον ἔχέτω ὁ τῶν προκουρσα-
 τῶν ἀρχηγὸς τὸ ἐπίστασθαι (τὸ) ὅλον τάγμα, πῶς ὀφείλουσι δι-
 105 αχωρισθῆναι καὶ | στήναι εἰς τὰ δύο χωρία, τὰ ἔνθεν κάκειθεν
 ὄντα τῆς τριγώνου τῶν καταφράκτων παρατάξεως. 11. καὶ τῶν ἐχ-
 θρῶν πλησιαζόντων, τὸ πᾶν στράτευμα τοῦ λαοῦ τὴν ἀπροσμάχη-
 τον καὶ χριστιανοῖς πρέπουσαν εὐχὴν ἕκαστος αὐτῶν λεγέτω, τὸ
 "Κύριε Ἰησοῦ Χριστέ, ὁ Θεὸς ἡμῶν, ἐλέησον ἡμᾶς, ἀμήν," καὶ
 110 οὕτως τὴν ὁρμὴν ποιείσθωσαν κατὰ τῶν ἐχθρῶν εὐτάκτως περιπα-
 τοῦντες ἐν ἀνέσει τὸ λεγόμενον βῆμα, ταραχῆς μήτε μὴν τὸ σύνο-
 λον φωνῆς παρ' αὐτῶν ἐξηγουμένης. σύσσημον δὲ δοθῆτω αὐτοῖς
 ἵνα, εἴτε βουκίῳ ἢ ἐτέρῳ μουσικῷ, ἐν τῷ καταπαύεσθαι αὐτὸ
 λέγειν αὐτοὺς πάλιν τὴν εὐχὴν αὐτήν, "Κύριε Ἰησοῦ Χριστέ, ὁ
 115 Θεὸς ἡμῶν, ἐλέησον ἡμᾶς, ἀμήν," καὶ "χριστιανοὺς ἡμᾶς παρά-
 λαβε, ἀξίους ποιῶν ὑπὲρ τῆς πίστεως καὶ τῶν ἀδελφῶν ἡμῶν ἀν-
 αστῆναι καὶ ἀγωνισθῆναι μέχρι θανάτου, ῥωννύων καὶ ἐνισχύων
 τὰς ψυχὰς καὶ τὰς καρδίας καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἡμῶν σῶμα, ὁ κραταιὸς ἐν
 120 σε Θεοτόκου καὶ πάντων τῶν ἁγίων, ἀμήν." 12. Δεῖ δὲ πρὸ πάντων

K15

130^v

one hundred men strong in proper formation. 9. The triangular formation
 and the two escorting units, that is, on its right and left flanks, must not
 be joined to one another, but must stand apart so that in the space between
 them two intervals are created. They must take their places as follows: the
 front lines of the two units must be level with the rear line of the triangular
 formation, while the rest of the corps in the triangular formation should
 jut forward down to its front line. 10. As the enemy is advancing, the
 aforementioned *prokoursatores* have to intercept them with ambushes and
 feints to disrupt them, all the more so if they are making their advance in
 a disorderly manner. If, however, their attack is made in order with units
 in formation, the *prokoursatores* should head back again toward our for-
 mations. At this point their leader must split them up into two units and
 conduct them through the two intervals we have mentioned on either side
 of the *kataphraktoi* and form them up behind, directly facing the two in-
 tervals. The commander of the *prokoursatores* has to have this worked out
 and formulated beforehand so that the whole unit knows how they are to
 split up and take their position in the two intervals on either side of the
 triangular formation of *kataphraktoi*. 11. As the enemy draws near, the
 entire contingent of the host, every last one of them, must say the invinci-
 ble prayer proper to Christians, "Lord Jesus Christ, our God, have mercy
 on us, Amen," and in this way let them begin their advance against the
 enemy, calmly proceeding in formation at the prescribed pace without
 making the slightest commotion or sound. Have the signal given to them
 either by trumpet or another instrument for them to repeat the same
 prayer at the signal's end, "Lord Jesus Christ, our God, have mercy on
 us," and, "Come to the aid of us Christians, making us worthy to rise up
 and fight to the death for our faith and our brethren by fortifying and
 strengthening our souls, our hearts, and our whole body, the mighty Lord
 of battles, incomparable in power, through the intercession of the Mother
 of God Who bore Thee, and of all the saints, Amen." 12. It is necessary,

86 φάλαγξ: φάλαγγα cod. 87 αἱ suppl. | αὐτῆς K: αὐτοῦ cod. 91 ἰσαζέσθωσαν K: ἰσταζεσθωσαν
 cod. 101 κάκειθεν: ἐκεῖθεν cod. 104 τὸ suppl. K 105 τὰ² K: τῶν cod. 106 τῶν καταφράκτων παρα-
 τάξεως K: τοῦ καταφράκτου παρατάξεων cod. 113 βουκίῳ K: βουκένω cod. 120 post ἀμήν spat.
 vac. usque ad finem lin.

σκοπήσαι ἐν ποίῳ μέρει τυγχάνων ἵσταται ὁ τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἀρχηγός, καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον αὐτὸν ὀρθῶσαι τὸ στόμα τῆς τριγώνου τῶν καταφράκτων παρατάξεως, ἐπακολουθουσὶν καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἐκατέρου αὐτῆς δύο παρατάξεων καὶ | τῶν ὑπερκεραστῶν (. . .) καὶ τῶν τριῶν
 125 τῶν ὀπισθεν ἐκείνων καὶ τοῦ | τούλδου καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν. καὶ δεῖ τότε τὸν ἀρχηγὸν τῶν προκουρσατόρων ἐκβαλεῖν διὰ τῶν δύο χωρίων, τῶν ὄντων ἐνθεν κάκειθεν τῶν καταφράκτων, ἀπὸ τοῦ λαοῦ αὐτοῦ πεντήκοντα ἄνδρας <εἰς> τὸ δεξιὸν μέρος τῶν καταφράκτων καὶ πεντήκοντα <εἰς> τὸ ἀριστερὸν πρὸς τὸ κατατρέχειν
 130 τοὺς καταφράκτους καὶ ἀποσοβεῖν τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἐκ πλαγίων τῶν καταφράκτων, πρὸς τὸ μὴ περισπᾶσθαι καὶ σκῦλαι αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐκκόψαι τὴν ὁρμὴν αὐτῶν. εἰ δὲ καὶ πλῆθος τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἐπέλθῃ ἐκ πλαγίων τῶν καταφράκτων (. . .) καὶ δοῦναι αὐτοῖς βοήθειαν. τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ καὶ οἱ ὑπερκερασταὶ ποιείτωσαν καὶ περικυκλούτωσαν
 135 τοὺς ἐχθροὺς. οἱ δὲ κατάφρακτοι καὶ <αἱ> ἐξ ἐκατέρου αὐτῶν δύο παρατάξεις τὴν τάξιν φυλαττέτωσαν, συνεπόμεναι καὶ αἱ λοιπαὶ ὁμοίως αὐταῖς. 13. τῶν δὲ ἐχθρῶν ἐν τάξει ἵσταμένων καὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων τὴν ὁρμὴν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐχόντων, ἡνίκα ἄρξονται τὰ τῶν ἐχθρῶν βέλη πρὸς τὸ μέτωπον τῆς τριγώνου τῶν καταφράκτων παρατάξεως πέμπεσθαι, δεῖ τοὺς ἡμετέρους τοξότας καὶ αὐτοὺς διὰ τῶν βελῶν κατατιτρώσκειν τοὺς ἐχθροὺς, εἴθ' οὕτως εὐτάκτως βῆμα τριπόδος ἐπελθεῖν τὸ μέτωπον τῆς τριγώνου παρατάξεως καὶ κρούσαι ἐν τῇ παρατάξει τοῦ ἀρχηγοῦ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, τῶν ὑπερκεραστῶν ἔξωθεν, ὅσον κατὰ δύναμιν, περικυκλούντων τοὺς ἐχθροὺς, τῶν ἐτέρων δὲ δύο παρατάξεων μὴ προπηδουσῶν μηδὲ τὴν
 145 τάξιν λουσῶν τὸ σύνολον, ἀλλ' ἐν πάσῃ ἀκριβεῖα καὶ ἰσότητι ἴσον τῶν οὐραγῶν καταφράκτων ἐξ ἐκατέρων τῶν μερῶν προβαινουσῶν. καὶ Θεοῦ συνεργίᾳ καὶ διὰ πρεσβειῶν τῆς παναχράντου αὐτοῦ μητρὸς οἱ ἐχθροὶ ἡττηθήσονται καὶ νῶτα δώσουσιν
 150 (.) 14. καὶ ἐὰν τελείως γένηται τῶν ἐχθρῶν τροπή, τότε δεῖ καὶ τὰς ἐκατέρωθεν τῶν καταφράκτων δύο παρατάξεις καταδίωκεν. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ὀπισθεν αὐτῶν τεσσάρων ἵσταμένων παρατάξεων τὰς τρεῖς παρατάξεις διὰ τῶν χωρίων, ἐν οἷς ἵστανται, εὐτάκτως ἐξελεθεῖν καὶ ἀκολουθεῖν εἰς τὴν τῶν ἐχθρῶν καταδίωξιν.

131'

K16

131'

121 μέρει K: μέρος cod. 123 παρατάξεως: παρατάξεων cod. | ἐπακολουθουσῶν: επακολουθησῶν cod. 124 vide comm. 126 προκουρσατόρων K: κουρατόρων cod. 128–129 εἰς (bis) supplevi 133 vide comm. 135 αἱ suppl. K. 142 βῆμα τριπόδος: βήματι ποδός cod. 143 κρούσαι K: κρούσας cod. 145 προπηδουσῶν K: τροπηδουσῶν cod. 150 post δώσουσιν spat. vac. 6 fere litt.: vide comm. 151 τὰς K: τ(ης) cod. 152 τεσσάρων: τεσσάρω cod. 153 τρεῖς: δύο cod.

before all else, to check and see in what place the enemy commander happens to be and aim the triangular formation of *kataphraktoi* directly at him, with the two units on either side of it, the outflankers . . . the three units behind them, the baggage train and the rest all following along. At this point the commander of the *prokoursatores* must dispatch fifty of his men through the two intervals on either side of the *kataphraktoi* out to the right flank of the *kataphraktoi* and fifty out to the left to ride beside the *kataphraktoi* and keep the enemy away from their flanks so that they do not divert or disrupt the *kataphraktoi* and break up their charge. If a great many enemy attack the flanks of the *kataphraktoi* . . . and give them support. The outflankers should perform the same maneuver and encircle the enemy. The *kataphraktoi* and the two units on either side of them must remain in formation and so should the rest of the units trailing them. 13. Should the enemy remain in formation while our units make their attack against them, [as soon as the enemy's arrows begin to be launched against the front of the triangular formation of *kataphraktoi*, our archers must strike back at the enemy with their arrows. Then the front of the triangular formation must move in proper formation at a trotting pace and smash into the position of the enemy commander while the outflankers on the outside encircle the enemy as far as possible and the other two units proceed on both flanks with perfect precision and evenness with the rear ranks of the *kataphraktoi* without getting too far ahead or breaking rank in any way. With the aid of God and through the intercession of His immaculate Mother the enemy will be overcome and give way to flight . . . 14. If, in the end, a rout of the enemy ensues, the two units on either side of the *kataphraktoi* must then take up the pursuit. From the four units positioned behind them, the three units are to move up in good order through the intervals, where they stand, and follow in the pursuit of the

- 155 οἱ δὲ κατάφρακτοι ἐν πολλῇ ἀνέσει περιπατεῖτῳσαν εὐτάκτως τὸ
 λεγόμενον βῆμα καὶ ἀκολουθεῖτῳσαν. ἐὰν δὲ πλῆθος λαοῦ εἰσὶν
 οἱ ἐχθροί, δεῖ καὶ τὰς ἐτέρας παρατάξεις (. . .) ἐπακολουθοῦσαι
 μίαν τῇ ἄλλῃ. εἰ δὲ οὐκ ἐξικανοῦσιν οἱ προκουρσάτορες καὶ οἱ
 ὑπερκερασταὶ καὶ αἱ προλεχθεῖσαι δύο παρατάξεις εἰς καταδίω-
 160 ξιν τῶν ἐχθρῶν, δεῖ τὸν ἀρχηγὸν τοῦ στρατοῦ ἀπὸ τῶν οὕσων μετ'
 αὐτοῦ τεσσάρων παρατάξεων δύο παρατάξεις ἀπολῦσαι, τὰς δὲ
 ἐτέρας δύο ἔχειν ἀπαρασαλεύτους, παραγγελίαν ἔχουσῶν πασῶν
 τῶν παρατάξεων ἵνα, τῶν ἐχθρῶν διωκομένων, μήτε πρὸς κράτη-
 σιν δεσμίῳ ἐμποδισθῶσιν οἱ πολεμιστῳαὶ μήτε πρὸς ἀλόγων ἢ 132^r
 165 σκύλων ἔρευναν, ἀλλ' οἱ ἄνθρωποι αὐτῶν καὶ οἱ χυδαῖοι, μὴ μέν-
 τοι οἱ σχολαριοί, ταῦτα ἐνεργεῖτῳσαν. | 15. εἰ δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐχθροὶ K17
 ἐπιφέροντες καὶ αὐτοὶ ὁμοίως καταφράκτους ἐν ὁμοίῳ καὶ ἴσῃ παν-
 οπλία καὶ ἀντιμάχονται τοῖς ἡμετέροις καταφράκτοις καὶ παρα-
 τάξεσιν, δεῖ καὶ τὰς ἐτέρας τρεῖς παρατάξεις, τὰς ἱσταμένας ὀπι-
 170 θεν τῶν τεσσάρων παρατάξεων, διὰ τῶν χωρίων ἐκβαλεῖν καὶ
 περικυκλῶσαι τοὺς ἐχθροὺς. καὶ τότε, ἐξ ἐκατέρων τῶν μερῶν
 περικυκλουμένων τῶν ἐχθρῶν, (ἢ τοῦ Θεοῦ βοήθεια ἵνα ποιήσῃ
 τὴν τροπὴν αὐτῶν.) 16. εἰ δὲ καὶ τούτων προσβαλλόντων καρτερήσ-
 ωσιν οἱ ἐχθροί, δεῖ τὸν ἀρχηγὸν τοῦ στρατοῦ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν λοιπῶν
 175 παρατάξεων καὶ ἐτέρας δύο ἀπολῦσαι πρὸς βοήθειαν τῶν μαχο-
 μένων. καὶ ἀπλῶς, καθὼς βλέπει τὴν τοῦ πολέμου συμπλοκὴν,
 οὕτω ποιεῖτῳ καὶ τῶν παραταγῶν τὴν πρόνοιαν. 17. καὶ πρὸς φυγὴν
 χωροῦντων τῶν ἐχθρῶν, τότε δεῖ αὐτὸν καὶ δι' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ διὰ
 τῶν σὺν αὐτοῦ οὕσων δύο παρατάξεων προστίθεσθαι καὶ διδόναι
 180 βοήθειαν τοῖς μαχομένοις. εἰ δὲ καὶ Ἀραβίτας πολλοὺς ἐπιφέρον-
 ται (οἱ) ἐχθροὶ καὶ πρὸς κύκλωσιν τῶν ἡμετέρων ἔλθωσιν, δεῖ
 παραγγελίαν ποιῆσαι πρὸς τὸν λαὸν ἀκριβῇ τοῦ μὴ καταδιώκειν
 αὐτοὺς τὸ σύνολον, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῶν βελῶν τῶν τοξοτῶν ἀποσοβεῖν
 αὐτοὺς καὶ ἀποτρέπειν. εἰ δὲ καὶ (αἱ) ἐκ τῶν ἐχθρῶν φάλαγγες | 132^v
 185 πέριξ κυκλωθῶσιν παρὰ τῶν ἡμετέρων παραταγῶν, δεῖ καὶ αὐτὰς
 τὰς τὸ τοῦλδον φυλαττούσας παραταγὰς ἐλθεῖν εἰς βοήθειαν. ἐὰν
 Ἀραβίται οὐκ εἰσιν ἐνοχλοῦντες τὸ τοῦλδον, πᾶσαι οὖν ἐκ τοῦ

enemy, while the *kataphraktoi* must carry on very calmly and follow in formation at their pace. If the enemy are in large numbers, the other two units must . . . following one another. If the *prokoursatores*, the outflankers, and the aforementioned two units are not enough for the pursuit of the enemy, the commander of the army must detach two of the four units with him and keep the other two where they are, with all the units under orders that while the enemy is being pursued the cavalymen must not get involved in capturing prisoners or go off in search of horses or plunder, but that their attendants and the noncombatants are to attend to these tasks—certainly not the *scholarioi*. 15. If the enemy have brought along *kataphraktoi* themselves with exactly the same armament and they engage our *kataphraktoi* and cavalry units, it is necessary to send the other three units positioned behind the four units forward through the intervals to outflank the enemy. And then, when the enemy is outflanked on both sides, may the assistance of the Lord effect their rout. 16. If the enemy holds firm while these men make their attack, the commander of the army must detach two more units from the remaining units in support of those in battle. To put it simply, he must direct his units according to the way he sees the battle being fought. 17. As the enemy gives way to flight, then the commander himself and the two units with him must also join in and offer support to the men in the fighting. If the enemy brings along a great many *Arabitai* and they attempt to surround our units, it is necessary to make the order clear to the host that they are not to go chasing after them at all, but should fend them off with arrows from the archers to drive them away. If the enemy formations are completely surrounded by our units, even the units guarding the baggage train are to come up in support. All the cavalry units must then do so, as long as there are no *Arabitai* harass-

157 post ἐτέρας scr. cod. δύο quod delevi | vide comm. 159 προλεχθεῖσαι: προέλεχθήσαι cod. | δύο: τέσσαρες cod. 165–166 μὴ μέντοι: ἢ τοι cod. 166 ἐχθροί: ἐχροί cod. 167 ἐν ὁμοίῳ καὶ ἴσῃ K: ἐνομονοία καὶ ἴσῃ cod. 172–173 ἢ . . . αὐτῶν restitui: τροπὴν ποιήσητε cod. cf. TNO 61.^{248–249} 173 προσβαλλόντων: προβαλλόντων cod. 175 ἐτέρας K: ἕτερα cod. 181 οἱ suppl. K 184 αἱ supplevi | post ἐχθρῶν scr. cod. αὐτοῦ quod delevi 187 ἐνοχλοῦντες K: ἐνοχλοῦντος cod.

καβαλλαρικοῦ στρατοῦ παρατάξεις πολεμιστῶν οὕτως ποιείτωσαν. 18. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐστὶ πλέων τοῦ ἡμετέρου λαοῦ ἀριθμός, αἱ
 190 προειρημέναι παρατάξεις ἀπαράλειπτοι φυλαττέσθωσαν, καὶ τὸ
 βάθος αὐτῶν πλέον τῶν πέντε ἀνδρῶν μὴ ἔστω, τὸ δὲ μήκος κατὰ
 τὴν ποσότητα τοῦ λαοῦ τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἐκτεινέσθω. 19. καὶ πρῶτον
 μὲν διὰ τε τῶν κατασκόπων καὶ προσφύγων καὶ δεσμιῶν δεῖ ἀνα-
 195 μάθειν τὴν ποσότητα τοῦ λαοῦ τῶν ἐχθρῶν καὶ πρῶτιστα τὴν
 ἐξόπλισιν τῶν ὀπλῶν αὐτῶν. καὶ ἐὰν ὑπερπερισεύει ὁ τῶν ἐν-
 αντίων στρατὸς πρὸς τὸν ἡμέτερον ἔκ τε τῶν καβαλλαρίων αὐτῶν
 καὶ τῶν πεζῶν, χρὴ ἐκφεύγειν τὸν δημόσιον πόλεμον καὶ τὰς συμ-
 πλοκάς, καὶ μετ' ἐπιτηδευμάτων καὶ ἐνεδρῶν ἀγωνίζεσθαι τοῦ
 200 τραυματίσαι τοὺς ἐχθρούς. τότε δεῖ τὰς δημοσίας συμπλοκάς
 (μετὰ) τῶν πολεμίων ἐπιζητεῖν, ὅταν ἅπαξ καὶ δις καὶ τρίτον τῇ
 βοηθείᾳ τοῦ Θεοῦ τραπῶσιν οἱ ἐχθροὶ καὶ τραυματισθῶσιν καὶ
 δειλανδρήσωσιν, τοῦ ἡμετέρου λαοῦ δηλονότι τε θαρσοποιούντος
 καὶ τῶν φρονημάτων τῆς ἀνδρείας αὐτῶν διεγερμένων. οὐ
 205 μόνως δὲ τὴν περιτετεύουσιν τῶν ἐχθρῶν δύναμιν χρὴ ἐκφεύγειν,
 | ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἰσότητα, ἕως οὗ ἡ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἰσχὺς καὶ δύναμις τὰς
 συντετριμμένας τοῦ ἡμετέρου λαοῦ καρδίας καὶ τὸ φρόνημα διὰ
 τῆς αὐτοῦ κραταιᾶς χειρὸς καὶ ἰσχύος διεγείρη καὶ ἐνισχύσῃ. καὶ
 210 τῆς τοιαύτης φιλανθρωπίας καὶ εὐσπλαγχνίας διὰ τῶν πρεσβειῶν
 τῆς παννυμνίου Θεοτόκου ἐπικαμπτομένης, καὶ ἕως τρίτου τὰ
 νικητήρια τοῦ λαοῦ αὐτῆς βραβευούσης, ἔκτοτε, καὶ διπλοὶ ἐὰν
 ὦσιν οἱ ἐχθροὶ πρὸς τὸν ἡμέτερον λαόν, οὐ δεῖ καταπτήσσειν ἢ
 ὑποστέλλεσθαι αὐτούς. 20. εἰ δὲ τὸ πεζικὸν οὐκ ἐξικανοῖ συστή-
 ναι πρὸς δώδεκα χιλιάδας, ἐξ ἀνάγκης χρὴ τὸν ἕνα ὄρδινον τῶν
 οὐραγῶν ὀπλιτῶν καὶ τὸν ἕνα ὄρδινον τῶν τοξοτῶν ἐκβαλεῖν ἐκ
 215 τῶν δώδεκα παρατάξεων, ἐκ μιᾶς ἐκάστης παρατάξεως ἄνδρας δι-
 ακοσίους, καὶ συστήσασθαι δύο ἐτέρας παρατάξεις καὶ ρυθμίσαι
 καὶ συντάξαι αὐτοὺς κατὰ (τὸν) τῶν ἀνωτέρω ρηθέντων πεζικῶν
 παρατάξεων ρυθμόν. καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἀκοντιστῶν φυλαττέσθωσαν τὰ
 χωρία καὶ παρὰ τῶν τοξοτῶν καὶ σφενδονιστῶν. μὴ ἴστασθαι δὲ
 220 αὐτοὺς ἴσον τῶν προμάχων ὀπλιτῶν, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἰσότητα τῶν οὐρ-
 αγῶν ὀπλιτῶν ἴστασθαι | τοὺς τῶν ἀκοντιστῶν προμάχους, τῆς λοι-
 πῆς παρατάξεως ὅπιθεν αὐτῶν ἱσταμένης κατὰ (τὰ) προειρημένα.

133^r

K18

133^v

190 προειρημέναι K: προαίρημέναι cod. 191 πλέων K: πλέος cod. 196 ἔκ K: ἐν cod. | καβαλλα-
 ρίων: καβαλαρικῶν cod. 198 ἐνεδρῶν K: ἐνέδρω cod. 200 μετὰ suppl. | δις: δύο cod. 202 δηλο-
 νότι: δήλος ὅτι cod. 208 τῆς K: τοῖς cod. 210 αὐτῆς K: αὐτοῦ cod. 217 τὸν suppl. K 222 τὰ
 suppl. K

ing the baggage train. 18. Even if the total number of our army is greater, the units discussed must be kept as they are, their depth must be no more than five men and their length is to be drawn out according to the number of the enemy host. 19. It is imperative first to find out the number of the enemy host and above all what kind of equipment they have, by means of spies, deserters, and prisoners. If the enemy force far outnumbers our own both in cavalry and infantry, avoid a general engagement or close combats and strive to injure the enemy with stratagems and ambushes. The time to seek general engagements with the enemy is when, with the help of God, the enemy has fled once, twice, or three times and are crippled and fearful, while on the other hand our host is obviously confident and their thoughts of valor have been awakened. Avoid not only an enemy force of superior strength but also one of equal strength, until the might and power of God restore and fortify the oppressed hearts and souls of our host-and their resolve with His mighty hand and power. And when this love and compassion (of God) is stirred by the intercession of the all-celebrated Mother of God, when She secures Her people's victory for the third time, from that moment on they need not flinch or recoil in fear, be the enemy twice the number of our host. 20. If the infantry falls short of twelve thousand, out of necessity bring out one of the rear rows of heavy infantry and one row of archers from the twelve units, two hundred men from each unit, and put together two more units. Arrange and set them up according to the plan of the infantry units discussed above. The intervals must be guarded by the javeliners, archers, and slingers. They must not be positioned alongside the frontline infantrymen, but instead the front ranks of the javeliners must be positioned beside the infantrymen in the back lines with the rest of their unit behind them in the manner described above.

V. Περὶ ἀπλήκτου

1. Δεῖ καὶ περὶ ἀπλήκτου βραχέα διαλαβεῖν. προσταχθήτωσαν πάντες οἱ στρατηγοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄρχοντες παρὰ τοῦ καθηγεμόνος καὶ ἀρχηγοῦ τοῦ στρατοῦ ἐν ποίοις μέρεσιν ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ὀφείλει ἐν τῇ πολεμίᾳ γῇ ἀπληκεύειν. καὶ ὁ μὲν καθηγεμὼν τοῦ
 5 ὅλου στρατεύματος μέσον τοῦ φοσσάτου ἀπληκεύετω, οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ καὶ τὰ τάγματα καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ ἄρχοντες καθὼς παρ' αὐτοῦ διαταχθῶσιν, οἱ μὲν πρὸς τὸ ἀνατολικὸν αὐτοῦ μέρος, οἱ δὲ πρὸς τὸ δυσικόν, οἱ δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἀρκτῶν, οἱ δὲ πρὸς τὸ μεσημβρινόν. καὶ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν γνωρίζετω ἐν οἷφ τόπῳ προσετάγῃ ἀπληκεύειν, ἵνα μὴ κατὰ φύρσιν ἐναλλάττωσι τὰς τάξεις τῶν κατατοπίων. ἀπληκεύετωσαν δὲ κατὰ τάξιν τὰ τε βάνδα αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ κοντουβέρνια. 2. ἐν ᾧ δὲ τόπῳ ὀφείλει γενέσθαι τὸ ἄπληκτον, πρῶτον δεῖ ἀποσταλῆναι μινσουράτορας τοῦ κατασκοπῆσαι πεδινούς τόπους καὶ ἐπιτηδεῖους ἔχοντας ὕδωρ πλησίον τὸ αὐταρκες.
 15 καὶ πρῶτα μὲν δεῖ πηγνύναι τὸ φλάμουλον τοῦ ἀρχηγοῦ τοῦ στρατοῦ, εἴθ' οὕτως καὶ τὰ τῶν λοιπῶν στρατηγῶν | καὶ ἀρχόντων φλάμουλα κατὰ τὸν τύπον, ὃν ἐξετέθησαν ἀπληκεύειν. καὶ ὅταν ἴδωσι τὴν τοῦ ἀρχηγοῦ τένδαν σταθεῖσαν, τότε καὶ αὐτοὶ τὰς ἰδίας πεζάτωσαν. | 3. διαταχθήτωσαν δὲ καὶ οἱ χιλίαρχοι τῶν πεζῶν
 20 τοῦ γνωρίζειν τὰ ἄπληκτα αὐτῶν. καὶ ἀπληκεύετωσαν καὶ αὐτοὶ γύρωθεν τοῦ φοσσάτου, τετραχῇ τρεῖς ταξιαρχίαι, τὸ ἀνατολικὸν μέρος τρεῖς, τὸ δυτικὸν τρεῖς, τὸ μεσημβρινὸν τρεῖς, τὸ ἀρκτῶν τρεῖς, ὥστε περιλαβεῖν αὐτοὺς τὸ πᾶν τοῦ φοσσάτου. καὶ καθὼς ἐν τῇ παρατάξει ἐρρυθμίσθησαν ἴστασθαι, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ
 25 ἐν τῷ ἀπλήκτῳ στηκέτωσαν, ἵνα, ἴσως αἰφνιδίως (φωνῆς) τῶν ἐχθρῶν γεναμένης, ἔτοιμοι εὐρεθῶσιν ὡς ἐπὶ παρατάξεως. ἔχοντες οἱ αὐτοὶ ὀπλίται καὶ τὰ κοντάρια αὐτῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ πεπηγμένα, τὰ δὲ σκουτάρια εἰς τὰ κοντάρια ἀκκουμπιζέτωσαν. ὅπιθεν δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν (ὀπλιτῶν) οἱ ψιλοὶ τοξόται. οἱ δὲ οὐραγοὶ ὀπλῖται, εἰ μὲν
 30 πολὺς ἐστὶν ὁ καβαλλαρικὸς στρατὸς καὶ οὐκ ἐξικανοῖ τὸ πεζικὸν περιλαβεῖν αὐτοὺς ἐν τῷ ἀπλήκτῳ, ἐκταχθήτωσαν καὶ αὐτοὶ

4 ὁ μὲν: ὁ μὲν ὁ cod. 7 αὐτοῦ K: ἀβτῶν cod. 9 ἐν οἷφ τόπῳ K: ἐν ἡ ὁ τόπος cod. 10 φύρσιν: φύσιν cod. cf. φύρμα TNO 62.⁹ 10-11 κατατοπίων K: κατῶ πῖον cod. 13-14 πεδινούς: δεινούς cod. cf. πεδινὸν TNO 62.¹⁵ 14 ἔχοντας K: ἔχοντα cod. | αὐταρκες K: αὐταρκεῖς cod. 19 οἱ χιλίαρχοι K: ὁ χιλιάρχων cod. 21 τετραχῇ K: τέτραρχοι cod. | τρεῖς: τέσσαρες cod. 22 τρεῖς: τέσσαρες cod. | τρεῖς: τέσσαρα cod. | τρεῖς: δ' cod. 23 τρεῖς: Δ' cod. 24 ἐρρυθμίσθησαν: ἡρύθησαν cod. 25 φωνῆς supplevi 29 ὀπλιτῶν supplevi | οἱ ψιλοὶ K: ὑψηλοὶ cod. 31 ἐκταχθήτωσαν: ἐκταθήτωσαν cod.

V. On the Encampment

1. It is time to discuss briefly the encampment. All the *strategoi* and officers should be assigned by the leader and commander of the army to the spots where each of them should set up quarters in enemy territory. The leader of the entire army should make his quarters in the center of the encampment, the *strategoi*, *tagmata*, and remaining officers as he has directed them, some to its eastern flank, some to the western, some to the northern, and some to the southern. Each of them must know where he has been assigned to set up his quarters to avoid mixing up the order of their assigned places out of confusion. Their *banda* and *kontubernia* must set up camp according to plan. 2. In the area where the camp should be it is necessary first to send out *minsouratores* to search for level, suitable sites with sufficient water nearby. The banner of the army commander should be planted first, then the banners of the other *strategoi* and officers, keeping to the plan they have prepared for the camp. When they see the commander's tent set up, then they should pitch their own. 3. The chiliarchs of the foot soldiers must be instructed to identify their quarters. They themselves must make their quarters around the encampment, three taxiarchies four ways; three to the eastern side, three to the western, three to the southern, three to the northern, so that they encompass the whole encampment. They must keep their places in the camp exactly as they are set to deploy in battle formation, so that, in the event of a sudden (report) of the enemy, they will be found ready as though in battle formation. Keeping their spears fixed in the ground, the same infantrymen should lean their shields against the spears. Behind these infantrymen are the light archers. If the cavalry force is quite large and there is not enough infantry to surround them in the camp, the rear lines of the infantry

διπλοῖ μετὰ τῶν προμάχων. (εἰ δὲ οἱ) ὀπλῖται ἱκανοῦσι τοῦ περιλαβεῖν τὸ ὅλον φοσσάτον, μενέτωσαν οἱ οὐραγοὶ κατὰ τὴν τάξιν αὐτῶν. οἱ δὲ μεναυλάτοι ἀπληκεύετῶσαν εἰς τὰς ἐξόδους τῶν
 35 χωρίων, καθὼς ἀνωτέρω | ἐν τῇ πεζικῇ παρατάξει δεδήλωται, οὐ μόνως αὐτοὶ ἀλλὰ ἀπὸ τῶν τοξοτῶν καὶ σφενδονητῶν. 4. ἐν δὲ τῷ τοῦ φοσσάτου ἀπλήκτῳ ἐαθήτωσαν (χωρία) ὀκτώ, ὥστε τοὺς τρεῖς χιλιάρχους ἔχειν χωρία δύο. ταῦτα οὖν ὀφείλουσι γενέσθαι σταυροειδῶς διὰ τῶν τεσσάρων μερῶν τοῦ φοσσάτου (. . .) ὁδοὶ
 40 δύο ἀπὸ ἀνατολῆς πρὸς δύσιν καὶ δύο ἀπὸ ἄρκτου πρὸς μεσημβρίαν. αἱ δὲ τοιαῦται ὁδοὶ ἐχέτωσαν καὶ διάχωρα καβαλλαρίων πέντε. (οἱ) δὲ χιλιάρχοι προδιαταχθήτωσαν καὶ προδιατυπωθήτωσαν ἵνα, καθὼς ὁ λαὸς ἀπληκεύει, οἱ ἐκατόνταρχοι κατ' εὐθείαν τῶν χωρίων κωλύουσιν τὸν λαὸν τοῦ μὴ ἀπληκεύειν καὶ ἀποφράσσειν τὰς ὁδοὺς. (τὰς ὁδοὺς δὲ) διευθετεῖτωσαν μέχρι τοῦ φοσσάτου ἀπὸ ἀνατολῶν πρὸς δύσιν καὶ ἀπὸ ἄρκτου πρὸς μεσημβρίαν.
 45 5. τὰ δὲ τῶν πεζῶν, ἡγουν τῶν ὀπλιτῶν καὶ τοξοτῶν, ἄλογα μὴ πλησίον αὐτῶν καὶ τοῦ σκουταρώματος ἀπληκεύετῶσαν, ἀλλ' ὅσον ἀπὸ σαγιτοβόλου τῆς σοῦδας, ἵνα (μὴ), τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἴσως ἐν νυκτὶ ἐρχομένων, ἀπὸ τῆς τοξείας τῶν βελῶν τιτρωσκομένων τῶν ἀλόγων, γένηται τὸ λεγόμενον ἐν τῇ συνηθείᾳ ἀλογόπτωμα καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ συμβῇ γενέσθαι φυγὴν τοῦ λαοῦ καὶ ἀφανισμόν. 6. ἐὰν δὲ καὶ φόβος τις παρὰ τῶν ἐχθρῶν ὑποπτεύηται, δεῖ καὶ τάφρον ποιῆσαι ἐξωθεν τῶν πεζῶν γύρωθεν τοῦ ὅλου φοσσάτου, τὸν παρ'
 50 ἡμῖν λεγόμενον χάνδακα. εἰ δὲ καὶ φόβος τοιοῦτος παρὰ τῶν ἐχθρῶν οὐκ ὑποπτεύεται οὐδὲ χρονίσει βούλεται τὸ φοσσάτον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τόπῳ, οὐ δεῖ κόπους παρέχειν τῷ λαῷ ἔνεκεν | τῶν τοιούτων ἔργων. 7. παραγγεῖλαι δὲ τοῖς χιλιάρχοις ἵνα μετὰ τὴν τοῦ ἡλίου δύσιν μὴ ἑώσιν ἐκ τοῦ φοσσάτου ἐξέρχεσθαι τίνα τὸ σύνολον,
 55 ἀλλὰ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ξύλον καὶ χόρτον δι' ὅλης τῆς ἡμέρας καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς χρείας ἐν τοῖς ἀπλήκτοις ἀποφέρεσθαι. φυλάσσεσθαι δὲ καὶ τοὺς τὰς χρείας ἀποκομίζοντας ἐξωθεν τοῦ φοσσάτου διὰ βιγλῶν καὶ ἀσφαλείας πολλῆς τοῦ μὴ παρὰ τῶν ἐχθρῶν κινδυνεῦσαι. ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ στρατηγοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄρχοντες δι' ὅλης τῆς νυκτός,
 65 σὺν δυο στρατηγοί, ποιῶσι τὸ κέρκετον γύρωθεν τοῦ φοσσάτου ἐξ-

134'

135'

K20

32 εἰ δὲ οἱ suppl. K. 34 μεναυλάτοι: μοναυλοῖται cod. 36 τῷ K: τῇ cod. 37 ἐαθήτωσαν: ἐκ ταθήτωσαν cod. | χωρία supplevi | τρεῖς: τέσσαρες cod. 39 vide comm. 42 post πέντε spat. vac. 2 litt.: οἱ suppl. K. 45 τὰς ὁδοὺς δὲ supplevi 49 μὴ suppl. K. 51 ἀλογόπτωμα: λογοπτωμα cod. 52 φυγὴν K: φυγῆ cod. 53 τάφρον: τάφος cod.

should themselves be positioned in two rows together with the front lines, but if there are enough infantrymen to go around the entire encampment, the rear lines should stay in their place. The *menavlatoi* should camp in the exits of the intervals, as explained above on infantry deployment, not only them but also some of the archers and slingers. 4. Eight intervals must be left open in the army's encampment so that three chiliarchs have two intervals. These must be in the shape of a cross on the four sides of the encampment . . . two roads from east to west and two from north to south, and these roads must have width of passage for five horsemen abreast. The chiliarchs must have their instructions and plans well beforehand to ensure that the hekatontarchs can prevent the host from camping directly in the intervals and hence blocking off the roads as they set up camp. Have them run the roads straight through the camp from east to west and from north to south. 5. The baggage animals belonging to the foot soldiers, that is, the heavy infantrymen and archers, should not be quartered near them or the shield-cover, but instead as far as a bowshot away from the ditch so that, in the event of an enemy attack at night and the animals being hit by arrows, there will not occur a "stampede," as it is called in colloquial speech, resulting in the rout and annihilation of the host. 6. If there is reason to be wary of the enemy, it is necessary to dig a trench (what we call a *chandax*) outside the infantry around the whole encampment, but if on the other hand there is no concern about the enemy and the army does not intend to remain for long in the same place, there is no need to tire out the host with this task. 7. Instruct the chiliarchs that after sunset they must not allow anyone at all to leave the encampment, but that water, wood, fodder, and other supplies should be brought into the camp during the day. Those foraging for supplies outside the camp must be very securely guarded by pickets to avoid being endangered by the enemy. Throughout the night the *strategoï* and the officers, the *strategoï* in

ωθεν τῶν πεζῶν, ὁ εἷς ἔμπροσθεν καὶ ὁ ἕτερος ὀπισθεν, μετὰ τοῦ λαοῦ αὐτῶν, κεχωρίσμενοι τοσοῦτον ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ὅσον ἀπὸ σαγι- τοβόλου.

VI. Περὶ κατασκόπων

1. Εἰ δὲ καὶ φήμη τις γένηται ὅτι κατάσκοποι εἰσῆλθοσαν εἰς τὸ φοσσάτον, δεῖ, εἰ μὲν ἐν νυκτὶ ἢ φήμη λαληθῇ, παραγγελίαν γενέσθαι τοῦ μὴ ἐξελεῖν ἐκ τοῦ φοσσάτου ἄνθρωπον. καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας διαφαινούσης, χρὴ τὸν ἀρχηγὸν τοῦ στρατοῦ διατάξασθαι
5 πᾶσιν τοῖς στρατηγοῖς καὶ ἄρχουσιν καὶ τῷ λαῷ ἵνα πάντες εἰσέλθωσιν ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις ἀπλήκτοις καὶ καθεσθῶσιν. καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τοι-
10 οῦτου τρόπου εὐρεθήσονται οἱ κατάσκοποι, μήτε ἄπληκτον ἔχον-
τες μήτε εἰς βάνδον ὄντες μήτε εἰς κοντουβέρνια. καὶ τότε, ὡς
περισσοὶ εὐρισκόμενοι, διαγνωσθήσονται παρὰ τοῦ λαοῦ καὶ
15 κρατηθῶσιν. εἰ δὲ ἡμέρας οὔσης ἢ τοιαύτη φήμη γένηται, ὥσαύτως
χρὴ διαλαλῆσαι τοῦ ἀθροισθῆναι τὸν λαὸν ἐν τοῖς ἀπλήκτοις
αὐτῶν, κρατηθῆναι δὲ καὶ τὰς πόρτας τοῦ μὴ ἐξέρχεσθαι τινα. καὶ
τούτου γενομένου, οἱ κατάσκοποι φωραθήσονται. 2. δεῖ δὲ τὸν
ἀρχηγὸν τοῦ λαοῦ προδιατάξασθαι τοῖς στρατηγοῖς καὶ ἄρχουσιν
16 καὶ τῷ λοιπῷ στρατῷ ἵνα ἐν τῷ ἀπλήκτῳ, ἐν ᾧ τὸ πᾶν στράτευμα
ἀπληκεύει, ἐν τῷ καιρῷ τῆς δοξολογίας, ἐν τε τοῖς ἑσπερινοῖς
ᾠμοῖς καὶ ὄρθροις, ποιῶσιν οἱ ἱερεῖς τοῦ στρατοῦ μετὰ τὴν συμ-
πλήρωσιν ᾠδῶν εὐχὰς ἐκτενεῖς, καὶ ἀνακράζη τὸ πᾶν στράτευμα
20 τοῦ λαοῦ τὸ "Κύριε, ἐλέησον" μέχρι τῶν ἑκατὸν μετὰ προσοχῆς
καὶ φόβου Θεοῦ καὶ μετὰ δακρύων, μὴ κατατολμώντός τινος ἐν τῇ
ᾠρᾷ τῆς εὐχῆς ἀσχολεῖσθαι εἰς τὴν ὅπως οὖν δουλείαν. ἀλλ' εἴ τι
ἂν εὐρεθῇ ποιῶν, καὶ ὡς εὐρέθῃ, ἂν τε καὶ βαλλάριος ἐστὶν
ἂν τε πεζός, εἰ μὲν βαλλάριος τύχη, καταβήτω καὶ στήτω ἐν ᾧ
25 τόπῳ εὐρέθῃ πρὸς ἀνατολὰς καὶ ἀποδότω τὴν εὐχὴν αὐτοῦ μετὰ
φόβου τῷ Θεῷ. εἰ δὲ καὶ πεζὸς τύχη, τὸ αὐτὸ ποιείτω. ὅστις δὲ
εὐρέθῃ ἐν τῇ ᾠρᾷ τῆς εὐχῆς τῆς ἐκτενοῦς γεναμένης ἀσχολούμε-
νος εἰς τὸ οἰονοῦν πρᾶγμα καὶ οὐ πάρεργα πάντα ἡγησάμενος
σταθῇ (καὶ) ἀποδότω | τὴν εὐχὴν αὐτοῦ ἐν φόβῳ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ὁ
30 αὐτοῦ ἐκπίπτων εἰς ὑποδεέστερον βαθμὸν κατατασσέσθω. καὶ

2 εἰ μὲν ἐν νυκτὶ K: ἢ μὲν ἐν νυκτὶ cod. 4 διαφαινούσης K: διάφανούσης cod. 7-8 ἔχοντες K: ἔχον-
ται cod. 16 τοῖς K: τέσ cod. 18 εὐχὰς K: εὐχαῖς cod. 23 τύχη: ἐτύχει cod. 26 ἐκτενοῦς: ἐκτενῆς
cod. 27 οἰονοῦν K: οἱ ὄνοῦ cod. 28 καὶ suppl. K

pairs, must conduct a patrol around the camp outside the infantry, one in front, the other behind, with their party, separated from one another by about a bowshot.

VI. Concerning Spies

1. If there is a report that spies have entered the encampment, there must be an order, if the report is circulated at night, forbidding anyone at all to leave the camp. At daybreak the commander of the army must issue the order to all the *strategoï*, the officers, and the host, that everyone must go into his own quarters and remain there. In this way the spies will be discovered, neither having quarters nor belonging to a *bandon* or *kontoubernia*. Then, found as extras, they will be picked out by the host and seized. If such a report occurs while it is still daytime, likewise pass out the word that the host must assemble in their quarters and that the gates are to be secured so that no one may leave. When these steps are taken, the spies will be caught. 2. The commander of the host must give prior instructions to the *strategoï*, officers, and the rest of the army in the camp where the whole force is quartered that during the time of the Doxology, both at Vespers and Matins, the priests accompanying the army will recite the Litany upon the completion of the hymns and the whole host must call out, "Lord, have mercy," up to one hundred times with devotion and fear toward God, even with tears, with no one daring to attend to any other task at the hour of prayer. But let someone be found doing something else and, just as he was found, whether he is a cavalryman or an infantryman, if he happens to be a cavalryman, he must dismount and stand facing east on the spot where he was discovered and offer his prayer with fear to God. If he is a foot soldier, let him do the same. Whosoever is detected at the time of the Litany attending to some other matter without thinking of putting all else aside to stand and offer his prayer in the fear of the Lord, such a man, on being demoted from his office, is to be assigned to an inferior rank accompanied by beatings, shorn hair and public display.

ταῦτα μὲν περὶ προσευχῆς. 3. τῶν δὲ ἐχθρῶν πλησιαζόντων, δεῖ
δοθῆναι βουλὴν, τὸ πῶς καὶ πότε ὀφείλει γενέσθαι ὁ πόλεμος. καὶ
τῆς βουλῆς γεναμένης, ὀφείλει ὁ τοῦ στρατοῦ ἀρχηγὸς ἐκκλησιά-
σαι πάντας τοὺς τε στρατηγοὺς καὶ ἄρχοντας καὶ τὸν ὑπ' αὐτοὺς
35 ἅπαντα λαὸν καὶ παραινέσαι καὶ διατάξασθαι τοῦ ἀγνίσαι αὐτοὺς
καὶ νηστεῦσαι πρὸ τοῦ πολέμου τρεῖς ἡμέρας, ξηροφαγίαν
ἀσκοῦντες καὶ πρὸς ἐσπέραν ἐσθίοντες ἅπασι. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς πρὸς
ἀλλήλους φιλονικίας καὶ μνησικακίας καὶ ἔριδας ἐκ τῶν ψυχῶν
40 αὐτῶν ἕκαστος ἐκβαλλέσθω. ὡσαύτως καὶ ἐν ταῖς λοιπαῖς
πλημμελείαις ἕκαστος πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν συνθήκας ποιεῖτω μετα-
νοίας καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὑποστρέφω | ἁλῶναι κακοῖς, ἀλλ'
ἐν εὐαρέσῳ πολιτεία καὶ μετανοία βιοῦν. καὶ τούτων οὕτως
καλῶς τελουμένων, πρὸ μιᾶς τοῦ πολέμου ἡμέρας δέον τοὺς ἱερεῖς
45 ἀναιμάκτους θυσίας ἐκτελέσαι, καὶ τῆς συνήθους ἀκολουθίας ἐκ-
τελεσθείσης τῆς μεταλήψεως τῶν θείων καὶ ἀχράντων μυστηρίων
τὸ πᾶν στράτευμα ἀξιῶσαι. καὶ εἴθ' οὕτως εὐθαρσῶς καὶ ἀνδρείως
τῇ πρὸς Θεὸν πίστει καὶ πεποιθήσει θαρροῦντας πρὸς τοὺς ὑπεν-
αντίους χωρεῖν.

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These are the rules concerning prayers. 3. When the enemy is drawing near, the plan outlining how and when the battle is to take place should be distributed. Once the plan is made, the commander of the army should assemble all the *strategoï*, officers, and all the host under their command and counsel and enjoin them to purify themselves and fast for three days before the battle, maintaining a dry fast and eating once a day toward evening. Each and every one of them should expel from his soul any spite, grudges, or grievances toward one another. Similarly, let each one make a promise of repentance to God for his other sins, not to be caught in the same sins by returning to those ways, but to live a repentant life pleasing to God. When these rituals have been properly completed, the priests must perform bloodless sacrifice the day before the battle, and upon completion of the Liturgy the army must partake of the Holy and undefiled Mysteries. And so then, confidently and courageously with conviction and faith in God, they are to go forth against the foe.

38 ἀλλήλους K: ἀλλήλας cod. 39 ταῖς λοιπαῖς K: τῆς λοιπῆς cod. 41 ἁλῶναι K: ἁλῶναις cod.
44 συνήθους: συνήθου cod.

LINE NOTES TO THE *PRAECEPTA MILITARIA*

Chapter I

- 1-3 ἀπό τε Ῥωμαίων καὶ Ἀρμενίων . . . μὴ ὄντας χρόνων
Qualities in recruits: cf. *LT* IV.1; *ST* 36.1.
- 8-10 ὅπως ὁ μὲν ἐκατόνταρχος . . . ὁ ἕτερος ἐν τῇ ἐτέρῳ
Placement of line officers: cf. *ST* 45.12.
- 11 κοντουβέρνια
The term κοντουβέρνιον is derived from the Latin *contubernium* and appears in the *Strategikon* of Maurice (index, s.v.). Here it designates a unit of soldiers marching and quartering together while the army is on campaign; other texts indicate that *kontoubernion* might also mean a file of soldiers: *LT* IV.2, 38; *ST* 35.12, 45.11. Cf. *DRM* I.³⁵⁻⁴⁰, where the equivalent Greek term δεκαρχία is used to refer to a unit of ten men under the command of a dekarch.
- 14-20 ὀφείλουσιν δὲ ἐπιταγῆναι . . . ὑπὸ κομποθηλυκίων κρατεῖσθαι
Phokas' list of protective garments for infantrymen is based on the *Sylloge* 38.4.
- 15 καβάδια
Padded tunics made of felt, cotton, or coarse silk, worn by infantrymen; cf. Kolias, *Waffen*, 55-57 and *infra*, pp. 204-5.
- 16 βαμβάκιν καὶ κουκούλιν
Syncopated forms: cf. *infra*, III.²⁹⁻³⁰: ἀπὸ κουκούλιου καὶ βαμβακίου. *Koukoulion* can mean a hood or a cowl, but here refers to coarse silk (cf. Kolias, *Waffen*, 56-57, and notes 149-50). *Bambakion*, or cotton (also *bambax*, *bambak-eron*), is not mentioned in military treatises until the mid-tenth century when it appears to have become widely available, as its use for humble infantrymen's tunics suggests: cf. *ST* 38.4; *De obsid.* 49.¹, and J. Teall, "Byzantine Urbanism in the Military Handbooks," in *The Medieval City*, ed. H. A. Miskimin, D. Herlihy, and A. L. Udovitch (New Haven-London, 1977), 201-5; Kolias, *Waffen*, 56-57, and note 150. On the use of cotton in nonmilitary garb, see J. Koder,

Leonis sapientis liber praefecti, CFHB 33 (Vienna, 1991), section 9.1; Haldon, *Imperial Expeditions*, Text C.²⁹⁴, and p. 230.

16 μανίκια

From Latin *manica*; cf. infra, III.^{27, 33}. The μανίκια, or sleeves hung from the shoulders to cover the upper arms, are to be distinguished from μανικέ(λ)ια (arm-guards covering the lower arm and hand: infra, III.²⁸); see Kolias, *Waffen*, 55–56, 65.

19–20 κομποθηλυκίων

Cf. κομποθηλυκίων: *ST* 38.4; *TNO* 56.²⁵. These refer to fastenings combining loops and buttons (or hooks): Kolias, *Waffen*, 56 and note 145; for examples of Byzantine buttons, see G. R. Davidson, *Corinth*, XII: *The Minor Objects* (Princeton, 1952), 296–304 (with references to photographs in the plates).

20–23 ὑποδήματα . . . μουζάκια . . . τζερβούλια

The soldiers' boots were most likely made of leather (cf. ὑποδήματα ἀδήμινα, Haldon, *Imperial Expeditions*, Text C.²⁴⁶, and p. 224); ὑποδήματα appears to mean boots combined with protective leggings, as noted by Kolias, *Waffen*, 72–73. The word μουζάκιον, meaning a peasant's shoe, has been identified as Armenian, Arabic, or Albanian. The most convincing case for its etymology was made by W. Ludtke, "Armeno-Graeca," *Byzantinisch-Neugriechische Jahrbücher* 3 (1922), 90–91, who saw it as a Persian word transmitted to Greek through Armenian. See also Ph. Koukoules, *Βίος καὶ Πολιτισμός*, 6 vols. in 7 pts. (Athens, 1948–57), IV, 411–12, and D. Polemis, *The Doukai* (London, 1968), 147, note 5, for further references. The word τζερβούλιον also appears in the *De administrando* (32.¹³, in the form σέρβυλα), again to refer to "menial shoes," while those who wore them were derisively called τζερβουλιανοί. See also Koukoules, IV, 414.

23 καμελαύκια

On the various meanings of this term (soldier's felt cap; miter; and naval standard), see Kolias, *Waffen*, 85–87, and notes 68–69.

24 κενδοούκλων

On κέντουκλον or κένδουκλον, from the Latin *centuculus* (= felt), see Haldon, *Imperial Expeditions*, Text C.⁸⁵, and p. 189; Kolias, *Waffen*, 54–55, 58–59.

24 φακιολίων

On this term, referring to strips of cloth wrapped about the head in the manner of a turban, see Haldon, *Imperial Expeditions*, Text C.⁷⁵⁵, and p. 279; Kolias, *Waffen*, 86–87.

25 σπαθία ζωστικά

Usually understood as two-edged swords carried from a waist-belt as opposed to a shoulder-strap; see Haldon, *Imperial Expeditions*, Text C.^{751–752}, and p. 278; Kolias, *Waffen*, 137–38, 152, 155, 158. Cf. infra, III.^{56–57}, on the *paramerion*.

29–31 τὰ δὲ κοντάρια . . . τὸ μῆκος

The figures cited for the lengths of the infantrymen's spears (25–30 *spithamai*) are undoubtedly reliable since they are repeated by Ouranos (*TNO* 56.^{33–35}). Schilbach, *Metrolgie*, 19–23, equates the length of the *spithame* ("span") as 23.4 cm, which results in the improbable lengths of 5.8 to 7 m when multiplied by Phokas' figures. We must therefore take Schilbach's equivalents as maximum figures only (for which I am unable to posit a plausible minimum) and assume that Phokas was thinking of a smaller *spithame*.

32 κουσπία

From the Latin *cuspis*, or "barb," but here meaning the rivets which were inserted through holes in the socket of the spearhead to hold it to the shaft: see Kolias, *Waffen*, 189, 198–99, and notes 81–84; for illustrations showing Roman spearheads with sockets and rivet holes, see M. C. Bishop and J. C. Coulston, *Roman Military Equipment* (London, 1993), figs. 22, 35, 68, 84, 115.

33 οἱ λεγόμενοι . . . ψιλοί

Classification of infantrymen in ancient treatises: Asklepiodotos I.2, Aelian II.7–9; repeated in Byzantine military writings: *LT* VI.24, *ST* 30.1–4.

35 σαράκοντα

Σαράκοντα is an intermediate form between the classical τεσσαράκοντα and modern σαράντα, and is attested elsewhere in contemporary texts: cf. Haldon, *Imperial Expeditions*, Text C.^{376, 384}, and p. 73; D. Feissel, "Trois aspects de l'influence du latin sur le grec tardif," *TM* 8 (1981), 143, notes 76–84.

39–51 ἡ δὲ τοιαύτη παράταξις . . . ἐν πολλῇ ἀσφαλείᾳ

This passage is based on a short text known as the *Syntaxis armatorum quadrata*, which Phokas copied almost verbatim into the *Praecepta*; see McGeer, "Syntaxis armatorum quadrata."

41 τετράπλευρος

Cf. Asklepiodotos XI.6; Aelian XXXVII.8–9.

44 χωρίον

Different terms are used in the *Praecepta*, the *Sylloge*, and the *Taktika* for the aisles or intervals between the infantry units in the square formation: χωρίον (*PM*); διάλειμμα (*ST*); διάχωρον/διαχώρισμα (*TNO*).

51–62 εἰς δὲ τὰ εἰρημένα χωρία . . . τῶν ἐγκατειλεγμένων αὐτοῖς
Placement of javeliners to guard the openings of the intervals: cf. *ST*
47.15.

52 Ῥῶς
On the origins of the term Ῥῶς, referring to the mixed Scandinavian,
Slavic, and Finnic inhabitants of “*Rhosia*,” see Obolensky’s comments, *De ad-*
min. II, 20–23.

74 Ἀγαρηνοί
The Byzantines referred to the Arabs as “the offspring of Hagar,” re-
garding them as the descendants of Abraham’s concubine Hagar or of her son
Ismael (hence *Ismaelitai*: cf. Gen. 16:6); note that Ouranos instead uses the term
Sarakenoi (*TNO* 56.⁷⁶). See also *infra*, II.⁷⁹.

83–84 οἱ δὲ ἑκατὸν ἔχουσιν μεναύλια παχέα ἔχοντα τὸ μῆκος (. . .) ἀνὰ δύο
ἡμισυ σπιθαμὰς ἢ καὶ δύο . . .

Cf. *TNO* 56.^{82–85}: . . . οἱ δὲ ἑκατὸν ἵνα ἔχωσιν μεναύλια παχέα ἔχοντα
τὸ μῆκος ἀπὸ ἐν ἡμισυ οὐργυῶν εἴτε καὶ ἀπὸ δύο, τὰ δὲ ξιφάρια αὐτῶν ἵνα
ἔχωσιν ἀπὸ μιᾶς ἡμίσεος σπιθαμῆς εἴτε καὶ ἀπὸ δύο . . .

The text of the *Praecepta* gives the improbable figure of 47–58 cm as
the length of the *menavlion* (a heavy spear). Comparison with the *Taktika* indi-
cates that originally the measures of both shaft and blade were given and that
by a *saut du même au même* (cf. the proximity of ἀπὸ . . . ἀπὸ in the *Taktika*,
corresponding to ἀνὰ . . . ἀνὰ in the *Praecepta*), a copyist passed over the length
of the shaft and recorded the length of the blade as the length of the weapon
itself.

87–88 οἱ πληγάδες
More commonly οἱ πληγάτοι: cf. *SM* I.8.^{17, 24}; VII B.6.^{1, 2}; *DRM* 31.²⁰.
The military codes ordained that soldiers leaving the line during battle were
liable to the death penalty, but the wounded were automatically exculpated: cf.
SM I.8.^{11–19, 20–25} = *LT* VIII.21–23.

119–124 τὰ δὲ μέναυλα . . . ὅσον δύνανται χεῖρες κυβερνᾶν
Cf. *ST* 38.3. On νεάκια (saplings, trunks), cf. *De obsid.* 49.¹⁸, with fur-
ther references. Oak and cornel trees (as well as ash) furnished the hard wood
preferred by the ancients for their spears (cf. Theophrastos, *Historia Plantarum*
III.12.2, V.1.2, V.6.4); but the derivation and meaning of ἀ(ρ)τικίδιον remain
mysterious. In a personal communication, John Haldon has proposed that the
word comes from Turkic *ağaz* (pronounced a’atch = tree, timber), not an im-
plausible derivation considering the presence of Turkic mercenaries (Chazars)

in the Byzantine army and the entry of Turkic words into contemporary Greek
(e.g., πασμαγάδιον), but it is clear from the passage that *atzekidion* refers to a
specific type of tree, of which the identity remains unknown.

131–133 τότε ἐξ ἑκατέρων ἐν τάξει γινέσθωσαν φάλαγγες (. . .) καὶ αὐτοὶ γί-
νονται (. . .) εἰσελθόντες διὰ τῶν ἀμφοτέρων πλαγίων τῶν ἐχθρῶν εὐτάκτως παρ-
αλύσωσιν αὐτούς.

Cf. *TNO* 56.^{127–133}: . . . τότε χωρισθήτωσαν εἰς δύο τάξεις οἱ μεναυλά-
τοι μετὰ τῶν ῥιπταριστῶν. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἡμίσεις ἀπελθέτωσαν εἰς τὸ ἀριστερὸν
κέρασ, ἡγουν τὸ ἄκρον τῆς παραταγῆς ἡμῶν, οἱ δὲ ἡμίσεις πρὸς τὸ δεξιόν. καὶ
ἐπεὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κέρατα εἰς τὴν ἄκραν ὡς σίγμα κάμπτουσιν, ἵνα προσβάλωσιν
ἐκ τῶν δύο μερῶν οἱ αὐτοὶ μεναυλάτοι μετὰ τῶν ῥιπταριστῶν εἰς τὰ πλάγια τῆς
παραταγῆς τῶν ἐχθρῶν καὶ παραλύσωσιν αὐτούς.

The sense of the passage in the *Praecepta* is obscure and the grammar
is awkward; the words καὶ αὐτοὶ γίνονται are masculine plural following the
feminine plural φάλαγγες, and their connection with the phrase beginning
εἰσελθόντες is unclear. The words τότε . . . φάλαγγες match τότε . . . τάξεις in
the *Taktika* and the concluding phrase εἰσελθόντες . . . αὐτούς corresponds to
ἵνα . . . προσβάλωσιν . . . εἰς τὰ πλάγια . . . αὐτούς. It would appear that the
isolated words καὶ αὐτοὶ γίνονται were once part of a longer passage describing
how the *menavlatoi* and javeliners were to form up and proceed in a semicircular
movement (ὡς σίγμα) to penetrate the flanks of the enemy formation.

138 τὰς βασιλικὰς σαγίτας
In other words, the arrows collected by imperial requisition; cf. *De cer.*
657.^{12, 13, 17–18}.

146–148 οἱ δ’ αὐτοὶ καὶ ὕδωρ . . . τὴν τῶν ἀγωνιζομένων δίψαν
Detailing men to obtain and distribute water during battle: *DV* V.^{7–10}.

150–155 δεῖ δὲ τὸν ἀρχηγὸν . . . καὶ παραλύσωσιν αὐτούς
The *cheiromangana* mentioned here seem to be portable arrow launch-
ers, similar to crossbows, which were mounted on stands and discharged arrows.
The term ἡλακάτια in this context may refer to a windlass, or the tubes or
channels through which the arrows were discharged. On the Byzantine crossbow
and other missile-shooting devices, see Kolias, *Waffen*, 239–53; D. Nishimura,
“Crossbows, Arrow-guides and the *solenarion*,” *Byzantion* 58 (1988), 422–36;
and Dagron, *Le traité*, 139, note 10. Phokas also refers to hand pumps or syringes
(*cheirosiphona*), which propelled the fearsome Greek fire, and a swivel tube
(στρεπτόν) through which the “prepared” liquid fire (λαμπρόν, σκευαστὸν πῦρ)
was launched (cf. *ST* 53.8, where λαμπρόν is equated with τὸ ὑγρὸν πῦρ, or
“liquid fire”). According to Leo VI, the *cheirosiphon* was a small, hand-held

siphon invented during his reign (*LT* XIX.57: τῶν διὰ χειρὸς βαλλομένων μικρῶν σιφώνων . . . ἅπερ χειροσίφωνα λέγεται, παρὰ τῆς ἡμῶν βασιλείας ἄρτι κατασκευασμένα). The illustrated manuscript of Hero of Byzantium (*Vaticanus gr.* 1605, eleventh century) depicts a soldier on a ramp using such a device, although it is very difficult to see how in fact it worked. The most sensible discussion of Greek fire, its composition and propulsion, is by J. F. Haldon and M. Byrne, "A Possible Solution to the Problem of Greek Fire," *BZ* 70 (1977), 91–99.

157–158 αἱ δὲ τῶν θεμάτων

These words must be restored here, since the *tourmai* were units of the *themata*, not of the *tagmata*. A δὲ clause to balance αἱ μὲν τῶν ταγμάτων is also expected. Cf. *TNO* 57.^{1–3}, where a similar omission is found.

159–160 τεσσάρων ὀργυιῶν ἢ καὶ τριῶν
A distance of about 5.5 to 7.5 m.

163 τὸ τοῦλδον

The usual term for the baggage train in the military treatises. Cf. ὁ τοῦλδος (*SM*); τὸ τοῦλδον (*DV*, *TNO*). On the forms and possible etymology of this word (from Latin *tultum*), see A. Dain, "«Touldos» et «touldon» dans les traités militaires," in *Mélanges Henri Grégoire*, II (Brussels, 1950), 161–69.

163–165 ἐαθῆναι δὲ καὶ ὁδοὺς . . . πρὸς τὸ ἀνεμποδίστως διέρχεσθαι (. . .) τὴν ὁδὸν καὶ ποιεῖν τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν καὶ ἀποφέρειν καὶ τὰς ἀποκρίσεις.

Cf. *TNO* 57.^{9–12}: ὁφείλουσι δὲ καταλειφθῆναι καὶ στραταί . . . πρὸς τὸ διαβαίνειν ἀνεμποδίστως καὶ τὸν λαὸν καὶ τὰς ἀποκρίσεις . . .

The words τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν mean that τὸν λαὸν cannot have been the original reading in the *Praecepta*; the singular τὸν λαὸν must instead be Ouranos' paraphrase of a plural such as τοὺς στρατιώτας or τοὺς πεζοὺς.

166–171 τὸν δὲ λαὸν . . . ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ γῇ καταλιμπάνεσθαι

Similar directions on restricting the number of noncombatants and baggage animals while in hostile territory: *DRM* 15–17; see also the directions concerning the supplies to be taken across the frontier in Haldon, *Imperial Expeditions*, Text C.^{512–606}, and pp. 251–54.

166 σαγμάρια

On baggage animals, see Haldon, *Imperial Expeditions*, 184–87 (terms), and 251–52 (with references to works dealing with loads and fodder requirements based on sources from the sixth through seventh centuries).

Chapter II

5 πετζίμεντα

From the Latin *impedimentum*; cf. *De admin.* 9.⁵⁶, and Haldon, *Imperial Expeditions*, Text C.^{303–304}, and p. 231.

10–11 ὑπουργοί

On the soldiers' attendants and the service units (τὸ ὑπουργικόν), see Dagron, *Le traité*, 186–89.

11–14 σκοπεῖν δὲ χρὴ . . . διαφθεῖρη τὸ στράτευμα

Importance of water on campaign: *DRM* 13.^{5–6}, 20.^{108–109}; cf. the passage listing the tools used for digging down to sources of water in Haldon, *Imperial Expeditions*, Text C.^{130–131}.

20 κλιβάνια

Cf. *infra*, III.²⁷, IV.⁶. The word is of uncertain origin; it may stem from κλίβανος ("oven") or from the Persian *grivpan* ("neck-guard": cf. Bivar, "Cavalry Equipment," 277–78, and note 28; Kolias, *Waffen*, 44–45, and note 59). The *klibanion* was one of the two main types of body armor worn by Byzantine cavalymen. Haldon (*Imperial Expeditions*, 278–79) offers this definition: "a lamellar cuirass (usually of interlocked iron, bronze, or boiled leather plates or *petala*) . . . sleeveless, waist-length, and enclosing the trunk entirely, or of plain leather at the back and of interlinked plates at the front." The other was the *lorikion* (cf. *infra*, IV.¹⁰), a waist-length mail shirt with sleeves covering the upper arms down to the elbows. On these two types of armor, see Kolias, *Waffen*, 37–54.

19–20 ἐλαφροὺς . . . τοὺς λεγομένους . . . προκουρσάτορας

The term ἐλαφρός was used by classical tacticians (cf. Asklepiodotos, I.3) in reference to light horsemen; the *Sylloge* (33.1) defines ancient ἐλαφροί as light cavalry armed with lances or bows. The term προκουρσάτωρ was taken directly from the Latin *procursator* and designated a light cavalryman or skirmisher: *ST* 35.15; cf. 23.7, 29.1–3, 43.10. Note that scouts and skirmishers were called by different terms in other military manuals: κούρσορες (*SM* II.3); κούρσορας . . . ἡγουν προκλάστας (*LT* XII.38); χονσάριοι, συνοδικοί, and κουρσάτορες (Kek. 134.^{11–12, 22}).

22–28 πρὸς τὸ ἀπαντῆσαι . . . αὐτῶν ἀριθμόν

Cf. *DRM* 21.^{44–48} on the use of advance parties to set ambushes both to gain information and sow panic among the enemy.

57 σεσωρευμένοι

Phokas is distinguishing between an enemy force standing in a body "all bunched together" but without proper deployment, as opposed to an enemy force advancing in formation, μετὰ συστάσεως καὶ παραταγῶν εὐτάκτως (below, II.¹⁰¹⁻¹⁰²).

61-62 ὥς ἀπὸ σαγιτοβόλου

The *Sylloge* (43.11) gives the distance of a bowshot as 156 ὀργυιαί (or 170-80 ἀπλαῖ ὀργυιαί), calculated by Schilbach (*Metrologie*, 42) as 328.84 m; see also W. McLeod, "The Range of the Ancient Bow," *Phoenix* 19 (1965), 1-14. Note that this distance represents the flight range and not the actual target range. The cavalry bow had less carry, approximately 130-135 m (Bivar, "Cavalry Equipment," 283), which may be closer to the distance Phokas had in mind here.

98-101 καὶ εἴθ' οὕτως ἐξορμήσαι . . . πρὸς βοήθειαν αὐτῶν

These instructions refer to the maneuver by which one of the rear lines of infantry and the *menavlatoi* came forward to reinforce the front lines against an enemy cavalry attack, outlined earlier (supra, I.¹⁰⁶⁻¹¹⁵).

104 Ἀραβίται

Cf. infra, IV.^{180, 187}. Although the Byzantine used the terms *Arabes* or *Arabitai* to refer to the Arabs generally, Phokas here uses *Arabitai* in the specific sense of "Bedouin"; for similar use of *Arabes* or *Arabitai*, cf. Leo diac. 18.⁶⁻⁷, Attal. 111.⁷⁻⁸. On the role of the Bedouin in Hamdanid and Fatimid armies, see below, pp. 238-42.

117-118 {καὶ κἄν τε πεζικὴ ἔστιν ἢ τῶν ἐχθρῶν παράταξις, ὥς εἴρηται}

The scribe repeated a phrase he had just copied (II.¹¹⁵⁻¹¹⁶), recognized his error, and attempted to fit the phrase into the text with the formula ὥς εἴρηται.

118-120 καὶ τὴν τρίγωνον παράταξιν τῶν καταφράκτων (. . . .) ὀρθῶσαι ἐν ᾧ ἵσταται ὁ ἀρχηγὸς τοῦ στρατοῦ τῶν ἐναντίων . . .

Cf. *TNO* 57.¹⁴⁵⁻¹⁴⁷: καὶ ὀρθῶσαι τὸ στόμα τῆς τριγώνου παραταγῆς πρὸς τὸν τόπον εἰς ὃν ἵσταται ἡ κεφαλὴ τῶν πολεμίων . . .

A similar passage in the *Praecepta* (IV.¹²¹⁻¹²³: ἐν ποίῳ μέρει τυγχάνων ἵσταται ὁ τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἀρχηγός, καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον αὐτὸν ὀρθῶσαι τὸ στόμα τῆς τριγώνου τῶν καταφράκτων παρατάξεως) suggests that the missing words may have been πρὸς τὸ μέρος, paraphrased as πρὸς τὸν τόπον by Ouranos.

139-147 εἰ δὲ τὸ καβαλλαρικὸν . . . τριακόσιοι ψιλοὶ τοξόται

The same methods for creating greater space within the infantry square are prescribed in the *Sylloge* 47.20.

151-175 ἐάν δὲ ὁ τόπος . . . τὸν ἀρχηγὸν τοῦ στρατοῦ διεγερθῆναι
Cf. *ST* 47.3; 9-10.

165-166 τοῦ ἔχειν

Note the use of the genitive case in place of the instrumental dative.

Chapter III

1-9 Χρὴ εἰδέναι ὅτι . . . ἀνδρῶν πεντακοσίων τεσσάρων

Cf. *ST* 46.6 (where the numbers recorded in the MS are wrong); 46.26.

4 ἀκίας

From the Latin *acies*, "edge" of a weapon or "battle line." Note that the *Sylloge* (46.6-7) and the *Taktika* (60.⁶) use the equivalent Greek term ζυγός.

11-16 τὴν πρώτην ἀκίαν ἄνδρας δέκα . . . τὴν δωδεκάτην ἄνδρας νδ´

Cf. *ST* 46.29: εἴη δ´ ἂν τοῦτο ἡ τρίγωνος, τὸν μὲν πρῶτον ζυγόν, εἴτ' οὖν ὀρδινον, ἐξ ἀνδρῶν ἔχων (λβ´), τὸν δὲ δωδέκατον νδ´. The figures given in the *Sylloge* obviously require emendation: first, the figure δ´ is all that remains of πδ´ (384), the total worked out in the *Praecepta*. Secondly, there is a gap of four letters which Dain completed with Vári's suggested λβ´; this should instead be (δέκα), corresponding to the design of the formation outlined in the *Praecepta*, that is, 10, 14, 18 . . . 54.

28 μανικέλ(λ)ια

Arm-guards of thick cotton or coarse silk, covering the lower arm from the elbow down, as well as the back of the hand; on arm-guards, see Kolias, *Waffen*, 65-68; Haldon, *Imperial Expeditions*, Text C.⁸⁴¹, and p. 289. Note that Ouranos uses the equivalent term χειρόνελλα (*TNO* 60.³⁸; cf. *LT* VI.3, 25; *ST* 30.2, 38.5)

29 κρεμάσματα

Literally, "hanging pieces." P. Schreiner interpreted *kremasmata* as skirt- or apron-like garments (*Lendenschurzen*) hanging from the wearer's waist and covering him to the knees: "Zur Ausrüstung des Kriegers in Byzanz, im Kiever Rußland und in Nordeuropa nach bildlichen und literarischen Quellen," *Les pays du nord et Byzance (Scandinavie et Byzance) = Actes du Colloque nordique et international de Byzance* (Uppsala, 1981), 215-36, p. 221 (with illustra-

tions). Similarly, Kolias (*Waffen*, 47, 54) identifies the *kremasmata* with the felt coverings (καβάδια) hung by mounted archers from their belts to cover their lower bodies and part of their horses (infra, III.⁶⁷⁻⁶⁹).

29 ζάβας

Of uncertain etymology (see Bivar, "Cavalry Equipment," 288; T. G. Kolias, "Ζάβα, ζαβαρείον, Ζαβαρειώτης," *JÖB* 29 [1980], 27-35), the term ζάβα first appears in the sixth century and designates a coat of mail worn by cavalrymen (cf. *SM* I.2.^{10, 25}, and index). In this period the term was synonymous with *lorikion* (infra, IV.¹⁰, and Kolias, *Waffen*, 37-44), but by the tenth century its meaning was restricted to pieces of mail, as opposed to the entire garment (Kolias, *Waffen*, 65-67, and note 12). The passage here indicates that *zabai* are strips of chain mail worn over arm-guards and *kremasmata* to reinforce them; cf. below (III.³⁵⁻³⁷) where *zabai* are attached to the helmet to cover the face.

31 ἐπιλώρικα

Sleeveless, padded surcoats of cotton or coarse silk worn over the *klibanion* or *lorikion* for increased protection; cf. Haldon, *Imperial Expeditions*, Text C.^{750, 838}, and p. 277; Kolias, *Waffen*, 58-61.

37 χαλκότουβα

Cylindrical greaves made of iron, wood, or leather; cf. Kolias, *Waffen*, 70-74.

39 νεύρων

The term νεύρον here appears to mean pieces of boiled leather fastened together into a carapace (see the various meanings of the word given by Haldon, *Imperial Expeditions*, 203); the term νευρικόν is used in the *Taktika* of Leo VI in reference to armor of (doubled) felt worn by soldiers in place of *lorikia* or *klibania* (i.e., the καβάδια of the *Praecepta*): *LT* V.4: νευρικὰ τὰ ἀπὸ κενδούκλων γινόμενα; XIX.13: τὰ λεγόμενα νευρικὰ ἄπερ ἀπὸ διπλῶν κενδούκλων γίνεται. Note that the chronicler Theophanes (318.²⁵⁻²⁸) refers to the carapace worn by the emperor Herakleios' horse as καταφράκτα νευρικὰ—horse-armor of quilted felt similar to that recommended by Phokas for his *kataphraktoi*.

46-50 δεῖ δὲ συνεῖναι . . . ἕως τῶν οὐραίων
Cf. *ST* 46.7.

52 <τεσσάρων καὶ ὀγδοήκοντα>

384 is the total of the smaller formation of *kataphraktoi* outlined above at III.⁹⁻¹⁷; the corresponding passage in the *Taktika* (60.⁶⁴⁻⁶⁶) prescribes a total of 80 archers in this formation of 384.

56-57 παραμήρια

Although sometimes synonymous with the two-edged σπαθίον ζωστικ-ιον (see above, I.²⁵; cf. Kolias, *Waffen*, 137-38, 150, and note 110), the *Taktika* of Leo VI and the *Sylloge* define *paramerion* specifically as a one-edged sword (*LT* V.3, *ST* 39.2); in the *Praecepta* the *paramerion* may thus be a curved, single-edged sword akin to a saber (cf. Haldon, "Military Technology," 31).

67-68 καβάδια

See above on III.²⁹ and I.¹⁵.

Chapter IV

7-18 διαιρεθῆναι δὲ προκουρσάτορες . . . τὴν τοῦ πολέμου ἀρχήν
Position and open order of the *prokoursatores*: *ST* 46.2.

10 λωρίκια

From the Latin *lorica* (cf. Haldon, *Imperial Expeditions*, Text C.⁵⁶, and p. 183); a waist-length mail shirt worn separately or in combination with a *klibanion*. On mail armor, see Kolias, *Waffen*, 38-41.

12 συρτόν

Cf. infra, IV.⁷⁶⁻⁸². On reserve horses and pack animals, see Haldon, *Imperial Expeditions*, 184-87.

13 στρατηγὸν . . . τοποτηρητὴν

The *strategos* was the governor of a theme and commander of a thematic contingent on campaign (Oikonomidès, *Listes*, 341); the context here suggests, however, that the *strategos* assigned to lead the *prokoursatores* should be identified as one of the "lesser *strategoï*" stationed in the frontier (or "Armenian") themes (*Listes*, 345-46). The *topoteretes* was a tagmatic officer seconded to the commander of a *tagma* (domestic or *droungarios*); cf. *Listes*, 329.

16-18 οὗτοι δὲ οἱ προκουρσάτορες μὴ ἐν τῇ τάξει τῶν παραταγῶν συναριθμή-
τωσαν διὰ (. . .) τὴν τοῦ πολέμου ἀρχήν.

Cf. *TNO* 61.¹⁹⁻²¹: οὗτοι δὲ οἱ προκουρσάτορες μὴ ἐχέτωσαν σύνταξιν
ὡς αἱ παραταγαὶ διότι αὐτοὶ μέλλουσι ταρασσεῖν καὶ ποιεῖν τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ πολέμου.

The *Praecepta* may once have read διὰ τὸ ταρασσεῖν καὶ ποιεῖν τὴν τοῦ πολέμου ἀρχήν. Cf. *PM* I.⁶⁷⁻⁶⁸ and *TNO* 56.⁷⁰⁻⁷¹: Ouranos paraphrases διὰ τὸ ἀντιμάχους ἔχειν with διότι εἶχον πολεμίους.

19 φοῦλκον

This term has two meanings and possibly two derivations. Dagron suggests that it derived from the Latin *furca* ("fork"), which is certainly the image

created by its first meaning of a densely formed body of infantry advancing with spears and shields close together. Cf. *SM* XII B 14.⁹: φοῦλκω περιπατεῖν (= *LT* VII.66). Others have proposed that φοῦλκον stems from the Germanic *Volk*. This matches the sense of the term in the tenth-century treatises where it designates a company of men (usually cavalry) following in support of scattered raiding or foraging parties. This is obviously its meaning in the *Praecepta*: an organized reserve kept with the commander of the *prokoursatores* for the security of the rest of the unit sent out to reconnoiter or ambush the enemy. Cf. *DV* IX.^{70, 72}, XIV.⁸⁶⁻⁸⁷ and index; *DRM* 22.^{4, 9}, 23.⁷; *TNO* 63.⁵⁹; Theoph. cont. 460.⁶: τὰ φοῦλκα τοῦ ἀθέου Χαμβδᾶ. See H. Mihăescu, "Les éléments latins des 'Tactica-Strategica' de Maurice-Urbicius et leur écho en néo-grec," *Revue des études sud-est européennes* 6 (1968), 496, and Dagron, *Le traité*, 224 and note 18.

24-51 καὶ πρῶτον . . . ἀνδρῶν πέντε

Disposition of the front line (πρόμαχος παράταξις): cf. *ST* 46.4-13.

26-33 καὶ ἡ μὲν δεξιὰ παράταξις . . . τοὺς τῶν ἐχθρῶν ὑπερκεραστάς

Position and role of the outflankers and flankguards (contingents of lancers mixed with mounted archers): *ST* 35.16; 46.10-11.

27-28 τοὺς παρὰ τῶν παλαιῶν λεγομένους ὑπερκεραστάς

The term ὑπερκεραστής, designating the horsemen assigned to attack the enemy's flank, goes back to the *Strategikon* of Maurice II.4.

36-38 σκουντάρια . . . εἴτε ἀπὸ πέντε

Four *spithamai* = 93.6 cm.; five *spithamai* = 117 cm.

51-60 ὀπισθεν δὲ τῶν προειρημένων . . . ποσότητα ἐκτιθέσθω

Disposition of the support line (βοηθὸς παράταξις): cf. *ST* 46.14-18.

60-65 ἔστωσαν δὲ αἱ τοιαῦται . . . μήτε τὰς διερχομένας

Cf. *ST* 46.16-18.

65-69 ὀπιθεν δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων τεσσάρων παρατάξεων παραταχθήτωσαν ἕτεραι τρεῖς παρατάξεις ὅμοιαι τῶν ἔμπροσθεν. καὶ εἰ μὲν δυνατόν, ἔχειν καὶ ἐτέρους [ἐτέρας cod.] (. . .) παρατάξεις κατ' εὐθείαν τῶν χωρίων τῶν ἔμπροσθεν αὐτῶν τεσσάρων παρατάξεων ὡς ἀπὸ σαγιτοβόλου . . .

Cf. *TNO* 61.¹⁰⁴⁻¹¹¹: καὶ γὰρ ὀπισθεν τῶν εἰρημένων τεσσάρων παραταγῶν ὀφείλουσι γενέσθαι ἄλλαι τρεῖς παραταγαὶ ὅμοιαι ταῖς ἔμπροσθεν. εἰ δ' ἐστὶ δυνατόν, ἵνα ὥσι καὶ ἄλλοι κατάφρακτοι, γενέσθω ἐκ τῶν τριῶν τούτων ἡ μέση παραταγὴ ὁμοία τῇς ἔμπροσθεν καταφράκτου παραταγῆς. εἰ δὲ ἀδύνατόν ἐστι τοῦτο, ἔστω καὶ αὐτὴ ὡς αἱ λοιπαί. αἱ δὲ τοιαῦται τρεῖς παραταγαὶ ἵνα

στήκωσι κατέναντι τῶν εἰρημένων διαχώρων τῶν τεσσάρων παραταγῶν. ἵνα δὲ στήκωσι ὀπίσω αὐτῶν ὡς ἀπὸ σαγιτοβόλου . . .

The *Taktika* recommends that a second formation of *kataphraktoi* be positioned in the middle of the third line of three cavalry units; in turn, these three units must take a position directly facing the three intervals between the four units ahead of them (see the diagram of cavalry deployment in Chapter IV). The same instructions appear to have been given in the *Praecepta*. Emending ἐτέρας to ἐτέρους matches ἔχειν καὶ ἐτέρους [sc. καταφράκτους] with ἵνα ὥσι καὶ ἄλλοι κατάφρακτοι in the *Taktika* (ἐτέρους = ἄλλοι) and corrects the misleading impression that Phokas is issuing instructions that "other units" (ἐτέρας παρατάξεις), instead of the three under discussion, must be placed behind the intervals of the four units ahead. (It is likely that a copyist changed ἐτέρους to ἐτέρας to agree with παρατάξεις after the loss of the text in between). This third line of three cavalry units is called the σάκα in the *Sylloge* (46.17; 19); this manual also recommends that if it is possible, a second triangle of *kataphraktoi* should be placed in the middle of the third line.

72-74 ὀπιθεν δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων . . . τρεῖς ἐτέρας παρατάξεις

Placement of the baggage train and three units of rear-guards: cf. *ST* 46.20.

74-76 εἰ δὲ καὶ πλέων ἐστὶν ὁ στρατός, ὁ μὲν τύπος τῶν τοιούτων παρατάξεων (. . .)

Cf. *TNO* 61.¹²⁰⁻¹²³: εἰ δὲ καὶ περισσότερος ἐστὶν ὁ στρατός, ὁ μὲν τύπος τῶν τριῶν παραταγῶν φυλαχθήτω ἀπαράλλακτος, καθὼς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ πλῆθος τοῦ λαοῦ ὃν ἔχεις, ποιεῖ τὰς προσθήκας εἰς τὰς παραταγὰς.

The passage in the *Praecepta* breaks off abruptly after παρατάξεων; the *Taktika* follows the preserved opening phrase quite closely and no doubt repeats the words with which the passage concluded in the *Praecepta*.

77-84 φλαμούλου . . . γνωρίσματα ἀπὸ στοιχείων

The term φλάμουλον is taken from the Latin *flammula*, "small flame." On Byzantine banners and flags, see G. T. Dennis, "Byzantine Battle Flags," *ByzF* 8 (1982), 51-59; S. Dufrenne, "Aux sources des gonfanons," *Byzantion* 43 (1973), 51-60, with illustrations of banners from ninth-century psalters; and Haldon, *Imperial Expeditions*, 270-74. Στοιχεῖα here may mean letters of the alphabet distinguishing each pennant; cf. *TNO* 61.¹³³⁻¹³⁵: τὰ δὲ φλάμουλα ὀφείλουσιν ἔχειν γνωρίσματα εἴτε ἀπὸ γραμμάτων εἴτε ἀπὸ ἄλλων τινῶν σημείων, although both terms should probably be understood in the wider sense of "symbols" or "markers."

84–85 οἱ λεγόμενοι ἀποσοβηταί

Phokas uses the term ἀποσοβηταί to refer to the cavalrymen assigned to “fend off” the enemy outflankers (cf. ἀποσοβεῖν, IV.^{31–33}); but the standard term was πλαγιοφύλακες; cf. *SM* II.4; *LT* IV.25; *ST* 36.16, 46.10–11; *TNO* 61.¹³⁷.

90–93 τὰ μέτωπα . . . πρὸς τὸ ἔμπροσθεν μέρος

Front ranks of the flanking cavalry units equal with the back line of the *kataphraktoi*: cf. *ST* 46.8.

123–125 ἐπακολουθουσῶν καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἑκατέρου αὐτῆς δύο παρατάξεων καὶ τῶν ὑπερκεραστῶν (. . .) καὶ τῶν τριῶν τῶν ὀπισθεν ἐκείνων καὶ τοῦ τούλδου καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν.

Cf. *TNO* 61.^{175–180}: ἵνα ἀκολουθῶσι αἱ δύο παραταγαὶ . . . αἱ οὖσαι ἔνθεν καὶ ἐκεῖθεν αὐτῆς. ὁμοίως ἵνα ἀκολουθῶσι καὶ οἱ ὑπερκερασταὶ καὶ οἱ πλαγιοφύλακες καὶ οἱ προκουρσάτορες καὶ αἱ τρεῖς πάλιν, αἱ ὀπισθεν ἐκείνων, καὶ τὸ τούλδον καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα ἵνα ἀκολουθῶσιν.

A minor omission.

132–133 εἰ δὲ καὶ πλῆθος τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἐπέλθῃ ἐκ πλαγίων τῶν καταφράκτων (. . .) καὶ δοῦναι αὐτοῖς βοήθειαν

Cf. *TNO* 61.^{186–188}: εἰ δὲ καὶ πλῆθος τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἐπέλθῃ ἐκ πλαγίων τῶν καταφράκτων, τότε ἀρμόζει πάντας τοὺς προκουρσάτορας ἐξελεῖν ἐκ τῶν δύο πλαγίων τῶν καταφράκτων δοῦναι αὐτοῖς βοήθειαν.

The omission of a line in the *Praecepta* is confirmed by comparison with the passage in the *Taktika*.

148–152 καὶ Θεοῦ συνεργίᾳ καὶ διὰ πρεσβειῶν τῆς παναχράντου αὐτοῦ μητρὸς οἱ ἐχθροὶ ἡττηθήσονται καὶ νῶτα δώσουσιν (.) καὶ ἐὰν τελείως γένηται τῶν ἐχθρῶν τροπή, τότε δεῖ καὶ τὰς ἑκατέρωθεν τῶν καταφράκτων δύο παρατάξεις καταδιώκειν.

Cf. *TNO* 61.^{204–222}: καὶ συνεργούντος ἡμῖν τοῦ Θεοῦ διὰ τῆς παναχράντου αὐτοῦ μητρὸς τραπῆναι ἔχουσιν οἱ ἐχθροὶ διὰ τῆς τοιαύτης τριγώνου παραταγῆς τῶν καταφράκτων. τὰ γὰρ κοντάρια τῶν ἐχθρῶν καὶ τὰ μεναύλια κλασθήσονται ὑπὸ τῶν καταφράκτων καὶ αἱ σαγίται αὐτῶν γενήσονται ἀνενέργητοι. καὶ τότε προσλαμβάνοντες οἱ κατάφρακτοι ἀνδρείαν καὶ θράσος, κατακλάσουσι τὰς κεφαλὰς καὶ τὰ σώματα τῶν ἐχθρῶν καὶ τῶν ἵππαρίων αὐτῶν μετὰ τῶν σιδηροραβδίων καὶ τῶν παραμηρίων αὐτῶν, ἐμβήσονται καὶ κόψουσι τὰς παραταγὰς αὐτῶν καὶ διαβήσονται ἐκεῖθεν καὶ ἐκ τούτων τελείως παραλύσουσιν αὐτούς. | παραλυομένων δὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, μὴ διώκωσιν οἱ κατάφρακτοι τὸ σύνολον μηδὲ παραλύσωσι τὴν τάξιν αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ αἱ δύο παραταγαὶ ἔνθεν καὶ ἐκεῖθεν τῶν καταφράκτων διώκωσι τὰ πρῶτα, πλὴν μόνοι οἱ προκουρσάτορες ἐξελεθῶσαν διὰ τῶν προειρημένων χωρισμάτων μετὰ καὶ τῶν ὑπερκεραστῶν καὶ

σπουδαζέτωσαν εἰς τὴν δίωξιν καὶ εἰς τὴν σφαγὴν τῶν ἐχθρῶν. εἰ δὲ γένηται τελείως ἡ τροπὴ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, τότε πρέπει καὶ τὰς ἔνθεν καὶ ἐκεῖθεν τῶν καταφράκτων δύο παραταγὰς παραλύειν τὴν ἰδίαν ἐκείνων σύνταξιν καὶ καταδιώκειν τοὺς ἐχθρούς.

An empty space of six letters' length on f. 131^v belies an extensive loss to the text of the *Praecepta*. The treatise originally contained a passage corresponding to the passage in the *Taktika*, as suggested by the close resemblance between the introductory and concluding passages in both texts. The *Taktika* portrays two situations (which I have here separated by the bar |) that can be linked to earlier passages in the *Praecepta*. The first situation, the impact of the *kataphraktoi*, recalls an earlier passage in the *Taktika* 57.^{147–152}: καὶ τότε τὰ μὲν κοντάρια τῶν πολεμίων πεζῶν τῶν ἱσταμένων ἔμπροσθεν τῶν καβαλλαρικῶν αὐτῶν παραταγῶν κλασθῆναι ἔχουσιν ὑπὸ τῶν καταφράκτων ἡμῶν. αἱ δὲ σαγίται αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ μέναυλα τῶν ῥιπταριστῶν αὐτῶν γενέσθαι ἔχουσιν ἀνενέργητοι διὰ τὴν ὀχυρότητα τῶν ἡμετέρων καταφράκτων. This passage paraphrases the *Praecepta* II.^{120–123}: καὶ τότε τὰ μὲν κοντάρια τῶν ἔμπροσθεν πεζῶν τῶν ἐναντίων συνθλασθήσεται ὑπὸ τῶν καταφράκτων, αἱ δὲ σαγίται αὐτῶν ἀνενέργητοι ἔσονται, ὥσαύτως καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀκοντιστῶν μέναυλα. The internal parallel between the two passages in the *Taktika* 57/61 implies that chapter IV of the *Praecepta* likewise contained a section describing the impact of the *kataphraktoi* echoing the earlier passage in chapter II. As the *Taktika* 57.^{147–152} corresponds to the *Praecepta* II.^{120–123}, it follows that the *Taktika* 61.^{204–222} corresponds to a passage only partially preserved in the *Praecepta*.

The second situation, the opening stages of the pursuit of the defeated enemy, seems to have been based on a passage now lost from the *Praecepta*. The *Taktika* instructs the *prokoursatores* and outflankers to undertake the pursuit until the enemy are in full flight, at which point the two cavalry divisions accompanying the *kataphraktoi* may also be committed to this task. The *Praecepta* evidently contained similar instructions; note the following passage which comes shortly after the signaled break in the text: *PM* IV.^{158–160}: εἰ δὲ οὐκ ἐξικανούσιν οἱ προκουρσάτορες καὶ οἱ ὑπερκερασταὶ καὶ αἱ προλεχθεῖσαι τέσσαρες παρατάξεις εἰς καταδίωξιν τῶν ἐχθρῶν. . . . Mention here of the *prokoursatores* and outflankers indicates that the *Praecepta* issued the instructions preserved in the *Taktika*.

148–159 καὶ ἐὰν τελείως . . . εἰς καταδίωξιν τῶν ἐχθρῶν

The numbers in this passage have become confused and require correction in three places. (1) At line 153 I have emended δύο to τρεῖς, since Phokas must be referring to the three units stationed behind the intervals between the four reserve units in the second line, outlined earlier at IV.^{65–72}. Comparison with

the parallel at *TNO* 61.²²²⁻²²⁶ confirms this emendation. (2) At line 157 I have deleted δύο on the basis of the parallel passage at *TNO* 61.²³¹ where no number is given. (3) At line 159 I have emended τέσσαρες to δύο on the assumption that Phokas is referring to the two units with the *kataphraktoi* mentioned already (προλεχθείσαι). Comparison with the *TNO* 61.²³³ supports the emendation.

157-158 ἐὰν δὲ πλῆθος λαοῦ εἰσιν οἱ ἐχθροί, δεῖ καὶ τὰς ἐτέρας παρατάξεις (. . .) ἐπακολουθούσαι μίαν τῇ ἄλλῃ

Cf. *TNO* 61.²³⁰⁻²³²: εἰ δὲ πλῆθος λαοῦ εἰσιν οἱ ἐχθροί, ἀρμόζει καὶ τὰς ἄλλας παραταγὰς παραλῦσαι τὴν ἰδίαν σύνταξιν καὶ ἐπακολουθεῖν μίαν τῇ ἄλλῃ.

166 σχολάριοι

Strictly speaking, the *scholarioi* were the soldiers in the *tagma* of the *Scholai*, but the term referred generally to the soldiers in all four tagmatic units, as Phokas does here; cf. *De cer.* 666.³⁻¹³: ἄρχοντες τῶν δ' ταγμάτων . . . σχολάριοι τῶν δ' ταγμάτων. . .

Chapter V

1 περὶ ἀπλήκτου

The noun ἄπληκτον and the corresponding verb ἀπληκεύειν derive from the Latin *applicatum*; ἄπληκτον can mean a temporary marching camp, as here, but the term also refers to the large standing camps used as mobilization points for expeditions preparing for campaigns beyond the eastern frontiers: see Haldon, *Imperial Expeditions*, Text A, and p. 155.

5 τοῦ φοσσάτου

Φοσσάτον, from the Latin *fossatum*, could mean both the expeditionary army or the expeditionary camp. The terms ἄπληκτον and φοσσάτον were used synonymously, but Leo VI did make the following distinction: *LT* XI.1: τὰ ἀπλίκτα, ἥτοι τὰ φοσσάτα (κυρίως γὰρ φοσσάτον τὸ ἄπλικοτον τοῦ ὅλου φοσσάτου καλεῖται). . . . See also Haldon, *Imperial Expeditions*, 175.

13 μινσουράτορες

From the Latin *ensor*, *mensurator*. The term is used both of the surveyors who went ahead to choose a suitable location for the camp and mark out its boundaries (as here; on their role, see below, pp. 331-32, 348), and of the officials in charge of the imperial tent when the emperor was traveling (cf. Haldon, *Imperial Expeditions*, 160, 171-73).

18 τένδαν

From the Latin *tenta*, *tenda*; cf. Haldon, *Imperial Expeditions*, Text C.¹⁶⁵, et al.

36-41 ἐν δὲ τῷ τοῦ φοσσάτου ἀπλήκτῳ ἐαθήτωσαν (χωρία) ὀκτώ, ὥστε τοὺς τρεῖς χιλιάρχους ἔχειν χωρία δύο. ταῦτα οὖν ὀφείλουσι γενέσθαι σταυροειδῶς διὰ τῶν τεσσάρων μερῶν τοῦ φοσσάτου (. . .) ὁδοὶ δύο ἀπὸ ἀνατολῆς πρὸς δύσιν καὶ δύο ἀπὸ ἄρκτου πρὸς μεσημβρίαν.

Cf. *TNO* 62.⁴⁹⁻⁵⁵: εἰς δὲ τὸ ἄπληκτον ὀφείλουσι καταλιμπάνεσθαι χωρίσματα ὀκτώ. ἐπεὶ γὰρ δώδεκα εἰσιν οἱ χιλίαρχοι, ἐχέτωσαν οἱ τρεῖς χιλίαρχοι εἰς τὸ μέσον αὐτῶν διαχωρίσματα δύο. ταῦτα δὲ τὰ διαχωρίσματα ὀφείλουσι γενέσθαι διὰ σταυροῦ διὰ τῶν τεσσάρων μερῶν τοῦ φοσσάτου. ἐχέτωσαν δὲ στενὸν τὸ ἐκβασίδιον αὐτῶν. καὶ μὴ ἔστωσαν στενὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα αὐτῶν ἐκβασίδια εἰς τὸ σκουτάρωμα, ἀλλὰ καμπέτωσαν πρὸς γάμμα. ὀφείλουσι δὲ γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὰ ἴσα τῶν αὐτῶν διαχωρισμάτων εἰς τὸ μέσον τοῦ φοσσάτου καὶ ὁδοὶ δύο ἀπὸ τῆς ἀνατολῆς εἰς δύσιν καὶ ἀπὸ ἄρκτου πρὸς μεσημβρίαν.

The gap in the *Praecepta* may be attributable to a *saut du même au même*. Note the proximity in the *Taktika* of διὰ τῶν τεσσάρων μερῶν τοῦ φοσσάτου and εἰς τὸ μέσον τοῦ φοσσάτου, suggesting that a similar proximity in the *Praecepta* caused a copyist's eye to wander from the first to the second φοσσάτου and thus pass over the instructions on the shape of the camp entrances.

39-42 ὁδοὶ δύο . . . καβαλλαρίων πέντε

Cf. *ST* 22.8.

48 σκουτάρωμα

Cf. *TNO* 62.^{52, 63-64}. This term, not listed by Du Cange or Sophocles, refers to the shield palisade around the encampment. See pp. 350-51.

49 σοῦδα

The terms τάφος, φόσσα, χάραξ, σοῦδα, used to refer to the trench around the encampment, can also mean the encampment itself.

53-55 τάφρον . . . τὸν παρ' ἡμῖν λεγόμενον χάνδακα

E. A. Sophocles, who did not know this passage, derived χάνδαξ (s.v.) from the Arabic root KNDQ and gave the meanings "ditch," "trench," and "fortification" (= Grk. τάφος), fully supported by the apposition of τάφος and χάνδαξ here. Cf. the forms χάντακας . . . χαντάκων: Kek. 178.^{16, 17}.

63 βίγλα

From the Latin *vigilia*; used here to mean "pickets," or "watchmen." The term also refers to a unit, the imperial *Vigla*: cf. Haldon, *Imperial Expeditions*, 159.

65 κέρκετον

From the late Latin *circitum* (or from Greek κερκίς, "shuttle," according to Dagron, *Le traité*, 215 note 1; the prevalence of Latin military terminology and the accentuation of the word make the Latin derivation more likely); cf. κέρκιτον and κερκιτεύω: *DRM* 3.^{3, 4, 12, 26}; 4.²⁶. On this term and the system of patrols and passwords employed within the imperial compound, see Haldon, *Imperial Expeditions*, Text C.⁴²⁰⁻⁴³⁹, and p. 240; see also the instructions on patrols and counterpatrols (κέρκετα καὶ παρακέρκετα) in the *De obsidione* 54.⁴⁻⁹.

Chapter VI

1-13 Εἰ δὲ καὶ φήμη . . . οἱ κατάσκοποι φωραθήσονται
The standard method for detecting spies: cf. *SM* IX.5.⁹⁹⁻¹²⁷; *DRM* 2.⁴⁻¹³.

20 καὶ μετὰ δακρύων
Orthodox spirituality attaches great importance to the "gift of tears" in repentance for one's sins: see T. Špidlík, *La spiritualité de l'orient chrétien* = *Orientalia Christiana Analecta* 206 (Rome, 1978), 188-98. See also G. W. H. Lampe, *A Patristic Greek Lexicon* (Oxford, 1978⁵) (s.v., E, F).

27 πάρεργα
The word πάρεργον has added force in this context as the opposite of τὸ ἔργον τοῦ Θεοῦ, that is, asceticism. As Špidlík observes: "L' ἔργον s'oppose au πάρεργον, oeuvre accessoire qui n'est pas «l'oeuvre de l' âme»." (*La spiritualité*, 173 and notes 2 and 5). This is the contrast between observance of the religious rituals and disobedience implied by Phokas' strict directives on the soldiers' rituals of repentance each day and before battle.

33-48 ὁφείλει ὁ τοῦ στρατοῦ ἀρχηγὸς . . . τοὺς ὑπεναντίους χωρεῖν
Cf. *LT*, XIV.1; *ST* 44.1. On the religious rituals of the Byzantine army and their emphasis on spiritual purification, see M. McCormick, *Eternal Victory* (Cambridge, 1986), 237-52, and G. T. Dennis, "Religious Services in the Byzantine Army," in *ΕΥΛΟΓΗΜΑ: Studies in Honor of Robert Taft, S.J.*, ed. E. Carr et al. = *Studia Anselmiana* 110 (Rome, 1993), 107-17.

36 ξηροφαγία
The "dry fast" (consisting of bread, herbs, salt, and water, consumed once a day in the evening) maintained during Holy Week; cf. Lampe, *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, s.v.

The *Taktika* of Nikephoros Ouranos, Chapters 56 through 65

(Τακτικὰ Ἦγουν Στρατηγικὰ
Νικηφόρου Τοῦ Οὐρανοῦ)

INTRODUCTION

DATE: ca. 1000

MANUSCRIPTS: *Monacensis graecus* 452 (fourteenth century, second half), folios 109^r -128^v; *Oxonienis Baroccianus* 131 (ca. 1250-1280), folios 262^r -263^r (chapter 65 only)

PREVIOUS EDITIONS: Chapters 56 through 62 of the *Taktika* are edited here for the first time; chapters 63 through 74 were edited with a French translation by J.-A. de Foucault, "Douze chapitres inédits de la *Tactique* de Nicéphore Ouranos," *TM* 5 (1973), 281-312.

The *Taktika* of Nikephoros Ouranos is the last of the Byzantine military treatises inspired by the revival of military science in tenth-century Byzantium and the last in the long tradition of Greek military writings dating from antiquity. The *Taktika* is an enormous compilation in 178 chapters of which only a handful have been published;¹ the French scholar Alphonse Dain, who identified the text and examined its manuscripts and sources in the 1930s,² never realized his ambition to publish the *Taktika*, and to this day the text remains inédit in full. The section of the *Taktika* published here comprises chapters 56 through 65.

¹ See Dain, "Stratégistes," 371, for the excerpts of the *Taktika* published in earlier works; to this list should be added chapters 54 and 119 through 123, published by Dain in *Naumachica* (Paris, 1943), 69-104.

² A. Dain, *La Tactique*.

The Author and Work

To summarize what I have discussed at greater length elsewhere,³ Nikephoros Ouranos (ca. 950–1011) was a civil official and soldier distinguished by his loyalty and competence in the service of the emperor Basil II. After an eventful civil and military career in the 980s and 990s, which included his crushing victory over the Bulgars at the river Spercheios in 997, Ouranos was appointed governor of Antioch in December 999 and held this post until at least 1007, possibly until 1011. As Basil's plenipotentiary in the east, he played an active military role in enforcing Byzantine authority in the recently conquered regions of Cilicia and northern Syria while Basil concentrated on his principal military objective in the west, the subjugation of Bulgaria.

The *Taktika* belongs to the years of Ouranos' stewardship over the easternmost reaches of the Byzantine Empire. The text as a whole comprises four main sections deriving from Byzantine and classical military works: chapters 1 through 55 reprise the *Taktika* of Leo VI, while chapters 66 through 175, and 176 through 178 are based on collections of ancient tacticians. The ten chapters of interest here, 56 through 65, represent a revised and expanded version of the *Praecepta militaria* of Nikephoros Phokas. Chapters 56 through 62 are a close paraphrase of the *Praecepta* with some minor differences in organization and style. As we have seen in the edition of the *Praecepta*, this paraphrase, based on an earlier and better copy of Phokas' treatise than the one preserved in the Moscow codex, is a valuable witness by which to isolate and clarify the many defective passages in the *Praecepta*. At the same time, however, the *Taktika* 56 through 62 is not without independent worth since it records a change in infantry tactics introduced after Phokas' time; in turn, Ouranos' retention of his predecessor's other prescriptions can be taken as a sign that the tactical system outlined by Phokas was still in use during Ouranos' military career.]

The three succeeding chapters discuss raids (63), tactics for fighting from an encamped position or on the march (64), and siege warfare (65). With the exception of *Taktika* 64.5–8, based in part on chapter 20 of the contemporary *De re militari*, these chapters derive from Ouranos' own military experience in the east which is known to have included raiding expeditions and siege operations. His firsthand knowledge of contemporary conditions and warfare is most pronounced in the discussion of siege tactics in chapter 65, where he candidly portrays the nature of Byzantine-Muslim contacts in northern Syria and the varying allegiances of the peoples who had migrated there in the wake of the Byzantine conquests.

³McGeer, "Tradition and Reality."

Chapters 56 through 65 of the *Taktika* are of considerable interest from a military historical perspective. They form a complete treatise within themselves, the work of a commander active in northern Syria at the beginning of the eleventh century who covered the full range of contemporary Byzantine military operations—field tactics, raids, and sieges. Ouranos' addition of chapters on local raiding and siege tactics to Phokas' manual on battle tactics is particularly significant in that it marks the transition from a policy of conquest to one of controlling the newly gained territories in the east once Basil II had concluded a peace treaty with the Caliph al-Hakim (1001) and devoted himself to the subjugation of Bulgaria. It is therefore not only as a faithful paraphrase of the *Praecepta*, and hence a reliable indirect tradition, but also as an important source for Byzantine military history at the end of the tenth century, that the *Taktika* 56 through 65 accompanies the edition of the *Praecepta militaria*.

The Manuscripts

The *Taktika* of Nikephoros Ouranos is found in three main witnesses: these are the *Constantinopolitanus graecus* 36 (fourteenth century, in the Seraglio, Istanbul), the *Monacensis graecus* 452 (in the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Munich), and the *Oxoniensis Baroccianus* 131 (in the Bodleian Library, Oxford). Of these three manuscripts, only the *Monacensis* preserves chapters 56 through 65 of the *Taktika* in their entirety; the *Constantinopolitanus* breaks off in chapter 43, while the *Baroccianus* contains chapter 65. As all three manuscripts have been studied in detail by Dain and others, it will suffice here to offer a brief review of their findings.

The *Constantinopolitanus* gr. 36 (= K: 20.7 × 13.5 cm, 288 folios, paper)⁴

Although the *Constantinopolitanus* preserves the text of the *Taktika* only as far as chapter 43, it occupies a very important place in the tradition since it is the sole witness to record the author and title of the *Taktika*. The first seventeen folios list the titles of the 178 chapters of the text; but unfortunately for our purposes, the titles of chapters 59 through 123 are not recorded, presumably owing to a defect in the scribe's model. This table of contents is still helpful, however, since the lone witness for chapters 56 through 64, the *Monacensis*, shows only blank spaces where the titles and initial capitals of each chapter

⁴R. Blass, "Die griechischen und lateinischen Handschriften im Alten Serail zu Konstantinopel," *Hermes* 23 (1888), 225 and 622; A. Deissmann, *Forschungen und Funde im Serai* (Berlin-Leipzig, 1933), 72–3; Dain, *La Tactique*, 93–95.

just two. The *Monacensis* presents only a few problems in chapters 56 through 64, which may be noted briefly here.

Very few errors in these chapters originate with the scribe. He committed some minor errors of orthography, repetition (*TNO* 57.³²⁻³³), and confused word order (57.¹⁶⁰⁻¹⁶¹), which are corrected and noted in the apparatus; but it bears noting that the scribe detected and remedied a number of his oversights. He twice records omitted words in the margin with an indication of their proper place in the text (57.¹¹⁷; 61.¹⁷⁵⁻¹⁷⁶); he also restored the reading γαληνότητος from βαληνότητος by writing Γ over β (57.¹⁴⁵), and corrected τόπος to τύπος by writing υ above the ο (61.¹²¹). These too are signaled in the apparatus.

The text of chapters 56 to 64 appears to have inherited few corruptions resulting from oversights by earlier copyists or physical damage in the scribe's model. Only in two places was the scribe compelled to reproduce a defective reading or acknowledge a lacuna (56.²²; 56.¹⁰⁰).

It has been necessary to introduce corrections in places where the sense of a passage was uncertain or misleading. This has meant substituting, deleting or supplying a word or phrase where required to ensure that the meaning of the text was clear or consistent. All such corrections have been noted in the apparatus.

With chapter 65, however, matters become slightly more complicated, for the reason that the *Monacensis* and the *Baroccianus* represent different recensions of the *Taktika*. Where the two witnesses overlap, clear differences in style, vocabulary, and reliability emerge, which led Dain to conclude that the text of the *Monacensis* had been recast in a more literary but less accurate version, whereas the *Baroccianus* belonged to the direct tradition and was a more faithful witness to the language and content of the original work.⁸

A comparative reading of chapter 65 in the two manuscripts supports Dain's judgment. There are consistent differences between the *Baroccianus* and the *Monacensis* in style and wording: ἄν + subjunctive (Q) replaced by εἰ + indicative (N); ἵνα + subjunctive (Q) replaced by the future indicative or the imperative (N); standard forms substituted for late ones, as in ὑπομένειν (N) for ὑποστήκειν (Q). These changes attest the efforts of a copyist—whether of the *Monacensis* or of an ancestor cannot be determined—to render the common idiom of Ouranos' *Taktika* in a more polished prose style. Of far more importance in the comparison of the manuscripts, however, is the number of erroneous readings and omissions in the *Monacensis* which prove that the *Baroccianus* is the more reliable witness. Particularly telling in this regard is the word μεταβά-

⁸ Dain, *La Tactique*, 102–7.

δας, taken from the Arabic active participle *muta'abiddun* (meaning "the faithful"), which is recorded (without an accent) in the *Baroccianus* but omitted from the *Monacensis*, where a blank space of five to six letters' length testifies to the scribe's incomprehension of this foreign word. Both for usage and accuracy the text of the *Baroccianus* is therefore to be preferred and has served as the basis for the edition of chapter 65.

As in the translation of the *Praecepta*, technical terms without an exact English equivalent have been transliterated and are listed in the glossary. Brief notes on sources and terminology have been included for chapters 63 through 65 only.

LIST OF SIGNS

N = *Monacensis graecus* 452
Q = *Oxoniensis Baroccianus* 131
F = J.-A. de Foucault

PM = *Praecepta militaria*

< > = *addenda*

Ἐκ Τῶν Τακτικῶν Νικηφόρου Τοῦ Οὐρανοῦ

56. Περί ἐξοπλίσεως καὶ συντάξεως τῶν πεζῶν

1. (Ἀ)ρμόζει ἐκλέξασθαι πεζοὺς στρατιώτας ἀπὸ Ῥωμαίων καὶ Ἀρμενίων ἄνδρας μεγάλους καὶ νεωτέρους μὴ ὄντας πλέον τῶν τεσσαράκοντα χρόνων. εἶτα γύμνασον αὐτούς, ὥς πρέπει, πρὸς τὸ βαστάζειν τὰ σκουτάρια αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς τὸ περιπατεῖν
5 μετ' αὐτῶν καὶ φυλάττειν ἑαυτοὺς καλῶς καὶ ἀντιμάχεσθαι πρὸς ὁμοίους αὐτῶν σκουταράτους. καὶ ἀπλῶς οὕτως, ἵνα γυμνάσῃς αὐτοὺς ὥστε εἶναι ἐπιτηδείους εἰς ἅπαντας τοὺς πολεμικοὺς ἀγῶνας. ποιήσον δὲ εἰς αὐτοὺς καὶ ἄρχοντας, δεκάρχους, πεντηκοντάρχους καὶ ἑκατοντάρχους, ἵνα, ἐπεὶ οἱ ὄρδινοι τῆς παραταγῆς εἰς
10 μῆκος ἀπὸ ἑκατὸν ὀρδίνων ὀφείλουσιν ἔχειν, ὁ μὲν ἑκατόνταρχος ἵνα στήκῃ μέσον τῶν ἑκατὸν καὶ τελειοῖ τὸν ὄρδινον τῆς παραταγῆς, ὁ δὲ πεντηκόνταρχος ἵνα στήκῃ μετὰ τῶν πεντήκοντα εἰς τὴν ἄκρην τῆς παραταγῆς καὶ ἄλλος πάλιν πεντηκόνταρχος ἵνα στήκῃ ὁμοίως (μετὰ) τῶν πεντήκοντα εἰς τὴν ἄλλην ἄκρην τῆς παραταγῆς καὶ ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἵνα ποιῶσιν ὄρδινον ἓνα. 2. ἔστωσαν δὲ καὶ
15 κοντουβέρνια αὐτῶν καὶ συγγενεῖς μετὰ συγγενῶν καὶ φίλοι μετὰ φίλων καὶ ἐπὶ ἀπλήκτου καὶ ἐπὶ παραταγῆς καὶ ἐπὶ ὁδοιπορίας καὶ ἐπὶ παντὸς πράγματος. ὀφείλει δὲ συσταθῆναι ὁ ἀριθμὸς τῶν |
20 τοιούτων πεζῶν, εἰ μὲν ἐστὶ δυνατόν, χιλιάδες ὀκτώ, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον, χιλιάδες ἕξ. 3. ἵνα δὲ ποιῶσι καβάδια κοντὰ μέχρι γονάτων φθάνοντα, ἔχοντα βαμβάκιον καὶ κουκούλιον. τὰ δὲ μανίκια αὐτῶν ἵνα ὦσι (κοντὰ καὶ πλα)τέα, ἔχοντα εἰς τὰς μασχάλας σχίσματα πρὸς τὸ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκεῖθεν τὰς χεῖρας καὶ μάχεσθαι. τὰ δὲ μανίκια αὐτῶν ἵνα κρατῶνται ὀπίσω εἰς τοὺς ὤμους ὑπὸ
25 κομποθηλύκων. ἐχέτωσαν δὲ, εἰ δυνατόν, καὶ ὑποδήματα κοντὰ (διπλᾶ) μέχρι τῶν γονάτων ἢ μονοπλᾶ μέχρι τῶν μηρῶν καὶ μου-

The *Taktika* of Nikephoros Ouranos [Chapters 56 through 65]

56. On The Equipment and Deployment of the Infantry

1. It is best to choose foot soldiers from Byzantines and Armenians, good-sized men and rather young, no older than forty years of age. Then train them properly to carry their shields and to move about with them, to protect themselves capably and to fight against foot soldiers the same as they are. To put it simply, you must train them to be fit for all types of combat. Appoint officers for them, dekarchs, pentekontarchs and hekatontarchs, so that, since the lines of the formation have to be one hundred files across, the hekatontarch will stand in the middle of the hundred and command one line of the formation, while one pentekontarch will stand with his fifty men on one wing of the formation, the other pentekontarch in turn will likewise stand with his fifty men on the other wing of the formation, and the two of them will make up one line. 2. Their *kontoubernia* should be kinsmen with kinsmen and friends with friends in camp, in battle formation, on the march, and in every situation. The number of these infantrymen should come to eight thousand, if possible; if not, six thousand. 3. Have them prepare short tunics extending to the knees, of cotton or coarse silk. Their sleeves must be short and broad with slits up to the pit of the arm so that they can put their arms out and fight. Their sleeves must be fastened with loops and buttons back behind their shoulders. They should have, if possible, short boots, folded up to the knees or unfolded up to the thighs, or else *mouzakia* or *tzerboulia*, and thick caps

9 ἑκατοντάρχους: χιλιάρχους cod. 12 μετὰ: μέσον cod. 14 μετὰ supplevi | post πεντήκοντα scr. cod. μέσον quod deleui 22 κοντὰ καὶ πλατέα restitui: cf. *PM* I.¹⁷ 26 διπλᾶ restitui: cf. *PM* I.²¹

ζάκια καὶ τζεβρούλια, καὶ καμαλαύκια παχέα ἀπὸ κενδούκλων
κρατούμενα ἐπάνω μετὰ φακεωλίων, καὶ σπαθία ζωστήκια καὶ τζι-
κούρια καὶ σιδηροράβδια, ἵνα ἄλλος μετὰ τοῦτου τοῦ ἄρματος καὶ
30 ἄλλος μετ' ἐκείνου πολεμῇ, ὥς ἔχει εὐκολίαν εἰς ἕκαστος. ἐχέτω-
σαν δὲ πάντες καὶ τὰ σφενδοβόλια εἰς τὰ ζωνάρια αὐτῶν. ἔστωσαν
δὲ καὶ τὰ σκουτάρια μὴ μικρότερα τῶν ἐξ σπιθαμῶν, ἀλλ' εἰ ἐστὶ
δυνατόν, ἔστωσαν καὶ μεγαλώτερα. καὶ τὰ κοντάρια αὐτῶν παχέα
καὶ ἰσχυρά, εἴτε ἀπὸ τριάκοντα σπιθαμῶν εἴτε ἀπὸ εἴκοσι πέντε
35 τὸ μῆκος. καὶ τὰ ξιφάρια αὐτῶν ἐπιτήδεια καὶ τὰ κουσπία. 4.
ὀφείλεις δὲ ἐπιλέξασθαι καὶ τοξότας ἐπιτηδεῖους, τοὺς λεγομέν-
ους ψιλοὺς, χιλιάδας τέσσαρας. οἵτινες ἐχέτωσαν ἀπὸ σαγιτῶν
πεντήκοντα εἰς τὰ κούκουρα αὐτῶν καὶ ἀπὸ τοξαρίων δύο καὶ
σκουτάρια μικρὰ καὶ κόρδας περισσάς. ἐχέτωσαν δὲ καὶ σπαθία
40 ζωστήκια εἴτε τζικούρια καὶ τὰ σφενδοβόλα εἰς τὰ ζωνάρια
αὐτῶν. ἔστωσαν δὲ καὶ ὑπὸ δεκάρχους καὶ ἑκατοντάρχους καὶ
χιλιάρχους. 5. ἡ δὲ παραταγὴ τῶν τοιούτων πεζῶν, καὶ τῶν σκουτ-
αράτων καὶ τῶν ψιλῶν, ἔστω τετράγωνος, ἣν ἔλεγον οἱ παλαιοὶ
τετράπλευρον. ἐχέτω δὲ κατὰ ἓν ἕκαστον μέρος ἀνὰ παραταγὰς
45 τρεῖς πρὸς τὸ εἶναι ὁμοῦ διὰ τῶν τεσσάρων πλευρῶν παραταγὰς
δώδεκα. ἐχέτω δὲ μία ἐκάστη ἐπτὰ ὀρδίνους εἰς μῆκος ἀπὸ ἑκατὸν
ἀνδρῶν. τὸ δὲ πάχος αὐτῆς ἔστω, ὥς εἴρηται, ἄνδρες ἐπτὰ. καὶ δύο
μὲν ὀρδῖνοι σκουταράτων ἔστωσαν ἔμπροσθεν εἰς τὸ μέτωπον τῆς
παραταγῆς. ὀπισθεν δὲ αὐτῶν στηκέτωσαν τοξοτῶν ὀρδῖνοι τρεῖς,
50 καὶ πάλιν ὀπίσω τῶν τοξοτῶν, σκουταράτων ὀρδῖνοι δύο. ἔστωσαν
δὲ αἱ παραταγαὶ κεχωρισμέναι ἀπὸ ἁλλήλων τοσοῦτον, ὅσον ἵνα
χωρῇ ἓν ἕκαστον διαχώρισμα καβαλλαρίους δεκαπέντε ἢ καὶ
δώδεκα πρὸς τὸ ἐμβαίνειν καὶ ἐκβαίνειν εἰς αὐτὰ τοὺς πολεμοῦν-
τας καὶ πολεμεῖν. εἰ δ' ἐστὶ τὸ καβαλλαρικὸν ἡμῶν ὀλίγον, ἔχουσι
55 δὲ οἱ ἐχθροὶ πεζικόν, ὀφείλουσιν ἀπομεῖναι διαχωρίσματα ὅκτω
πρὸς τὸ εἶναι αὐτοὺς ἐν πολλῇ ἀσφαλείᾳ. 6. εἰς δὲ τὰ εἰρημένα
διαχωρίσματα, ἃν μὲν ὦσι ριπταρισταί, εἴτε Ῥῶσοι εἴτε ἄλλοι ἐθ-
νικοί, ὀφείλουσιν ἵστασθαι κατὰ ἓν ἕκαστον διαχώρισμα, ἄνδρες
πεντήκοντα ἢ τεσσαράκοντα ἢ τριάκοντα. ἵνα δὲ στήκωσιν εἰς τὸν
60 ἀργὸν καὶ εὐκαιρον τόπον τοῦ διαχωρίσματος, πλὴν μὴ ἔμπροσθεν
εἰς τὸ μέτωπον τῆς παραταγῆς, ἀλλὰ μάλλον κατὰ ἴσα τοῦ ὀπίσω
μέρους τῆς παραταγῆς τῶν σκουταράτων, καὶ ἵνα βλέπωσιν ὀρθὰ
πρὸς τὸ στόμα τοῦ διαχωρίσματος. ὀφείλουσι δὲ εἶναι ὀπισθεν

N110*

35 ξιφάρια: σκουτάρια cod. cf. *PM I*.³¹ 53-54 πολεμοῦντας: πολεμίους cod. 56 πολλῇ: πολλῶν cod.

of felt fastened over their heads with bands of cloth, as well as swords at
the waist, axes, and iron maces, so that one man fights with one weapon,
the next with another, just as each feels comfortable. All should carry
slings in their belts. Their shields must not be smaller than six *spithamai*
and should be even larger if possible. Their spears should be thick and
solid, from twenty-five to thirty *spithamai* in length. Their points and fas-
tenings should be fit for the task. 4. You must select proficient archers, the
so-called light infantry—four thousand. These men must have fifty arrows
each in their quivers, two bows, small shields, and extra bowstrings. Let
them also have swords at the waist, or axes, and slings in their belts. They
too are to be under dekarchs, hekatontarchs, and chiliarchs. 5. The forma-
tion of these foot soldiers, heavy infantrymen and light, is to be a square,
which the ancients called “a four-sided formation.” It should have three
units on each side so that altogether there are twelve units on four sides.
Each unit must have seven lines one hundred men long. Its depth, as
noted, must be seven men. Two rows of heavy infantrymen must be in
front in the face of the formation. Behind them stand three rows of ar-
chers, with two rows of infantrymen in turn behind the archers. These
units must be set far enough apart from one another to permit space in
each interval for twelve to fifteen cavalrymen, so that the combatants can
move in and out through them and fight. If our cavalry force is small and
the enemy has infantry, eight intervals should be left so that they are in a
very secure position. 6. Inside these intervals just described, if there are
javeliners, either *Rhosoi* or other foreigners, they must be positioned inside
each interval—fifty, forty, or thirty men. Have them stand in the empty,
open space of the interval—not up in front in the face of the formation,
but instead at a position level with the back line of the infantry formation.
They must keep their eyes directly on the opening of the interval. Behind

αὐτῶν καὶ τοξόται πεζοὶ καὶ σφενδοβολισταὶ πρὸς τὴν ποσότητα
 65 τοῦ λαοῦ. 7. οἱ δὲ σκουταράτοι ὀφείλουσιν ἴστασθαι εἰς τὸ μέτω-
 πον τῆς παραταγῆς δύο καὶ εἰς τὴν οὐρὰν δύο, καὶ μέσον αὐτῆς
 τοξόται ψιλοὶ τρεῖς πρὸς τὸ ἔχειν τὸ πάχος τῆς παραταγῆς ἄνδρας
 ἑπτὰ. εὐρίσκομεν γὰρ τοὺς παλαιοὺς Μακεδόνας ὅτι ἐποίουν τὸ
 70 πάχος τῆς φάλαγγος ἀνδρῶν δεκαεξί, ἄλλοτε δὲ καὶ δώδεκα καὶ
 δέκα. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνοι διὰ τοῦτο ἐποίουν αὐτό, διότι εἶχον πολεμίους
 βασταζομένους ὑπὸ ἐλεφάντων. ἀπελύοντο δὲ καὶ θηρία εἰς τὰς
 παραταγὰς, καθὼς εὐρίσκομεν ὅτι ἐποίησαν καὶ οἱ Αἰθίοπες πρὸς
 τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον τὸν Μακεδόνα. ἐποίουν δὲ τότε καὶ ἄλλας ἐπι-
 75 νοίας εἰς τοὺς πολέμους, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἶχεν ἀπὸ ἀνδρῶν δεκαεξί
 τὸ πάχος τῆς παραταγῆς. ἄρτι δὲ οὐκ ἐνεργοῦσιν αἱ τοιαῦται πα-
 ραταγαί, ἐπειδὴ καὶ οἱ Σαρακηνοὶ πολὺ ὀλιγώθησαν πρὸς τὸ
 πλῆθος τῶν ἀνδρῶν ὅπερ εἶχον εἰς τοὺς πολέμους οἱ παλαιοί. 8.
 οἱ δὲ ἡμέτεροι χιλιάρχοι ἄρτιως ἐχέτωσαν ὑπὸ τὴν ἐξουσίαν
 80 αὐτῶν ἀπὸ ἀνδρῶν τετρακοσίων σκουταράτων καὶ τριακοσίων
 ψιλῶν. ἐχέτωσαν δὲ οἱ αὐτοὶ χιλιάρχοι καὶ ἀπὸ ἄλλων ἀνδρῶν
 τριακοσίων πρὸς ἀναπλήρωσιν τῶν χιλίων, ἵνα οἱ μὲν διακόσιοι
 ὦσι ριπταρισταὶ καὶ σφενδοβολισταὶ καὶ τοξόται, οἱ δὲ ἑκατὸν
 ἵνα ἔχωσι μεναύλια παχέα ἔχοντα τὸ μήκος ἀπὸ ἓν ἡμισυ οὐργυ-
 85 ῶν εἴτε καὶ ἀπὸ δύο, τὰ δὲ ξιφάρια αὐτῶν ἵνα ἔχωσιν ἀπὸ μιᾶς
 ἡμίσεος σπιθαμῆς εἴτε καὶ ἀπὸ δύο, ἵνα, γινομένου πολέμου, αἱ
 μὲν παραταγαὶ ἰστώνται ἀτάραχοι, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐκβαίνωσιν ἐκ τῶν
 εἰρημένων διαχωρισμάτων καὶ μάχωνται πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους.
 καὶ ὅσοι ἐξ αὐτῶν ἢ (πληγὰς) λαμβάνουσιν ἢ ἀτονοῦσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ
 90 κόπου, ἵνα ἐμβαίνωσι πάλιν διὰ τῶν τοιούτων διαχωρισμάτων καὶ
 φυλάττωνται ὑπὸ τῶν παραταγῶν καὶ ἀναπαύωνται. 9. οἱ δὲ αὐτοὶ
 διακόσιοι ριπταρισταὶ καὶ τοξόται καὶ σφενδοβολισταὶ ὀφείλου-
 σιν ἴστασθαι εἰς τὰ διαχωρίσματα τῶν παραταγῶν καὶ φυλάττειν
 τὰ ἐμβασίδια αὐτῶν. μὴ στήκωσι δὲ κατὰ τὰ ἴσα τοῦ μετώπου τῶν
 σκουταράτων. καὶ ὀπισθεν πάλιν τῶν αὐτῶν προμάχων ἵνα στήκη
 95 ἡ λοιπὴ παραταγὴ αὐτῶν, οἷον οἱ λοιποὶ ριπταρισταὶ καὶ οἱ τοξό-
 ται καὶ οἱ σφενδοβολισταί. μόνοι δὲ οἱ ἑκατὸν τῶν μεναυλάτων
 στηκέτωσαν ἔμπροσθεν μετὰ τῶν αὐτῶν προμάχων εἰς τὸ μέτωπον
 τῆς παραταγῆς αὐτῶν. ἀρμόζει δὲ πάντας τοὺς ριπταριστὰς καὶ
 τοὺς μεναυλάτους ἔχειν σκουτάρια μικροτέρα τῶν

79 τριακοσίων: τετρακοσίων cod. 88 πληγὰς supplevi 91 post σφενδοβολισταὶ scr. cod. οὐκ quod
 delevi 96 μεναυλάτων: μεναύλων cod. 97 προμάχων: προβάτων cod. 99 μεναυλάτους: μεναύ-
 λους cod.

them should be archers on foot and slingers in numbers conforming to the
 quantity of the host. 7. The infantry should be arrayed two deep in the
 face of the formation and two deep in the rear, and in its middle are three
 rows of archers so that the depth of the formation is seven men. For we
 find that the ancient Macedonians used to make their phalanx sixteen men
 deep, sometimes twelve or ten, but they did so for the reason that they had
 80 enemies borne by elephants. Wild beasts were also set loose against their
 formations, just as we find the Ethiopians did against Alexander the
 Great. In those days they employed other devices in their wars so the depth
 of the formation was sixteen men. Nowadays these formations are not
 effective, and even the Saracens are greatly reduced in depth when com-
 pared with the large number of men the ancients had in their wars. 8. Our
 chiliarchs should have under their command no less than four hundred
 infantry and three hundred light archers. These chiliarchs should have
 another three hundred men to make a full complement of one thousand.
 Two hundred must be javeliners, slingers, and archers, and one hundred
 must have thick *menavlia* with a length of one and a half or two *ourguiai*
 while their points must have a length of one and a half or two *spithamai*,
 so that, when battle begins, the units will calmly form up while these men
 will move out through the aforementioned intervals and engage the enemy.
 Those receiving wounds or worn out by fatigue can come back in again
 through these intervals and find relief under the protection of the infantry
 units. 9. These two hundred javeliners, archers, and slingers should take
 up their positions inside the intervals between the units and guard their
 entrances. They must not stand alongside the front lines of the infantry.
 The rest of their unit, that is, the remaining javeliners, archers, and sling-
 ers, must in turn stand behind the soldiers in the front ranks. Only the one
 hundred *menavlatoi* should stand in with the front ranks in the face of
 their formation. All the javeliners and *menavlatoi* should have shields

- 100 <.....> μετὰ τῆς λοιπῆς αὐτῶν ἐξοπλίσεως. οἱ δὲ τοιοῦτοι μεναυλάτοι εἰς τοῦτο ὀφείλουσιν ἐνεργεῖν. ἂν μάθωσιν οἱ ἐχθροὶ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡμῶν παραταγῶν καὶ ποιήσωσι καταφράκτους καβαλλαρίους πρὸς τὸ εἶναι ἐν ἀσφαλείᾳ καὶ αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰ ἵππάρια αὐτῶν ὑπὸ τῶν ἄρματων, καὶ κλάσωσιν οἱ αὐτοὶ
- 105 κατάφρακτοι τὰ κοντάρια τῶν σκουταράτων καὶ παραλύσωσι τὰς παραταγὰς ἡμῶν, τότε, ἵνα ὧσιν ἐξ ἐτοίμου οἱ μεναυλάτοι ὀπισθεν, καὶ εἰς οἷον μέρος ἴδωσιν ὅτι ὥρμησαν οἱ κατάφρακτοι τῶν ἐχθρῶν, παραυτὰ ἵνα ἐκβαίνωσιν οἱ αὐτοὶ μεναυλάτοι ἀπὸ τῶν εἰρημένων διαχωρισμάτων καὶ στήκωσιν ἔμπροσθεν τῆς παραταγῆς τῶν σκουταράτων. πλὴν ἵνα μὴ μακρύνωσιν ἐξ αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὧσι σύγκολλα μετὰ τῶν αὐτῶν σκουταράτων. 10. τότε δὲ ἀρμόζει μίσγειν καὶ τοὺς δύο ὀρδίνους τῶν πεζῶν καὶ ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς ἓνα, οἷον εἰς ὀρδινὸς ἵνα ἐμβῇ εἰς τὸν ἄλλον καὶ οἱ ἐπτά ἄνδρες ἵνα γένωνται δεκατέσσαρες καὶ πυκνώσωσι τὴν παραταγὴν. οἱ δὲ μεναυλάτοι ἵνα ἰστώνται καὶ ἀπαντῶσι γενναίως τὴν ὀρμὴν τῶν καταφράκτων καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν πολεμίων καὶ στρέφωσιν αὐτούς. 11. τὰ δὲ μέναυλα αὐτῶν μὴ ὧσιν ἀπὸ ξύλων πελεκητῶν, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ νεακίων ἢ δρυῶν ἢ κρανεῶν ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν λεγομένων ἀρτζηκιδίων ἢ καὶ ἀπὸ ἄλλου ξύλου ἰσχυροῦ. εἰ δὲ οὐχ εὐρίσκονται
- 120 αὐτοφυῆ ξύλα, γενέσθωσαν τὰ τοιαῦτα μέναυλα καὶ ἀπὸ ξύλων πελεκητῶν, πλὴν ἔστωσαν ἀπὸ ἰσχυρῶν (ξύλων) καὶ παχέα τοσοῦτον, ὅσον δύνανται χεῖρες κυβερνᾶν. ἀρμόζει δὲ εἶναι τοὺς μεναυλάτους ἀνδρείους καὶ ἰσχυροὺς. 12. οἱ δὲ ῥιπταρισταὶ ὀφείλουσιν ἐξέρχεσθαι ἀπὸ πάντων τῶν διαχωρισμάτων τῶν παραταγῶν καὶ συμβάλλειν πόλεμον μετὰ τῶν καταφράκτων ἐχθρῶν καὶ περισπᾶν αὐτούς. 13. εἰ δ' ἐπέλθῃ καὶ πεζικὴ παραταγὴ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, τότε χωρισθῆτωσαν εἰς δύο τάξεις οἱ μεναυλάτοι μετὰ τῶν ῥιπταριστῶν. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἡμίσεις ἀπελθέτωσαν εἰς τὸ ἀριστερὸν κέρας, ἡγουν τὸ ἄκρον τῆς παραταγῆς ἡμῶν, οἱ δὲ ἡμίσεις πρὸς τὸ δεξιόν.
- 130 καὶ ἐπεὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κέρατα εἰς τὴν ἄκραν ὡς σίγμα κάμπτουσιν, ἵνα προσβάλωσιν ἐκ τῶν δύο μερῶν οἱ αὐτοὶ μεναυλάτοι μετὰ τῶν ῥιπταριστῶν εἰς τὰ πλάγια τῆς παραταγῆς τῶν ἐχθρῶν καὶ παραλύωσιν αὐτούς. εἰ δὲ ἡ παραταγὴ τῶν σκουταράτων τῶν πολεμίων τετράπλευρός ἐστιν, ὀφείλουσι καὶ οἱ μεναυλάτοι καὶ οἱ ῥιπταρισταὶ βοηθεῖν εἰς ἐκεῖνο τὸ μέτωπον τῆς παραταγῆς, ὅπου ἡ μάχη γίνεται, καὶ συναγωνίζεσθαι τοῖς σκουταράτοις πρὸς τὸ μὴ παρα-

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smaller than those . . . with the rest of their equipment. The *menavlatoi* must perform in this way. If the enemy has learned of our infantry units and they prepare *kataphraktoi* so as to protect themselves and their horses with armor, these *kataphraktoi* will shatter the spears of the infantrymen and break up our units, so, in that event, the *menavlatoi* must be at the ready in the back and on whichever side they see the enemy *kataphraktoi* attacking, those *menavlatoi* must immediately move out through the aforementioned intervals and take their places in front of the infantry formation. They must certainly not be at any great distance from them, however, but must instead be closely attached to these infantrymen. 10. It is then necessary to combine two files of infantry and make them into one file, meaning that one file must move over into the next so that the seven men will become fourteen and thicken the formation. The *menavlatoi* must stand their ground and bravely meet the charge of the *kataphraktoi* and the rest of the enemy and turn them away. 11. Their *menavla* must not be made from wood cut into sections but from saplings of oak, cornel, the so-called *artzekidia*, or from another hard wood. If trees in one piece cannot be found, let these *menavla* be made from trees cut into sections, but they have to be of hard wood and as thick as hands can wield. The *menavlatoi* have to be courageous and strong. 12. The javeliners must move out through all the intervals between the infantry divisions and join battle with the enemy *kataphraktoi* and divert them. 13. If the enemy infantry force comes to the attack, then the *menavlatoi* must be divided into two units along with the javeliners. Have half of them move out to the left wing, that is, out to the flank of our formation, and half out to the right. When these columns on the flank curve like a letter C, the *menavlatoi* and javeliners should make an attack from both sides against the flanks of the enemy formation and break them up. If the enemy infantry formation is a square, the *menavlatoi* and javeliners must assist that side of the formation where battle is under way and fight alongside the infantry so that they

100 spat. vac. 15 fere litt.: cf. *PM I*.⁹⁵⁻⁹⁷ 121 ξύλων supplevi

λυθῆναι αὐτούς. 14. ἀρμόζει δὲ ὀπισθεν τῶν σκονταράτων τῶν περιπατούντων εἰς τὴν οὐρὰν τῆς παραταγῆς ἀκολουθεῖν καὶ βορδώνια ἢ μουλάρια βαστάζοντα (τὰς) βασιλικὰς σαγίτας μιᾶς ἐκάστης παραταγῆς, χιλιάδας δεκαπέντε, πρὸς τὸ εἶναι ὁμοῦ τὸ πᾶν σαγίτας χιλιάδας ἑκατὸν ὀγδοήκοντα ἢ καὶ διακοσίας. εἰ δὲ καὶ τετρακόσiai χιλιάδες εἰσὶ σαγίται, τοῦτο ἐστὶ κρεῖττον, πρὸς τὸ ἔχειν τοὺς τριακοσίους τοξότας ἀπὸ πενήκοντα σαγιτῶν χωρὶς τῶν ιδίων κουκούρων. ὀφείλει δὲ ὁ χιλίαρχος διαχωρίσαι πρῶτον 145 τὰς σαγίτας καὶ ποιῆσαι αὐτὰς ἀπὸ πενήκοντα καὶ συνδῆσαι μίαν ἐκαστὴν πενηκοντάδα καὶ ἀποθεῖναι (αὐτὰς) εἰς τὰς θήκας αὐτῶν, εἴτε ἄρκλαι εἰσὶν εἴτε βουτζία. ἀρμόζει δὲ ἀφορισθῆναι καὶ ἐκ τῶν σφενδοβολιστῶν καὶ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ περισεΐαν τοξοτῶν ἀπὸ μιᾶς ἐκαστῆς παραταγῆς ἄνδρας ὀκτὼ ἢ καὶ δέκα πρὸς τὸ φέρειν 150 σαγίτας τοῖς τοξόταις καὶ μὴ σκύλλεσθαι αὐτούς τὸ σύνολον ἐκ τῆς παραταγῆς αὐτῶν. οἱ δὲ αὐτοὶ ὀφείλουσιν ὕδωρ εἰς ἀσκούς φέρειν, βαστάζοντες καὶ καυκία πρὸς τὸ παραμυθεῖσθαι τὴν δίψαν τῶν ἀγωνιζομένων. ἄλλοι δὲ πάλιν ἀφορισθήτωσαν πρὸς τὸ φέρειν λιθάρια τοῖς σφενδοβολισταῖς. 15. ἀρμόζει τὸν στρατηγὸν 155 ἔχειν καὶ χειρομάγγανα μικρά, ἡλακάτια τρία, καὶ στρεπτὸν μετὰ λαμπροῦ καὶ χειροσίφωνα, ἢ ἵνα, ἂν ἔχωσιν οἱ ἐχθροὶ παραταγὴν ἴσην καὶ ὁμοίαν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ, γένηται ἡ παραταγὴ ἡμῶν δυνατωτέρα ἀπὸ τῶν χειρομαγγάνων καὶ τοῦ λαμπροῦ καὶ παραλύση αὐτήν.

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57. Περὶ τῶν καβαλλαρικῶν παραταγῶν

1. (Α)ἱ δὲ καβαλλαρικαὶ παραταγαὶ ὀφείλουσιν ἴστασθαι ὀπισθεν τῶν πεζῶν μετὰ τάξεως κεχωρισμένοι, αἱ μὲν τῶν ταγμάτων πάλιν ἰδίᾳ, (αἱ δὲ τῶν θεμάτων) χωρὶς μετὰ τῶν τουρμῶν καὶ τῶν βάνδων αὐτῶν. πλὴν μὴ στηκέτωσαν αἱ παραταγαὶ τῶν 5 καβαλλαρίων ἐγγὺς τῶν πεζῶν, ἀλλ' ἔστω μέσον αὐτῶν οἶον ἀπὸ τῆς οὐρᾶς τῶν πεζῶν καὶ μέχρι τῶν καβαλλαρίων ὡς ἄχρι τεσσάρων οὐργυῶν ἢ τριῶν τόπος ἀργός. καὶ ἔσωθεν τῶν πεζῶν γύρωθεν στηκέτωσαν οἱ αὐτοὶ πολεμισταὶ καβαλλάριοι, τὰ δὲ συρτὰ

139 τὰς βασιλικὰς σαγίτας: βασιλικὴν σαγιταν cod. 146 αὐτὰς supplevi 155 ἡλακάτια: ἀλακάτια cod.

3 αἱ . . . θεμάτων supplevi

are not broken up. 14. Behind the infantrymen marching at the rear of the formation should follow the mules or donkeys carrying the "imperial" arrows of each division, fifteen thousand, so that all in all there are 180,000 to 200,000 arrows. If there are four hundred thousand arrows, so much the better, so that the three hundred archers will have fifty arrows apart from their own quivers. The chiliarch must first divide the arrows, put them in groups of fifty, bind together each bundle of fifty and put them away in their containers, either boxes or casks. It is best to detail eight to ten men from the slingers or extra archers in each unit to carry arrows to the archers so they are not put to the trouble of having to leave their position at all. The same men must also fetch water in waterskins and relieve the thirst of the combatants by carrying around bowls of water. Still other men must be detailed to bring stones to the slingers. 15. The commander should have on hand small *cheiromangana*, three *elakatia*, a swivel tube with liquid fire, and a hand pump, so that, if the enemy has a force equal in number and comparable to our own, our force will be the stronger because of the *cheiromangana* and liquid fire and destroy theirs.

57. On the Cavalry Divisions

1. The cavalry divisions must line up separately behind the foot soldiers in good order, those of the *tagmata* by themselves apart from those of the *themata* with their *tourmai* and *banda*. The cavalry divisions must not, however, line up close by the foot soldiers, but there should be an empty space of up to three to four *ourguiai* between the cavalry and the rear lines of the foot soldiers. The cavalry soldiers should line up inside the surrounding infantry, with their spare horses behind them and the

- αὐτῶν ὀπίσω αὐτῶν καὶ μέσον τὸ τοῦλδον. ὀφείλουσι δὲ καταλει-
 10 φθῆναι καὶ στραταί, καθὼς στήκει ἐν ἑκαστον τάγμα καὶ θέμα,
 πρὸς τὸ διαβαίνειν ἀνεμποδίστως καὶ τὸν λαὸν καὶ τὰς ἀποκρί-
 σεις. 2. ὁ δὲ στρατὸς οὐκ ὀφείλει ἔχειν πολλὰ σαγμαρία καὶ φύρ-
 σιν λαοῦ, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πλῆθος τοῦ χυδαίου λαοῦ καὶ τῶν σαγμαρ-
 15 ίων ἵνα καταλιμπάνῃ εἰς τὴν ἡμετέραν γῆν. τὰς δὲ ἀρκούσας
 χρείας ἵνα ἔχῃ εἰς τὴν πολεμίαν γῆν, πλὴν καὶ αὐτὰς συμμέτρους
 καὶ οὐχὶ μετ' ἀπληστίας καὶ τρυφῆς. 3. καὶ οἱ μὲν σκουταράτοι, εἰ
 ἐστὶ δυνατόν, περιπατεῖτωσαν πανταχόθεν πεζοί, ἔχοντες σύνδυο
 20 βορδώνιον ἐν πρὸς τὸ βαστάζειν τὰ σκουτάρια καὶ τὰς χρείας
 αὐτῶν. ἐχέτωσαν δὲ οἱ αὐτοὶ σκουταράτοι καὶ συντέσσαρες ἄν-
 θρωπον ἓνα τὸν ὀφείλοντα εἰς καιρὸν πολέμου φυλάττειν τὰ ἱππάρια
 καὶ τὰ πράγματα καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς χρείας αὐτῶν. ὅσοι δὲ οὐ δύναν-
 ται διὰ τὸ μῆκος πολλάκις καὶ διὰ τὸν κόπον ἀκολουθεῖν καβαλ-
 25 λαρίοις πεζοί, ἐχέτω εἰς ἑκαστος ἐξ αὐτῶν πρὸς ἐν βορδώνιον τοῦ
 καβαλλικεύειν αὐτὸ καὶ βαστάζειν καὶ τὰς τούτων χρείας.
 ὀφείλει δὲ εἰς ἑκαστος τῶν σκουταράτων φορεῖν τὸ ἴδιον σκου-
 30 τάριον καὶ βαστάζειν τὸ κοντάριον καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἄρματα αὐτοῦ.
 οἱ δὲ ὑπουργοὶ αὐτῶν καὶ ἀκολουθεῖτωσαν πεζοί. 4. ἀρμόζει δὲ
 σκοπεῖν καὶ τοῦτο τὸν ἀρχηγὸν τοῦ στρατοῦ, ἵνα πλησίον ὕδατος
 ποιῇ τὰς παραταγὰς εἰς τὴν ἡμέραν τοῦ πολέμου πρὸς τὸ μὴ παρα-
 35 τάξει ἀσκόπως εἰς ἀνύδρους τόπους καὶ ἀπολέσαι τὸ στρατεύμα
 αὐτοῦ. οὕτως ἀρμόζει ποιῆσαι τὴν ἀνάμικτον παραταγὴν τῶν
 πεζῶν καὶ τῶν καβαλλαρίων καθὼς ἀνωτέρω εἵπομεν. 5. καὶ ἂν
 μὲν ἐπέρχωνται οἱ ἐχθροὶ κατὰ τῶν ἡμετέρων παραταγῶν, ἵνα |
 προαποστείλῃς σύ, ὁ ἄρχων τοῦ στρατοῦ, καβαλλαρίους πεντα-
 35 κοσίους ἢ τριακοσίους, οὐχὶ καταφράκτους καὶ βαρεῖς, ἀλλ' ἐλα-
 φροὺς καὶ ἀσφαλεῖς, οὓς ἔλεγον οἱ παλαιοὶ προκουρσάτορας. οἵτι-
 νες φορεῖτωσαν τὰ κλιβάνια αὐτῶν καὶ μόνα, καὶ ἀπελθέτωσαν
 πρὸς τὸ ἀπαντῆσαι τοῖς πολεμίοις. εἰ ἐνδέχεται δέ, ποιησάτωσαν
 οἱ αὐτοὶ προκουρσάτορες καὶ ἔγκρυμμα, ἵνα, ἂν ἐρχωνται οἱ ἐχ-
 40 θροὶ ἀτάκτως καὶ ἀσκόπως, κλασματίσωσι τοὺς προκουρσάτορας
 αὐτῶν καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἵνα ἐμβῇ δειλία καὶ εἰς τὸ φοσσᾶτον αὐτῶν.
 καὶ ἅμα ἵνα καὶ ἐκ τῶν δεσμίων, ὧν ἔχουσι κρατῆσαι οἱ προκουρ-
 σάτορες ἡμῶν, δυνηθῇς μαθεῖν τὰς βουλὰς αὐτῶν καὶ πόσος ἐστὶν
 ὁ στρατὸς αὐτῶν. 6. ὅταν δὲ οἱ τοιοῦτοι προκουρσάτορες ἡμῶν,

19-20 ἄνθρωπον: ἄνθρωποι cod. 24 καβαλλικεύειν: καβαλικεύειν cod. 32-33 καὶ . . . ἵνα iter. in
 init. f. 112^r 42 δεσμίων: δύο δεσμίων cod.

baggage train in the center. Avenues must be left clear, according to the
 position of each *tagma* or *thema*, so that both the host and dispatches can
 get through without hindrance. 2. The army must not have many baggage
 animals or a throng of people, but should leave the better part of the
 noncombatants and baggage animals behind in our own territory. It
 should have sufficient supplies in enemy territory, but in moderation and
 in no wise in excess or luxury. 3. The infantrymen are to travel everywhere
 on foot if they can, each pair of men with one mule to carry their shields
 and necessities. Every four of these infantrymen must also have one man
 whose responsibility it is in time of battle to keep watch over their horses,
 goods, and the rest of their necessities. Those unable to keep up with the
 cavalry on foot, as often happens because of distance or fatigue, must
 have, each one of them, an extra mule to ride on and to carry their necessi-
 ties. Each one of the infantrymen must wear his own shield and carry his
 spear and the rest of his equipment. Their attendants must follow along
 on foot. 4. The commander of the army must see to it that he prepares his
 formations close by a source of water on the day of battle lest he bring
 ruin on his force by heedlessly deploying in places without water. It is
 necessary to prepare the combined deployment of infantry and cavalry as
 we have described above. 5. If the enemy is advancing toward our units,
 you, the commander of the army, must send ahead five hundred or three
 hundred cavalrymen—not heavy *kataphraktoi*, but light and elusive—the
 ones the ancients called *prokoursatores*. They must be wearing their *kli-*
bania only, and should move out to intercept the enemy. These *prokoursa-*
tores should set ambushes if they get the chance, so that, if the enemy is
 advancing without order or reconnaissance, they will injure their *prokour-*
satores so that their terror will spread to their main force. At the same
 time, you will be able to find out their plans and the size of their army
 from the prisoners our *prokoursatores* will capture. 6. When our *prokoursa-*

45 οἱ καβαλλάριοι, προαπαντήσωσι τοῖς πολεμίοις καὶ συμβάλωσι
 μάχην μετ' αὐτῶν καὶ γένηται κραυγὴ, ἂν θελήσῃ καὶ ὁ λοιπὸς
 λαὸς τῶν πολεμίων καταδιῶξαι τοὺς ἡμετέρους, καὶ ἐπίκεινται
 καὶ συνέχουσιν αὐτοὺς οἱ ἐχθροί, ὀφείλεις, πρὸς τὸ μὴ κινδυνεῦσαι
 50 αὐτοὺς, ἀποστεῖλαι καὶ πρώτην καὶ δευτέραν καὶ τρίτην παρα-
 ταγὴν καβαλλαρίων καὶ δοῦναι βοήθειαν αὐτοῖς διωκομένοις καὶ
 κλασματίσαι τοὺς ἐχθροὺς. ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ καὶ σὺ ὀπισθεν τῶν
 παραταγῶν εὐτάκτως μετὰ τῶν τεσσάρων παραταγῶν ὧν ἔχεις,
 καθὼς κάτωθεν ἐροῦμεν περὶ τῆς καβαλλαρικῆς παρατάξεως λεπ-
 55 τομερέστερον. 7. εἰ δὲ οἱ ἐχθροὶ συνέχουσι τοὺς προαποσταλέν-
 τας προκουρσάτορας ἡμῶν καβαλλαρίους, ἄφες αὐτοὺς ἕως οὗ
 πλησιάσουσι ταῖς πεζικαῖς παραταγαῖς. καὶ τότε ἐξαίφνης ἵνα ἐξ-
 ἔρχωνται ἐκ τῶν διαχωρισμάτων τῶν πεζικῶν παραταγῶν καβαλ-
 60 λαρिकाὶ παραταγαί, εἴπερ εἰσὶ καὶ ἄλλαι, ἵνα ἐξέρχωνται
 καὶ αὐταί. εἴτα ὀπισθεν αὐτῶν ἵνα ἐξέλθῃ καὶ σὺ, ὁ ἀρχηγός,
 μετὰ τῶν τεσσάρων καβαλλαρικῶν παραταγῶν καὶ ἀκολουθῇς
 μετὰ συντάξεως ὀπισθεν αὐτῶν. καὶ ἂν μὲν τραπῶσιν οἱ ἐχθροί,
 65 φύλαττε τὰς τέσσαρας παραταγὰς ἀπαρασαλεύτους, ἕως οὗ ἴδῃς
 τὴν τελείαν αὐτῶν κατάλυσιν. καὶ ὅταν ἴδῃς ὅτι τελείως κατελύ-
 θησαν καὶ μάθῃς παρὰ δεσμίων καὶ παρὰ προσφύγων ὅτι ἄλλην
 70 τινὰ δύναμιν, οὔτε καβαλλαρικὴν οὔτε πεζικὴν, ἔχουσιν, ἀλλὰ
 μόνοι ἦσαν οἱ τραπέντες, τότε τὰς δύο παραταγὰς ἀπόστειλον εἰς
 καταδιώξιν αὐτῶν. τὰς δὲ ἄλλας δύο ἔχε μετὰ σαντοῦ ἀπαρασα-
 75 λεύτους πρὸς τὸ εἶναι αὐτὰς εἰς σύστασιν καὶ ὠφελείαν ὅλου τοῦ
 καταδιώκοντος λαοῦ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς. ὀφείλει δὲ καὶ τὸ πεζικόν, καὶ
 ὁ λαὸς ὅλος, ἀκολουθεῖν ὀπισθεν μετὰ συντάξεως παρατεταγ-
 μένος πρὸς τὸ μὴ φυρθῆναι τὰς παραταγὰς αὐτῶν. 8. εἰ δὲ οἱ κα-
 80 ταδιώκοντες ἐχθροὶ τοὺς προκουρσάτορας ἡμῶν οὐ πλησιάσουσι
 πρὸς τὰς πεζικὰς παραταγὰς, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ μακρόθεν αὐτῶν σταθῶσι
 συνηγμένοι, ἀπόστειλον τὰς εἰρημένας τρεῖς καβαλλαρικὰς παρα-
 ταγὰς εἰς ἓν μέρος. ἀκολουθεῖτω δὲ μία τῇ ἄλλῃ. ἀπόστειλον δὲ
 καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἄλλου μέρους ἄλλας τρεῖς καὶ ἀκολουθεῖτωσαν ὁμοίως
 καὶ αὐταὶ μία τῇ ἄλλῃ. καὶ αἱ μὲν πρώται παραταγαί, ὅταν πλησι-
 80 ἄσωσι τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, σταθήτωσαν πλησίον αὐτῶν ὡς ἀπὸ σαγιτοβό-

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tores, the cavalymen, make initial contact with the enemy, join battle with them, and the alarm goes up, in case the remainder of the enemy host decides to pursue our men, and the enemy falls upon them and stays with them, to keep them out of danger you must dispatch a first, second and third unit of cavalry to render assistance to those under pursuit and shatter the enemy. You follow behind the units in good order with your own four units, of which we intend to speak at greater length below on the deployment of cavalry. 7. If the enemy maintains contact with our cavalry *prokoursatores* sent ahead in advance, let them come on until they approach the infantry formations. Then have three cavalry divisions suddenly move out through the intervals between the infantry divisions and attack the enemy in good order. If there are still more cavalry divisions, have them also move out from the same place where these three left from. You, the commander, must next move out behind them with the four cavalry divisions and follow behind them in formation. If the enemy turns to flight, keep the four divisions where they are until you see their complete collapse. At the moment when you do see that they have been completely broken and learn from prisoners and deserters that they have no other force of either cavalry or infantry, but there are only those fleeing, that is the time to dispatch two divisions in pursuit of them. Keep the other two in place with you for the security and assistance of all the host pursuing the enemy. The infantry force, and the entire host, must follow along deployed in good order so as not to throw their units into confusion. 8. If the enemy pursuing our *prokoursatores* does not approach the infantry formations, but remains in a body at a distance from them, send the aforementioned three cavalry units out to one side. They must proceed one after another. Send out another three from the other side and have them follow one another in the same way. When the first units draw near the enemy, they must come to a halt close by them out of bowshot, and like-

53 ἐροῦμεν: εἰπόμεν ἂν cod. 54 post ἐχθροὶ scr. cod. δὲ quod delevi

85 λου καὶ ὁμοίως καὶ αἱ δευτέραι πλησίον τῶν πρώτων καὶ αἱ τρίται
 πλησίον τῶν δευτέρων. τὰς δὲ προειρημένας τέσσαρας παραταγὰς
 ἔχε σὺ μετὰ σαυτοῦ καὶ ἐξελθε ὕστερον μετὰ τάξεως. 9. καὶ ἂν
 τραπῶσιν οἱ ἐχθροί, ὀφείλουσι καταδιώκειν αὐτοὺς οἱ προκουρ-
 90 σάτορες καὶ αἱ λοιπαὶ παραταγαὶ μετὰ συστάσεως ἕως οὗ τελείως
 τραπῶσι καὶ παραλυθῶσιν. καὶ μέχρι τῆς καθολικῆς αὐτῶν τρο-
 πῆς, αἱ παραταγαὶ ἡμῶν μὴ παραλύσωσι τὴν σύνταξιν αὐτῶν, ἀλλ'
 ὥς εἴρηται, μετὰ τάξεως ἀκολουθεῖτωσαν. παραγγελθήτωσαν δὲ
 καὶ οἱ προκουρσάτορες καὶ αἱ εἰρημέναι παραταγαὶ ἵνα μηδεὶς
 100 ἐκ τῶν ἀρχόντων καὶ ἐκ τῶν πολεμιστῶν ἐπάρῃ τὸ σύνολον, ἀλλ'
 οἱ μὲν ἄρχοντες καὶ οἱ πολεμισταὶ σπουδαζέτωσαν εἰς τὸν πό-
 λεμον, οἱ δὲ ἄνθρωποι αὐτῶν καὶ οἱ στρατιῶται κρατεῖτωσαν τοὺς
 δεσμίους. ἀρμόζει δὲ ἵνα θῆς καὶ ἐπιτίμιον πολεμικὸν τιμωρικόν,
 95 ὥς οἱ παλαιοί, ἵνα ὁ παραβαίνων τὴν τοιαύτην πρόσταξιν ὑπομένη
 ποινήν. 10. εἰ δέ, ὅταν πλησιάζωσιν αἱ ἡμέτεραι παραταγαὶ πρὸς
 τὰς παραταγὰς τῶν ἐχθρῶν, σταθῶσιν αἱ τοιαῦται παραταγαὶ τῶν
 ἐχθρῶν ἀμετακίνητοι, ὀφείλουσι τότε οἱ προκουρσάτορες κινηθῆ-
 ναι καὶ ταραῖσαι τὸν πόλεμον. εἴτα ἵνα ἐπέρχωνται κατὰ τῶν πο-
 λεμίων μετὰ τάξεως ἔνθεν καὶ ἐκεῖθεν ἐκ τῶν δύο μερῶν αἱ ἕξ
 100 παραταγαὶ ἡμῶν καὶ συνάψωσι μάχην μετὰ τῶν πολεμίων. ὁμοίως
 δὲ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι τέσσαρες παραταγαί, αἱ οὐσαι μετὰ σοῦ, ἵνα ἔρχ-
 ωνται μετὰ τάξεως πρὸς βοήθειαν τῶν ἔμπροσθεν παραταγῶν. ἵνα
 δὲ ἀκολουθῶσι καὶ αἱ πεζικαὶ παραταγαὶ καὶ πλησιάζωσιν καὶ
 αὐταὶ | μετὰ τάξεως. καὶ εἰ τοσοῦτον οἱ ἐχθροί, εἴτε ἀπὸ θάρρους
 105 τῶν καταφράκτων αὐτῶν εἴτε ἀπὸ πλήθους λαοῦ, καρτερήσουσι
 καὶ οὐ τραπῶσι, τότε ἐκβαλον ἀπὸ τῶν διαχώρων τῶν σκουταρ-
 ᾶτων καὶ ῥιπταριστὰς πεζοὺς καὶ τοξότας καὶ σφενδοβολιστὰς καὶ
 ἀπόστειλον αὐτοὺς πρὸς συμμαχίαν τῶν καβαλλαρίων. συνακο-
 λουθεῖτωσαν δὲ μετὰ τάξεως καὶ ὅλαι αἱ πεζικαὶ παραταγαὶ καὶ
 110 πλησιάζετωσαν πρὸς τὰς καβαλλαρικὰς ἡμῶν παραταγὰς. εἰ δὲ
 καὶ οὕτως ἴστανται οἱ ἐχθροὶ καὶ οὐ τρέπονται, ὀφείλουσιν
 ὁμοίως καὶ οἱ ἡμέτεροι καρτερεῖν ἀγωνιζόμενοι ἕως οὗ μετὰ τῆς
 βοηθείας τοῦ Θεοῦ καταλυθῶσιν οἱ ἐχθροί. 11. ἂν δὲ συμβῇ καὶ
 115 κλασματίσωσιν αἱ παραταγαὶ τῶν ἐχθρῶν τὰς παραταγὰς ἡμῶν τὰς
 καβαλλαρικὰς καὶ στρέψωσιν αὐτάς, ὀφείλουσι τότε αἱ τοιαῦται
 καβαλλαρικαὶ ἡμῶν παραταγαὶ καταφεύγειν ἔσωθεν τῶν παρα-
 ταγῶν τῶν πεζῶν καὶ σώζεσθαι. εἴτα ἵνα ὀρμήσωσι μετὰ τάξεως

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wise the second units should be close by the first ones and the third near
 the second. You keep the four units noted above with you and head out
 last of all in good order. 9. If the enemy turns and runs, the *prokoursatores*
 and the rest of the divisions must pursue them rigorously until they are in
 full flight and disarray. Until there is a general rout, our units must not
 break ranks, but, as stated, they must follow along in formation. The *pro-*
koursatores and the aforementioned units must be under orders that none
 of the officers or cavalymen should relent in the slightest. The officers
 and cavalymen must press on with the battle and their attendants and the
 infantrymen are to secure the prisoners. It is best that you proclaim an
 article of war, as did the ancients, to the effect that anyone transgressing
 this order will be subject to punishment. 10. If though, when our units
 approach the enemy formations, these enemy formations remain in place,
 the *prokoursatores* should then move forward and begin skirmishing to
 open the battle. Our six units must then move to the attack in good order
 against the enemy from the two flanks on either side and join battle with
 the enemy. In like fashion, the other four units, the ones with you, must
 move up in good order in support of the units ahead. The infantry units
 must follow up and approach in good order themselves. If, because of
 their confidence either in their *kataphraktoi* or the sheer size of their host,
 the enemy perseveres up to this point and does not turn to flight, then
 bring infantry javeliners with archers and slingers out from the intervals
 between the heavy infantry and send them forward to fight alongside the
 cavalymen. All of the infantry units must follow together in good order
 and draw up close by our cavalry units. If, even then, the enemy stands
 firm and does not turn away, then our men must likewise persevere in
 fighting until, with the help of God, the enemy is broken. 11. If it comes
 to pass that the enemy formations shatter our cavalry units and repulse
 them, these cavalry units must then flee inside the infantry formations and
 find safety. Our infantry soldiers, with the *menavlatoi*, must then move up

κατὰ τῶν ἐχθρῶν οἱ πεζοὶ σκουνταράτοι μετὰ τῶν μεναυλάτων ἔχοντες ἔσωθεν τοὺς καβαλλαρίους εἰς βοήθειαν αὐτῶν. καὶ τότε
 120 ἐλπίζομεν ὅτι ἡ βοήθεια τοῦ Θεοῦ συνεργήσει ἡμῖν πρὸς τὴν κατάλυσιν τῶν ἐχθρῶν. 12. ἂν δὲ καὶ ἔλθωσιν οἱ ἐχθροὶ μετὰ συστάσεως καὶ παραταγῶν εὐτάκτως ἔχοντες πλῆθος καβαλλαρικοῦ λαοῦ καὶ πεζικοῦ, καὶ παρατάξωσι, καὶ αἱ μὲν παραταγαὶ τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἔλθωσιν ἀπὸ ἔμπροσθεν εἰς ἓν μέρος τῶν ἡμετέρων παρα-
 125 ταγῶν, οἱ δὲ Ἀραβίται, ὡς ἔχουσιν ἦθος, περικυκλοῦσι τὴν ἡμετέραν τετραπλεύρον παραταγὴν, θαρροῦντες εἰς τὰ ἱππάρια αὐτῶν, μηδὲ ἐξέρχονται τὸ σύνολον πρὸς καταδίωξιν αὐτῶν οἱ ἡμέτεροι καβαλλάριοι, διότι γοργὰ εἰσὶ τὰ παρίππια τῶν Ἀραβιτῶν καὶ καταδιωκόμενοι οὐ καταλαμβάνονται, ἀλλ' ὅταν ὑποστρέφωσιν οἱ
 130 ἡμέτεροι, συνυποστρέφουσι γοργὸν καὶ ἐκεῖνοι μετ' αὐτῶν καὶ βοηθούμενοι ἀπὸ τῆς γοργότητος τῶν ἱππαρίων αὐτῶν κλασματίζουσι τοὺς ἡμετέρους. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐ πρέπει τὸ σύνολον καταδιώκειν αὐτούς. 13. πλὴν τότε, ὅταν ἔλθωσιν οὕτως αἱ παραταγαὶ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, ὡς εἴρηται, πρὸς τινὰς τῶν ἡμετέρων παραταγῶν,
 135 ὁφείλεις ἔχειν ἐξ ἐτοίμου τὴν τρίγωνον παραταγὴν τῶν καταφράκτων, καθὼς κάτωθεν ἐροῦμεν περὶ αὐτῆς, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας δύο παραταγὰς τὰς οὐσας μετ' αὐτῆς. εἰς οἷον μέρος ἴστανται αἱ παραταγαὶ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, αἱ ἐλθοῦσαι πρὸς τὰς ἡμέτερας παραταγὰς, ἵνα ἐκβάλῃς ἐξ ἐκείνων | τῶν διαχωρισμάτων τῶν πεζῶν τὴν εἰρη-
 140 μένην τρίγωνον παραταγὴν τῶν καταφράκτων καὶ τὰς ἄλλας δύο παραταγὰς, τὰς οὐσας μετ' αὐτῆς. ἵνα δὲ ἐκβάλῃς αὐτὰς μετὰ πολλῆς γαληνότητος καὶ συντάξεως. καὶ τάχα καὶ ἡ πεζικὴ παραταγὴ τῶν ἐχθρῶν σκουνταράτοι, ἂν στήκωσιν ἔμπροσθεν τῶν καβαλλαρίων αὐτῶν παραταγῶν, οὐ πρέπει δειλιάειν τοὺς καταφράκτους
 145 ἡμῶν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀπελθεῖν μετὰ πολλῆς γαληνότητος καὶ ὀρθῶσαι τὸ στόμα τῆς τριγώνου παραταγῆς πρὸς τὸν τόπον εἰς ὃν ἴστανται ἡ κεφαλὴ τῶν πολεμίων. καὶ τότε τὰ μὲν κοντάρια τῶν πολεμίων πεζῶν τῶν ἱσταμένων ἔμπροσθεν τῶν καβαλλαρικῶν αὐτῶν παραταγῶν κλασθῆναι ἔχουσιν ὑπὸ τῶν καταφράκτων ἡμῶν. αἱ δὲ
 150 σαγίται αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ μέναυλα τῶν ριπταριστῶν αὐτῶν γενέσθαι ἔχουσιν ἀνενέργητα διὰ τὴν ὀχυρότητα τῶν ἡμετέρων καταφράκτων. καὶ οὕτω συνεργεῖα Θεοῦ τραπῆναι ἔχουσιν οἱ ἐχθροί. 14. τρεπομένων δὲ αὐτῶν, οὐκ ὀφείλουσιν οἱ κατάφρακτοι διώ-

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121-122 συστάσεως: στάσεως cod. 124 post εἰς scr. cod. καὶ quod deleui 125 Ἀραβίται cod. 128 Ἀραβιτῶν cod. 145 γαληνότητος corr. scriba ex βαληνότητος

against the enemy in good order with the cavalry on the inside to help them. We hope then that the help of God will assist us in destroying the enemy. 12. If the enemy makes a methodical advance with their units in good order, comprising a large host of cavalry and infantry, and deploy for an attack, and the enemy units make a frontal assault on one side of our formations, the *Arabitai*, as is their habit, will encircle our square formation, confident in their horses, but our cavalrymen are by no means to head out and chase after them for the reason that the horses of the *Arabitai* are very swift, and when these men are pursued they are not overtaken. Instead, whenever our men wheel around, they too wheel around swiftly with them and, aided by the speed of their horses, strike against our men. For this reason one should by no means go chasing after them. 13. However, at the moment when the enemy forces are advancing against some of our formations, as noted, you must have ready the triangular formation of *kataphraktoi*, which we will describe further on, and the two cavalry divisions accompanying it. On the side where the enemy formations are, the ones advancing against our units, send the aforementioned triangle of *kataphraktoi* and its two escorting units out through those intervals between the foot soldiers. Send them on their way very calmly in good order. On the assumption that the enemy infantry force is of heavy infantrymen, if they are standing in front of their cavalry units, our *kataphraktoi* must not be afraid but should instead proceed very calmly and aim the front of the triangular formation directly at the spot where the enemy leader is standing. Then the spears of the enemy infantrymen standing in front of their cavalry will be smashed by our *kataphraktoi*, while their arrows and the *menavla* of their javeliners will be ineffective because of the armor of our *kataphraktoi*. And so, with the help of God, the enemy will be routed. 14. As they begin to flee, it is not the *kataphrak-*

155 κειν, ἀλλ' αἱ δύο παραταγαὶ αἱ οὐσαι μετ' αὐτῶν καὶ ἀκολουθοῦσαι
 ὅπισθεν αὐτῶν. ὁμοίως δὲ ἵνα ἐξέλθωσι καὶ αἱ λοιπαὶ παραταγαὶ
 ἐκ τῶν διαχωρισμάτων τῶν ὄντων ἔνθεν καὶ ἐκεῖθεν πρὸς τὸ σκορ-
 πίσαι τοὺς Ἀραβίτας, ἵνα μὴ ἔμβωσιν ὅπισθεν τῶν καταδιωκόντων
 τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἡμετέρων καὶ κλασματίσωσιν αὐτούς. πλὴν μὴ κα-
 ταδιώκωσι τοὺς Ἀραβίτας αἱ τοιαῦται παραταγαί. 15. ἂν δὲ καὶ
 160 ταχύνη ἢ παραταγὴ τῶν ἐχθρῶν καὶ συμβάλωσιν οἱ σκουταράτοι
 πεζοὶ τῶν ἐχθρῶν καὶ οἱ ἡμέτεροι καὶ μάχωνται, εἰ οὐκ ἔχουσιν
 οἱ κατάφρακτοι εὐρυχωρίαν πρὸς τὸ ἐξέρχεσθαι διὰ τῶν ὄντων
 εἰς τὸ μέτωπον χωρισμάτων, εἴτα τὸ στόμα τῆς τριγώνου παρα-
 ταγῆς (καὶ) τῶν ὄντων μετ' αὐτῆς ἵνα ὁρμήσῃ κατὰ τῶν πολεμίων
 165 ἐκ πλαγίου αὐτῶν. καὶ ἂν κλασματισθῶσιν οἱ ἐχθροὶ καὶ τραπῶ-
 σιν, ἵνα ἐξέλθωσι καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ὄντων εἰς τὸ μέτωπον τῆς παρα-
 ταγῆς χωρισμάτων αἱ λοιπαὶ καβαλλαρικαὶ παραταγαὶ πρὸς τὸ
 ἀφανίσαι τελείως καὶ παραλῦσαι αὐτούς. 16. εἰ δὲ ἐστὶ πολὺ καὶ
 170 τὸ ἡμέτερον καβαλλαρικὸν καὶ οὐ χωρεῖται ἔσωθεν τῆς τετρα-
 πλευρου παραταγῆς, ἐπεὶ εἰς τὸ ὀπίσω μέρος τῶν πεζικῶν (παρα-
 ταγῶν), οἷον εἰς τὴν οὐρὰν, ἴστανται εἰς ἓνα ἕκαστον ὄρδινον
 ὀπίσω τῶν τοξοτῶν δύο σκουταράτοι, ὡς εἵπομεν εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν
 τοῦ παρόντος στρατηγικοῦ, ὀφείλεις διατάξασθαι τοῖς χιλιάρχοις
 ἵνα τὸν ἓνα ζυγὸν τῶν τοιούτων σκουταράτων τῶν ὄντων εἰς τὴν
 175 οὐρὰν ὀπισθεν τῶν τοξοτῶν—οἷον τὸν ἓνα ὄρδινον ἰστάμενον εἰς
 μᾶκρος τῆς μιᾶς γωνίας ἀπὸ τῶν παραταγῶν ἕως τῆς ἄλλης, ἔχ-
 οντα ἄνδρας χιλίους διακοσίους καθὼς καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ ὄρδινον—
 ἵνα ἐκβάλωσι καὶ προσθήσουσιν αὐτὸν εἰς μῆκος τῶν ὀρδίνων τῶν
 σκουταράτων τῶν δώδεκα παραταγῶν πρὸς τὸ δέξασθαι προσ-
 180 θήκην τὸν μὲν ἓνα ὄρδινον τῶν προμάχων τῶν ἰσταμένων ἔμπρο-
 σθεν τῶν σκουταράτων εἰς τὰς δώδεκα παραταγὰς ἀπὸ ἀνδρῶν τρι-
 ἄκοντα τεσσάρων. τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς δύο ὀρδίνους τῶν αὐτῶν
 δώδεκα παραταγῶν, οἷον τὸν δεῦτερον ὄρδινον τῶν σκουταράτων
 καὶ τὸν ἄλλον ὄρδινον τὸν ἰστάμενον εἰς τὴν οὐρὰν ὀπίσω τῶν
 185 τοξοτῶν, δέξασθαι προσθήκην ἀπὸ τριάκοντα τριῶν. καὶ ἐκ τού-
 του γενέσθαι ἅπλωμα περισσότερον εἰς τὸ μῆκος τῆς παραταγῆς,
 ἵνα χωρῇται ἔσωθεν τῆς τοιαύτης τετραπλευρου παραταγῆς τὸ κα-
 βαλλαρικὸν ἡμῶν. ἂν ἄρα καὶ ἔχωμεν, ὡς εἴρηται, πολὺ καβαλ-

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toi who are to pursue them, but the two escorting units following behind them. The remaining units should likewise move out through the intervals on either side to scatter the *Arabitai* lest they come up from behind on our men pursuing the enemy and attack them, but these units must not give chase to the *Arabitai*. 15. If the enemy force moves quickly and the enemy infantrymen become embroiled in battle with our own, should the *kataphraktoi* not have enough room to move out through the intervals in front, then the front of the triangular formation and the escorting units have to attack the enemy from the flank. If the enemy is broken up and flees, the rest of the cavalry units should make their way out through the intervals in the front of the formation to annihilate and destroy them completely. 16. If our cavalry force is quite large and cannot fit inside the square formation, since there are two heavy infantrymen standing in each file behind the archers in the rear of the infantry formation, that is, in the back row, as we described at the beginning of this treatise, you must instruct the chiliarchs to withdraw one line of these infantrymen in the rear behind the archers—meaning the line standing all the way across from one end of the units to the other, comprising 1,200 men, as do the remaining lines—and add it to the length of the infantry lines in the twelve units so that the one row of heavy infantry standing ahead in the front lines in the twelve units receives an additional thirty-four men. The other two lines in these twelve units, that is, the second line of heavy infantrymen and the other line standing in the rear behind the archers, receive an additional thirty-three men. As a result, the length of the line will be even greater so that our cavalry will fit inside this square formation. If we have, as suggested, a lot of cavalry, stretch the archers out in the same way. As

154 ἀκολουθοῦσαι: ἀκολουθῆσαι cod. 160–161 συμβάλωσιν . . . ἡμέτεροι: συμβάλωσιν οἱ σκουταράτοι πεζοὶ καὶ οἱ ἡμέτεροι τῶν ἐχθρῶν cod. 164 καὶ supplevi 166 εἰς τὸ μέτωπον: εἰς τὰ πλάγια cod. 170–171 παραταγῶν supplevi

190 λαρικόν, πρόσθε δὲ ὁμοίως καὶ τοὺς τοξότας. καὶ ἐπεὶ τρεῖς ὀρδῖ-
 νοὶ εἰσὶ τοξοτῶν, ὥς εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ στρατηγικοῦ καὶ περὶ
 αὐτῶν προεῖπομεν, ἰστάμενοι ἀπὸ τῆς μιᾶς γωνίας τῶν παραταγῶν
 ἕως τῆς ἄλλης καὶ ἔχοντες καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀπὸ ἀνδρῶν χιλίων διακοσ-
 195 πολὺ δὲ ἐστὶ καὶ καλὸν τοῦτο, ἂν ἄρα καὶ βαστάζωσιν ἄρματα
 περισσά, οἷον μεναύλια καὶ κοντάρια καὶ σκουτάρια.

58. Ἄλλα τινὰ πολλὰ ἀναγκαῖα καὶ χρήσιμα

1. Ἐἰσὶ δὲ τὰ σχήματα καὶ ἄλλων παραταγῶν πεζικῶν καὶ
 ἀναμίκτων, οἷον πεζικῶν καὶ καβαλλαρικῶν, ἅτινα ὠφέλιμα εἰσὶ
 καὶ οὐ μὴν ὀκνήσομεν γράψαι αὐτά. εἰ ἐστὶ πολὺ ὁμαλὸς ὁ τόπος
 εἰς ὃν μέλλει γενέσθαι ὁ πόλεμος, καὶ ποιῶσιν οἱ ἐχθροὶ τὰς παρ-
 5 αταγὰς αὐτῶν ἐπὶ μακροῦς, οἷον ἵνα ἔμπροσθεν τὸ μέτωπον αὐτῶν
 ἄπλωμα μέγα ἀπὸ τοῦ δεξιοῦ μέρους μέχρι καὶ τοῦ ἀριστεροῦ, ἂν
 θέλῃς ποιῆσαι καὶ σὺ ἕκταμα εἰς τὴν παραταγὴν σου καὶ μακρύ-
 ναι αὐτήν, ποιήσον μέτωπον τέσσαρας παραταγὰς ἢ πέντε. ποιή-
 10 σον δὲ καὶ ὀπισθεν ὁμοίως τέσσαρας ἢ πέντε παραταγὰς. εἰς δὲ
 τὰ δύο πλάγια ἔνθεν καὶ ἐκεῖθεν ἄφες ἀνὰ δύο παραταγὰς ἢ καὶ
 μίαν, καὶ ἀπλῶς, ὥς συνορᾷς ὃ τι ἔστι καλόν. καὶ ἂν μὲν ποιήσης
 τέσσαρας παραταγὰς ἔμπροσθεν καὶ τέσσαρας ὀπισθεν, καὶ ἔνθεν
 καὶ ἐκεῖθεν εἰς τὰ δύο πλάγια ἀνὰ δύο παραταγὰς, ἀπομένουσι
 15 διάχωρα εἰς μὲν τὰς τέσσαρας γωνίας πρὸς ἓν, τρία δὲ εἰς τὰς
 ἔμπροσθεν παραταγὰς καὶ τρία εἰς τὰς ὀπισθεν. εἰς δὲ τὰς δύο
 παραταγὰς τὰς οὐσας εἰς τὸ ἓν πλάγιον, ἡγουν εἰς τὴν μέσσην
 αὐτῶν, διάχωρον ἓν, ὁμοῦ διάχωρα δώδεκα. εἰ δὲ θέλῃς ποιῆσαι
 παραταγὰς ἀσφαλεστέρας, φράξον τὰ διάχωρα τῶν τεσσάρων
 γωνιῶν. τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ ὀκτὼ ἄφες ἵνα ἐνεργῶσιν. εἰ δὲ θέλῃς, ἵνα
 20 ἐνεργήσης μακροτέρας τὰς παραταγὰς, ἵνα ἔχωσιν ἔμπροσθεν εἰς
 τὸ μέτωπον ἄπλωμα, ποιήσον ἔμπροσθεν πέντε παραταγὰς καὶ ὀπι-
 σθεν πέντε, καὶ ἔνθεν καὶ ἐκεῖθεν εἰς τὰ πλάγια, μίαν. πλὴν ἂν
 μὲν φαίνεται καλὸν τὸ ἀφεῖναι τὰ διάχωρα τῶν τεσσάρων γωνιῶν,
 ἵνα ἐργάζωνται, καὶ ὥς οὕτως γίνονται διάχωρα δώδεκα. ἂν δὲ
 25 θέλῃς φράξαι αὐτά, ἀπομένουσι τέσσαρα διάχωρα ἔμπροσθεν. 2.
 εἰ δὲ ὁ τόπος ἐστὶ πολὺ στενὸς εἰς ὃν μέλλεις παρατάξαι, ποιήσον

14 διάχωρα: διάφορα cod. 19–20 ἵνα ἐνεργήσης: ἂνα ἐνεργῶσαι cod.

there are three lines of archers, in the way we described them above in the
 beginning of the treatise, standing from one end of the units to the other,
 comprising 1,200 men themselves, take out one line of archers and add it
 to the length of the two lines of archers in the twelve units. It is a very
 good thing indeed if they are carrying extra equipment such as *menavlia*,
 spears, and shields.

58. Other Necessary and Useful Ideas

1. There are designs of other infantry and combined formations, that
 is, infantry with cavalry, which we shall not hesitate to record since they
 are quite helpful. If the terrain on which the battle is to take place is very
 flat and the enemy deploys in a broad line, in such a way that their front
 line is a great mass from the right side to the left, if you wish to make an
 extension to your formation and lengthen it, put four or five units in front.
 Likewise, put four or five units in the back. On the two flanks on either
 side allow for two units or just one. In a word, do as you see fit. If you put
 four units in front and four in the back, and two units on either side on
 the two flanks, one interval will be left in each of the four corners, three
 between the units in front and three between the ones in the back. In
 between the two units on one flank, in the middle of them, to be precise,
 will be one interval, making twelve all told. If you wish to make the forma-
 tions more secure, close off the intervals in the four corners and leave the
 remaining eight functioning. If you want to make your formations even
 broader so that they have a large mass up in front, put five units in front
 and five in the back, and one on either side on the flanks. Only unless it
 seems best to allow an interval in the four corners, let them be arranged,
 and so there are twelve intervals created. If you would rather close them
 off, four intervals will be left open in front. 2. On the other hand, if the

30 τὸ ἐναντίον. ἄπλωσον δύο παραταγὰς ἔμπροσθεν εἰς τὸ μέτωπον πρὸς τὸ γενέσθαι εἰς τὴν μέσσην αὐτῶν διάχωρον ἓν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰς τὴν ὀπίσω πλευρὰν ἄπλωσον ἄλλας δύο παραταγὰς πρὸς τὸ ἔχειν καὶ αὐτὰς εἰς τὴν μέσσην αὐτῶν διάχωρον ἓν. εἰς δὲ τὰ δύο πλάγια ἔνθεν καὶ ἐκεῖθεν στήσον ἀπὸ τεσσάρων παραταγῶν. καὶ ἀπλῶς, πρὸς τὴν θέσιν τοῦ τόπου, οὕτως παράταξον.

59.

1. (Ἐ)στὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλο πεζικῆς παρατάξεως σχῆμα, ἵνα δὲ
 5 ὑπάρχη καὶ αὕτη τετράγωνος καὶ τετράπλευρος, ἔσωθεν δὲ ἵνα φυλάττη τὸ καβαλλαρικόν. ὀφείλεις δὲ ἔχειν καὶ εἰς τὸ μέτωπον αὐτῆς, εἰς τὸ μέσον, παραταγὴν ἐλευθέραν. καὶ ἐκ τῶν δύο μερῶν
 10 τῆς τοιαύτης παραταγῆς ἔνθεν καὶ ἐκεῖθεν εἰς τὸ μέτωπον αὐτῆς ἵνα ἔχη διάχωρα δύο, ἔξωθεν δὲ τῶν τοιούτων δύο διαχώρων, οἷον ἄπλωμα, πληρωθῇ ὁ τόπος τῶν ἄλλων διαχώρων. ἵνα παρατάξωσι τετράγωνα αἱ λοιπαὶ παραταγαί, καὶ ἵνα ὥσι σύγκολλα ἀλλήλων καὶ μὴ ἀπομείνωσι διάχωρα. ἐκ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων δύο διαχώρων,
 15 οἷον ἄπλωμα, πληρωθῇ ὁ τόπος τῶν ἄλλων διαχώρων. ἵνα παρατάξωσιν ὡς γραμμαὶ αἱ λοιπαὶ παραταγαὶ σύγκολλα ἀλλήλων καὶ μὴ ἔχωσι τὸ σύνολον διάχωρον. ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἵνα (μὴ) φράξωσι καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ εἰρημένα δύο διάχωρα τὰ ὄντα εἰς τὸ μέτωπον, ὡς εἵπομεν, τῆς παραταγῆς, πρὸς τὸ γενέσθαι τὴν ὅλην φάλαγγα τετράγωνον πλὴν εἰς τὴν ὀπίσω πλευρὰν εἰς τὰς δύο μόνον γωνίας ἔνθεν καὶ ἐκεῖθεν. ἵνα ἀπομείνωσι τέσσαρα διάχωρα καὶ ἵνα
 20 στήκη ἔσωθεν κατὰ τάξιν ὅλον τὸ καβαλλαρικόν, οἷον εἰς μὲν τὰ ἐκβασίδια τῶν τεσσάρων διαχώρων ἵνα | στήκωσιν οἱ πολεμισταὶ καβαλλάριοι κατὰ τάξιν τῶν ταγμάτων καὶ τῶν θεμάτων. εἰς δὲ
 25 τὰς γωνίας ἵνα στήκη τὸ τοῦλδον καὶ τὸ πλήθος ὅπερ οὐκ ἐνεργεῖ εἰς τὸν πόλεμον. ἔχε δὲ καὶ ῥιπταριστὰς πεζοὺς καὶ ψιλοὺς καὶ στήσον αὐτοὺς εἰς τὸ ἔμπροσθεν τῶν καβαλλαρίων εἰς τὰ ἐκβασίδια τῶν διαχώρων καθὼς ἀνωτέρω εἵπομεν. 2. τὰς μὲν πεζικὰς παραταγὰς καὶ τὰς ἀναμίκτους, οἷον πεζικὰς καὶ καβαλλαρικὰς, ἀρτίως ἐτελειώσαμεν. ἤδη δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ποιησόμεθα τῶν καβαλλαρικῶν παραταγῶν, συνεργοῦντος ἡμῖν τοῦ Θεοῦ.

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6 ἔξωθεν: ἔσωθεν cod. 7 ἄλλων: αὐτῶν cod. 10 ἄλλων: αὐτῶν cod. 12 μὴ supplevi 14 τὴν: τὸ cod. 18 ἵνα iter. in init. f. 115'

terrain is very constricted where you are about to deploy, do just the opposite. Amass two units up in front so that between them is one interval, and likewise amass another two units in the back so that they too have one interval in between them. Position four units on the two flanks on either side. To put it simply, deploy your men according to the lay of the land.

59.

1. There is one more design of an infantry formation. It too must be four-cornered and four-sided and protect the cavalry inside. In the front you must keep a freestanding unit in the middle. On the two flanks of this formation, on either side in its front, it must have two intervals, and except for these two intervals, the space of the other intervals must be filled in like a solid mass. The remaining units must line up in the shape of a square and they must be joined to one another and not leave any intervals. Apart from these two intervals, the space of the other intervals must be filled in like a solid mass. The remaining divisions should form up like straight lines joined to one another without any gap at all, but they must not close off these two aforementioned intervals in the front of the formation, as we said, so that the entire formation is a solid square except only in the two corners in the back line on either side. Four intervals must remain open, and within them the entire cavalry force must line up in order, which is to say that the cavalry soldiers line up in the openings of the four intervals, arrayed in their *tagmata* and *themata*. In the corners are the baggage train and the throng with no role in battle. Get some javeliners on foot and some light infantry and position them in front of the cavalry in the openings of the intervals in the manner we described above. 2. We have now given a full account of infantry and combined formations, that is, infantry with cavalry. It is time now, with the help of God, to take up cavalry units.

1. (Ἀ)ρμόζει γινώσκειν ὅτι ἡ τρίγωνος τῶν καταφράκτων
 παράταξις τὸ μὲν βάθος ἔχει καβαλλαρίους δώδεκα. τὸ δὲ μέτω-
 πον αὐτῆς, ἡγουν ὁ πρῶτος ὄρδινος ὁ ὢν εἰς τὸ μέτωπον, ὀφείλει
 5 ἔχειν καβαλλαρίους ὅσους συνορᾷ ὁ ποιῶν αὐτήν, ἡγουν πρὸς τὸ
 πλῆθος τῶν καβαλλαρίων ὧν ἔχει, εἴτε πολλοὺς εἴτε ὀλίγους. ἀπὸ
 τοῦ δευτέρου δὲ ζυγοῦ καὶ τὸ κάτω ἕως τοῦ δωδεκάτου εἰς ἕκασ-
 τος ζυγὸς δέχεται προσθήκην καβαλλαρίους τέσσαρας εἰς τὸ δε-
 10 ξιὸν μέρος καὶ τὸ ἀριστερὸν ἀπὸ δύο. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἔχεις λαὸν πολύν,
 ὀφείλεις ἔχειν καβαλλαρίους πεντακοσίους τέσσαρας. τὸ γὰρ
 βάθος αὐτῆς καβαλλαρίων δώδεκα. ὁ δὲ πρῶτος ὄρδινος τοῦ ζυ-
 γοῦ, ὁ ὢν εἰς τὸ μέτωπον τῆς παραταγῆς, ἔχει καβαλλαρίους εἴ-
 15 κοσι, ὁ δεῦτερος εἴκοσι τέσσαρας, ὁ τρίτος εἴκοσι ὀκτώ, ὁ τέταρ-
 τος τριάκοντα δύο, ὁ πέμπτος τριάκοντα ἕξ, καὶ πάλιν ὁ ἕκτος ἔχει
 καβαλλαρίους τεσσαράκοντα, ὁ ἕβδομος τεσσαράκοντα τέσ-
 20 σαρας, ὁ ὄγδοος τεσσαράκοντα ὀκτώ, ὁ ἕνατος πεντήκοντα δύο, ὁ
 δέκατος πεντήκοντα ἕξ, ὁ ἐνδέκατος ἐξήκοντα, καὶ αὐθις ὁ δωδέ-
 κατος ἐξήκοντα τέσσαρας, πρὸς τὸ εἶναι ὁμοῦ ὅλους τοὺς καβαλ-
 λαρίους τῆς τριγώνου παραταγῆς πεντακοσίους τέσσαρας. 2. εἰ
 δὲ τοσοῦτον λαὸν οὐκ ἔχεις, ποιήσον μικροτέραν τὴν τοιαύτην
 25 παραταγὴν, ἵνα ἔχη ὁ πρῶτος ζυγὸς καβαλλαρίους δέκα, ὁ δεύ-
 терος δεκατέσσαρας, ὁ τρίτος δεκαοκτώ, ὁ τέταρτος εἴκοσι δύο, ὁ
 πέμπτος εἴκοσι ἕξ, ὁ ἕκτος τριάκοντα, ὁ ἕβδομος τριάκοντα τέσ-
 σαρας, ὁ ὄγδοος τριάκοντα ὀκτώ, ὁ ἕνατος τεσσαράκοντα δύο, ὁ
 30 δέκατος τεσσαράκοντα ἕξ, ὁ ἐνδέκατος πεντήκοντα, ὁ δωδέκατος
 πεντήκοντα τέσσαρας, πρὸς τὸ εἶναι ὁμοῦ ὅλους τοὺς καβαλλαρί-
 ους τῆς τριγώνου παραταγῆς τριακοσίους ὀγδοήκοντα τέσσαρας.
 3. εἰ δ' ἐστὶ περισσότερος ὁ στρατὸς ἢ ὀλιγώτερος, ὀφείλεις ποι-
 εῖν τὸ στόμα τῆς παραταγῆς, ἡγουν τὸ μέτωπον αὐτῆς, πρὸς τὸ
 35 πλῆθος τοῦ λαοῦ σου, ὡς εἴρηται, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ δευτέρου ζυγοῦ καὶ
 τὸ κάτω εἰς ἕκαστος ζυγὸς δέχεται προσθήκην καβαλλαρίων τεσ-
 σάρων, δύο εἰς τὸ δεξιὸν μέρος, ὡς εἵπομεν, καὶ δύο εἰς τὸ ἀριστ-
 ερόν, πρὸς τὸ γενέσθαι αὐτὴν παράταξιν τρίγωνον. 4. οἱ δὲ αὐτοὶ
 κατάφρακτοι ἔστωσαν ὑπὸ μίαν κεφαλὴν, καὶ ἐκείνη πάλιν ἡ κεφ-
 αλὴ ἐχέτω διαφόρους ἄρχοντας εἰς αὐτοὺς. πᾶσα δὲ τρίγωνος παρ-
 αταγὴ ἀπὸ καταφράκτων καβαλλαρίων εἶναι ὀφείλει. ἐχέτωσαν δὲ

26 τριακοσίους: τρισχιλίους cod.

1. Take note that the triangular formation of *kataphraktoi* has a depth
 of twelve cavalrymen. Its face, or in other words, the first line in the face,
 should contain as many cavalrymen as the man preparing it deems best,
 namely, by judging from the total number of cavalrymen he has on hand,
 either many or few. From the second row on down to the twelfth, each
 row receives an additional four cavalrymen, two each on the right and the
 left side. If you have a very large host, you must have 504 cavalrymen. Its
 depth is twelve cavalrymen. The first line of the van, the one in the face of
 the formation, has twenty cavalrymen, the second, twenty-four, the third,
 twenty-eight, the fourth, thirty-two, the fifth, thirty-six; successively, the
 sixth has forty cavalrymen, the seventh, forty-four, the eighth, forty-eight,
 the ninth, fifty-two, the tenth, fifty-six, the eleventh, sixty, and the twelfth,
 in turn, sixty-four, so that, taken together, all the cavalrymen in the trian-
 gular formation will be 504. 2. If you do not have so large a host, make
 this formation smaller, so that the first row has ten cavalrymen, the sec-
 ond, fourteen, the third, eighteen, the fourth, twenty-two, the fifth, twenty-
 six, the sixth, thirty, the seventh, thirty-four, the eighth, thirty-eight, the
 ninth, forty-two, the tenth, forty-six, the eleventh, fifty, the twelfth, fifty-
 four, so that, taken together, all the cavalrymen in the triangular formation
 will be 384. 3. Whether the army is greater or less, you must make the
 front of the formation, meaning its face, according to the total number of
 your host, and, as noted, from the second row on down each row receives
 an additional four cavalrymen, two on the right, as we said, and two on
 the left, to create a triangular formation. 4. These *kataphraktoi* must be
 under one commander, and this commander should have officers dispersed
 among them. The entire triangular formation must consist of *kataphrak-*
toi. The *kataphraktoi* must have the following equipment. Each one must

καὶ οἱ κατάφρακτοι ἐξόπλισιν τοιαύτην. εἷς ἕκαστος ἀνὴρ ἐχέτω κλιβάνιον. τὰ δὲ κλιβάνια ἐχέτωσαν τὰ μανίκια αὐτῶν μέχρι τῶν ἀγκῶνων καὶ φορεῖτωσαν οἱ ἄνδρες χειρόψελλα. ἐχέτωσαν δὲ καὶ τὰ κρεμάσματα τῶν κλιβανίων ζάβας ἀπὸ κουκουλίων καὶ βαμβακίων, καὶ τοσοῦτον ἔστωσαν παχέα τὰ κρεμάσματα, ὅσον ἐνδέχεται καταραφῆναι αὐτά. ἐπάνω δὲ τῶν κλιβανίων ὀφείλουσι φορεῖν ἐπιλωρίκια μετὰ τῶν κουκουλίων καὶ βαμβακίων καὶ ἐκβάλλειν τὰς χεῖρας αὐτῶν ἀπὸ τῶν μασχαλῶν. τὰ δὲ μανίκια ἵνα κρέμονται ἐξόπισθεν εἰς τοὺς ὤμους. ἐχέτωσαν δὲ καὶ κασίδας σιδηρᾶς ὀχυρὰς πᾶν πρὸς τὸ σκεπάζεσθαι τὰ πρόσωπα αὐτῶν ἀπὸ διπλῶν καὶ τριπλῶν καὶ παχέων ζαβῶν, καὶ μόνους τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς αὐτῶν φαίνεσθαι. φορεῖτωσαν δὲ καὶ χαλκότουβα. 5. ἐχέτωσαν δὲ καὶ ἱππάρια δυνατὰ καὶ τολμηρά. ἔστωσαν δὲ καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ ἱππάρια κατάφρακτα, εἴτε ἀπὸ κεντούκλων καὶ νεύρων προσκολλητῶν καὶ κατερραμένων μέχρι τῶν γονάτων πρὸς τὸ σκεπάζεσθαι ὅλον τὸ σῶμα τοῦ ἱππάριου, καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο φαίνεσθαι πλὴν τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰς ρίνας, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν γονάτων ἕως κάτω ὀφείλουσιν εἶναι οἱ πόδες τῶν ἱππαρίων ἀσκεπάστοι, εἴτε ἐχέτωσαν καὶ τὰ ἱππάρια κλιβάνια ἀπὸ βουβαλικῶν βυρσαρίων. ἔστω δὲ τοιοῦτον κλιβάνιον πρὸς τὸ στήθος τοῦ ἱππάριου σχιστὸν ἀπὸ τῶν βραχιόνων τοῦ ἱππάριου καὶ ἕως κάτω πρὸς τὸ μὴ κωλύεσθαι τοὺς πόδας αὐτοῦ. ἐχέτωσαν δὲ οἱ κατάφρακτοι καὶ σκουτάρια πρὸς τὸ ἀπαντᾶν τὰς σαγίτας. 6. ἀρμόζει δὲ εἶναι εἰς τὸ μέσον τῶν καταφράκτων καὶ τοξότας, ἵνα φυλάττωνται οἱ τοιοῦτοι τοξόται παρ' αὐτῶν. καὶ οἱ μὲν πρόμαχοι τῶν καταφράκτων καὶ οἱ δεύτεροι καὶ οἱ τρίτοι καὶ οἱ τέταρτοι μὴ ἔστωσαν τοξόται, | ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τοῦ πέμπτου ὀρδίνου καὶ ἕως τοῦ δωδεκάτου. καὶ ἂν μὲν ἔχη πεντακοσίους τέσσαρας ἢ παραταγὴ καβαλλαρίους τῶν καταφράκτων, ἔστωσαν εἰς αὐτοὺς ἑκατὸν πεντήκοντα τοξόται. εἰ δ' ἔχει ἢ παραταγὴ τριακοσίους ὀγδοήκοντα τέσσαρας, ἔστωσαν εἰς αὐτοὺς ὀγδοήκοντα τοξόται. 7. τῶν δὲ καταφράκτων ἔστωσαν τὰ ἄρματα τοιαῦτα, ῥαβδία ὀλοσίδηρα ἔχοντα εἰς τὰ κεφάλια γωνίας ὀξείας πρὸς τὸ εἶναι αὐτὰ τρίγωνα ἢ τετράγωνα ἢ ἐξάγωνα, ἢ ἄλλα σιδηροραβδία ἢ παραμήρια. ὅλοι δὲ ἐχέτωσαν σπαθία καὶ ὅλοι ῥαβδία σιδηρὰ εἴτε εἰς τὰ ζωνάρια εἴτε εἰς τὰς σέλας αὐτῶν. καὶ ὁ μὲν πρῶτος ὀρδινος, ἡγουν τὸ στόμα τῆς παραταγῆς, καὶ ὁ δεύτερος καὶ ὁ τρίτος καὶ ὁ τέταρτος ἐχέτωσαν τὴν ὁμοίαν κατάσ-

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have a *klibanion*. The *klibania* must have sleeves down to the elbows and the men must wear arm-guards. The skirts hanging from the *klibania* must have *zabai* of coarse silk or cotton, and these hanging pieces must be as thick as can be stitched together. Over the *klibania* they must wear *epilorkia* of coarse silk or cotton, and put their arms out through the openings under the shoulders. The sleeves must be hung from behind on their shoulders. They must have extremely strong iron helmets to cover their faces with doubly or triply thick *zabai*, and only their eyes must show through. They must also wear leg-guards. 5. They must have powerful, bold horses. These horses should also be covered in armor, either of pieces of felt and boiled leather glued or stitched together down to the knees so as to cover the whole body of the horse, with nothing but its eyes and nostrils showing through, while from the knees down the horses' legs are uncovered; or else the horses also should have *klibania* made from bison-hides. This type of *klibanion* should go over the horse's chest and be split at the legs of the horse and down below so as not to impede its feet. The *kataphraktoi* should also have shields to block arrows. 6. There are to be archers in the middle of the *kataphraktoi* and these archers must be shielded by them. The men in the front line of the *kataphraktoi*, and those in the second, third, and fourth lines must not be archers, but those from the fifth line down to the twelfth. If the formation of *kataphraktoi* comprises 504 cavalrymen, there should be 150 archers among them. If the formation comprises 384, there should be eighty archers among them. 7. The weapons of the *kataphraktoi* should be the following: maces, made completely of iron, with sharp corners on the heads so that they are three-, four-, or six-cornered, or other iron maces, or sabers. Everyone must have swords and all must have iron maces either on their belts or their saddles. The first line, that is, the face of the formation, the second, third, and fourth, must have the same complement, but the *kataphraktoi* on the flanks should line

τασίν, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ πέμπτου ὀρδίνου οἱ ἀπὸ πλαγίων κατάφρακτοι
 στηκέτωσαν οὕτως, εἷς κονταράτος καὶ ἕτερος ῥαβδάτος ἢ ἐκ τῶν
 75 βασταζόντων τὰ παραμήρια. ἵνα στήκωσιν οὕτως καὶ οἱ ὄντες εἰς
 τὴν οὐράν, οἷον ὁ ἔσχατος ὀρδίνος καὶ ὁ ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ. 8. οἱ
 δὲ τοξόται ἐχέτωσαν τὰ κλιβάνια αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ κασίδια μόνα. εἰ
 δ' ἐστὶ δυνατόν, ἔστωσαν καὶ τὰ ἱπάρια αὐτῶν κατάφρακτα. εἰς
 80 δὲ τὰ ζωνάρια-φορεῖτωσαν οἱ τοξόται καβάδια πρὸς τὸ φυλάττεσθαι
 αὐτοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς ζώσεως καὶ ἕως κάτω καὶ πρὸς τὸ σκέπεσθαι
 ἀπὸ τῶν καβαδίων μέρος τι καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἱππαρίων αὐτῶν. 9. εἰ δ'
 ἔχεις καὶ ῥιπταριστὰς καβαλλαρίους, ἀρμόζει ἵνα ὧσι καὶ ἐξ
 αὐτῶν ἔσωθεν τῶν καταφράκτων. οἱ δὲ κονταράτοι ὀφείλουσιν ἔχ-
 85 εῖν καὶ αὐτοὶ σπαθία καὶ σιδηροράβδια ὁμοίως καὶ οἱ ῥιπταρισ-
 ταί, πάντες δὲ ἐχέτωσαν τὰ σκουτάρια αὐτῶν χωρὶς τῶν τοξοτῶν.
 10. τὰ δὲ κοντουβέρνια τῶν καταφράκτων ἔστωσαν καὶ αὐτὰ φίλοι
 μετὰ φίλων καὶ συγγενεῖς μετὰ συγγενῶν καὶ ἐπὶ παρατάξεως καὶ
 ἐπὶ ἀπλήκτου καὶ ἐπὶ ὁδοιπορίας. καὶ εἷς ἕκαστος ζυγὸς τῶν κα-
 90 ταφράκτων ἐχέτω κεφαλὴν, οἱ δὲ μεγάλοι ζυγοὶ ἐχέτωσαν ἀνὰ δύο
 κεφαλὰς συναπληκεύοντας καὶ συντρώνοντας καὶ συμπεριπα-
 τοῦντας μετ' αὐτῶν. ὀφείλει δὲ καὶ τὸ σύστημα ὅλον τῶν κατα-
 φράκτων καὶ συναπληκεύειν μετὰ τῆς πρώτης αὐτῶν κεφαλῆς καὶ
 συμπεριπατεῖν. 11. ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ τῆς πλευρικῆς τετραπλεύρου παρ-
 αταγῆς εἵπομεν εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀναμίκτου συντάξεως,
 95 οἷον ἵνα ὑπάρχη καὶ πεζικὸν καὶ | καβαλλαρικόν, πῶς ὀφείλουσι
 χωρίζεσθαι καὶ ποταπὴν ἔχειν τάξιν καὶ δὴ καὶ πρὸ ὀλίγου εἵπο-
 μεν τὴν ἐξόπλισιν καὶ τὴν τάξιν τῶν καταφράκτων καὶ καβαλλαρ-
 ῖων, ἀρμόζει ἄρτι ἵνα γράψωμεν καὶ περὶ τῆς καβαλλαρικῆς παρα-
 τάξεως.

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61.

1. (Χ)ωρισθήτωσαν οἱ ἀρχηγοὶ τῶν καβαλλαρικῶν παρα-
 ταγῶν εἰς βάνδα, ἔχοντα τὰ βάνδα αὐτῶν ἀπὸ καβαλλαρίων πεντή-
 κοντα, πλὴν εἰς ἓν ἕκαστον χωρισθήτωσαν συγγενεῖς μετὰ συγ-
 5 γενῶν καὶ φίλοι μετὰ φίλων πρὸς τὸ εἶναι αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐπὶ
 ἀπλήκτου καὶ ἐπὶ ὁδοιπορίας καὶ πανταχοῦ ἐν τῷ ἅμα καὶ ἐν τῷ
 τρώγειν καὶ διάγειν. καὶ ἴστασθαι καὶ αὐτοὺς εἰς τὴν παραταγὴν

79 καβάδια: καββάδια cod. 89 post μεγάλοι scr. cod. δύο quod delevi 93 πλευρικῆς: πλευρι-
 τικῆς cod.

up as follows from the fifth line on back, one a lancer and the other armed
 with a mace or one of the men carrying sabers. The men in the back should
 also line up in this way, that is to say, the very last row and the one in front
 of it. 8. The archers must have their *klibania* and helmets only. Their horses
 should be in armor if possible. The archers must wear *kabadia* from their
 belts to protect themselves from the waist down and also to cover a part
 of their horses with their *kabadia*. 9. If you have mounted javeliners, they
 should be inside the *kataphraktoi*. The lancers too must have swords and
 iron maces as should the javeliners, and all of them must have shields
 except for the archers. 10. The *kontubernia* of the *kataphraktoi* must also
 keep friends with friends and kinsmen with kinsmen in battle formation,
 in camp, and on the march. Each row of *kataphraktoi* must have a com-
 mander, while the bigger rows must have two commanders, who camp,
 take meals, and march along with them. The entire contingent of *ka-*
*ta**phraktoi* must encamp and march with its head commander. 11. Since
 we began with the account of the square infantry formation and combined
 deployment, which must consist of infantry and cavalry, how they should
 be divided, and what battle order they must have, and now that we have
 just discussed the equipment and battle order of the *kataphraktoi*, we must
 now begin writing about the deployment of the cavalry.

61.

1. The officers of the cavalry divisions must be distributed among
banda, their *banda* containing fifty men each, but see to it that kinsmen
 with kinsmen and friends with friends are assigned to each one so that
 they live and take meals together in camp, on the march, and everywhere.
 They must line up in battle formation as follows. Two *banda* must form

οὕτω. τὰ δὲ δύο βάνδα ὀφείλουσι ποιεῖν ὄρδινον ἓνα πρὸς τὸ ἔχειν
τὸν ὄρδινον καβαλλάριους ἑκατόν. ἐχέτωσαν δὲ οἱ αὐτοὶ καὶ τὰ
κλιβάνια αὐτῶν καὶ σπαθία καὶ ῥαβδία. 2. ὀφείλουσι δὲ χωρισθῆ-
10 ναι καὶ προκουρσάτορες, ἄνδρες καβαλλάριοι πεντακόσιοι. ἐξ
αὐτῶν δὲ ἀρμόζει εἶναι καὶ τοξότας ἐπιτηδείους, ἄνδρας ἑκατόν
εἴτε ἑκατόν εἴκοσιν, οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ πάντες ἔστωσαν κονταράτοι. οἱ
δὲ τοιοῦτοι πεντακόσιοι καβαλλάριοι ἐχέτωσαν καὶ κασίδια καὶ
κλιβάνια εἴτε λωρίκια, καὶ σπαθία καὶ ῥαβδία. ἐχέτω δὲ εἰς
15 ἑκάστος ἐξ αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς ἓν συρτόν. ἔστω δὲ κεφαλὴ εἰς αὐτοῦς,
εἴτε στρατηγὸς εἴτε ἄλλος ὃν ἂν ἡ βασιλεία ἡμῶν προστάξῃ. εἰ δ'
ἐστὶν ὀλίγος ὁ στρατὸς καὶ οὐκ ἄρκεῖ ἵνα γένωνται προκουρσά-
τορες πεντακόσιοι, ὀφείλουσιν εἶναι τριακόσιοι, ἐξ αὐτῶν δὲ οἱ
ἐξήκοντα ἔστωσαν τοξόται. οὗτοι δὲ οἱ προκουρσάτορες μὴ ἐχέ-
20 ωσαν σύνταξιν ὥς αἱ παραταγαί, διότι αὐτοὶ μέλλουσι ταρασσείν
καὶ ποιεῖν τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ πολέμου. ἡ δὲ κεφαλὴ αὐτῶν, ἂν μὲν ὦσι
πεντακόσιοι, ἐχέτω μετ' αὐτῆς εἰς ἴδιον φοῦλκον ἄνδρας ἑκατόν
πεντήκοντα, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς διαμερισάτω πρὸς τὴν δύναμιν τῶν
ἐχθρῶν καθὼς ἂν δυνηθῇ μαθεῖν περὶ αὐτῆς. εἰ δ' εἰσὶ τριακόσιοι,
25 ἐχέτω ἡ κεφαλὴ αὐτῶν μετ' αὐτῆς ἑκατόν, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς διαμερ-
ισάτω ὁμοίως. 3. ἀρμόζει δὲ χωρισθῆναι τοῦ καβαλλαρικοῦ στρα-
τοῦ τὰς παραταγὰς οὕτως. ἂν ἀποκρίνωσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ πεζικοῦ αὐτῶν
αἱ καβαλλαρικαὶ παραταγαὶ καὶ ἔχωσι καὶ τοῦλδον, ὀφείλουσι
χωρισθῆναι εἰς παραταγὰς δεκαεξί. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν χώρισον παρα-
30 ταγὰς τρεῖς | κεχωρισμένας ἀπ' ἀλλήλων καὶ στήσον αὐτὰς ἔμπρο-
σθεν εἰς ἓν μέρος μετώπου, ἡγουν τὴν μίαν δεξιὰ καὶ τὴν ἄλλην
ἀριστερὰ καὶ τὴν ἄλλην εἰς τὴν μέσην. καὶ ἡ μὲν δεξιὰ παραταγὴ
ἐχέτω εἰς τὴν δεξιὰν ἄκραν αὐτῆς τοὺς ὑπερκεραστάς, οὗτοι δὲ
εἰσὶν οἱ μέλλοντες περικυκλῶσαι τὴν παραταγὴν τῶν πολεμίων,
35 ἔστωσαν δὲ οἱ τοιοῦτοι ὑπερκερασταὶ κονταράτοι καὶ τοξόται πο-
λεμισταί, ἄνδρες ἑκατόν. οἱ πλείονες δὲ ἔστωσαν τοξόται πρὸς τὸ
κυκλῶσαι, ὥς εἴρηται, τὴν παραταγὴν τῶν πολεμίων καὶ τοξεύειν
αὐτούς. ὁμοίως καὶ ἡ ἀριστερὰ παραταγὴ ἐχέτω (εἰς τὴν) ἀρι-
στερὰν ἄκραν αὐτῆς καβαλλάριους ἑκατόν πρὸς τὸ κωλύειν αὐτοὺς
40 τοὺς ὑπερκεραστάς τῶν πολεμίων ἵνα μὴ κυκλώσωσι τὴν τοιαύτην
παραταγὴν. αἱ δὲ τοιαῦται τρεῖς παραταγαί, αἱ μὲν δύο, ἡ δεξιὰ
καὶ ἡ ἀριστερά, ἔστωσαν ἀπὸ ἀνδρῶν πεντακοσίων, ἀπὸ τριακο-
σίων κονταράτων καὶ ἀπὸ διακοσίων τοξοτῶν. οὗτοι δὲ πάντες ἐχ-

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23-24 τῶν ἐχθρῶν: τῶν χρείων cod. 38 εἰς τὴν supplevi 40 κυκλώσωσι: κωλύσωσι cod.

one line with the result that the line contains one hundred cavalrymen.
They must have their *klibania*, swords, and maces. 2. *Prokoursatores* must
be set apart, five hundred cavalrymen. There must be proficient archers
among them, one hundred or 120 men, and the rest of them must all be
lancers. These five hundred cavalrymen must have helmets and *klibania* or
lorikia, swords and maces. Let each of them have an extra horse. They
must have one head commander, either a *strategos* or someone else whom
our Majesty appoints. If the army is rather small and not big enough for
there to be five hundred *prokoursatores*, they should be three hundred,
of whom sixty must be archers. These *prokoursatores* should not have an
assigned station like the cavalry divisions for the reason that they are the
ones who begin skirmishing and open the battle. Their commander, if they
are five hundred, must keep 150 men with him in his own *phoulkon*, and
should set aside the rest according to the strength of the enemy, insofar as
he can find out about it. If they are three hundred, their commander must
keep one hundred with him, and set aside the rest for the same purpose.
3. The units of the cavalry force should be divided as follows. If the cavalry
divisions are separated from their infantry force but do have a baggage
train, they must be broken up into sixteen units. First, take three units,
separate from one another, and put them in front as one forward line, that
is, one on the right, one on the left and one in the center. The unit on the
right must have the outflankers on its right wing, who are to encircle the
enemy formation; these outflankers must be mounted lancers and archers,
one hundred men. The majority of them should be archers, in order to
encircle, as we said, the enemy formation and shoot arrows at them. Cor-
respondingly, the unit on the left must have one hundred cavalrymen on
its left wing to prevent the same outflankers of the enemy from encircling
our formation. These three units, or rather the two, the one on the right
and on the left, must be made up of five hundred men, three hundred
lancers, and two hundred archers. All of them must have lances and

45 έτωσαν καὶ κοντάρια καὶ σκουτάρια, οὐχὶ μεγάλα σκουτάρια οἷα
 τὰ τῶν πεζῶν σκουταράτων, ἀλλὰ μικρότερα, εἴτε ἀπὸ τεσσάρων
 σπιθαμῶν εἴτε καὶ ἀπὸ πέντε, ἐχέτωσαν δὲ καὶ κλιβάνια καὶ
 σπαθία. καὶ παραταξάτωσαν οὕτως, δύο βάνδα ἐκ τῶν κονταρ-
 50 άτων, ἄνδρες καβαλλάριοι πολεμισταὶ ἑκατόν, ἵνα στήκωσιν εἰς
 ἓν μέτωπον (τῆς) παραταγῆς, ὀπισθεν δὲ αὐτῶν ἵνα ὦσιν ἕτερα
 βάνδα δύο, κονταράτοι καβαλλάριοι ἑκατόν. καὶ ἀκολουθεῖτω εἰς
 τῷ ἄλλῳ μετὰ τάξεως, οἷον ὁ ὀπισθεν τῷ ὄντι ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ.
 καὶ ὀπίσω πάλιν τῶν αὐτῶν δύο παραταγῶν ἵνα στήκωσιν ἐκ τῶν
 τοξοτῶν δύο βάνδα, καβαλλάριοι ἑκατόν, ὄρδινος εἷς. καὶ ὀπίσω
 55 τῶν αὐτῶν δύο βάνδων τῶν τοξοτῶν στηκέτωσαν καὶ ἄλλα δύο
 βάνδα ὁμοίως τοξοτῶν, καβαλλάριοι ἑκατόν, ὄρδινος εἷς. ὀφεί-
 λουσι γὰρ εἶναι διπλοὶ καὶ οἱ ὄρδινοι τῶν τοξοτῶν καὶ ἴστασθαι
 ὀπισθεν τῶν κονταράτων. καὶ ἀκολουθεῖτωσαν καὶ ὁ εἷς τῷ ἄλλῳ.
 καὶ ὀπισθεν τῶν αὐτῶν τοξοτῶν στηκέτωσαν ἄλλα δύο βάνδα,
 κονταράτοι καὶ καβαλλάριοι ἑκατόν, ὄρδινος εἷς, πρὸς τὸ γενέ-
 60 σθαι διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν δέκα βάνδων παραταγὴν μίαν καβαλλαρίων
 πεντακοσίων ἔχουσιν τὸ πάχος καβαλλαρίων πέντε, δύο κονταρ-
 άτους ἔμπροσθεν καὶ ὀπίσω αὐτῶν δύο τοξότας καὶ ὀπίσω πάλιν
 τῶν δύο τοξοτῶν κονταράτων ἓνα. μέσον δὲ τῶν δύο παραταγῶν,
 ὧν εἵπομεν, τῆς δεξιᾶς | καὶ τῆς ἀριστερᾶς, στηκέτω ἡ εἰρημένη
 65 τρίγωνος τῶν καταφράκτων παραταγὴ ἔχουσα σώαν τὴν ποσότητα
 τῶν πολεμιστῶν αὐτῆς ἀνδρῶν καβαλλαρίων πεντακοσίων τεσ-
 σάρων. ἐχέτω δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐξόπλισιν αὐτῆς ἀνελλιπῶς καθὼς ἀν-
 ωτέρω εἵπομεν. καὶ ἕκαστος ὄρδινος ἐχέτω τοὺς πολεμιστὰς κα-
 βαλλαρίους αὐτοῦ, οἷον ὁ μὲν πρῶτος καβαλλαρίους εἴκοσιν, ἀπὸ
 70 δὲ τοῦ πρώτου καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἕως τοῦ δωδεκάτου ἵνα προστίθων-
 ται εἰς ἓνα ἕκαστον ὄρδινον ἀπὸ ἀνδρῶν τεσσάρων, δύο εἰς τὸ
 δεξιὸν μέρος καὶ δύο εἰς τὸ ἀριστερόν. εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ὀλιγώτερος ὁ
 στρατός, ἡ μὲν παραταγὴ τῶν καταφράκτων γενέσθω καθὼς προεί-
 πομεν, καὶ τὸ πάχος αὐτῆς ἐχέτω ἀναμφιβόλως δώδεκα καβαλλα-
 75 ρίους καὶ τὸ μῆκος καὶ τὸ ἄπλωμα αὐτῆς ἔστω πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος
 τοῦ στρατοῦ. πλὴν ἂν ἔχη ὁ πρῶτος ὄρδινος δέκα καβαλλαρίους,
 ὀφείλει ὁ δεύτερος καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ ἕως τοῦ δωδεκάτου δέχεσθαι,
 ὥς εἴρηται, προσθήκην ἀπὸ καβαλλαρίων τεσσάρων, δύο εἰς τὸ
 δεξιὸν καὶ δύο εἰς τὸ ἀριστερόν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰς τὰς λοιπὰς δύο
 80 παραταγὰς, ἂν λείπη ὁ στρατὸς πρὸς πεντακοσίους, τὸ μὲν πάχος

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49 τῆς supplevi 70 δωδεκάτου: δεκάτου cod.

shields, certainly not large shields like those of the heavy infantrymen, but
 smaller, of either four or five *spithamai*, and they should also have *klibania*
 and swords. They are to deploy in the following way: two *banda* of lancers,
 one hundred cavalry soldiers, who line up as the front of the unit, and
 behind them there should be another two *banda*, one hundred mounted
 lancers. Each one should follow the other in order, that is, the man behind
 follows the one in front of him. Behind these two battle lines of lancers
 have two *banda* of archers line up in turn, one hundred cavalrymen, one
 line. Behind these two *banda* of archers stand another two *banda*, likewise
 of archers, one hundred cavalrymen, one line. For the lines of archers
 should be two deep and line up behind the lancers. They must follow one
 after the other. Behind the archers line up another two *banda*, lancers, one
 hundred cavalrymen, one line, so that one unit of five hundred cavalrymen
 is created by these ten *banda*, with a depth of five cavalrymen, two lancers
 in front, two archers behind them, and one lancer in turn behind the two
 archers. Between the two units of which we have been speaking, the one
 on the right and the one on the left, stands the above-mentioned triangular
 formation of *kataphraktoi*, with its full complement of cavalry soldiers,
 504 mounted men. It should have its full equipment just as we described
 above. Each line must have its number of cavalry soldiers, that is, the first
 has twenty cavalrymen, and from the first through the rest down to the
 twelfth let there be four men added to each line, two on the right side and
 two on the left. If the force is smaller, let the formation of *kataphraktoi*
 take shape as we outlined earlier; its depth must have twelve cavalrymen
 without change, while its breadth and mass must correspond to the size
 of the army. However, if the first line has ten cavalrymen, the second line
 and the rest down to the twelfth must receive, as noted, an additional four
 cavalrymen, two on the right and two on the left. The same holds true for
 the other two units, in case the army cannot furnish five hundred men,

ἐχέτωσαν ἀπαράλλακτον καβαλλαρίους πέντε, δύο κονταράτους
 ἔμπροσθεν καὶ ὀπισθεν αὐτῶν δύο τοξότας καὶ πάλιν ὀπισθεν τῶν
 τοξοτῶν κονταράτον ἓνα. τὸ δὲ μάκρος καὶ τὸ ἔκταμα τῆς παρα-
 85 ταγῆς ἔστω πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος τοῦ λαοῦ, ὅσον ἀπαντᾷ. 4. ὀπισθεν δὲ
 τῶν τοιούτων τριῶν παραταγῶν, τῆς δεξιᾶς, τῆς ἀριστερᾶς, καὶ τῆς
 μέσης, ἡγουν τῆς τριγώνου τῶν καταφράκτων, ποιήσον ἐτέρας τέσ-
 σαρὰς παραταγὰς. καὶ ἵνα ἔχωσι καὶ αὐταὶ τὴν ὁμοίαν τάξιν τῶν
 ἔμπροσθεν δύο παραταγῶν χωρὶς τῶν καταφράκτων, ἡγουν μία
 90 ἐκάστη παραταγὴ ἵνα ἔχη καβαλλαρίους πεντακοσίους, δύο ὀρδί-
 νους, ὡς προείπομεν, ἀπὸ ἑκατὸν κονταράτων καὶ ὀπισθεν αὐτῶν
 δύο ὀρδίνους ὁμοίως ἀπὸ ἑκατὸν τοξοτῶν, καὶ πάλιν ὀπισθεν τῶν
 τοξοτῶν κονταράτων ἓνα ὀρδινον. τὸ δὲ μάκρος καὶ τὸ ἔκταμα τῆς
 παραταγῆς ἔστω πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος τοῦ λαοῦ πρὸς τὸ εἶναι τὴν φά-
 95 λαγγα τῶν καβαλλαρίων ἀπὸ ἀνδρῶν δισχιλίῳ. εἰ δὲ ἐστὶν ὀλιγ-
 ὗτερος ὁ στρατὸς ἢ καὶ περισσότερος, τὸ μὲν πάχος ἐχέτωσαν αἱ
 παραταγαὶ ἀπαράλλακτον τῶν πέντε καβαλλαρίων, τῶν δύο κοντ-
 αράτων, ὡς εἵπομεν, καὶ τῶν δύο τοξοτῶν καὶ πάλιν τοῦ ἐνὸς κοντ-
 αράτου. τὸ δὲ μέτωπον καὶ τὸ ἄπλωμα τῆς παραταγῆς γενέσθω
 100 πρὸς τὴν ποσότητα τοῦ λαοῦ. αἱ δὲ αὐταὶ τέσσαρες παραταγαὶ ἔστ-
 ωσαν κεχωρισμέναι | ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ἔχουσαι δὲ τὰ διάχωρα αὐτῶν
 πλατέα πρὸς τὸ διαβαίνειν εὐκόλως καὶ ἀνεμποδίστως τὰς ἔμπρο-
 σθεν τρεῖς παραταγὰς ὀπισθεν καὶ τὰς ὀπισθεν τρεῖς πάλιν ἔμπρο-
 σθεν καὶ μὴ ἐμποδίζεσθαι μήτε τὰς ἱσταμένας παραταγὰς μήτε
 105 τὰς διαβαινούσας. 5. καὶ γὰρ ὀπισθεν τῶν εἰρημένων τεσσάρων
 παραταγῶν ὀφείλουσι γενέσθαι ἄλλαι τρεῖς παραταγαὶ ὅμοιαι
 ταῖς ἔμπροσθεν. εἰ δ' ἐστὶ δυνατόν, ἵνα ὦσι καὶ ἄλλοι κατάφρακ-
 τοι, γενέσθω ἐκ τῶν τριῶν τούτων ἡ μέση παραταγὴ ὁμοία τῆς ἔμ-
 προσθεν καταφράκτου παραταγῆς. εἰ δὲ ἀδύνατόν ἐστι τοῦτο,
 110 ἔστω καὶ αὕτη ὡς αἱ λοιπαί. αἱ δὲ τοιαῦται τρεῖς παραταγαὶ ἵνα
 στήκωσι κατέναντι τῶν εἰρημένων διαχώρων τῶν τεσσάρων παρα-
 ταγῶν. ἵνα δὲ στήκωσι ὀπίσω αὐτῶν ὡς ἀπὸ σαγιτοβόλου εἴτε
 πλέον ἢ καὶ ὀλιγώτερον καθὼς συνοράς ὃ τι ἐνδέχεται, ἵνα, ὅταν
 προστάξης ἐξελθεῖν πρὸς τὴν μάχην τὰς τοιαύτας τρεῖς παρατα-
 γὰς, ἐξέλθωσι μετὰ τάξεως καὶ διαβῶσιν ἀκωλύτως εἰς τὰ τρία
 115 διάχωρα τῶν τεσσάρων παραταγῶν πρὸς τὸ μήτε ταύτας τὰς τρεῖς
 παραταγὰς ἐμποδισθῆναι μήτε τὰς προειρημένους τέσσαρας κωλυ-
 θῆναι. 6. ὀπισθεν δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν τριῶν παραταγῶν ἵνα στήκη τὸ

N118^r

90 κονταράτων: σκουταράτων cod.

they must keep the depth unaltered at five cavalrymen, two lancers in
 front, two archers behind them, and one lancer in turn behind the archers.
 The length and breadth of the formation must conform to the size of the
 host, however great it may be. 4. Behind these three units to the right, the
 left, and in the center, namely, the triangle of *kataphraktoi*, put another
 four units. They too must have the same battle order as the two units in
 front apart from the *kataphraktoi*, which is to say that each unit must
 have five hundred cavalrymen, two lines, as we were saying earlier, of one
 hundred lancers, behind which are two lines, likewise of one hundred men,
 archers, and in turn behind the archers is one line of lancers. The length
 and the breadth of the formation must conform to the size of the host, so
 that the whole line of cavalry comes to two thousand men. Whether the
 army is fewer or greater, the units must keep the depth of five cavalrymen
 unaltered, two lancers, as outlined, two archers, and then one lancer. The
 front and the mass of the unit must depend on the quantity of the host.
 These four units must be separated from one another and keep wide inter-
 vals between them for the three units in front to pass through to the rear
 easily and uninterruptedly, and in turn the three rear units to come for-
 ward, so that neither the divisions standing in place nor those moving
 through are hindered. 5. Behind the four units just mentioned should
 stand another three units, the same as the ones in the front. If possible,
 there should be more *kataphraktoi* and make the middle unit of these three
 the same as the formation of *kataphraktoi* in the front. If this is impossible,
 then let it be the same as the rest. These three units must line up directly
 opposite the aforementioned intervals between the four units. They should
 line up behind them more or less out of bowshot, depending on your
 judgment of what the situation permits, so that, whenever you order these
 three units forward into battle, they will move out in order and freely pass
 through the three intervals between the four units, ensuring that neither
 these three units are impeded nor the above-mentioned four units hin-
 dered. 6. The baggage train should be behind these three units, and behind

120 τοῦλδον, καὶ ὀπισθεν τοῦ τοῦλδου ἵνα στήκωσιν ἄλλαι τρεῖς παρα-
 αταγαί, δεξιὰ καὶ ἀριστερὰ καὶ μέση, ἔχουσαι ἀπὸ ἑκατὸν
 125 ἀνδρῶν πρὸς τὸ φυλάττεσθαι δι' αὐτῶν τὸ τοῦλδον. εἰ δὲ καὶ περ-
 ισσότερος ἐστὶν ὁ στρατός, ὁ μὲν τύπος τῶν τριῶν παραταγῶν φυ-
 λαθηῖτω ἀπαράλλακτος, καθὼς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ πλήθος
 τοῦ λαοῦ ὃν ἔχεις, ποίει τὰς προσθήκας εἰς τὰς παραταγὰς. 7. τὰ
 130 δὲ συρτὰ μιᾶς ἐκάστης παραταγῆς ὀφείλουσιν ἵστασθαι κεχωρισ-
 μένα ὀπισθεν αὐτῆς ὡς ἀπὸ τριῶν οὐργυιῶν ἢ τεσσάρων. ἔστω δὲ
 καὶ πρὸς μία κεφαλὴ εἰς τὰ συρτὰ μιᾶς ἐκάστης παραταγῆς μετὰ
 φλαμούλου. πλὴν μὴ ἐχέτωσαν πλήθος συρτῶν διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι φύρ-
 σιν πολλὴν καὶ ἐμποδίζεσθαι αὐτούς, εἰ δὲ συμβῇ πληρωθῆναι εἰς
 135 τὸν πόλεμον ἱππάρδιον τινος, ἀπερχέσθω ὁ καβαλλικεύων αὐτὸ
 πρὸς τὸ γνωριζόμενον φλάμουλον τῶν συρτῶν τῆς παραταγῆς αὐ-
 τοῦ καὶ ἀλλαττέτω τὸ ἱππάρδιον καὶ πάλιν ἐρχέσθω καὶ στηκέτω
 εἰς τὸν ὄρδινον αὐτοῦ. ἔν δὲ ἕκαστον | βάνδον ἐχέτω καὶ τὸ ἴδιον
 140 φλάμουλον, πλεον δέ τι μὴ βαστάζετω. τὰ δὲ φλάμουλα ὀφείλουσιν
 ἔχειν γνωρίσματα εἴτε ἀπὸ γραμμῶν εἴτε ἀπὸ ἄλλων τινων
 145 σημείων. 8. οἱ δὲ ὑπερκερασταί, οἱ ἱστάμενοι εἰς τὴν δεξιὰν ἄκ-
 ραν τῆς δεξιᾶς παραταγῆς πρὸς τὸ κυκλῶσαι τοὺς πολεμίους, καὶ
 οἱ πλαγιοφύλακες, οἱ ἱστάμενοι εἰς τὴν ἀριστερὰν ἄκρην τῆς ἀρι-
 στερᾶς παραταγῆς πρὸς τὸ κωλύσαι τοὺς ὑπερκεραστὰς τῶν πο-
 λεμίων πρὸς τὸ μὴ κυκλῶσαι τὴν ἡμετέραν παραταγὴν, ἔστωσαν
 150 ἀπὸ ἑκατὸν ἀνδρῶν καὶ στηκέτωσαν καὶ αὐτοὶ μετὰ τάξεως. 9. ἡ
 δὲ τρίγωνος τῶν καταφράκτων παραταγὴ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι αἱ οὖσαι
 μετ' αὐτῆς δύο, ἡ μία ἐκ τοῦ δεξιοῦ καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ἐκ τοῦ ἀριστεροῦ
 μέρους, μὴ ὥσιν ἠνωμέναι πρὸς ἀλλήλας, ἀλλὰ κεχωρισμέναι
 145 στηκέτωσαν, ἵνα μέσον αὐτῶν γένωνται δύο διάχωρα. στηκέτωσαν
 δὲ οὕτως. τὰ μέτωπα τῶν δύο παραταγῶν τῆς δεξιᾶς καὶ τῆς ἀρι-
 στερᾶς ἰσαζέτωσαν μετὰ τῶν ὄντων ὀπισθεν εἰς τὴν οὐρὰν τῆς παρα-
 ταγῆς τῆς τριγώνου τῶν καταφράκτων. ὀφείλει γὰρ προεκβαίνειν
 150 ἔμπροσθεν αὐτῶν ἡ τοιαύτη τρίγωνος παραταγὴ τῶν καταφράκτων.
 10. ὅταν δὲ ἐπέρχωνται οἱ ἐχθροὶ κατὰ τῶν ἡμετέρων, ἀρμόζει
 τοὺς προκουρσάτορας προαπαντῆσαι αὐτοῖς. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐστὶ δυνα-
 τόν, ἵνα κλασματίσωσιν αὐτοὺς οἱ προκουρσάτορες ἡμῶν μετὰ ἐγ-
 κρυμμάτων καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων, ἂν ἄρα καὶ ἔρχωνται οἱ ἐχθροὶ
 ἀτάκτως. εἰ δ' ἔρχονται μετὰ τάξεως καὶ παραταγῶν καὶ συστά-
 σεως, ὀφείλουσιν οἱ προκουρσάτορες ἡμῶν προαπαντῆσαι αὐτοῖς

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the baggage train another three units should line up, right, left, and center,
 with a strength of one hundred men, by which to provide protection for
 the baggage train. Even if the army is larger, the design of these three units
 must be kept unaltered, just as it should for the rest, and make additions
 to the formations depending on the size of the host you have. 7. The spare
 horses of each unit must be kept separate to the rear, at a distance of about
 three to four *ourguiai*. There must be a separate commander for the spare
 horses of each unit with a pennant. They should not have a great many
 spare horses which would cause much confusion and get in their way. If
 someone's horse happens to be injured in battle, the rider can take it back
 to the pennant designated for the spare horses of his unit, exchange the
 horse, and head off again to take his place in the line. Each *bandon* must
 have its own pennant but should not carry more. The pennants must have
 distinguishing marks either of letters or some other kind of signs. 8. The
 outflankers, who line up on the right wing of the unit on the right to
 encircle the enemy, and the flankguards, who line up on the left wing of
 the unit on the left so as to prevent the enemy outflankers from encircling
 our formation, should comprise one hundred men, and they too must line
 up in good order. 9. The triangular formation of *kataphraktoi* and the
 other two units which accompany it, the one on the right flank and the
 one on the left, must not be joined to one another, but must line up sepa-
 rately so that between them there are two intervals. Have them line up like
 this. The fronts of the two units on the right and the left must be exactly
 even with the men behind in the rear of the triangular formation of *ka-
 taphraktoi*. The triangular formation of *kataphraktoi* must jut forward
 ahead of them. 10. When the enemy is advancing against our forces, it is
 up to the *prokoursatores* to engage them first. If they can, the *prokoursa-
 tores* must disrupt them with ambushes and feints, all the more so if the
 enemy is advancing in a disorderly manner. If, on the other hand, they are
 advancing in good order and in close formation, our *prokoursatores* must
 go to meet them and then retire once more to return toward our units.

121 τύπος corr. scriba ex τόπος 147 προεκβαίνειν: παρεκβαίνειν cod.

- 155 καὶ πάλιν ὑποστρέψαι καὶ ἐλθεῖν εἰς τὰς ἡμετέρας παραταγὰς.
καὶ διάβασον τὰς αὐτὰς δύο παραταγὰς τῶν προκουρσατόρων εἰς
τὰ δύο διάχωρα τὰ ὄντα ἔνθεν καὶ ἐκεῖθεν τῶν καταφράκτων καὶ
στήσον αὐτοὺς ὀπισθεν κατέναντι τῶν αὐτῶν δύο διαχώρων τῶν
ὄντων ἔνθεν καὶ ἐκεῖθεν τῶν καταφράκτων. 11. καὶ ὅτε πλησιά-
160 σουν οἱ ἐχθροί, τότε ὀφείλει ὅλον τὸ στράτευμα ἡμῶν, εἰς ἕκασ-
τος, λέγειν τὴν ἀναπάντητον τῶν χριστιανῶν εὐχὴν, τὸ “Κύριε Ἰη-
σοῦ Χριστέ, ὁ Θεὸς ἡμῶν, ἐλέησον ἡμᾶς, ἀμήν,” καὶ οὕτως
ὁρμήσαι κατὰ τῶν ἐχθρῶν μετὰ τάξεως περιπατοῦντες ἐν ἀνέσει
τὸ βῆμα αὐτῶν, καὶ μήτε ταραχὴ μήτε φωνὴ τὸ σύνολον παρ’ αὐτῶν
165 γινέσθω. δοθῆτω δὲ σημεῖον εἰς τὸν στρατὸν ἵνα, ὅταν παύωσιν
εἶτε τὰ βούκινα εἶτε ἕτερα ἅπαντα κρουόμενα, λέγωσιν ἐκεῖνοι
πάλιν τὸ “Κύριε Ἰησοῦ Χριστέ, ὁ Θεὸς ἡμῶν, ἐλέησον ἡμᾶς,” καὶ
“χριστιανοὺς ἡμᾶς παράλαβε καὶ ἀξιώσον ἡμᾶς ὑπὲρ τῆς πίστεως
καὶ τῶν ἀδελφῶν ἡμῶν ἀγωνίσασθαι μέχρι θανάτου, καὶ ἐνίσχυ-
170 σον τὰς ψυχὰς καὶ τὰς καρδίας καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἡμῶν σῶμα, ὁ κραταῖος
ἐν πολέμοις Θεός, πρεσβείαις τῆς παναχράντου καὶ Θεοτόκου
μητρὸς σου καὶ πάντων τῶν ἁγίων, ἀμήν.” 12. (Ἀ)ρμόζει δὲ πρὸ
πάντων σκοπῆσαι τό, εἰς ποῖον μέρος ἵσταται ἡ κεφαλὴ τῶν πολεμ-
ίων καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον αὐτὸν ὀρθῶσαι τὸ στόμα τῆς παραταγῆς τῆς
175 τριγώνου τῶν καταφράκτων. ἵνα ἀκολουθῶσι αἱ δύο παραταγαὶ
(μετὰ τῆς παραταγῆς) τῶν καταφράκτων, αἱ οὖσαι ἔνθεν καὶ ἐκεῖ-
θεν αὐτῆς, ὁμοίως ἵνα ἀκολουθῶσι καὶ οἱ ὑπερκερασταὶ καὶ οἱ
πλαγιοφύλακες καὶ οἱ προκουρσάτορες, καὶ αἱ τρεῖς πάλιν, αἱ
ὀπισθεν ἐκείνων, καὶ τὸ τοῦλδον καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα ἵνα ἀκολου-
180 θῶσιν. καὶ τότε ὀφείλει ἡ κεφαλὴ τῶν προκουρσατόρων ἐκβάλλειν
ἐκ τῶν διαχωρισμάτων ἀπὸ τοῦ λαοῦ αὐτοῦ πεντήκοντα καβαλλα-
ρίους εἰς τὸ δεξιὸν μέρος τῶν καταφράκτων καὶ πεντήκοντα εἰς τὸ
ἀριστερὸν πρὸς τὸ κατατρέχειν τοὺς καταφράκτους καὶ κωλύειν
τοὺς ἐπερχομένους ἐχθροὺς ἐκ τῶν πλαγίων τῶν καταφράκτων εἰς
185 τὸ περισπᾶσαι καὶ ταράξαι αὐτοὺς καὶ κόψαι τὴν τούτων ὁρμὴν.
εἰ δὲ καὶ πλῆθος τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἐπέλθῃ ἐκ πλαγίων τῶν κατα-
φράκτων, τότε ἀρμόζει πάντας τοὺς προκουρσάτορας ἐξελεθεῖν ἐκ
τῶν δύο πλαγίων τῶν καταφράκτων (καὶ) δοῦναι αὐτοῖς βοήθειαν.
τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ ὀφείλουσι ποιεῖν καὶ οἱ ὑπερκερασταὶ καὶ περι-
190 κυκλοῦν τοὺς ἐχθροὺς. οἱ δὲ κατάφρακτοι καὶ ἔνθεν καὶ ἐκεῖθεν
αἱ δύο παραταγαὶ ἵνα φυλάττωσι τὴν τάξιν αὐτῶν, συνακολουθεῖτ-

N119^u

Have the two units of the *prokoursatores* pass through the two intervals on either side of the *kataphraktoi* and position them in behind, directly facing these two intervals on either side of the *kataphraktoi*. 11. When the enemy draws near, our whole army, every last one of them, must then say the irresistible prayer of Christians, “Lord Jesus Christ, our God, have mercy on us, Amen,” and so let them go forth in good order against the enemy, proceeding calmly at their pace, and let there be no sound or cry from them at all. Have the command given to the army that, when the trumpets or other instruments cease to sound, they are to repeat, “Lord Jesus Christ, our God, have mercy on us,” and, “Come to the aid of us Christians and make us worthy to fight to the death for our faith and our brothers, strengthen our souls and our hearts and our whole body, the mighty Lord of battles, [through the intercession of the immaculate Mother of God, Thy Mother, and of all the saints, Amen]” 12. Before all else it is necessary to look for this—on what side the enemy leader is standing—and aim the front of the triangular formation of *kataphraktoi* directly at him. The two units escorting the formation of *kataphraktoi* on either side of it must follow. So too the outflankers, the flankguards, and the *prokoursatores* must follow, and in turn the three units, the ones behind them, and the baggage train, as well as all the rest, must follow. At this point the commander of the *prokoursatores* must send forward through the intervals fifty cavalymen from his host to the right flank of the *kataphraktoi* and fifty to their left in order to run alongside the *kataphraktoi* and fend off the enemy attacking the flanks of the *kataphraktoi* in an attempt to draw them off or harass them to cut off their attack. If a great many of the enemy attack the flanks of the *kataphraktoi*, then all the *prokoursatores* must move out along the two flanks of the *kataphraktoi* and provide support to them. At the same time, the outflankers must encircle the enemy. The *kataphraktoi* and the two units on either side must maintain their formation and the rest of the units must follow them in the same

175–176 ἵνα . . . καταφράκτων in marg. dext.: μετὰ τῆς παραταγῆς supplevi 188 καὶ supplevi

195 ὡσαν δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ αἱ λοιπαὶ παραταγαὶ ὁμοίως. 13. ἂν δὲ
 στήκωσι μετὰ τάξεως οἱ ἐχθροὶ καὶ ὀρμήσωσιν οἱ ἡμέτεροι πρὸς
 αὐτούς, ἅμα τῷ ἄρξασθαι ρίπτειν τοὺς ἐχθροὺς σαγίτας πρὸς τὸ
 μέτωπον τῆς τριγώνου παραταγῆς τῶν καταφράκτων, ἀρμόζει παρ-
 200 αὐτικά τοὺς ἡμετέρους τοξότας κατατοξεύειν. εἴτα ὀφείλει ἀπελ-
 θεῖν τὸ βῆμα αὐτῆς ἢ τρίγωνος παραταγῆς τῶν καταφράκτων καὶ
 κροῦσαι τὸ μέτωπον αὐτῆς εἰς τὴν κεφαλὴν τῆς παραταγῆς τῶν
 πολεμίων. τότε δὲ ὀφείλουσιν οἱ ὑπερκερασταὶ ἔξωθεν, ὅσον δύ-
 205 νανται, περικυκλῶσαι τοὺς ἐχθρούς. αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι δύο παραταγαὶ
 αἱ οὖσαι ἔνθεν καὶ ἐκεῖθεν τῆς παραταγῆς τῶν καταφράκτων μὴ
 προεκτρέχωσι τὸ σύνολον μηδὲ παραλύωσι τὴν τάξιν αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ
 περιπατεῖωσαν μετὰ πάσης ἀκριβείας καὶ ἰσότητος εἰς τὰ ἴσα
 τῶν ὄντων εἰς τὴν οὐρὰν τῆς παραταγῆς τῶν καταφράκτων. καὶ
 210 συνεργοῦντος ἡμῖν τοῦ Θεοῦ διὰ τῆς παναχράντου αὐτοῦ μητρός,
 τραπήναι ἔχουσιν οἱ ἐχθροὶ διὰ τῆς τοιαύτης τριγώνου παραταγῆς
 τῶν καταφράκτων. τὰ γὰρ κοντάρια τῶν ἐχθρῶν καὶ τὰ μεναύλια
 κλασθήσονται ὑπὸ τῶν καταφράκτων καὶ αἱ σαγίται αὐτῶν γενή-
 σονται ἀνενέργητοι. καὶ τότε προσλαμβάνοντες οἱ κατάφρακτοι
 215 ἀνδρείαν καὶ θράσος, κατακλάσουσι τὰς κεφαλὰς καὶ τὰ σώματα
 τῶν ἐχθρῶν καὶ τῶν ἵππαριων αὐτῶν μετὰ τῶν σιδηροραβδίων καὶ
 τῶν παραμηρίων αὐτῶν, ἐμβήσονται καὶ κόψουσι τὰς παραταγὰς
 αὐτῶν καὶ διαβήσονται ἐκεῖθεν καὶ ἐκ τούτων τελείως παραλύ-
 σουσιν αὐτούς. παραλυομένων δὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, μὴ διώκωσιν οἱ κα-
 220 τάφρακτοι τὸ σύνολον μηδὲ παραλύωσι τὴν τάξιν αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ
 μηδὲ αἱ δύο παραταγαὶ ἔνθεν καὶ ἐκεῖθεν τῶν καταφράκτων διώ-
 κωσι τὰ πρῶτα, πλὴν μόνοι οἱ προκουρσάτορες ἐξελθέτωσαν διὰ
 τῶν προειρημένων χωρισμάτων μετὰ καὶ τῶν ὑπερκεραστῶν καὶ
 σπουδαζέτωσαν εἰς τὴν δίωξιν καὶ εἰς τὴν σφαγὴν τῶν ἐχθρῶν. 14.
 225 εἰ δὲ γένηται τελείως ἡ τροπὴ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, τότε πρέπει καὶ τὰς
 ἔνθεν καὶ ἐκεῖθεν τῶν καταφράκτων δύο παραταγὰς παραλύνειν
 τὴν ἰδίαν ἐκείνων σύνταξιν καὶ καταδιώκειν τοὺς ἐχθρούς. αἱ δὲ
 ἄλλαι τρεῖς παραταγαί, αἱ ἰστάμεναι ὀπισθεν τῶν τεσσάρων παρ-
 αταγῶν, ὀφείλουσιν, ἀφ' οὗ γένηται τροπὴ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, ἐξελθεῖν
 μετὰ συντάξεως διὰ τῶν τριῶν χωρισμάτων καὶ καταδιώκειν αὐ-
 τοὺς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αὐταὶ αἱ τέσσαρες παραταγαὶ ἵνα διαβῶσι καὶ
 αὐταὶ τοὺς καταφράκτους καὶ σπουδαιότερον ἀκολουθῶσι μετὰ
 τάξεως πρὸς τοὺς φυγόντας ἐχθρούς. οἱ δὲ κατάφρακτοι ἵνα περι-

N119^v

223 ἰστάμεναι: ἰσταμένοι cod.

way. 13. If the enemy stands in good order and our men make their attack
 upon them, as soon as the enemy begins to launch arrows against the front
 of the triangular formation of *kataphraktoi*, our archers must immediately
 shoot back. The triangular formation of *kataphraktoi* must then carry on
 at its pace and its front line must strike against the commander of the
 enemy formation. Meanwhile, the outflankers must encircle the enemy as
 far as they can to the outside. The other two units on either side of the
 formation of *kataphraktoi* must not race ahead or break their formation
 but proceed with perfect precision right alongside the men in the rear
 of the formation of *kataphraktoi*. With God lending us aid through the
 intercession of His immaculate Mother, the enemy will be put to flight by
 the triangular formation of *kataphraktoi*. For the spears and *menavlia* of
 the enemy will be broken to pieces by the *kataphraktoi* and their arrows
 will be ineffective. And then as the *kataphraktoi* gain in courage and bold-
 ness, they will smash the heads and bodies of the enemy and their horses
 with their iron maces and sabers, they will break into and dismember their
 formations, and from there break through them and so completely destroy
 them. When the enemy has been destroyed, the *kataphraktoi* must not
 pursue at all or break their ranks, but neither should the two units on
 either side of the *kataphraktoi* undertake pursuit at first; only the *prokour-*
satores should make their way through the aforementioned intervals and
 with the outflankers hasten to the pursuit and to the slaughter of the en-
 225 emy. 14. But if the rout of the enemy is complete, then the two units on
 either side of the *kataphraktoi* should break their formation and pursue
 the enemy. The other three units, the ones lined up behind the four units,
 must, from the moment when the flight of the enemy occurs, move out in
 formation through the three intervals and pursue them. Likewise, these
 four units must themselves pass through the *kataphraktoi* and, more care-
 fully, follow in good order after the fleeing enemy. The *kataphraktoi* must

230 πατώσιν ἐν τάξει μετὰ πολλῆς ἀνέσεως καὶ ἀταραξίας τὸ βῆμα
 αὐτῶν καὶ ἀκολουθῶσιν. εἰ δὲ πλῆθος λαοῦ εἰσὶν οἱ ἐχθροί, ἀρμό-
 ζει καὶ τὰς ἄλλας παραταγὰς παραλῦσαι τὴν ἰδίαν σύνταξιν καὶ
 ἐπακολουθεῖν μίαν τῇ ἄλλῃ. ἂν δὲ ἀρκῶσιν οἱ προκουρσάτορες
 καὶ ὑπερκερασταὶ | καὶ αἱ δύο παραταγαὶ αἱ ἔνθεν καὶ ἐκεῖθεν N120
 235 τῶν καταφράκτων, ἂν ἀρκῶσιν οὗτοι εἰς καταδίωξιν τῶν ἐχθρῶν,
 ὀφείλει μία ἐκ τῶν λοιπῶν τριῶν παραταγῶν λῦσαι τὴν τάξιν αὐ-
 τῆς καὶ ἀπελθεῖν εἰς βοήθειαν, οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ ἀκολουθεῖτωσαν μετὰ
 συντάξεως. ἂν δὲ περισσότεροι ὦσιν οἱ ἐχθροί, λύσον ἐκ τῶν τεσ-
 σάρων παραταγῶν δύο παραταγὰς καὶ ἀποστείλον (αὐτάς) πρὸς
 240 βοήθειαν, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας δύο ἔχε ἀπαρασαλεύτους. μὴ ἐμποδισθῶσι
 δὲ οἱ πολεμισταὶ εἰς τὴν δίωξιν πρὸς τὸ κρατῆσαι δεσμίους ἢ ἱππά-
 ρια, εἰς ταῦτα γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι αὐτῶν καὶ οἱ χυδαῖοι ὀφείλουσιν
 ἐνεργεῖν. 15. ἂν δὲ ἔχῃσι καὶ οἱ ἐχθροὶ ὁμοίως καταφράκτους
 (ἔχοντας) τὴν ὁμοίαν ἐξόπλιν καὶ μάχωνται πρὸς τοὺς ἡμετέρ-
 ους καταφράκτους καὶ τὰς παραταγὰς ἡμῶν, ἀρμόζει καὶ τὰς ἄλ-
 245 λας τρεῖς παραταγὰς, τὰς ἱσταμένας ὀπισθεν τῶν τεσσάρων παρα-
 ταγῶν, ἐκβάλλειν διὰ τῶν χωρισμάτων καὶ περικυκλῶσαι τοὺς
 ἐχθρούς. καὶ τότε περικυκλουμένων τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἐκ τῶν δύο
 μερῶν καὶ δεχομένων περίσπασιν, ἡ τοῦ Θεοῦ βοήθεια ἵνα ποιήσῃ
 τὴν τροπὴν αὐτῶν. 16. εἰ δὲ αἱ εἰρημέναι παραταγαὶ προσβάλωσι
 250 κατὰ τῶν ἐχθρῶν καὶ καρτεροῦσι καὶ ὡσαύτως οἱ ἐχθροί, ἀπόλυ-
 σον ἐκ τῶν τεσσάρων παραταγῶν τὰς δύο πρὸς βοήθειαν τῶν μαχο-
 μένων παραταγῶν. καὶ ἀπλῶς, ὡς βλέπεις τὴν συμβολὴν τοῦ πο-
 λέμου, οὕτως ποιεῖ καὶ τὴν πρόνοιαν τῶν παραταγῶν. 17. ἂν δὲ
 255 δειλανδρήσωσιν οἱ ἐχθροὶ καὶ ἄρξωνται φεύγειν, τότε καὶ σὺ αὐ-
 τὸς καὶ αἱ δύο παραταγαὶ αἱ οὖσαι μετὰ σου σπουδάζετε διδόναι
 βοήθειαν τοῖς μαχομένοις. ἂν δὲ ἔχῃσιν Ἀραβίτας πολλοὺς οἱ ἐχ-
 θροί, καὶ ἔλθωσιν οἱ Ἀραβίται κυκλῶσαι τοὺς ἡμετέρους, παράγ-
 γειλον τῷ λαῷ τοῦ μὴ καταδιώκειν αὐτούς, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοξείας οἱ
 260 τοξόται ἵνα ἀποδιώκωσιν αὐτούς. ἂν δὲ καὶ αἱ τῶν ἐχθρῶν παρα-
 ταγαὶ κυκλωθῶσι γύρωθεν παρὰ τῶν ἡμετέρων παραταγῶν, ἀρμό-
 ζει ἐλθεῖν εἰς βοήθειαν καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς φύλακας τοῦ τοῦλδου διὰ
 τὸ μὴ εἶναι τινὰς δυναμένους κλασματίσαι τὸ τοῦλδον. 18. ὅλαι
 αἱ παραταγαὶ τῶν πολεμιστῶν τοῦ καβαλλαρικοῦ στρατοῦ, ὡς εἴρ-
 ῃκαμεν αὐτὰς ἐνταῦθα, γίνονται χιλιάδες ἑξ. εἰ δ' ἐστὶ περισσό-

231 παραταγὰς bis | post παραταγὰς scr. cod. καὶ quod deleui 238 αὐτὰς supplevi 243 ἔχοντας
 supplevi 250 ὡσαύτως: ὡς οὕτως cod. 256 Ἀραβίτας cod. 257 Ἀραβίται cod.

proceed in order with great calm and composure at their pace and follow
 along. If the enemy is a very large host, the other units should break for-
 mation and follow one after another. If the *prokoursatores*, the outflankers,
 and the two units on either side of the *kataphraktoi* are enough, if they
 are sufficient for the pursuit of the enemy, one of the remaining three units
 should break formation and head off in support of them, and the rest
 should follow up in formation. If the enemy is more numerous, detach two
 units from the four and send them off in support, and keep the other two
 where they are. The cavalry soldiers in the pursuit must not get caught up
 in capturing prisoners or horses, for it is their attendants and the noncom-
 batants who are to perform this task. 15. If the enemy, too, has *kataphrak-*
toi with the same equipment and they engage our *kataphraktoi* and our
 units, it is necessary to send the other three units, the ones placed behind
 the four units, forward through the intervals and encircle the enemy. And
 then, as the enemy is being encircled from the two flanks and expecting to
 be routed, the help of God will bring about their flight. 16. If the afore-
 mentioned units make an attack on the enemy and the enemy resists all
 the same, detach two of the four units to assist the units engaged in com-
 bat. Simply stated, direct the units according to how you see the battle
 being fought. 17. If the enemy lose heart and begins to flee, then you
 yourself and the two units with you must hasten to the support of the
 combatants. If the enemy has a lot of *Arabitai*, and the *Arabitai* attempt
 to surround our men, order the host not to pursue them, but have the
 archers chase them off with arrows instead. If the enemy units are com-
 pletely surrounded by our units, even the ones guarding the baggage
 should come up in support since there is no one able to strike at the bag-
 gage train. 18. All the units of cavalry soldiers in the cavalry force, as we
 have described them in the present work, add up to six thousand. If our

- 265 τερος ὁ στρατὸς ἡμῶν, αἱ μὲν παραταγαί, ὡς εἵπομεν ὧδε, | ὀφεί- N120^v
 λουσι γίνεσθαι ἀνελλιπείς, καὶ τὸ πάχος αὐτῶν πλεόν τῶν πέντε
 ἀνδρῶν μὴ ἔστω. τὸ δὲ μέτωπον καὶ τὸ ἔκταμα τῶν παραταγῶν
 γινέσθω πρὸς τὴν ποσότητα τοῦ λαοῦ. καὶ ἂν ὑπάρχη περισσό-
 270 ποίει προσθήκην εἰς αὐτάς, καὶ γίνεται μακρότερον τὸ μέτωπον
 καὶ τὸ ἔκταμα αὐτῶν. 19. ἀρμόζει δὲ πρῶτον ἵνα μανθάνῃς διὰ
 κατασκόπων καὶ δεσμίῶν καὶ προσφύγων πόσον λαὸν καὶ ποταπὸν
 ἔχουσιν οἱ ἐχθροὶ καὶ ποταπὴ ἐστὶν ἡ ἐξόπλισις τῶν ἀρμάτων
 αὐτῶν. καὶ ἂν περισσεύῃ ὁ στρατὸς τῶν πολεμίων καὶ εἰς τὸ κα-
 275 βαλλαρικὸν καὶ εἰς τὸ πεζικὸν παρὰ τὸν ἡμέτερον, φεύγε τοὺς
 δημοσίους πολέμους καὶ μετὰ ἐπιτηδεύσεως καὶ ἐγκρυμμάτων ἀγ-
 ωνίζου κλασματίζειν τοὺς ἐχθρούς. τότε γὰρ ἀρμόζει ἐπιζητεῖν
 τοὺς δημοσίους πολέμους, ὅταν καὶ μίαν καὶ δεύτερον καὶ τρίτον
 μετὰ τῆς βοηθείας τοῦ Θεοῦ τραπῶσιν οἱ ἐχθροὶ καὶ κλασματι-
 280 σθῶσι καὶ δειλανδρήσωσι, καὶ θαρσοποιηθῇ ὁ ἡμέτερος λαὸς καὶ
 διεγερθῇ ἡ ἀνδρεία αὐτῶν. καὶ γὰρ ὀφείλομεν φεύγειν τὸν δημό-
 σιον πόλεμον, οὐ μόνον ἂν ἔχωσιν οἱ ἐχθροὶ περισσοτέραν δύ-
 ναμιν παρ' ἡμᾶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ ἴσου τῆς ἡμετέρας ἂν ἔχωσι δύναμιν.
 καὶ τότε ὀφείλομεν φεύγειν, ὡς εἴρηται, τὸν δημόσιον πόλεμον,
 285 ἕως ἢ τοῦ Θεοῦ εὐσπλαγχνία διὰ τῶν πρεσβειῶν τῆς παναχράντου
 Θεοτόκου ἐπικαμπτομένη δώσει νίκην τῷ λαῷ ἡμῶν κατ' αὐτῶν
 καὶ μίαν καὶ δεύτερον καὶ τρίτον. ἀπὸ τότε γάρ, ἂν ὦσι διπλοὶ οἱ
 ἐχθροὶ πρὸς τὸν ἡμέτερον λαὸν καὶ τριπλοί, οὐκ ὀφείλομεν φοβεῖ-
 σθαι καὶ ὑποστέλλεσθαι αὐτοὺς διὰ τὴν ἀσφάλειαν καὶ ὀχυρότητα
 290 τῶν πεζικῶν καὶ καβαλλαρικῶν παραταγῶν ἡμῶν, ὧν ἐνταῦθα
 ἐγράψαμεν. 20. εἰ δὲ τὸ πεζικὸν ἡμῶν οὐκ ἀρκεῖ συσταθῆναι πρὸς
 δώδεκα χιλιάδας, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔκβαλον τὸν ἕνα ὄρδινον τὸν ὄντα
 εἰς τὴν οὐρὰν τῶν σκουταράτων καὶ τὸν ἄλλον ἕνα ὄρδινον τῶν
 τοξοτῶν καὶ ἔκβαλον αὐτοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν δώδεκα παραταγῶν ἐκ μιᾶς
 295 ἐκάστης ἀνδρας διακοσίους πρὸς τὸ εἶναι ὁμοῦ τοὺς ἐκβαλλομέν-
 ους ἐκ τῶν δώδεκα παραταγῶν ἀνδρας δισχιλίους τετρακοσίους.
 καὶ ἀπομένει τὸ πάχος τῶν πεζικῶν παραταγῶν ἀπὸ ἀνδρῶν πέντε,
 δύο σκουταράτων καὶ δύο τοξοτῶν καὶ ἐνὸς ὀπισθεν πάλιν σκουτ-
 αράτου. εἴτα χώρισον ἐξ αὐτῶν καὶ σύστησον τοὺς μεναυλάτους
 300 καὶ τοὺς τοξότας καὶ τοὺς ῥιπταριστάς καὶ τοὺς | σφενδοβολιστάς, N121^r
 καὶ καθὼς ἀνωτέρω εἵπομεν καὶ ἐξεθήκαμεν, σύνταξον αὐτούς.
 τὰ δὲ διαχωρίσματα τῶν τοιούτων πεζικῶν παραταγῶν ποίησον
 πλατύτερα πρὸς τὸ χωρεῖν αὐτὰ ἀπὸ εἴκοσι καβαλλαρίων εἰς τὸ

army is even more numerous, the units, as we so outlined, must remain intact and their depth must be no more than five men. The front and the length of the formations must be arranged according to the quantity of the host. Even if the host is more numerous, as said, divide it into the units and make additions to them so their front or length is broader. 19. It is first necessary to find out through spies, prisoners, and deserters what size and what kind of host the enemy have, and what kind of arms and equipment. If the enemy army outnumbers our own both in cavalry and infantry, avoid pitched battles and strive to weaken the enemy with feints and ambushes. The time to seek out general engagements is when, with the help of God, the enemy have fled once, twice, or three times, and are weakened and fearful, while our host is emboldened and its valor is awakened. For we ought to avoid a general engagement not only if the enemy is in greater strength than we are but also if they are in strength equal to our own. At that point we must avoid a general engagement, as mentioned, until the benevolence of God, stirred by the intercession of the immaculate Mother of God, grants victory to our host against them once, twice, and three times. From that moment on, be the enemy twice or even three times as great as our host, we need not fear or cower before them because of the security and strength of our infantry and cavalry units, of which we have written in this work. 20. If our infantry force is not large enough to make twelve thousand, out of necessity withdraw one line of infantrymen in the rear and another line of archers, and take them out of the twelve units, two hundred men from each one, so that all told the men withdrawn from the twelve units number 2,400. The depth of the infantry formations remains five men, two infantrymen, two archers, and one infantryman in turn at the rear. Then separate the *menavlatoi*, archers, javeliners, and slingers from them and put them together, then deploy them just as we outlined earlier in our presentation. Make the intervals between these infantry units wider so that they have space for twenty cavalymen

305 περιπατεῖν αὐτοὺς μετὰ τάξεως ἴσα, εἰ ἄρα καὶ ἔχομεν καβαλλαρ-
ικὸν πολὺ καὶ οὐ χωροῦσιν οἱ καβαλλάριοι ἡμῶν ἵστασθαι ἔσ-
ωθεν τῆς τετραπλεύρου παραταγῆς τῶν πεζῶν. τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ διάχωρα
ὀφείλουσι φυλάττεσθαι παρὰ τῶν ρίπτारιστῶν, τοξοτῶν καὶ σφεν-
δοβολιστῶν. καὶ γὰρ οἱ αὐτοὶ οὐκ ὀφείλουσιν ἵστασθαι κατὰ τὰ
ἴσα τῶν ἱσταμένων ἔμπροσθεν προμάχων σκουταράτων, ἀλλὰ οἱ
310 πρόμαχοι τῶν ρίπτारιστῶν ὀφείλουσιν ἵστασθαι κατὰ τὰ ἴσα τῶν
ὄντων εἰς τὴν οὐρὰν σκουταράτων. καὶ ἡ λοιπὴ παραταγὴ τῶν
αὐτῶν ρίπτारιστῶν καὶ σφενδοβολιστῶν ἵνα στήκη ὀπισθεν
αὐτῶν. ἂν δὲ καὶ χωρὶ τὸ καβαλλαρικὸν ἡμῶν ἔσωθεν τῆς τετρα-
πλεύρου παραταγῆς τῶν πεζῶν, μὴ ἐχέτωσαν τὰ διάχωρα πλέον
315 διάστημα παρ' ὃ ἀνωτέρω εἵπομεν. καὶ γὰρ πλέον τῶν δώδεκα κα-
βαλλαρίων ἢ καὶ δεκαπέντε οὐκ ὀφείλουσι χωρεῖν τὰ διάχωρα.
τούτων οὕτω σὺν Θεῷ τελειωθέντων, ἀπάρτι καὶ περὶ ἀπλήκτου
διηγησόμεθα.

62.

1. (Π)ροσταχθήτωσαν πάντες οἱ στρατηγοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄρχοντες
(παρὰ) τῆς κεφαλῆς τοῦ στρατοῦ εἰς ποῖον μέρος ἕκαστος αὐτῶν
ὀφείλει ἀπληκεῦειν εἰς τὴν πολεμίαν γῆν. καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀρχηγὸς τοῦ
ὅλου στρατοῦ ἀπληκεύετω μέσον τοῦ ὅλου φοσσάτου, οἱ δὲ
5 στρατηγοὶ καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ ἄρχοντες καθὼς ἔχουσι παρ' αὐτοῦ δια-
ταχθῆναι, ἄλλοι πρὸς τὸ ἀνατολικὸν αὐτοῦ μέρος, ἄλλοι πρὸς τὸ
δυτικόν, καὶ ἄλλοι πρὸς τὸ μέρος τῆς ἄρκτου καὶ ἕτεροι πρὸς τὸ
τῆς μεσημβρίας. καὶ εἷς ἕκαστος ἐξ αὐτῶν γνωρίζετω τὸν τόπον
ὅπου προσετάγη ἀπληκεῦειν, ἵνα μὴ ποιήσῃσι φῦρμα καὶ ἀλλάξ-
10 ωσι τὰ κατατόπια αὐτῶν. ὁμοίως καὶ οἱ ἄρχοντες, ὅσοι εἰσὶν ὑπὸ
τοὺς στρατηγοὺς καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ, ἀπληκευέτωσαν κατὰ τάξιν τὰ
βάνδα καὶ τὰ κοντουβέρνια αὐτῶν, καθὼς ἂν διαταγῶσι παρὰ τῆς
κεφαλῆς τοῦ στρατοῦ. 2. ὅπου δὲ μέλλει γενέσθαι τὸ ἀπληκτον,
ἀρμόζει πρῶτον ἀποσταλῆναι μινσουρατόρας τοῦ κατασκοπῆσαι
15 πεδινὸν καὶ ἐπιτήδειον | τόπον ἔχοντα πλησίον καὶ ὕδωρ τὸ ἀρ-
κοῦν. καὶ πρῶτα μὲν ἀρμόζει πῆσσεσθαι εἰς τὴν γῆν τὸ φλάμουλον
τοῦ στρατηγοῦ, εἴτα ἵνα πῆσσωνται τὰ φλάμουλα τῶν ἐτέρων
στρατηγῶν καὶ ἀρχόντων καθὼς προσετάγησαν ἀπληκεῦειν παρὰ
τῆς κεφαλῆς τοῦ στρατοῦ. καὶ ὅταν ἴδωσι ὅτι ἐστάθη ἡ τένδα αὐ-

N121^v

2 παρὰ supplevi 16 πῆσσεσθαι: πησσεσσεσθαι cod. 19 ἴδωσι: ἴδης cod.

to proceed in order at the same time, in case we have a lot of cavalry and our cavalymen cannot fit inside the infantry square. These intervals must be guarded by javeliners, archers, and slingers. These men must not line up alongside the infantry standing in the front lines, but the front ranks of the javeliners should line up alongside the infantrymen in the rear. The remaining unit of these javeliners and slingers must line up behind them. If the cavalry does fit inside the infantry square, the intervals should not have a width greater than the one we gave above, for the intervals should not accommodate more than twelve to fifteen cavalymen. So then, with the help of God, these matters being at an end, we will now go on to discuss the camp.

62.

1. All the *strategoi* and officers should receive instructions from the head of the army as to which place each of them is to set up camp in enemy territory. The leader of the entire army must make his quarters in the middle of the whole encampment, the *strategoi* and remaining officers as they will be directed by him, some to his eastern side, some to the western, some to the northern side, and the rest to the south. Each one of them must make known the place where he has been ordered to pitch camp, lest they cause confusion and mix up their assigned posts. So too the officers, those under the *strategoi* and the rest, have to make their quarters arrayed in their *banda* and *kontoubernia* just as they have been instructed by the head of the army. 2. It is necessary first of all that *min-souratores* be sent out in the region where the camp will be to look for a level, suitable place with water in sufficient supply close by. The banner of the general must be planted in the ground first, then the banners of the other *strategoi* and officers must be planted, keeping to the instructions for setting up the camp issued by the head of the army. When they see that his tent is up, then they should put up their own. 3. Order the chiliarchs

20 τοῦ, τότε καὶ αὐτοὶ τὰς ἰδίας τένδας στησάτωσαν. 3. πρόσταζον δὲ
καὶ τοῖς χιλιάρχοις τῶν πεζῶν τοῦ γνωρίζειν τὰ ἅπληκτα αὐτῶν.
καὶ ἀπληκευέτωσαν καὶ αὐτοὶ γύρωθεν τοῦ φοσσάτου εἰς τὰ τέσ-
25 σαρα μέρη, τρεῖς χιλιάρχοι μετὰ τοῦ λαοῦ αὐτῶν εἰς τὸ ἀνατολικ-
ώτερον μέρος, καὶ τρεῖς εἰς τὸ δυτικὸν καὶ τρεῖς εἰς τὸ μεσημβρι-
νὸν καὶ τρεῖς εἰς τὸ ἀρκτῶν πρὸς τὸ περιγυρεῦσαι καὶ
περιλαβεῖν αὐτοὺς ὅλον τὸ φοσσάτον. καὶ καθὼς ἐτυπώθησαν ἴσ-
τασθαι εἰς τὴν παραταγὴν, οὕτως ὀφείλουσιν ἴστασθαι καὶ εἰς τὸ
ἅπληκτον ἵνα, ἂν γένηται ἴσως ἐξαίφνης φωνὴ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, εὐρε-
30 θῶσιν ἔτοιμοι ὡς ἐπὶ παραταγῆς. στηκέτωσαν δὲ διπλοὶ γύρωθεν
τῆς σοῦδης, ἥγουν ὄρδινοι δύο, διὰ τὸ περιγυρεῦσαι καὶ περιλα-
βεῖν ὅλην τὴν σοῦδαν. καὶ τὰ μὲν κοντάρια τῶν πεζῶν ἔστωσαν
πεπηγμένα εἰς τὴν γῆν, τὰ δὲ σκουτάρια ἀκουμβιζέτωσαν εἰς τὰ
κοντάρια. οἱ δὲ σκουταράτοι ὀφείλουσιν ὀπισθεν τῶν ἀρμάτων
αὐτῶν μετὰ τάξεως καθέζεσθαι καὶ μετὰ τῶν ψιλῶν καὶ τῶν το-
35 ξοτῶν καὶ ἀναπαύεσθαι. οἱ δὲ ὄντες εἰς τὴν οὐρὰν σκουταράτοι
οἱ καὶ οὐραγοί, εἰ μὲν ἐστὶ πολὺς ὁ καβαλλαρικὸς στρατὸς καὶ
οὐκ ἀρκεῖ τὸ πεζικὸν πρὸς τὸ περιγυρεῦσαι τὸ ἅπληκτον καὶ περ-
ιλαβεῖν αὐτό, σταθήτωσαν εἰς τὸν ὄρδινον τοῦ σκουταρώματος
καὶ οἱ αὐτοὶ οὐραγοὶ διπλοὶ μετὰ τῶν προμάχων, εἷς ἕκαστος εἰς
40 τὸ κατατόπιον τῆς χιλιαρχίας αὐτοῦ. ἂν δὲ ἀρκῶσιν οἱ σκουταρά-
τοι τῶν προμάχων εἰς τὸ περιλαβεῖν ὅλον τὸ φοσσάτον καὶ χωρὶς
τῶν οὐραγῶν, τριπλωθήτωσαν οἱ οὐραγοὶ καὶ γενέσθωσαν ὄρδινοι
τρεῖς τῶν πεζῶν γύρωθεν τοῦ ἀπλήκτου. οἱ δὲ μεναυλάτοι καὶ οἱ
λοιποὶ τοξόται καὶ οἱ σφενδοβολισταὶ ἀπληκευέτωσαν εἰς τὰ δι-
45 ἄχωρα τὰ ἀπομένοντα εἰς τὰς στράτας, καθὼς ἀνωτέρω εἶπομεν
εἰς τὴν πεζικὴν παραταγὴν. 4. εἰς δὲ τὸ ἅπληκτον ὀφείλουσι κα-
ταλιμπάνεσθαι χωρίσματα ὁκτώ. ἐπεὶ γὰρ δώδεκα εἰσὶν οἱ χιλί-
αρχοι, ἐχέτωσαν οἱ τρεῖς χιλιάρχοι εἰς τὸ μέσον αὐτῶν διαχωρίσ-
ματα δύο. | ταῦτα δὲ τὰ διαχωρίσματα ὀφείλουσι γενέσθαι διὰ
50 σταυροῦ διὰ τῶν τεσσάρων μερῶν τοῦ φοσσάτου. ἐχέτωσαν δὲ
στενὸν τὸ ἐκβασίδιον αὐτῶν. καὶ μὴ ἔστωσαν στενὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα
αὐτῶν ἐκβασίδια εἰς τὸ σκουτάρωμα, ἀλλὰ καμπτέτωσαν πρὸς
γάμμα. ὀφείλουσι δὲ γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὰ ἴσα τῶν αὐτῶν διαχωρίσ-
μάτων εἰς τὸ μέσον τοῦ φοσσάτου καὶ ὁδοὶ δύο ἀπὸ τῆς ἀνατολῆς
55 εἰς δύσιν καὶ ἀπὸ ἄρκτου πρὸς μεσημβρίαν. αἱ δὲ τοιαῦται ὁδοί,

33 σκούταράτοι: κονταράτοι cod. 53 γάμμα: γράμμα cod. | ὀφείλουσι: ὀφείλεσθαι cod.

of the foot soldiers to point out their quarters. They must pitch camp all
around the encampment on the four sides, three chiliarchs with their host
out to the eastern side, three to the western, three to the southern, and
three to the northern, so that they surround and enclose the entire en-
campment. The way that they have been arranged to line up in battle
formation is how they must also line up in camp, so that, if word of the
enemy should suddenly come, they will be found ready in battle order.
Have them line up two men deep around the camp, that is, two lines, to
surround and enclose the whole camp. The spears of the foot soldiers must
be planted in the ground and their shields should be leaning against the
spears. The infantrymen should take their places in order along with the
light infantry and archers behind their weapons and rest. If the cavalry
force is very large and there is not enough infantry to surround the en-
campment and enclose it, the infantrymen in the rear, the ones in the back,
must stand in with the line at the shield cover, these soldiers in the rear
lines two deep alongside the men in the front lines, and each one in the
proper station in his chiliarchy. If the infantrymen in the front lines are
enough to enclose the entire encampment without the men in the rear
lines, let the men in the rear lines make them three deep and let there
be three lines of foot soldiers around the camp. The *menavlatoi* and the
remaining archers and slingers should pitch camp in the intervals left open
for the roads, in the manner we described above in the deployment of
infantry. 4. There should be eight intervals allowed in the camp. Since
there are twelve chiliarchs, three chiliarchs should have two intervals be-
tween them. These intervals should be in the form of a cross through the
four sides of the encampment. They should have a narrow exit. These
narrow exits must not be directly through the shield cover, but they must
be bent like a letter *gamma*. There should be two roads aligned with these
intervals running through the encampment from east to west and from
north to south. Each one of these roads must have width of passage for

μία ἐκάστη, ἐχέτωσαν καὶ διάχωρον ὅσον τεσσάρων καβαλλαρίων ἢ πέντε. τοῖς δὲ χιλιάρχοις παράγγειλον καὶ προστύπωσον αὐτοῖς ἵνα, καθὼς ἀπληκεύει ὁ λαός, κωλύσωσιν οἱ ἐκατόνταρχοι αὐτὸν κατὰ τὰ ἴσα τῶν διαχωρισμάτων τοῦ μὴ ἀπληκεύειν ἐκεῖ καὶ
 60 φράσσειν τὰς στράτας, ἀλλ' ὡς εἴρηται, ἵνα ποιῶσι τὰς στράτας διὰ σταυροῦ μέσον τοῦ φοσσάτου ἀπὸ ἀνατολῆς εἰς δύσιν καὶ ἀπὸ ἄρκτου πρὸς μεσημβρίαν. 5. τὰ δὲ τῶν σκουταράτων καὶ τοξοτῶν καὶ λοιπῶν πεζῶν ἄλογα μὴ στήκωσι πλησίον αὐτῶν εἰς τὸ σκουτάρωμα, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πρὸς τὸ φοσσάτον ἀπέχοντα ἐξ αὐτῶν ὡς ἀπὸ
 65 σαγιτοβόλου διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐπελθεῖν πολλάκις ἐχθροὺς τὴν νύκτα καὶ ἴσως ἐκ τῆς τοξείας ἐκείνων τοξευθῆναι τινὰ τῶν τοιοῦτων ἀλόγων καὶ γενέσθαι ἀλογόφυρμα καὶ φυγεῖν ἐκ τούτου τὸν λαὸν καὶ ἀφανισθῆναι. 6. ἂν δὲ καὶ φόβος ὑποπτεύηται παρὰ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, ἀρμόζει τότε καὶ σοῦδαν ἔξω τῶν πεζῶν γύρωθεν τοῦ φοσσάτου ποιῆσαι. εἰ δὲ καὶ φόβος τοιοῦτος ἀπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν οὐκ ἐστιν, οὐδὲ θέλει χρονίσει τὸ φοσσάτον εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, οὐ πρέπει κοπιᾶν τὸν λαὸν εἰς τὸ ὀρύξαι τὴν σοῦδαν. 7. ὀφείλουσι δὲ παραγγελθῆναι οἱ χιλιάρχοι ἵνα ἀφ' ἧς δύνῃ ὁ ἥλιος μὴ ἀφίωσί
 75 τινα ἐξέρχεσθαι τὸ σύνολον ἐκ τοῦ φοσσάτου. τὸ γὰρ ὕδωρ καὶ τὸ ξύλον καὶ τὸν χόρτον καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς χρεῖας ἀρμόζει δι' ὅλης τῆς ἡμέρας φέρειν εἰς τὸ ἀπληκτον. πλὴν ἵνα φυλάττωνται μετ' ἀσφαλείας καὶ μετὰ βιγλῶν οἱ διὰ τὰς τοιαύτας χρεῖας ἔξωθεν τοῦ φοσσάτου ἀποστελλόμενοι. πρόσταξον δὲ καὶ τοῖς στρατηγοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἄρχουσιν ἵνα ὅλην τὴν νύκτα συνδύο στρατηγοὶ ποιῶσι τὸ κέρκετον περιγυρεύοντες ὅλον τὸ φοσσάτον ἔξωθεν τῶν πεζῶν. περιπατεῖτω δὲ ὁ εἷς ἔμπροσθεν καὶ ὁ ἄλλος ὀπισθεν μετὰ τοῦ φούλκου αὐτῶν. ἔστωσαν διακεχωρισμένοι τοσοῦτον, ὅσον ἀπὸ δύο ἢ
 80 τριῶν σαγιτοβόλων. 8. ὅταν δὲ γένηται καὶ φήμῃ ὅτι κατάσκοποι εἰσῆλθον εἰς τὸ φοσσάτον, ἀρμόζει, ἂν μὲν εἰς τὴν νύκτα λυθῇ ἡ φήμη, ἢ γίνεσθαι παραγγελίαν τοῦ μὴ ἐξελθεῖν ἄνθρωπον ἐκ τοῦ φοσσάτου. καὶ ἅμα ἄρξεται γίνεσθαι ἡ ἡμέρα, πρόσταξον πᾶσι τοῖς στρατηγοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἄρχουσι καὶ τῷ στρατῷ ἵνα εἰσέλθωσιν εἰς τὰ ἀπληκτα αὐτῶν καὶ καθίσωσι. καὶ ἐκ τούτου εὐρεθῆναι ἔχουσιν οἱ κατάσκοποι, μήτε ἀπληκτον ἔχοντες μήτε εἰς βάνδα
 85 ὄντες μήτε εἰς κοντουβέρνια. καὶ τότε ὡς περισσοὶ ὄντες κρατηθήσονται παρὰ τοῦ λαοῦ καὶ φέρωσιν αὐτοὺς πρὸς σέ. εἰ δὲ

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58 κωλύσωσιν: κωλύωσιν cod. 65 σαγιτοβόλου: οὐργυίας cod. 81-82 φούλκου: φοσσάτου cod.

four or five cavalymen. Give the order to the chiliarchs and make it clear to them that as the host is setting up camp, the hekatontarchs must keep the men away from the intervals lest by making their quarters there they block the roads; instead, as indicated, have them make the roads in the form of a cross through the encampment from east to west and from north to south. 5. The baggage animals of the infantrymen, archers, and the rest of the foot soldiers must not be close by them in the shield cover, but should instead be well away from them inside the encampment out of bowshot, lest the enemy make frequent attacks during the night and some of the animals be hit by their arrows, causing a stampede resulting in the flight and destruction of the host. 6. If there is reason to be wary of the enemy, it is then wise to make a trench outside the foot soldiers around the encampment. If there is no such apprehension concerning the enemy, nor does the army intend to remain long in the same place, it is best not to tire out the host by having them dig a trench. 7. The chiliarchs must have instructions that after the sun has set they must not allow anyone to leave the encampment. For it is best to bring water, wood, fodder, and other necessities into the encampment all through the day, although those sent out from the encampment for these supplies must be securely guarded by pickets. Give instructions to the *strategoi* and officers that all through the night pairs of *strategoi* will conduct a patrol around the entire encampment outside the foot soldiers. Have one proceed in front and the other behind with their escorts. They should be separated from each other by two or three bowshots. 8. Whenever there is a report that spies have entered the encampment, it is best, if the report breaks out at night, that there be an order forbidding anyone to leave camp. As day begins, instruct all the *strategoi*, the officers, and the soldiery to enter their quarters and remain there. As a result the spies will be found, neither having quarters nor belonging to *banda* or *kontoubernia*. Then, standing out as extras, they will be seized by the host who will bring them to you. If, during the day,

95 ἡμέρας οὔσης γένηται ἡ φήμη ὅτι κατάσκοποι, ὡς εἴρηται, εἰσῆλθον εἰς τὸ φοσσᾶτον, διαλάλησον ὁμοίως τοῦ εἰσελθεῖν τὸν λαὸν ὅλον εἰς τὰ ἄπληκτα αὐτῶν. καὶ τούτου γενομένου, εὑρεθῆ-
 100 ναι ἔχουσιν οἱ κατάσκοποι. 9. ὀφείλεις δὲ διατάξασθαι τοῖς στρατηγοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἄρχουσι καὶ τῷ λοιπῷ λαῷ ἵνα εἰς τὰ ἄπληκτα αὐτῶν καὶ εἰς τὸν ἐσπερινὸν καὶ εἰς τὸν ὄρθρον, ἀφ' οὗ πληρωθῇ καὶ ὁ ἐσπερινός, ὡς εἴρηται, καὶ ὁ ὄρθρος, ποιῶσιν οἱ ἱερεῖς ἐκ-
 105 τενεῖς ὑπὲρ τοῦ στρατοῦ, καὶ κράζῃ ὁ λαὸς ὅλος τὸ "Κύριε, ἐλέη-
 110 σον" μέχρι τῶν ἑκατὸν μετὰ προσοχῆς καὶ φόβου Θεοῦ, εἰ δ' ἐστὶ δυνατόν, καὶ μετὰ δακρύων. καὶ μὴ κατατολμάτω τις εἰς τὴν ὥραν τῆς προσευχῆς περικοπῆναι εἰς τινα δουλείαν τὸ σύνολον, ἀλλ' εἴ τι εὑρεθῇ ποιῶν, εἴτε καβαλλάριος ἐστὶν εἴτε πεζός, εἰ μὲν ἐστὶ καβαλλάριος, ἀποκαταβήτω καὶ σταθήτω πρὸς ἀνατολὰς εἰς τὸν
 105 τόπον ὅπου εὑρέθη καὶ ἀποδώσει τὴν εὐχὴν αὐτοῦ μετὰ φόβου τῷ Θεῷ, εἰ δὲ καὶ πεζός, ἀποδώσει τὰ ὅμοια. ὅστις δὲ εὑρέθῃ ὅταν γίνηται ἡ εὐχὴ ὅτι περικόπτεται εἰς τι πράγμα καὶ οὐ ποιήσει ὅλα πάρεργα καὶ σταθῇ καὶ ἀποδώσει μετὰ φόβου Θεοῦ τὴν εὐχὴν αὐτοῦ, ὁ τοιοῦτος μετὰ δαρμοῦ εἰς τὸ φοσσᾶτον θριαμβευθήτω καὶ
 110 τοῦ ἀξιώματος αὐτοῦ ἐκπίπτων εἰς ὑποδεέστερον βαθμὸν κατα-
 115 ταχθήτω. 10. ὅταν δὲ πλησιάζωσιν οἱ ἐχθροί, ἀρμόζει γίνεσθαι βουλήν, τὸ πῶς καὶ πότε γενήσεται ὁ πόλεμος. καὶ τῆς βουλῆς γι-
 120 νομένης, ὀφείλεις συνάξει πάντας τοὺς στρατηγοὺς καὶ ἄρχοντας καὶ ὅλον ὑπ' αὐτοὺς λαὸν καὶ παραινέσαι καὶ διατάξασθαι αὐτοῖς τοῦ καθαρισθῆναι ἀπὸ παθῶν καὶ νηστεύσαι. ὅταν κατεπεῖγῃ ὁ πόλεμος, εἰ ἔστι δυνατόν, κρατησάτωσαν τρεῖς ἡμέρας τὴν ξηρο-
 120 φαγίαν καὶ τραγέτωσαν πρὸς τὴν ἐσπέραν μίαν τῆς ἡμέρας καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ ὁ λαὸς καὶ ἐκβαλλέτωσαν καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ψυχῶν αὐτῶν ἕκαστος τὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους | φιλονεικίας ἢ μνησικακίας καὶ ἔχ-
 125 ωσιν εἰρήνην, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλα τινὰ ἂν ἔχωσι πλημμελήματα, ἵνα μετανοήσωσι καὶ εἰς αὐτά. καὶ ἵνα ποιήσωσιν ὑποσχέσεις πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν τοῦ μὴ ἐπιστρέψαι ποτέ εἰς αὐτὰ καὶ ποιεῖν πάλιν ἐκεῖνα τὰ κακά, ἀλλὰ ἔχωσι μετάνοιαν καὶ πολιτείαν καθαρὰν. καὶ τούτων οὕτω γινομένων, ἀρμόζει πρὸ μιᾶς ἡμέρας τοῦ πο-
 125 λέμου λειτουργῆσαι τοὺς ἱερεῖς καὶ κοινωνῆσαι ὅλον τὸ στρά-
 τευμα, καὶ οὕτω μετὰ θάρρους πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν ἀνδρείως πολεμῆσαι τοῖς ἐχθροῖς.

98-99 ἐκτενεῖς: ἐκτενὰς cod. 120 πλημμελήματα: πλημελλήματα cod.

the report arrives, as we said, that spies have entered the camp, likewise spread the word that the entire host must enter their quarters. When this happens, the spies will be caught. 9. You must instruct the *strategoi*, the officers, and the rest of the host that in their quarters at Vespers and Matins, after Vespers is completed, as we said, and Matins, the priests will recite the Litany on behalf of the army and the whole host will call out, "Lord, have mercy," up to one hundred times with devotion and fear toward God, even with tears if they can. Let no one dare cut short the time of prayer for sake of any other task whatsoever, yet be there someone found so doing, whether a cavalryman or an infantryman, if he is a horse-
 man, let him dismount and stand facing east on the spot where he was discovered and render his prayer in fear of God. If an infantryman, have him perform the same ritual. If anyone is found to have cut short the time of prayer to attend to some other matter and will not put everything else aside to stand and offer his prayer in fear to God, such a man will be paraded through the encampment with beatings, and in demotion from his rank will be assigned to a lower station. 10. When the enemy are drawing near, it is necessary to prepare a plan telling how and when the battle will take place. When the plan is formed, you must assemble all the *strategoi*, officers, and the entire host under them to counsel and enjoin them to cleanse themselves from sins and to fast. When battle is imminent, let them observe, if possible, a dry fast for three days and eat just once a day in the evening; they and the host must also expel from their souls any spite or grudges they might have towards one another and be reconciled. So, too, if they have other faults, let them repent of these. They must promise God never to return to these ways or commit these sins again, but to maintain their repentance and a sinless life. When these matters are so disposed, one day before the battle the priests must perform the Liturgy, and the whole army must take Communion, and so with confidence in God they must bravely engage the enemy.

1. (Ο)φείλει ὁ ἀρχηγὸς τοῦ στρατοῦ πρῶτον διὰ κατασκόπων καὶ διὰ δεσμιῶν καὶ προσφύγων ἐρωτᾶν καὶ μανθάνειν πῶς κεῖται μία ἐκάστη χώρα τῶν πολεμίων καὶ πῶς εἰσι τὰ χωρία καὶ κάστρα αὐτῶν καὶ πόσις καὶ ποταπὴ ἐστὶν ἡ δύναμις τῶν πολεμιστῶν αὐ-
 5 τῆς. καὶ ὅταν πάντα μάθῃ καλῶς, ἀρμόζει ἵνα σκοπῇ καὶ τοὺς καιροὺς, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς καιροὺς καὶ τὰς εὐθείας θέσεις τῶν χωρῶν, ἵνα ποιῇ καὶ αὐτὸς τὰς ἐπιδρομὰς καὶ τὰ κοῦρσα. καὶ εἰς μὲν τοὺς θερμοὺς τόπους καὶ ἔχοντας καλύμματα, ἵνα ἀπέρχεται πρὸς τὸν χειμῶνα καὶ τὸ φθινόπωρον καὶ τὸ ἔαρ, εἰ ἄρα οὐ κατα-
 10 βαίνουσιν ποταμοὶ καὶ ποιοῦσι πλημμύρας ὑδάτων εἰς τὰς τοιαύτας χώρας. εἰς δὲ τοὺς ψυχροὺς πάλιν καὶ εὐκράτους τόπους, ἵνα ἀπέρχεται πρὸς τὸ ἔαρ καὶ τὸ θέρος καὶ τὸ φθινόπωρον. 2. τοῦτο δὲ ὀφείλει πρὸ πάντων ἀσφαλίζεσθαι, τὸ μὴ πρὸς τινὰ πάντων μηδὲ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν μυστικωτάτων αὐτοῦ εἰπεῖν τὴν βουλὴν ἢ πρὸς ποίαν
 15 χώραν μέλλει ποιῆσαι τὴν ἐπιδρομὴν, ἀλλὰ μάλλον ἵνα διαφημίζῃ ὅτι πρὸς ἄλλην χώραν μέλλει ἀπέρχεσθαι, καὶ τὴν μὲν ὁρμὴν τῆς ὁδοιπορίας ἵνα ποιῇ ὡς πρὸς ἐκείνην τὴν χώραν τὴν διαφημισθεῖ-
 20 σαν παρ' αὐτοῦ, τὴν δὲ οἰκείαν βουλὴν ἵνα κρύπτῃ, καὶ ὅταν ἴδῃ ὅλους ἀμεριμνήσαντας, ἵνα ἐτοιμάσῃ πάντα καλῶς, καὶ τότε ἐξαίφνης ἵνα ἀπέλθῃ μετὰ σπουδῆς εἰς ἐκείνην τὴν χώραν εἰς ἣν ἔχει βουλὴν ἀπελθεῖν. 3. τὸ δὲ πεζικὸν ὅλον μετὰ τοῦ πεζικοῦ τοῦλδου ἵνα ἀφήσῃ περιπατεῖν ὀπισθεν αὐτοῦ μετὰ τάξεως, καὶ ἵνα μὴ καταλίπῃ καβαλλαρίους πρὸς φύλαξιν τῶν πεζῶν πλὴν τοὺς
 25 καταφράκτους καὶ μόνους. διαλαλησάτω δὲ καὶ τοῖς (ἀρχηγοῖς) | ἵνα εἰς ἕκαστος ἀφορίσῃ ἐκ τῶν ψιλῶν αὐτοῦ ἄνδρας ἑκατὸν ἢ ἑκατὸν πεντήκοντα, καὶ ποιήσῃ αὐτοὺς καβαλλαρίους πρὸς τὸ συν-
 30 ακολουθεῖν τῷ καβαλλαρικῷ στρατῷ, ἵνα μετὰ τῆς βοηθείας τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἂν κρατηθῇ αἰχμαλωσία καὶ πραιδα, γένωνται κοινωνοὶ εἰς τὸ κέρδος διὰ τῶν τοιούτων ψιλῶν καὶ οἱ πεζοί. ὁμοίως ἵνα ἀφορι-
 35 σθῶσι καὶ ἐκ τῶν καταφράκτων πεντήκοντα ἢ τεσσαράκοντα, καὶ ἀφήσουσιν εἰς τὸ τοῦλδον τοὺς καταφράκτους αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ἱπ-
 4. ὅταν δὲ πλησιάσῃ ὁ στρατὸς εἰς τὴν χώραν τῶν ἐχθρῶν εἰς ἣν καὶ ἀπέρχεται, ὀφείλει πρὸ πάντων σπουδὴ καὶ ἐπιμέλεια γίνεσ-
 35 θαι παρὰ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ τοῦ κυβερνῶντος τὸν στρατόν, ἥγουν

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F289

24 ἀρχηγοῖς suppl. F

1. The commander of the army must first make investigations through spies, prisoners, and deserters and find out the situation of each enemy area, of their villages and fortresses, as well as the size and nature of their cavalry forces. When he is well informed about all these matters, he must take into account the time of year, and he should make incursions and raids with due allowance for the season and the accessibility of the areas. He should depart for warm, densely grown regions during winter, autumn, or spring, if indeed the rivers do not overflow and cause floods in those areas. Conversely, he should depart for cool, and temperate regions during spring, summer, or autumn. 2. Above all, he must make absolutely sure to divulge neither his intentions nor which region he is about to invade to anyone at all, not even to one of those privy to his secrets. He should instead spread word that he is planning to depart for some other place, and he should undertake the march as though heading for the region announced by him while keeping his intentions hidden. When he sees that no one is paying any heed, he must make all the proper preparations and then suddenly set off with haste for the region where he intends to go. 3. He must leave the entire infantry force and the baggage train of the infantry to proceed in good order behind him and he must not leave any caval-rymen behind for the protection of the infantry save only the *kataphraktoi*. He should give orders to the officers that each of them must detach one hundred or 150 of his light infantrymen and convert them into cavalrymen to accompany the cavalry force, so that if, with the aid of God, there are prisoners and spoils, the foot soldiers will get some share of the gain through these light infantrymen. Similarly, forty or fifty of the *kataphraktoi* should be set apart, who will leave their heavy armor and that of their horses with the baggage train and head out with the other light horsemen. 4. When the army approaches the enemy region for which it set out, the general guiding the army, or the *doukator*, must above all be quick and alert to send men out and secure information from prisoners through

40 παρὰ τοῦ δουκάτορος, πρὸς τὸ ἀποστεῖλαι καὶ κρατῆσαι γλῶσσας
 καὶ δι' αὐτῆς μαθεῖν βεβαίως περὶ τῆς χώρας. αἱ γὰρ ἐπιδρομαί,
 αἱ γινομέναι ἀπροσδοκῆτως εἰς τὴν πολεμίαν γῆν, πολλοὺς κινδύ-
 νους πολλάκις ποιοῦσιν εἰς τὸν στρατόν. πολλάκις γὰρ πρὸ μιᾶς
 45 ἡμέρας ἢ καὶ πρὸ δύο τῆς ἐξελάσεως τοῦ κούρσου ἔρχεται ποθεν
 ἐπιβολὴ λαοῦ εἰς τοὺς ἐχθρούς, καὶ οἱ κατάσκοποι καὶ οἱ προσ-
 φεύγοντες ἀπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν καὶ οἱ κρατηθέντες δέσμιοι ἐξερχό-
 μενοι ἐκεῖθεν πρὸ ἐβδομάδος ἢ καὶ πρὸ τεσσάρων καὶ τριῶν
 50 ἡμερῶν ἀγνοοῦσι τὰ γενόμενα ἐκεῖ πρὸ μιᾶς ἡμέρας ἢ καὶ πρὸ
 45 δύο. διὰ τοῦτο ἐξ ἀναγκαίου ἐστὶ τὸ κρατεῖν γλώσσας καὶ δι'
 αὐτῶν μανθάνειν τὰ περὶ τῆς χώρας τῶν πολεμίων, ἵνα ἐξ αὐτῶν
 πληροφορηται ὁ λαὸς εἴτε ἡλθόν τινες πρὸς βοήθειαν τῆς χώρας
 εἴτε καὶ μὴ, καὶ κουρσεύσῃ μετὰ θάρρους καὶ ἀφανίσῃ τὰ
 55 χωρία καὶ τὰς πολιτείας τῶν πολεμίων. 5. ὅταν δὲ μέλλῃς, ἀρχηγὲ
 τοῦ στρατοῦ, ἀπολῦσαι τὸ σκόρπισμα τοῦ κούρσου, χωρίσον τοὺς
 στρατηγοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας αὐτῶν εἰς μέρη τρία, καὶ τοῖς μὲν
 τοῦ δεξιοῦ μέρους, τοῖς δὲ τοῦ ἀριστεροῦ πρόσταξον ἵνα ὦσι πρὸς
 60 φύλαξιν τοῦ κούρσου. οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ ὀφείλουσιν εἶναι ἔμπροσθεν
 καὶ φυλάττειν τοὺς ἔμπροσθεν ὄντας ἐκ τοῦ κούρσου. σὺ δὲ
 55 ὀφείλεις μετὰ παντὸς τοῦ ὑπὸ σὲ λαοῦ τὴν μέσσην ὁδὸν τοῦ κούρ-
 σου κρατεῖν καὶ φυλάττειν ἀμφοτέρωθεν τὰ μέρη, καὶ εἰς οἷον (μέρος)
 γένηται ἡ φωνή, ἵνα ὑπάγῃς ἐκεῖ καὶ παρέχῃς βοήθειαν. παράγγει-
 λον δὲ καὶ τοῖς στρατηγοῖς καὶ τοῖς ὑποχειρίοις αὐτῶν ἄρχουσι
 καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς πολεμισταῖς εἶναι μετὰ σοῦ ἐν τάξει φούλκου
 60 πρὸς τὸ φυλάσσειν τὸν λαὸν εἰς τὸ σκόρπισμα τοῦ κούρσου. 6.
 ὅτε δὲ ἀποσωρευθῇ καλῶς τὸ κούρσον καὶ πληροφορηθῇς ἐκ τῶν
 κρατηθέντων δεσμιῶν καὶ αἰχμαλώτων ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι σῶρευμα
 λαοῦ τῶν ἐχθρῶν εἰς τὸν τόπον ὅπου γίνεται τὸ σῶρευμα τοῦ
 κούρσου, ποιήσον ἐκεῖ μίαν ἡμέραν, εἰ ἔστι δυνατόν, καὶ δύο, καὶ
 65 ἀνάπαυσον καὶ τὸν στρατὸν καὶ τὰ ἄλογα, εἴτα ὑπόστρεψον μετὰ
 τάξεως καὶ ἐνώθητι τῷ φοσσάτῳ σου. 7. ἀφ' οὗ δὲ ἐνώθης αὐτοῖς,
 καὶ γένηται βουλὴ εἴτε πρὸς τὰς χώρας τῶν ἐχθρῶν πάλιν ἵνα
 ὑποστρέψῃ ὁ στρατὸς εἴτε πρὸς τὸ κάστρον τοῦ πολεμῆσαι αὐτό,
 70 ἀρμόζει διὰ τάχους πολλοῦ ποιῆσαι τὸ βουλευθὲν καὶ μὴ χρονίζ-
 ειν εἰς τὸν τόπον. εἰ δὲ οὐκ ἔστι χρεῖα ἵνα ἀπέλθωσιν εἰς καστρο-
 πόλεμον ἢ ποιῆσαι πραΐδας καὶ κούρσα εἰς τὰς ἄλλας χώρας,
 ὑπόστρεψον τότε πρὸς τὴν ἡμετέραν γῆν, πλὴν ἄφες κατασκόπους

N124^r

whom he will acquire accurate knowledge of the region. Invasions made
 unexpectedly against enemy territory frequently bring many hazards upon
 the army. For it often happens that one or two days before the raid is
 launched, a body of reinforcements from somewhere else comes to the
 enemy, while the spies, deserters from the enemy, and captured prisoners
 coming from the place a week or three to four days previously are unaware
 of what has happened there one or two days before. Hence the necessity
 of taking prisoners for interrogation and through them learning of devel-
 opments in the enemy region, so that the host will be certain whether or
 not any others are coming to the aid of the region, and they will conduct
 the raid boldly and ravage the enemy villages and settlements. 5. When
 you, commander of the army, are about to let loose the force of pillagers,
 divide the *strategoî* and their officers into three bodies and instruct those
 in the body on the right as well as those on the left to provide protection
 for the raid. The rest must stay in front and protect the raiders who have
 gone ahead. You and the whole force under your command are to hold
 the main path of the raid and protect the bodies on both flanks, and on
 whichever flank a summons comes, make your way there and provide sup-
 port. Pass the word to the *strategoî*, their subordinate officers and to the
 rest of the cavalymen to remain with you in close formation to protect
 the men in the pillaging force of the raiding party. 6. When the raiding
 force has properly regathered and you have been informed by the prisoners
 or captives seized that there is no enemy host massing in the region where
 the raiding force is assembled, spend a day in the place, or two if possible,
 and rest the army and the horses, then return in good order and join your
 main force. 7. The moment you join with them, if there is a plan for the
 army either to return once more to enemy regions or to the fortress to
 besiege it, it is best to act on this decision very quickly and not to tarry in
 the place. If there is no point in embarking on a siege or in looting and
 raiding other regions, then make your way back to our country, but leave

75 εἰς τὴν πολεμίαν γῆν πρὸς τὸ κατασκοπῆσαι μετ' ἀκριβείας πῶς
 8. ἀν δὲ ἔλθωσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι κατάσκοποι καὶ εἴπωσιν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι
 σῶρευμα στρατοῦ εἰς τὴν χώραν τῶν ἐχθρῶν, ἀλλὰ ἔχει ἀμερι-
 80 μνίαν, τότε, ἀν γένηται ὀπισθόκουρσον εἰς τὰς πολεμίας χώρας τῆς
 κουρσευθείσης γῆς, κάλλιον ἔχει γενέσθαι παραταγαῖ πρὸς τὴν
 ἐπιδρομὴν. πλὴν ἀφ' οὗ γένηται ἡ πρώτη ἐπιδρομὴ τοῦ κούρσου,
 80 ἀρμόζει ἀναπαῦσαι τὸν λαὸν καὶ τὰ ἄλογα ὥς ἄχρι τριῶν ἡμερῶν
 ἢ καὶ πλεον, καὶ οὕτως ἵνα ἀποκινήσης περιπατεῖν εἰς τὴν ἡμε-
 ἔραν γῆν, καὶ ἵνα περιπατήσης μονὰς ὅσας θέλεις, καὶ τότε ἐξαίφ-
 νης ἵνα ὑποστρέψῃς καὶ ποιήσῃς τὸ ὀπισθόκουρσον, εἴτε εἰς
 85 νύκτα ἀρμόζει γενέσθαι αὐτὸ εἴτε εἰς ἡμέραν. 9. χωροβατῶν δὲ
 τὴν πολεμίαν γῆν ὀφείλεις ἐμπυρίζειν τὰς χώρας καὶ τὰς πο-
 λιτείας αὐτῆς καὶ κατακαίειν τὰ οἰκήματα καὶ τὰ γεννήματα καὶ
 τὰς βοσκὰς. πλὴν εἰς τὸν τόπον ὃν μέλλεις ὑποστρέψαι καὶ ἀνα-
 παῦσαι τὸν στρατόν, μὴ καύσης ἐκεῖ τὰς βοσκὰς καὶ τὸν σῖτον,
 90 ἀλλὰ φύλαξον αὐτὰ μᾶλλον ἀνέγγιστα πρὸς τὸ εὕρισκεν τὸν λαὸν
 τὴν τροφήν αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἱππαρίων αὐτῶν. 10. ἀφόρισον δὲ | μερί-
 90 δας ἀπὸ τῆς αἰχμαλωσίας καὶ τῆς πραιίδας καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν λοιπῶν
 πραγμάτων τῶν κρατηθέντων λόγῳ τῶν πεζικῶν σκουταράτων εἰς
 τὸ κούρσον καὶ τῶν ψιλῶν καὶ τῶν καταφράκτων καβαλλαρίων
 τῶν ἀπομεινάντων πρὸς φύλαξιν τοῦ φοσσάτου, καὶ τύπωσον τοῦ
 95 λαμβάνειν αὐτοὺς ταῦτα ἐκ τοῦ καβαλλαρικοῦ στρατεύματος πρὸς
 γενέσθαι αὐτοὺς μᾶλλον προθυμοτέρους εἰς τὴν φύλαξιν τοῦ φοσ-
 σάτου.

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64.

1. (Ὅ)ταν ὑπάρχῃς εἰς τὴν πολεμίαν γῆν καὶ μέλλῃς ἀποκιν-
 εῖν ἀπὸ ἀπλήκτου καὶ ὧσι πλησίον ἐχθροὶ καὶ φαίνονται ἐγγὺς
 τοῦ φοσσάτου, ἀν ὑπάρχῃ πολὺς λαὸς τὸ στράτευμα τῶν ἐχθρῶν
 καὶ ἔχωσι τὴν ὁρμὴν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὸ στράτευμα ἡμῶν καὶ ζητῶσι
 5 πόλεμον, οὐ πρέπει ἵνα ἀπολυθῇ ὁ στρατὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπλήκτου καὶ
 ἄρξῃται περιπατεῖν, ἀλλ' ἵνα ὑπάρχῃ εἰς τὸ ἀπλήκτον καὶ αἱ πεζι-
 καὶ παραταγαῖ καθὼς εἰσι γυρόθεν τοῦ φοσσάτου ἵνα ἐτοιμάζων-
 ται πρὸς πόλεμον ἀπαραλλάκτως, ὥς προείπομεν, καὶ ἵνα στήκωσι
 γυρόθεν τοῦ φοσσάτου. 2. αἱ δὲ καβαλλαρικαὶ παραταγαῖ ἵνα ἐξ-
 10 ἔρχωνται ἔξω μὲν τοῦ φοσσάτου καὶ παρατάσσωνται καθὼς καὶ

spies in enemy territory to observe carefully how the enemy is conducting himself and to bring reports to you promptly. 8. If these spies come and tell you that there is no mobilization of forces in the land of the enemy, but that all is quiet, then, if there is a return raid against the hostile regions of the territory raided, it is better that there be units detailed for the incursion. After the first raiding expedition has taken place, however, it is good to rest the host and the animals for three days or more, and so you get underway on the march to our country and march as many stages as you wish, then quickly turn round and make the return raid, which may be either during the night or day. 9. On your way through hostile territory you should set fire to the regions and their settlements and burn the dwellings, the crops, and the pastures. In the place where you intend to return and rest the army, however, do not burn the pastures and the grain, but guard these very closely so that the host will find food for itself and the horses. 10. Set aside shares from the prisoners and plunder and from the rest of the captured spoils for the allotment of the foot soldiers in the raid as well as the light infantry and the heavy cavalymen who remained behind to guard the encampment, and decree that they will receive these from the cavalry contingent so that they will be all the more zealous in guarding the camp.

64.

1. Whenever you are in hostile territory and about to set out from camp, and the enemy is in the vicinity and appears close to the encampment, if the enemy army is a large host and they make their advance toward our army and seek battle, it is not good for our army to break camp and begin to march. It should instead remain in camp and the infantry units, just as they are around the encampment, will prepare for battle without changing their position as we outlined earlier, and they will stand around the encampment. 2. The cavalry units should move out from the encampment and deploy for battle just as we spoke of them above. The

περὶ αὐτῶν προείπομεν. στηκέτωσαν δὲ ὀπισθεν τῶν καβαλλα-
 ρικῶν παραταγῶν καὶ πεζοὶ ῥιπταρισταὶ καὶ τοξόται καὶ σφενδο-
 βολισταί, πλὴν μὴ ἔστωσαν μακρὰν ἀπὸ τῶν πεζῶν. καὶ ἂν μὲν
 15 ὀρμήσωσιν οἱ ἐχθροὶ πρὸς τὸ στράτευμα ἡμῶν, ἀρμόζει τὰς κα-
 βαλλαρικὰς παραταγὰς ποιεῖν τὴν ὀρμὴν τοῦ πολέμου, καθὼς ἀν-
 ωτέρω εἵπομεν. 3. εἰ δὲ ἴστανται οἱ ἐχθροὶ καὶ οὐκ ἐπέρχονται
 πρὸς τὸ ἡμέτερον στράτευμα, εἰ οὐκ ἔστιν ὑποψία ὅτι πολλὸς λαὸς
 εἰσιν οἱ ἐχθροί, ἀλλ' εἴτε παρὰ κατασκόπων εἴτε παρὰ προσφύγων
 20 πληροφορηθῆς πόσις ἐστὶν ἡ δύναμις αὐτῶν, ἂν μὲν ὥσι πολὺ ὀλιγ-
 ωτεροὶ παρὰ τὸ ἡμέτερον στράτευμα, ἀρμόζει ἀποκινήσαι ἐκ τοῦ
 ἀπλήκτου ὅλον τὸν στρατὸν μετὰ τοῦ τοῦλδου καὶ μετὰ τάξεως
 καὶ μετὰ τῶν εἰρημένων παραταγῶν καὶ ὀρμήσαι κατὰ τῶν ἐχ-
 θρῶν, καὶ ἔμπροσθεν μὲν ἵνα | περιπατῶσιν αἱ καβαλλαρικαὶ παρ-
 25 αταγαί, | ὀπισθεν δὲ αἱ πεζικαὶ καί, τοῦ Θεοῦ συνεργοῦντος, ἂν
 τραπῶσιν οἱ ἐχθροί, ἵνα ποιήσωσιν οἱ ἡμέτεροι τὴν δίωξιν αὐτῶν
 μετὰ τάξεως, καθὼς λεπτομερῶς προείπομεν. εἴτα μετὰ χαρᾶς καὶ
 νίκης καὶ εὐφημίας βασιλικῆς, ἵνα ἄρξωνται περιπατεῖν. 4. ἂν δὲ
 φανῶσιν οἱ ἐχθροὶ ἀπὸ μακρόθεν καὶ ὥσιν ὀλίγοι, μὴ κωλυθῇ τὸ
 30 φοσσάτον εἰς τὴν ὁδὸν αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ μετὰ τάξεως περιπατεῖτωσαν
 οἱ μὲν τὸ δεξιὸν μέρος, οἱ δὲ τὸ ἀριστερόν, οἱ δὲ ἔμπροσθεν, οἱ
 δὲ ὀπισθεν σάκα. σὺ δὲ ὀφείλεις περιπατεῖν εἰς τὸ μέσον, ἵνα, εἰς
 οἶον μέρος ἐπέλθωσιν οἱ ἐχθροί, παρέχῃς βοήθειαν πρὸς αὐτό.
 καὶ, εἰ μὲν ἐστὶ πεδινὸς καὶ ἐπιτήδειος τόπος, περιπατεῖτωσαν
 35 ἔξωθεν τῶν πεζικῶν παραταγῶν οἱ πλαγιόφυλακες καὶ οἱ ὀπισθο-
 φύλακες, ὁμοίως καὶ οἱ ὄντες ἔμπροσθεν εἰς τὸ μέτωπον. ἔσθωθεν
 δὲ αὐτῶν περιπατεῖτωσαν μετὰ τάξεως αἱ πεζικαὶ παραταγαί,
 τρεῖς χιλίαρχοι μετὰ τοῦ λαοῦ αὐτῶν εἰς τὸ δεξιὸν μέρος καὶ
 τρεῖς εἰς τὸ ἀριστερόν καὶ τρεῖς εἰς τὸ μέτωπον καὶ τρεῖς ὀπισθεν
 40 εἰς τὴν οὐράν. πλὴν μὴ περιπατῶσιν ἐνδεδυμένοι τὰ ἄρματα αὐτῶν
 οἱ πεζοί, ἀλλὰ οἱ ἔχοντες εἴτε βορδῶνια εἴτε ἄλογα εἴτε ὄνικά,
 περιπατεῖτωσαν καβαλλάριοι μετὰ τῶν κοντουβερνίων αὐτῶν
 μετὰ τάξεως καὶ μὴ πεφυρμένοι, ἀλλὰ εἰς ἕκαστος περιπατεῖτω
 μετὰ τῆς ἰδίας χιλιαρχίας καὶ ἐκατόνταρχος καὶ πεντηκόνταρχος
 καὶ δέκαρχος, ἵνα ἴσως, ἂν γένηται αἰφνιδισμὸς παρὰ τῶν ἐχ-
 45 θρῶν, εὐρεθῇ εἰς ἕκαστος εἰς τὸν τύπον καὶ εἰς τὸν τόπον αὐτοῦ,
 καὶ ἐπάρωσι γοργὸν τὰ ἄρματα αὐτῶν, καὶ σταθῶσιν εἰς τὴν παρα-
 ταγὴν αὐτῶν εἰς ἕκαστος εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν τάξιν. 5. καὶ οὕτω μὲν

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javeliners, bowmen, and slingers who are on foot should stand behind
 the cavalry units, but not at a great distance from the infantry. If the enemy
 attacks our army, the cavalry units should begin battle in the manner de-
 scribed earlier. 3. If the enemy remains stationary and does not move
 against our army, and if there is no reason to suspect that the enemy is a
 large host, but through either spies or deserters you have been informed
 of the size of their force, if they are much fewer in number than our army,
 the whole army should move out from the camp along with the baggage
 train and advance toward the enemy in good order with the aforemen-
 tioned formations; the cavalry units should move ahead, the infantry be-
 hind them, and if with the help of God the enemy flees, our men must go
 in pursuit of them in good order, as we discussed at greater length before.
 And then with rejoicing, triumph, and imperial acclamations, they should
 begin the march. 4. If the enemy appears at a distance and is few in num-
 ber, the army should not be kept from its journey, but have them proceed
 in order, some to the right side, some to the left, some ahead, and some
 behind as a rearguard. You must proceed in the middle so that you can
 offer support to whichever side the enemy attacks. If the terrain is level
 and suitable, the flankguards and rearguards must proceed on the outside
 of the infantry formations, as should the men in front at the head. The
 infantry units should proceed in good order on the inside of the cavalry
 units, three chiliarchs with their contingents on the right side, three on the
 left, three in front, and three behind in the rear. The foot soldiers must
 not, however, march along clad in their equipment. Those with donkeys,
 horses, or mules should ride along in good order with their *kontubernia*
 and not in a confused array. Each hekatontarch, pentekontarch, and de-
 karch should march along with his own chiliarchy, so that if there is a
 sudden attack by the enemy, each man will be at his assigned station and
 place, they will swiftly take up their equipment and all will stand in their
 formation, each man in his place. 5. They should march along in this way.

21 post ἀπλήκτου scr. cod. ἀποκινήσαι quod F delevit | καὶ μετὰ τάξεως bis 41 τῶν supplevi

περιπατεῖτωσαν. γίνωσκε δὲ ὅτι, ἂν ὑπάρχη ἡ ὁδὸς στενή, ἦν μέλ-
 λει περιπατεῖν τὸ στράτευμα, καὶ πλησιάζωσιν οἱ ἐχθροὶ εἰς τὰ
 50 τοιαῦτα στενώματα, εἰ μὲν ἔχει τρεῖς στράτας καὶ τρία ἐκβασίδια
 τὸ στένωμα, καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶ μακρὰν ἀπὸ τούτων αἱ τοιαῦται στράται,
 ἀρμόζει ἵνα σταθῶσιν οἱ χιλιάρχοι ὀπισθεν εἰς τὴν οὐράν, καὶ ὁ
 μὲν εἰς χιλιάρχος μετὰ τοῦ πεζικοῦ αὐτοῦ κρατεῖτω | τὸ ἐν στέ-
 55 νωμα, ὁ δὲ ἄλλος τὸ ἄλλο στένωμα τῆς ἄλλης, καὶ ὁ ἄλλος ὁμοίως
 τῆς ἄλλης. ἵνα δὲ σταθῶσι καὶ ἄλλοι τρεῖς χιλιάρχοι, οἱ περιπα-
 τοῦντες ἔμπροσθεν, εἰς τὸ μέτωπον, καὶ ἐκ τῶν δύο πλαγίων καὶ
 ἵνα σταθῶσιν οἱ δὲ χιλιάρχοι οἱ τρεῖς εἰς τὸ δεξιὸν μέρος καὶ
 οἱ τρεῖς εἰς τὸ ἀριστερόν, φυλάττοντες τὴν τάξιν τῆς τετραγώνου
 παραταγῆς, ὡς ἀνωτέρω εἶπομεν. καὶ εἰς τὸ μέσον τῶν τριῶν ὁδῶν,
 60 ἵνα χωρισθῇ τὸ καβαλλαρικὸν καὶ περιπατῇ μετὰ τάξεως. αἱ δὲ
 εἰρημέναι πεζικαὶ παραταγαὶ ἵνα φυλάττωσι τὰ ἐκβασίδια τοῦ
 στενώματος ἕως οὗ διαβῇ τὸ καβαλλαρικόν. 6. ἂν δὲ καὶ ἔμπρο-
 σθεν τοῦ στενώματος ὑποπτεύηται φόβος ἀπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, ἀρμόζει
 τοὺς εἰς τὸ μέτωπον ὄντας τρεῖς χιλιάρχους περιπατεῖν ἔμπροσθεν
 65 τοῦ καβαλλαρικοῦ ἕως οὗ πληρωθῇ τὸ στένωμα. καὶ ὅταν
 πληρωθῇ, ὀφείλουσι σταθῆναι οἱ αὐτοὶ τρεῖς χιλιάρχοι μετὰ καὶ
 τοῦ λαοῦ αὐτῶν, ἕως οὗ διαβῇ τὸ καβαλλαρικὸν ὅλον, καὶ ὅταν
 διαβῇ, καὶ πλησιάζωσιν ἀπαρτὶ καὶ αἱ ὀπισθεν παραταγαὶ πεζι-
 καί, | τότε ἀρμόζει μετὰ τάξεως ἀποκινεῖν. ἂν δὲ δύο ᾖσιν αἱ ὁδοὶ
 70 τοῦ στενώματος εἴτε καὶ μία, ὀφείλει φυλαχθῆναι ὁμοίως ἡ αὐτὴ
 τάξις. ἂν δὲ ἐπιτηδεύσωνται τοῦτο οἱ ἐχθροί, καὶ κρατηθῶσι παρ'
 αὐτῶν τὰ στενώματα καὶ ἐκεῖνοι ἀκολουθῶσιν ὀπισθεν καὶ ἄλλην
 ὁδὸν οὐκ ἔχουσι τὸ φοσσάτον ἵνα διαβῇ, σκόπησον καὶ εὗρε
 ἐπιτηδείους τόπους ὕδωρ ἔχοντας, καὶ ἀνάπαυσον ἐκεῖ τὸν στρα-
 75 τόν. καὶ τότε, ἂν μὲν πλησιάζωσιν οἱ ἐχθροὶ οἱ ἀκολουθοῦντες
 ὀπισθεν, ἐτοίμασον πρῶτον τὰς παραταγὰς τοῦ καβαλλαρικοῦ
 στρατοῦ, καὶ ὄρμησον κατὰ τῶν τοιούτων ἐχθρῶν, τῶν ὀπισθεν, ὡς
 εἴρηται, ἀκολουθοῦντων. 7. καὶ ἂν μὲν τραπῶσι μετὰ τῆς συνερ-
 γίας τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἀρμόζει καταδιώκειν αὐτοὺς ἕως οὗ τελείως κατα-
 80 λυθῶσι, πλὴν οὕτως ἵνα καταδιώκωνται, ὡς ἀνωτέρω εἶπομεν λεπ-
 τομερῶς. ἵνα δὲ διώκωνται ἕως τότε ἕως οὗ, ὡς εἴρηται, τελείως
 παραλυθῶσι πρὸς τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι τοὺς διασωθέντας ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀπὸ
 τότε συσταθῆναι καὶ ὑποστρέψαι. εἰ δὲ εἰσι λαοὶ πολλοὶ | καὶ ἴσ-
 85 τανται μετὰ θάρρους ἐπιζητοῦντες πόλεμον, ἀρμόζει τότε ἵν' ἀκο-
 λουθῶσι τοῖς καβαλλαρίοις καὶ αἱ πεζικαὶ παραταγαί, καὶ ποιήσῃ
 ὅλος ὁ στρατὸς πρὸς αὐτοὺς δημόσιον πόλεμον ἕως οὗ, Θεοῦ συν-

N125^v

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N126^v

Take note that if the road on which the army will be traveling is constricted
 and the enemy approaches these narrow passes, if the pass has three roads
 and three exits, and these roads are not far apart, the chiliarchs behind in
 the rear should come to a halt. One chiliarch and his infantry unit should
 hold one pass, the other, the other pass along the other road, as should
 the other that of the other road. Have another three chiliarchs, the ones
 marching in the front, come to a halt in front, and along the two flanks
 let the chiliarchs halt, the three on the right side and the three on the left,
 preserving the order of the square formation as I have spoken of it above.
 Have the cavalry set off along the middle of the three roads and proceed
 in good order. The infantry units mentioned must guard the exits from the
 pass until the cavalry has gone through. 6. Before the pass, if there is
 reason to be wary of the enemy, the three chiliarchs in front should go
 ahead of the cavalry until the pass is completely filled. When the pass is
 filled, the same three chiliarchs must stay in place together with their host
 until the entire cavalry force passes through, and when it passes through,
 and the infantry units behind are just coming up, then it is necessary to
 get underway in good order. If there are two roads out of the pass or one,
 the same order must similarly be preserved. If the enemy anticipates this,
 however, and the passes have been seized by them, and they are following
 behind, and the army has no other route where it can go through, look
 around and find suitable areas with water and there rest the army. Then,
 if the enemy who has been trailing behind draws near, first get the units of
 the cavalry force ready and attack these foes who, as said, are following
 behind. 7. If, with the help of God, they turn to flight, it is necessary to
 pursue them until they are completely destroyed, but they are to be pur-
 sued in the manner which I described in detail above. They must be pur-
 sued up to the moment when, as stated, they are completely broken so
 that the survivors among them are unable to reassemble afterwards and
 return. If they are a large host and stand bravely seeking battle, it is then
 necessary for the infantry units to follow the cavalry, and the entire army
 will embark on a general engagement against them until, with the help of
 God, they turn to flight. When these enemies flee and the army comes

εργοῦντος ἡμῖν, τραπῶσι, καὶ τρεπομένων τῶν τοιούτων ἐχθρῶν
καὶ μετὰ νίκης καὶ χαρᾶς τοῦ στρατοῦ ὑποστρέφοντος, πάντως καὶ
οἱ κρατοῦντες τὰ στενώματα ἐχθροὶ δειλιάσουσι καὶ φύγωσι καὶ
90 αὐτοί. εἰ δὲ οὕτως ἴστανται μετὰ θάρρους καὶ κρατοῦσι τὰ στενώ-
ματα, κατασκόπησον αὐτοὺς πόσοι εἰσὶ καὶ ποταποὶ καὶ μετὰ
ποιᾶς τάξεως ἴστανται, καὶ πρὸς τὴν ποιότητα αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς τὸ
πλῆθος ἐτοίμασον διὰ τριῶν πεζικὰς παραταγὰς, καὶ ἀπόστειλον
κατ' αὐτῶν. 8. καὶ ἂν μὲν ἴστανται ὑψηλὰ εἰς πέτρας κρημνῶδεις,
95 καὶ φυλάττωσιν ὑποκάτω τὰς ὁδοὺς, ἀπόστειλον καὶ ῥιπταριστὰς
καὶ τοξότας καὶ σφενδοβολιστάς, εἰ ἔστι δυνατόν, καὶ ἐκ τῶν μεν-
αυλάτων τινὰς πρὸς τὸ ἀπογυρίσαι τοὺς αὐτοὺς κρημνῶδεις τό-
πους, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὁμαλῶν καὶ πεδινωτέρων τόπων ἐλθεῖν ὀρθὰ κατ'
αὐτῶν. εἰ δ' ἐνίστανται οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἐχθροὶ οἱ κρατοῦντες τὰ ὄχυρ-
100 ῶματα, μὴ ἐπισπεύσης τὸν πόλεμον καὶ ποιήσης ἀσκόπως συμ-
βολὴν πρὸς αὐτούς, τοῦ τόπου βοηθοῦντος τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ
διαφόρων τόπων ἔπελθε κατ' αὐτῶν καὶ περισπασον αὐτοὺς μετὰ
τῶν εἰρημένων ῥιπταριστῶν καὶ τοξοτῶν καὶ σφενδοβολιστῶν, καὶ
ἂν ἐπιμένωσιν ὡς οὕτω βοηθούμενοι ἀπὸ τῆς ὀχυρότητος τοῦ τό-
105 που, πέμψον τότε μίαν παραταγὴν σκουταράτων εἴτε καὶ δύο, ἵνα
ἐπέλθωσι κατ' αὐτῶν διὰ τῶν πεδινωτέρων τόπων. καὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ
συνεργοῦντος, γενήσεται ἡ τροπὴ αὐτῶν, καὶ διαβήσεται ἀκω-
λύτως ὁ λοιπὸς ὅλος στρατὸς τοὺς στενοὺς τε καὶ δυσκόλους τό-
πους ἐκείνους.

65. Περὶ καστροπολέμου

Q262^r

1. Ἄν γένηται βουλὴ ἵνα ἀπέλθῃ τὸ φοσσάτον ἡμῶν εἰς κασ-
τροπόλεμον πρὸς τὸ πολεμῆσαι αὐτό, ἔστι δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον κάστρον
πάντοθεν ὠχυρωμένον καὶ ἔχῃ πλῆθος λαοῦ, οὐ πρέπει ἀπελθεῖν
ἀπλῶς καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν πρὸς τὸ πολεμῆσαι αὐτό, ἂν ἄρα καὶ οὐ κατ-
5 ἐπίγῃ τίς ποτε, ἀλλὰ ἀρμόζει πρῶτον τὰς γυρόθεν | χώρας τοῦ
αὐτοῦ κάστρου κουρσεῦσαι καὶ τοὺς καρποὺς ὅλους κατακαῦσαι
καὶ ἀφανίσει. 2. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὅσαι χώραι καὶ ὅσα κάστρα εἰσὶ
πλησίον τοῦ αὐτοῦ κάστρου ὡς ἀπὸ ὁδοῦ μιᾶς ἢ καὶ δύο, ἵνα | καὶ
10 ἐκείνων πάντων τὰ γεννήματα καὶ τοὺς καρποὺς τελείως ἀφανί-
σωσι πρὸς τὸ στενοχωρηθῆναι ἀπὸ τοῦ λιμοῦ τὸ πλῆθος τοῦ λαοῦ

F297

N126^v

Tit. Q: vacat N 1 ἂν Q: litt. prima deest N 4 ἂν Q: εἰ N 5 γύροθεν Q: om. N 8 πλησίον τοῦ Q:
πλησίον καὶ τοῦ N | ὡς ἀπὸ Q: om. N

back with cries of victory and rejoicing, the enemy holding the passes will
surely become afraid and turn to flight themselves. But if they stand
bravely and hold the passes, examine them to see how many and of what
sort they are, and in what kind of order they are standing, and with regard
to their quality and numbers prepare units of infantry, three at a time, and
send these against them. 8. If they are high up on steep ridges and guard-
ing the roads down below, send javeliners, archers, and slingers, and if
possible, some of the *menavlatoi*, to encircle these steep places and ap-
proach them directly from the level, flat areas. If the enemy controlling
the strong points stand firm, do not press on into battle and heedlessly
engage them, since the terrain is of aid to the enemy, but go at them from
various points and disrupt them with the aforementioned javeliners, ar-
chers, and slingers. If they remain in place, aided as they are by the
strength of their position, then dispatch one or two units of infantrymen
and have them attack them from the more level areas. With the assistance
of God, their flight will ensue, and all the rest of the army will proceed
without hindrance through those constricted and difficult places.

65. On Siege Warfare

1. If it is decided that our army should depart for operations against
a fortress to make an attack on it, and this fortress is very strong on all
sides and has a very large garrison, it is unwise simply to head off just like
that to make an attack on it, all the more so if there is no reason to hurry.
It is necessary first to conduct raids into the regions surrounding this for-
tress and burn and destroy all the harvests. 2. Similarly, as many regions
and strongholds as there are nearby this fortress within a day or two's
journey, our men should completely destroy their crops and harvests so

καὶ μετοικῆσαι εἰς ἄλλους τόπους. 3. ὀφείλουσι γὰρ οἱ ὄντες εἰς τὰς ἄκρας στρατηγοὶ πυκνὰς ποιεῖν ἐκεῖ τὰς ἐπιδρομάς, ἵνα, ὅταν γένηται καιρὸς ἐπιτήδειος καὶ ἀπέλθῃ ὁ στρατὸς πρὸς τὸ πολεμῆσαι τὸ τοιοῦτον κάστρον, εὖρῃ αὐτὸ ὅτι ἔχει ἀδυναμίαν λαοῦ καὶ
 15 λείψιν τῶν τροφῶν, καὶ τότε εἴτε ἐκεῖνοι αὐτοὶ οἱ ὄντες ἐχθροὶ εἰς αὐτὸ ἵνα δειλιάσωσι καὶ παραδώσουσι αὐτὸ ἀπὸ ἰδίας προαιρέσεως τῷ ἀρχηγῷ τοῦ στρατοῦ, εἴτε καὶ μὴ θελόντων ἵνα παραλάβῃ αὐτὸ ἀπὸ πολέμου. 4. γενέσθω δὲ ἀκρίβεια ὑπερβάλλουσα εἰς τοὺς ἀκρίτας στρατηγούς, ἵνα κωλύσωσι πᾶσαν πραγματείαν
 20 τοῦ ἐμβαίνειν εἰς τὰς χώρας τῶν ἐχθρῶν. οἱ γὰρ ἐχθροὶ στενοχωρούμενοι εἰς τὰς τροφὰς ἀποστέλλουσιν εἰς τὰς ἐσωτέρας | χώρας τῆς Συρίας καὶ εἰς τὰς πόλεις καὶ εἰς τὰς πολιτείας, καὶ μὴνύουσιν εἰς τὰ μασιγίδια πρὸς τοὺς ματαβάδας τὰς ἐλθούσας εἰς αὐτοὺς συμφορὰς καὶ τὴν στενοχωροῦσαν αὐτοὺς ἀνάγκην τοῦ λι-
 25 μοῦ. 5. μὴνύουσι δὲ πρὸς αὐτοὺς τοιαῦτα, “ὅτι τοῦ κάστρου ἡμῶν ἐμβαίνοντος εἰς τὰς χεῖρας τῶν Ῥωμαίων, ἵνα ἀφανισθῶσι πᾶσαι αἱ χώραι τῶν Σαρακηνῶν,” καὶ ἐκ τούτου διεγείρονται οἱ Σαρακηνοὶ πρὸς ἐκδίκησιν τῶν ὁμοφύλων αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς πίστεως αὐτῶν, καὶ διαφημίζουσι εἰς τὰς γυρόθεν χώρας καὶ πανταχοῦ, καὶ συνά-
 30 γουσι τὴν λεγομένην παρ’ αὐτῶν μισθοδοσίαν, λογάρια καὶ σίτον πολλὸν καὶ ἄλλας χρείας, καὶ ἀποστέλλουσιν αὐτὰ εἰς τοὺς πολεμουμένους καὶ στενοχωρουμένους, ἐξαιρέτως δὲ ἀποστέλλουσιν αὐτοῖς πλησμονὴν λογαρίου. 6. καὶ ἀπολαμβάνοντες αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνοι μὴνύουσι διὰ κατασκόπων κρύφα πρὸς τοὺς ἡμετέρους οἰκοῦντας
 35 εἰς τὰς ἄκρας τοῦ φέρειν αὐτοῖς σίτον καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς χρείας καὶ λαμβάνειν παρ’ αὐτῶν εἰς τὰ δύο ἢ τρία μόδια νόμισμα ἓν, πολ- λάκις δὲ καὶ εἰς τὸν μόδιον τοῦ σίτου νόμισμα ἓν. 7. ὁμοίως δὲ μὴνύουσιν ἵνα φέρωσιν αὐτοῖς καὶ τυρὸν καὶ πρόβατα, καὶ ἵνα λαμβάνωσιν καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν πολλὴν τιμὴν. ταῦτα μὴνύουσι πρὸς
 40 τοὺς ἡμετέρους τοὺς οἰκοῦντας εἰς τὰς ἄκρας οἱ στενοχωρούμενοι εἰς κάστρον Σαρακηνοί. οἱ δὲ ἡμέτεροι ἀγαπῶντες τὰ κέρδη καὶ μικροὶ καὶ μεγάλοι ἀποκομίζουσιν αὐτοῖς οὐ μόνον σίτον πολλὸν

Q262^v

12 ἄκρας Q: ὁδοὺς N 15–16 οἱ ὄντες ἐχθροὶ εἰς αὐτὸ Q: οἱ ὄντες ἐκεῖσε ἐχθροὶ N 16 ἵνα δειλιάσωσι Q: δειλιάσουσι N | παραδώσουσι Q: ἀποδώσουσι N | ἰδίας Q: οἰκειάς N 17 τοῦ στρατοῦ Q: om. N | εἴτε καὶ Q: om. N 18 αὐτὸ Q: οὗτος N 19 ἀκρίτας Q: ἀκρήνους N 20 τοῦ ἐμβαίνειν Q: ἐμβαίνειν N 23 ματαβάδας F: ματαβαδας Q: vacat N (spat. vac. 5 vel 6 litt. relicto) 26 ἵνα ἀφανισθῶσι Q: ἀφανισθήσονται N 29 διαφημίζουσι Q: διαφημίζονται N 34 οἰκοῦντας Q: διοικούντας N 35 σίτον Q: om. N | τὰς λοιπὰς N: λοιπὰς Q 36 τρία Q: εἰς τὰ τρία N 37 τοῦ σίτου N: τὸν σίτον Q

that most of the populace is oppressed by starvation and moves to other places. 3. The *strategoi* along the frontiers should make constant incursions into that area so that when a favorable time comes and the army moves out to besiege this fortress, it will find that it is well below strength in manpower and has a shortage of provisions, at which point either the enemy who are inside it will lose heart and elect to surrender it to the commander of the army, or he can take it by force of arms if they refuse. 4. There must be exceeding vigilance on the part of the frontier *strategoi* that they prevent all commercial traffic from entering the lands of the enemy. For the enemy, oppressed by lack of provisions, send to the inner regions of Syria and to the towns and communities, and proclaim to the faithful in the mosques the calamities which have befallen them and the pain of starvation oppressing them. 5. They tell them such things as, “should our fortress fall into the hands of the Byzantines, it will be the ruin of all the lands of the Saracens,” whereupon the Saracens rise to the defense of their brethren and their faith, and spread the word in the surrounding regions and all about, and they gather the “donation,” as they call it, money, large quantities of grain, and other provisions, and send these to the people under attack and in dire straits—in particular, they send them a great deal of money. 6. As they obtain these things, they send messages secretly through spies to our people dwelling along the frontiers to bring them grain and other necessities, and to receive from them one *nomisma* for two or three *modia*, or even one *nomisma* for one *modion* of grain, as is frequently the case. 7. In like fashion, they send word to bring them both cheese and flocks in return for a high price for these goods. The Saracens who are hard pressed in their fortress say these things to our people dwelling along the frontiers, and our people of low station and

καὶ πρόβατα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἢ ἄλλας οἷας καὶ ὅσας ἔχουσι τροφάς. N127^r
 8. διὰ τοῦτο χρειά ἐστὶν ἵνα γένηται πολλὴ ἀκρίβεια καὶ ἀσφά-
 45 λεια καὶ φόβος πολὺς καὶ ποινὰὶ μεγάλαὶ πρὸς τὸ ἀποκοπῆναι
 ταῦτα καὶ κωλυθῆναι. ἐπεὶ δὲ εἰς τὸ στενοχωρούμενον, ὡς εἴρη-
 ται, κάστρον καὶ ἀπὸ Συρίας ἔρχονται καρβάνια καὶ φέρουσιν εἰς
 αὐτὸ τροφάς καὶ πραγματείας, ἀρμόζει ἵνα βεβαιωθῇς διὰ κα-
 50 τασκόπων καὶ βιγλατῶρων τὸ πόθεν καὶ πότε ἔρχονται ἢ τὰ τοι-
 αῦτα καρβάνια, καὶ ἵνα ποιήσῃ ἐκεῖ πυκνὰς ἐπιδρομὰς ὁ ἡμέτερος
 λαὸς καὶ κόψη τελείως καὶ ἀποπαύσῃ αὐτά. 9. γενομένης δὲ τῆς
 τοιαύτης ἀκριβείας, ὀφείλει λαὸς τῶν ἀκριτικῶν θεμάτων γενέ-
 σθαι ἀλλάγια καὶ φυλάσσειν πάντοτε τὰς ὁδοὺς τὰς ὑπαγούσας
 55 εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ κάστρον. ἐκ τούτου γὰρ ἵνα κωλυθῇ παντελῶς τὸ ἐμ-
 βαίνειν τίποτε εἰς Συρίαν. 10. ἀρμόζει δὲ παραμυθεῖσθαι καὶ
 τοὺς φυλάσσοντας τὰς ὁδοὺς ἄρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ὑποχειρίους
 αὐτῶν καὶ ποιεῖν εἰς αὐτοὺς ὑποσχέσεις καὶ ἀντιλήψεις καὶ
 δωρέας πρὸς τὸ ἀγωνίζεσθαι πάντας ἀόκνως εἰς τὴν κατάλυσιν
 60 τοῦ πολεμουμένου κάστρου, ἵνα μὴ ἀμελῶσιν οἱ φυλάσσοντες τὰς
 στράτας καὶ οὐ ποιῶσι πυκνὰς ἐπιδρομὰς κατὰ τοῦ τοιοῦτου κάσ-
 τρου, ἢ παραχωρῶσιν ἐμβαίνειν τροφάς εἰς αὐτὸ καὶ ἐνδυναμοῦ-
 σθαι αὐτό. οἱ δὲ ποιοῦντες ἐναντία τούτων, καὶ φρονοῦντες τὰ τῶν
 ἐχθρῶν καὶ ἀμελοῦντες, ὀφείλουσι ποινὰς μεγάλας καὶ τιμωρίας
 ὑποστήκειν. 11. εἰς δὲ τὸν καστροπόλεμον, ἂν ὑποπτεύηται ποθὲν
 65 ἐπιδρομὴ ἐχθρῶν, οὐ πρέπει ποιεῖν τὸ ἀπληκτον γυρόθεν τοῦ κάσ-
 τρου, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ἐν μέρος ὅπου καὶ ὕδωρ ὑπάρχει. οὕτω δὲ
 ἵνα γένηται τὸ ἀπληκτον καθὼς ἀνωτέρω περὶ ἀπλήκτων εἵπομεν.
 ὀφείλει δὲ γίνεσθαι καὶ ἔξωθεν τῶν πεζῶν σοῦδα, καὶ ἔξωθεν τῆς
 σοῦδας πάλιν ἵνα ρίπτονται τριβόλια καὶ τρισκέλια μετὰ τζι-
 70 πάτων, ἂν ἄρα καὶ βαστάζῃ αὐτὰ ὁ λαός. 12. ὀφείλεις δὲ προορί-
 σαι καὶ διαχωρίσαι ἐν ἑκάστῳ θέμα καὶ τάγμα καὶ τούρμας καὶ
 βάνδα τοῦ ποιῆσαι γυρόθεν τοῦ κάστρου τὰ κατατόπια αὐτῶν.
 εἴτα ἵνα προλαλήσῃς πρὸς τοὺς ὄντας εἰς τὸ κάστρον ὅτι, “ἂν θελή-
 75 ῃτε καὶ τὰς ἰδίας ὑμῶν ὑποστάσεις. καὶ οἱ πρῶτοι ὑμῶν ἵνα λάβ-

46 καὶ κωλυθῆναι Q: om. N 46-47 ὡς εἴρηται Q: om. N 49 πόθεν καὶ πότε Q: πότε καὶ πόθεν N
 53 ὑπαγούσας Q: ἀπαγούσας N 54 ἵνα κωλυθῇ Q: κωλυθήσεται N 55 ποτε Q: om. N 56-57 ὑπο-
 χειρίους αὐτῶν Q: ὑπὸ χεῖρα αὐτοῖς N 60 πυκνὰς ἐπιδρομὰς Q: τὰς ἐπιδρομὰς N 61 αὐτὸ Q: om.
 N 64 ὑποστήκειν Q: ὑπομένειν N 66 ὑπάρχει Q: om. N 67 ἵνα γένηται Q: γενέσθω N 69 σοῦδας
 Q: σοῦδης N ἢ πάλιν Q: om. N 73 ἵνα προλαλήσῃς Q: προλάλησον N 74 ἡμῖν Q: μοι N

high, in their love of gain, furnish them not only with great quantities of
 grain and flocks but also with all number and manner of foodstuffs in their
 possession. 8. For this reason, there must be great vigilance and security,
 as well as much intimidation and severe penalties, to cut these activities
 off and prevent them.] When caravans from Syria are coming to the fortress
 in difficulty, as mentioned, and are bringing foodstuffs and supplies to it,
 you must ascertain through spies and reconnaissance parties whence and
 when these caravans are coming, and our army must make constant incur-
 sions into that area and cut them off completely and put a halt to them.
 9. With this vigilant watch in place, the forces of the frontier *themata* must
 be arranged in relays to maintain a constant guard over the roads leading
 to this fortress, for as a result the entry of anything at any time into Syria
 will be completely prevented. 10. It is necessary to bolster the morale of
 the officers guarding the roads and their subordinates, and offer them
 promises, rewards, and gifts so that all will work unstintingly for the de-
 struction of the fortress under attack, lest the men guarding the roads
 become careless and do not make constant forays against this fortress, or
 allow foodstuffs to get through to it and the fortress to be strengthened.
 Those who do the opposite of these tasks, out of sympathy for the enemy
 or out of negligence, will be liable to severe penalties and punishments.
 11. During the siege, if there is reason to suspect an enemy attack from
 any quarter, it is not wise to build the encampment all the way around the
 fortress but on the one side where there is water. Let the encampment take
 shape in the way I spoke of encampments above. There should be a trench
 to the outside of the infantrymen, and then on the outside of the trench,
 caltrops and tripods with barbs should be cast out, if the host happens to
 be carrying these. 12. You must mark places beforehand and separate each
thema and *tagma*, the *tourmai* and the *banda*, to set their positions around
 the fortress. Then you must make an initial announcement to those inside
 the fortress that “if you are willing to surrender the fortress to us by your
 own choice, you will keep your possessions. The first among you will re-

80 ωσι δῶρα παρ' ἡμῶν. ἂν δὲ τοῦτο οὐ ποιήσητε ἀπὸ τότε καὶ ἂν
 θελήσητε ποιῆσαι αὐτό, οὐ μὴ εἰσακουσθῆτε, ἀλλὰ | καὶ τὰς ὑπο-
 στάσεις ὑμῶν καὶ αὐτοὺς ὑμᾶς ἵνα ἐπάρῃ δούλους ὁ στρατὸς τῶν
 Ῥωμαίων." 13. καὶ τοῦτο δὲ ἵνα προλαλήσης εἰς τὸ κάστρον ὅτι,
 85 "καὶ οἱ Μαγαρίται ὅλοι καὶ οἱ Ἀρμένιοι καὶ οἱ Σύροι τοῦ αὐτοῦ
 κάστρου ὅσοι οὐ προσφύγωσιν ἂν εἰς ἡμᾶς πρὶν κρατηθῇ τὸ κά-
 στρον, πάντες ἵνα ἀποκεφαλίσθωσι." ταῦτα ἀρμόζει ἵνα προείπῃς
 πρὸς τοὺς ὄντας εἰς τὸ κάστρον. γίνεται γὰρ ἐκ τούτου διχόνοια
 καὶ στάσις μέσον αὐτῶν, καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀρέσκονται εἰς τοῦτο, οἱ δὲ
 90 εἰς ἐκεῖνο, καὶ μεγάλως ὠφελεῖ. 14. ὀφείλεις δὲ διατάξασθαι ὅλην
 τῷ στρατῷ τοῦ ποιῆσαι τὰ πρὸς καστροπόλεμον μηχανήματα, λαί-
 σας εἴτε ἀπὸ κλημάτων ἀμπελίων, εἴτε ἀπὸ βεργίων ἰτέας, ἢ ἀπὸ
 μυριχίων. ὀφείλουσι γὰρ γενέσθαι πλεκτὰ καὶ πολλά. τὸ δὲ σχῆμα
 | αὐτῶν ἵνα εἰσὶν τροπικῶς οἴκου. ἔστω δὲ τὸ ἐπάνω μέρος οἶον
 95 τὸ στέγος αὐτῆς καὶ ὀξύτερον. ἐχέτωσαν δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ δύο θυρίδων,
 καὶ ἵνα χωρῇ μία ἐκάστη λαῖσα ἀπὸ ἀνδρῶν δεκαπέντε ἢ καὶ εἴ-
 κοσιν. 15. ἵνα δὲ | ἔχῃ καὶ εἰς τὸ ἔμπροσθεν στόμα ἀποκεκρά-
 μενον ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν βεργίων ὡς βῆλον πρὸς τὸ δέχεσθαι τὰ ῥιπτό-
 μενα ἐκ τοῦ τείχους καὶ φυλάττειν καὶ τοὺς ἔσωθεν. ἵνα δὲ ποιή-
 100 σωσι καὶ μονόπτερα πλεκτά, ὡς δῆθεν ψιάθιον. τινὰ δὲ ἐξ αὐτῶν
 ἐχέτωσαν καὶ ἀπὸ τεσσάρων θυρίδων διὰ σταυροῦ. μὴ γένωνται
 δὲ αἱ λαῖσαι βαρεῖαι πρὸς τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι βαστάζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ
 ἐλαφρότεραι ὅσον δ' ἔστιν ἐνδεχόμενον βαστάζεσθαι αὐτὰς καὶ
 φέρεσθαι πρὸς τὰ τεῖχη καὶ πάλιν εὐκόλως ἐπαίρεσθαι πρὸς τὰ
 105 ἔξω. 16. παράγγειλον δὲ τοῖς στρατηγοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἄρχουσιν ἵνα
 ποιήσωσι τὸν λαὸν αὐτῶν εἰς τρία μέρη, καὶ ὅταν πάντα καλῶς
 ἐτοιμασθῶσι τὰ πρὸς καστροπόλεμον, παραντὰ γενομένης ἡμέρας,
 ἵνα γένηται πόλεμος γυρόθεν τοῦ κάστρου, καὶ τὰ μὲν πρῶτα ἵνα
 πολεμῇ ὅλος ὁ στρατὸς ὀλοψύχως καὶ μετὰ πάσης σπουδῆς μέχρι
 105 καὶ τετάρτης ἢ καὶ πέμπτης ὥρας. 17. ἵνα δὲ πῆξωσι καὶ τὰς λαί-
 σας ὡς ἀπὸ ὀργυιῶν πέντε ἢ καὶ δέκα ἐγγὺς τοῦ τείχους, καὶ οἱ
 μὲν διὰ τοξείας, οἱ δὲ διὰ σφενδοβόλων ἵνα κρούωσι τοὺς ἐχ-

N127^v

F301

Q263^r

76 ἂν Q: εἰ N | ἀπὸ τότε Q: τὰ νῦν ἀπὸ τότε N 76–77 ἂν θελήσετε Q: εἰ βουλήσεσθε N 77 αὐτό
 Q: om. N | οὐ μὴ εἰσακουσθῆτε Q: οὐκ εἰσακουσθήσεσθε N 78 αὐτοὺς ὑμᾶς Q: ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς N |
 ἵνα ἐπάρῃ Q: ἐπαρεῖ N 79 ἵνα προλαλήσης Q: προλάλησον N 82 ἵνα ἀποκεφαλίσθωσι Q: ἀποκεφα-
 λισθήσονται N | ἵνα προείπῃς Q: προειπεῖν σε N 88 μυριχίων Q: μυρρίνης σχοίνου N | πλεκτὰ καὶ
 πολλά Q: πλεκτὰ πολλὰ N 89 ἵνα εἰσὶν Q: ἔστωσαν N | τροπικῶς N: ὅμοιον τροπικῶς Q 91 ἵνα
 χωρῇ Q: χωρεῖτωσαν N 92 ἵνα δὲ ἔχῃ Q: ἐχέτω δὲ N 94–95 ἵνα δὲ ποιήσωσι Q: ποιησάτωσαν N
 97–99 ἀλλὰ . . . φέρεσθαι Q: om. N 105 ἵνα δὲ πῆξωσι Q: πηξάτωσαν N 106 ὀργυιῶν Q: οὐργυιῶν
 N | ἐγγὺς Q: om. N 107–108 ἵνα κρούωσι τοὺς ἐχθροὺς Q: om. N

ceive gifts from us. If you do not do this and afterwards consent to do so,
 your petition will not be accepted, but the Byzantine army will carry off
 both your possessions and your persons as slaves." 13. You must also make
 this announcement to the fortress, that "all the *Magaritai*, Armenians, and
 Syrians in this fortress who do not cross over to us before the fortress is
 taken will be beheaded." These are the things you will proclaim first to
 those within the fortress, for it causes disagreement and dissension among
 them, some favoring this, others that, which is of great benefit to us. 14.
 You must issue instructions to the entire army to prepare the implements
 used in siege warfare, *laisai* made either from vine stalks or from branches
 of willow or mulberry trees. These must be woven together and in great
 number. In their design they must be in the shape of a house. The upper
 part, in other words its roof, must be quite sharply peaked. They should
 have two doorways and each *laisa* must have room enough for fifteen to
 twenty men. 15. Hanging over the opening in front it should have a piece
 made from the same branches acting as a screen to receive projectiles
 launched from the wall and protect the men inside. Have them make
 plaited screens, just like a mat. Some of the *laisai* should have four door-
 ways crosswise. The *laisai* must not be heavy, so that they are impossible
 to lift, but rather light, to the extent that they can be lifted up and carried
 to the walls, and then easily carried away again. 16. Pass the word to the
strategoï and the officers that they are to divide their host into three teams,
 and when everything has been properly prepared for the siege, as soon as
 day dawns, let the battle begin around the fortress, and at first the whole
 army must fight wholeheartedly and with every effort until the fourth or
 fifth hour. 17. Have the men fix the *laisai* close by the wall at a distance of
 five or ten *orguias* and have them bombard the enemy, some with arrows
 and some with slings. Others must bombard the walls and the enemy with

- 110 θρούς, ἄλλοι δὲ διὰ τῶν μαγγανικῶν καὶ τὰ τεῖχη καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς
 ἵνα κρούωσι μετὰ λιθαρίων, ἄλλοι μετὰ τζόκων καὶ σειστών ἵνα
 ὀρύσσωσι τὰ τεῖχη. 18. καὶ οὗτοι μὲν ἵνα πολεμῶσιν, ὡς εἴρηται,
 μέχρι τῆς πέμπτης ὥρας τῆς ἡμέρας. ἀπὸ δὲ (τῆς) πέμπτης ὥρας ἀφ'
 ἧς κοπωθῇ ὁ λαός, ἵνα ἀλλάσωσιν ἄλλοι καὶ πολεμῶσιν. | N128
 ὀφείλει γὰρ ὁ στρατός, ὡς εἵπομεν, εἰς τρία μέρη χωρισθῆναι, καὶ
 τὰ μὲν δύο μέρη, ἵνα ἐμβαίνωσιν ἔσωθεν τῶν λαισῶν καὶ ἀνα-
 115 παύωνται, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο μέρος ἵνα ποιῇ τὸν πόλεμον, καὶ ἵνα ἀλλάσ-
 σονται οὕτω τὰ τρία μέρη καὶ ποιῶσιν ἀδιαλείπτως τὸν πόλεμον.
 19. κατασκοπήσον δὲ γυρόθεν τοῦ κάστρου τόπον ἐπιτήδειον πρὸς
 τὸ γενέσθαι ὀρύγματα ὑποκάτω τῆς γῆς, ἵνα ἐμβῶσι διὰ γῆς εἰς τὰ
 θεμέλια τοῦ κάστρου καὶ ὀρύξωσι καὶ χαλάσωσιν αὐτά. ἀφ' ἧς δὲ
 120 κατασκοπήσεις τὸν τόπον, ἵνα εἰσὶν ἔτοιμοι οἱ ἀφορισθέντες εἰς
 τὸ ὀρύσσειν. 20. καὶ ὡς ἔτι γίνεται γυρόθεν τοῦ κάστρου ὁ πό-
 λεμος, ἵνα ἄρξωνται ὀρύσσειν, καὶ ἂν εὕρωσι χαύνωσιν τῆς γῆς,
 ἵνα ποιήσωσι ψιάρια ἀπὸ βεργίων καὶ ὑποτιθῶσιν αὐτὰ ἔσωθεν
 τοῦ ὀρύγματος. καὶ τὸ μὲν ψιάριον ἵνα βαστάζωσι στῦλοι τέσ-
 125 σαρες, τὴν δὲ γῆν τὴν ἐπάνω τοῦ ὀρύγματος ἵνα βαστάξῃ τὸ ψιάρ-
 ιον πρὸς τὸ μὴ σπᾶσαι αὐτὴν εἰς τὰ κάτω καὶ ἐπιχῶσαι τοὺς ὀρύσ-
 στοντας. καὶ ὀλίγον ὀλίγον καθὼς τὸ ὄρυγμα γίνεται, ἵνα
 ὑποβάλλωνται καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ ἀπὸ βεργίων ψιάρια μετὰ καὶ στύλων,
 ὡς εἴρηται, τεσσάρων πρὸς τὸ βαστάζειν τὴν ἐπάνω τοῦ ὀρύγματος
 130 γῆν, ἕως οὗ μετὰ τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ συνεργίας ἔλθωσιν εἰς τὰ θεμέλια
 οἱ ὀρύσσοντες. 21. τότε δὲ ἀρμόζει ἵνα, καθὼς χαλῶνται οἱ λίθοι
 τῶν θεμελίων, ὑποβάλλωσιν οἱ ὀρύσσοντες στύλους παχεῖς ξυλί-
 νους πρὸς τὸ βαστάζειν τὸ τεῖχος ἵνα μὴ συμπέσῃ καὶ φονεύσῃ
 τοὺς ὀρύσσοντας. | ἅμα δὲ γένωνται κοῦφα καὶ ἐκθεμελιωθῶσι τὰ
 135 μέρη τῶν τειχῶν ὅπου γίνεται τὸ ὄρυγμα καὶ ὑποστυλωθῶσι, τότε
 ἵνα ἀναγεμισθῇ ὅλον τὸ κοῦφωμα ξύλα ξηρὰ καὶ ἵνα ἄψωσιν αὐτά,
 καὶ καιομένων τῶν ξύλων, ἵνα πέσῃ ἀπὸ μιᾶς ὅλον τὸ τεῖχος. ἀρ-
 μόζει δὲ τὸ ὄρυγμα βαθὺ ποιεῖν, ἵνα μὴ οἱ ἐχθροὶ κρύφα ἐκ τῶν
 ἔσωθεν ἀντιτρυνήσαντες βλάψωσι τοὺς ὀρύσσοντας. 22. οἱ μὲν
 140 γὰρ παλαιοὶ ἔχοντες τὴν σπουδὴν εἰς καστροπόλεμον ἐποίουν καὶ
 μηχανήματα πολλὰ οἷον κριοὺς καὶ πύργους ξυλίνους καὶ σκάλας

N128

F303

109 ἵνα κρούωσι Q: κρουσάτωσαν N 110 ἵνα πολεμῶσιν Q: πολεμιζέτωσαν N 111 τῆς πέμπτης N:
 πέμπτης Q | τῆς supplevi 118 ὑποκάτω Q: ἀποκάτω N 120 ἵνα εἰσὶν Q: ἔστωσαν N | ἀφορισθέντες
 Q: ἀφορισμένοι N 123 ἵνα ποιήσωσι . . . ὑποτιθῶσι Q: ποιησάτωσαν . . . ὑποτιθέτωσαν N 124 ἵνα
 βαστάζωσι Q: βασταζέτωσαν N 128 ὑποβάλλωνται Q: ὑποβάλλονται N | μετὰ καὶ στύλων Q: μετὰ
 στύλων N

stones from the trebuchets, while still others must break the walls open
 with sledgehammers and battering rams. 18. These men must fight, as
 noted, until the fifth hour of the day. After the fifth hour, when the host is
 exhausted, others must take their place and fight. The army, as noted,
 must be divided into three teams, and two teams will go inside the *laisai*
 and rest while the other team carries on the fight, and in this way the three
 teams will relieve each other and keep the battle going without interrup-
 tion. 19. Look around the fortress for a suitable place for there to be tun-
 nels underground. The men must make their way through the earth to the
 foundations of the fortress, dig them out, and collapse them. As soon as
 you begin to look for the place, the men detailed to do the tunneling must
 be at the ready. 20. As the battle goes on around the fortress, they must
 begin to tunnel, and if they find loose earth, they must construct mats
 from branches and put them inside the tunnel. Four posts must support
 the mat, and the mat must support the earth above the tunnel so that it
 does not come loose and bury the sappers. And little by little as the tunnel
 advances, they must install these mats made of branches along with the
 four posts, as noted, to hold up the earth above the tunnel, until with the
 help of God the sappers come to the foundations. 21. Then it is necessary,
 as the stones are being loosened from the foundations, for the sappers to
 insert thick wooden posts to support the wall so that it does not collapse
 and kill the sappers. As soon as the sections of the walls where the tunnel
 is are hollow and the foundations have been undermined and are resting
 on the posts, then the entire cavity must be filled with dry wood. They
 must ignite this, and when the wood is consumed by the fire, the entire
 wall will collapse at once. It is necessary to make the tunnel deep lest
 the enemy, having secretly dug a countertunnel from inside, endanger the
 sappers. 22. The men of old, in their conduct of siege warfare, constructed
 many devices such as rams, wooden towers, scaling ladders with various
 features, as well as tortoises and all kinds of other things which our gener-
 ation has never even seen. It has, however, tried all these devices and dis-
 covered that of all of them, the more effective way, one the enemy cannot
 match, is undermining the foundations, all the more so if one does this
 with careful scrutiny and method, and has the accompanying and ex-

145 ἐχούσας ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα ιδιώματα, καὶ χελώνας καὶ ἄλλα περισ-
 σότερα ἢ ἡμετέρα γενεὰ οὐδὲ ἰδεῖν ἴσχυσε. πλὴν ἀπεπείρ-
 ασε ταῦτα πάντα | καὶ εὗρεν ἐκ πάντων τούτων ἐπιτηδειότερον N128^v
 καὶ ἀναπάντητον τοῖς ἐχθροῖς τὸ διὰ τῶν θεμελίων ὄρυγμα, ἂν
 ἄρα καὶ μετὰ διακρίσεως καὶ τάξεως ποιήσῃ τις αὐτό, ἔχων συνα-
 κολουθοῦσαν καὶ βοηθοῦσαν πολὺ καὶ τὴν σκέπην τῶν λαισῶν.
 23. γινωσκέτω δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ὁ ἀρχηγὸς τοῦ στρατοῦ ἵνα ὥς ἔτι
 γίνεται ὁ πόλεμος καὶ τὰ ὀρύγματα γυρόθεν τοῦ κάστρου, ἂν δει-
 150 λανθρήσωσιν οἱ ἐχθροὶ καὶ ζητήσωσι λόγον πρὸς τὸ δοῦναι τὸ
 κάστρον καὶ αὐτοὺς ἀπελθεῖν ὅπου θέλουσιν, ἂν μὲν ἔστιν
 ὑποψία ἵνα ἔλθῃ λαοῦ ἐπιβολὴ πρὸς βοήθειαν αὐτῶν, καὶ ἔχῃ τὸ
 κάστρον πλῆθος λαοῦ καὶ ἔστιν ὄχυρόν πολὺ καὶ δυσκολοπολέμη-
 τον, ἀρμόζει τότε κατανεῦσαι πρὸς τὴν αἴτησιν αὐτῶν, καὶ τὸ μὲν
 155 κάστρον παραλαβεῖν χωρὶς κόπου, ἐκείνους δὲ ἀφήσειν ἵνα ἀπέλ-
 θωσιν ὅπου θέλωσιν. 24. ἂν δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐλπίς ἵνα ἔλθῃ ποθὲν εἰς
 αὐτοὺς βοήθεια, καὶ ἀπαρτὶ ἐξατονῶσι καὶ οὐκ ἰσχύωσι γενναίως
 ἀντιστῆναι, ὀφείλει τότε ὁ ἀρχηγὸς τοῦ στρατοῦ πᾶσαν σπουδὴν
 ποιῆσαι ἵνα παραλάβῃ αὐτὸ ἀπὸ πολέμου, εἴτα ἵνα δώσῃ λόγον
 160 αὐτοῖς τοῦ ἔχειν αὐτοὺς τὴν ζωὴν καὶ μόνον, αὐτοὺς δὲ καὶ τὰς
 φιλίας αὐτῶν ἵνα ἐπάρῃ δεσμίους ὁ ῥωμαϊκὸς στρατὸς καὶ
 μερίση καὶ τὰς ὑποστάσεις αὐτῶν. ταῦτα ἂν γένωνται οὕτως, ὑπά-
 γει ἡ φήμη πανταχοῦ, καὶ ἔρχονται καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ κάστρα τῆς Συρ-
 165 ίας ἅπερ μέλλει πολεμεῖν εἰς τὰς χεῖρας τῶν Ῥωμαίων χωρὶς κό-
 που. 25. πρὸ πάντων δὲ ὀφείλεις ἀποστέλλειν πανταχοῦ καὶ
 κρατεῖν βίγλας μετὰ ἀσφαλείας. ἀρμόζει δὲ ἵνα εὐεργετῆς καὶ
 τοὺς ἐξερχομένους πρόσφυγας ἀπὸ τοῦ κάστρου πρὶν ταλαι-
 πωρηθῇ, ἵνα δὲ καὶ μανθάνωσι καὶ βλέπωσι τοῦτο οἱ ἔσωθεν τοῦ
 κάστρου. πολλὰ εἰσι καὶ ἄλλα εἰς καστροπόλεμον ἅπερ ἐπενόη-
 170 σαν οἱ παλαιοί, ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς ἅπερ ἀρτίως ποιεῖ ἡ καθ' ἡμᾶς γενεὰ
 μόνον ἐγράψαμεν ὧδε. τὰ δὲ περισσότερα τούτων ἀφήκαμεν, ἵνα οἱ
 φιλομαθεῖς μελετῶσιν τὰ τακτικὰ καὶ εὐρίσκωσιν αὐτά.

144 πάντων τούτων Q: τούτων πάντων N 151 ἔστιν Q: ὑπάρχει N 152-153 τὸ καστρὸν Q: καὶ τὸ
 καστρὸν N 153 ἔστιν ὄχυρόν πολὺ Q: εὐρίσκεται καὶ ὄχυρόν N 156 ὅπου Q: ἐνθα N | ἂν Q: εἰ N
 156-157 ἵνα ἔλθῃ... βοήθεια Q: ἐλθεῖν... βοήθειαν N 157 ἐξατονῶσι Q: ἐξατονοῦσι N | ἰσχύωσι
 Q: ἰσχύουσι N 159 ἵνα δώσῃ: ἵνα δώσει Q: εἴτα δώσει N 168 δὲ Q: om. N | ἔσωθεν Q: ἐντὸς N
 171 μόνον Q: om. N

tremely helpful protection of the *laisai*. 23. The commander of the army
 should take note that as the battle and the tunneling continue around the
 fortress, if the enemy become faint-hearted and seeks parley with a view
 to giving up the fortress and departing wherever they wish, if there is rea-
 son to suspect that an enemy attack is on the way to rescue them, and if
 the fortress has a large garrison and is very strong and difficult to attack,
 then it is best to accede to their request and take the fortress without a
 struggle, and allow them to leave for wherever they wish. 24. If, however,
 there is no hope of relief from anywhere and they are by now worn out
 and incapable of mounting stout resistance, then the commander of the
 army must make every effort to take it by force of arms. He must then
 offer terms to them that they may keep only their lives, while the Byzantine
 army will bear both them and their families off as prisoners and divide
 their possessions. If events unfold in this fashion, the tidings will circulate
 everywhere, and other fortresses in Syria which you intend to attack will
 fall into the hands of the Byzantines without a struggle. 25. Before all else
 you must send men out in every direction and maintain a secure guard. It
 is wise to treat well any deserters coming out from the fortress before it
 begins to suffer so that those inside the fortress may know and see this.
 Many and varied are the means which the men of old contrived for con-
 ducting siege operations, but I have set down only the methods that our
 generation currently employs. Their more extraordinary devices I have
 passed over, and let those eager to learn them study the tactical treatises
 and find out all about them.

LINE NOTES TO THE *TAKTIKA* OF NIKEPHOROS OURANOS

Chapter 63

1-21 ὀφείλει ὁ ἀρχηγὸς . . . ἔχει βουλὴν ἀπελθεῖν

The procedures listed here invite comparison with the second of the three treatises on imperial expeditions attached to the *De cerimoniis*, which places the same emphasis on prior reconnaissance and secrecy: Haldon, *Imperial Expeditions*, Text B.^{1 33}.

36 κρατῆσαι γλῶσσαν

This sinister expression (literally, "to seize the tongue," i.e., force someone to speak) is found in other military treatises: cf. *SM* XI.4.¹⁰²; Dagron, *Le traité*, 244; Kek. 134.¹³ and p. 354.

50; 60 σκόρπισμα

This term is found in the *De velitatione* (VI.²³, IX.⁶⁵) where it refers to a force of pillagers ranging about in open order in search of plunder; Ouranos uses the word in the same sense. See Dagron's comments in *Le traité*, 224 and note 19.

59 ἐν τάξει φοῦλκου

According to the raiding tactics outlined in the *De velitatione* (IX.⁷⁰⁻⁷⁶), the φοῦλκον was a unit that escorted and protected the pillaging force (σκόρπισμα). See Dagron, *Le traité*, 224 and note 18, and the note on this term, *PM* IV.¹⁹.

90-97 ἀφόρισον δὲ μερίδας . . . φύλαξιν τοῦ φορσάτου

Candid testimony to the desire for booty as the most powerful motivating force in Byzantine soldiers; see pp. 321-23.

Chapter 64

29-35 ἀλλὰ μετὰ τάξεως . . . εἰς τὸ μέτωπον

The order of march outlined here (main column preceded by a vanguard and covered by flankguards and rearguard) resembles the disposition rec-

ommended in the short treatise detailing procedures for an imperial campaign: Haldon, *Imperial Expeditions*, Text B.¹³⁴⁻¹³⁹.

31 σάκα

On this term of Arabic origin, which by the tenth century had become synonymous with the standard Greek term for rearguards, *νωτοφύλακες* (cf. Haldon, *Imperial Expeditions*, Text B.¹³⁶, and comments, p. 175), see the discussion of cavalry deployment below in Chapter IV, pp. 283-84.

47-109 καὶ οὕτω . . . ἐκείνους
Cf. *DRM* 20.⁸⁶⁻¹⁴¹.

Chapter 65

23 εἰς τὰ μασγίδια πρὸς τοὺς ματαβάδας

Note Ouranos' familiarity with these Arabic words, which he must have learned during his years in the east. The second, *ματαβάδας*, echoes the Arabic active participle *muta'abiddun*, meaning "the worshipers." I wish to thank Prof. I. Shahîd of Georgetown University and Prof. H. Shakeel of the University of Toronto for their help with this term.

30 τὴν λεγομένην παρ' αὐτῶν μισθοδοσίαν

The "donation" (μισθοδοσία) to which Ouranos refers here is the *waqf*, or the private contributions, in cash or kind, made by pious Muslims to support the war against the infidel. See the passages on this custom in the *Taktika* of Leo VI (XVIII.128-133), translated and discussed by Dagron, *Le traité*, 147-49.

36 εἰς τὰ δύο ἢ τρία μόδια νόμισμα ἓν

As a measure of grain, the *modios* is equivalent to 12.8 kg (or 28 lbs, 2 1/2 oz). The *nomisma* was the standard gold coin (24 carats).

69-72 τρισκέλια μετὰ τζιπάτων

These contraptions were assembled by fastening a spear with a long point (τζίπα = "barb") over a two-legged stand; the butt end of the spear rested against the ground and the spearpoint projected forward at an angle. See McGeer, "Tradition and Reality," 134-35.

80 Μαγαρίται . . . Σύροι

On the demographic changes that occurred along the eastern frontiers in the wake of the Byzantine conquests of the later tenth century, see Dagron, "Minorités ethniques," 179-86; in his discussion of this passage he identifies *Magaritai* as former Christians who had apostasized to Islam (185 note 43).

86-87 λαίσας

On the term *λαίσας* and the use of these plaited, hut-like shelters in sieges, see McGeer, "Tradition and Reality," 135-38.

104-105 μέχρι . . . πέμπτης ὥρας
About 10:00 A.M.

121-139 καὶ ὥς ἔτι γίνεται . . . βλάβῳσι τοὺς ὀρύσσοντας

The procedures which Ouranos lists in tunneling operations—the method he declares to be the most effective in breaching the walls of a fortress—are similar to those listed in the mid tenth-century *poliorcetic* treatise attributed to Hero of Byzantium (ed. C. Wescher, *Poliorcétique des grecs: Traités théoriques—récits historiques* [Paris, 1867], 197-279; a new edition, including the diagrams, with a translation and commentary, is in preparation by Dr. Denis Sullivan). In his description of Phokas' successful siege of Candia (which capped the conquest of Crete in March 961), Leo the Deacon reports that the Byzantines combined the use of battering rams and trebuchets with a tunneling operation that succeeded in undermining and collapsing a section of the wall and two towers with it, whereupon the besiegers poured through the breach into the fortress (25.^{11-27.5}).

139-147 οἱ μὲν γὰρ παλαιοὶ . . . τὴν σκέπην τῶν λαισῶν

Treatises on siege machines and artillery (*poliorketika*, *belopoiika*) constituted a distinct body of texts in the collection of *militaria* that took shape in tenth- and eleventh-century Byzantium, but it is most likely that Ouranos derived most of his knowledge from the compendium under the name of Hero of Byzantium.

PART II

HISTORICAL COMMENTARY

*The man once sharper than the sword to men
Himself became the trifle of a woman and the sword.
Who once by his might held dominion over all the earth
Now, a meager remnant, dwells in a plot of ground.
Who once, methinks, commanded the awe of savage beasts,
His consort slew, though they seemed as one.
Who would not sleep the least portion of the night
In his tomb now sleeps the span of time.*

*A piercing sight. But arise now, Lord,
Marshall thy infantry, thy horsemen, thy archers,
All thy army, thy legions, thy ranks.
The armed might of Russia is upon us,
The races of the Scyths hasten to the slaughter,
And all the nations assail thy city,
Who once cringed in terror at the sight of thy image
Engraved before the gates of the city of Byzantium.*

*Come, do not turn thy eyes away; cast aside the stone
That covers you, and with stones
Drive off these beasts of nations. Give unto us a rock
To be our own unbroken, enduring bastion.
But if you will not venture briefly from thy tomb,
From the earth hurl a cry at the nations with thy voice alone,
For merely by this you will surely scatter them in flight.*

*If neither this, then receive into thy tomb
All the rest of us, for thy corpse alone could
Defend the hosts of all Christians,
Conqueror of all but a woman, Nikephoros.*

Epitaph of the emperor Nikephoros Phokas,
attributed to John, Metropolitan of Melitene
(Skyl. 282.⁶⁴–283.⁹⁰)

NIKEPHOROS PHOKAS AND THE *PRAECEPTA MILITARIA*

The tenth century which stands as the great age of conquest also represents the great age of military science in Byzantium. Initiated by Leo VI (886–912) and continued by his son Constantine VII (945–959), the renewal of military science resulted in a large and diverse corpus of classical and Byzantine texts discussing war in its many dimensions: tactics and technical terminology (*taktika*), strategy and generalship (*strategika*), siege machines and tactics (*poliorketika*), naval warfare (*naumachika*), military rhetoric (*paraggelmata*), ruses, and stratagems (*strategemata*).¹ For the most part, however, both the nature and purpose of this military corpus reflect the retrospective and derivative character of the “encyclopedism” that inspired the other specialized compilations of the tenth century.² Almost all of the Byzantine military writers or compilers were without direct experience of war, and so their works, drawn from the reputed authorities of the past, are literary rather than technical, theoretical rather than practical, traditional rather than innovative, and hence of general rather than specific interest.³

Given the remoteness of most tenth-century military treatises from current reality, it is necessary at the outset to confront the central issue of the contemporaneity and realism of the *Praecepta militaria*. This introductory chapter will therefore undertake a study of the treatise along the following lines of inquiry. The first will establish the authorship and context of the *Praecepta*; the second will examine the author’s reliance on earlier tactical works and his adaptation of their prescriptions to current practice; the third will discuss the conception of tactics and battle in the *Praecepta*; the fourth will review evidence from the

¹ The standard survey of the classical and Byzantine military writings remains Dain, “Stratēgistes”; see also H. Hunger, “Kriegswissenschaft,” in *DHPLB*, II, 321–40.

² P. Lemerle, *Le premier humanisme byzantin* (Paris, 1971) 267–300.

³ Dagron, *Le traité*, 139–41.

sources casting light on the reception and use of the tactical treatises by soldiers of the tenth and eleventh centuries; and finally, the conclusion will outline the perspectives which will guide this study of Byzantine warfare in the pages to follow.]

The Authorship and Context of the *Praecepta militaria*

Praecepta militaria ("instructions on warfare") was the Latin title bestowed on the treatise by its first editor, J. A. Kulakovsky. The Latin title is now conventional and so is here retained for sake of convenience, but it hardly does justice to the Greek title under which the treatise has come down: Στρατηγικὴ ἐκθεσις καὶ σύνταξις Νικηφόρου δεσπότης, or "a presentation and composition on warfare of the emperor Nikephoros"—beyond all doubt the great military emperor Nikephoros II Phokas (963–969). The authenticity of the attribution to Nikephoros Phokas is confirmed by Nikephoros Ouranos' listing of a "Nikephoros" among the sources of the *Taktika*, surely in reference to his paraphrase of the *Praecepta* in chapters 56 through 62.⁴ The identification is also secure on historical grounds, since the recommendation of Armenian infantrymen, the prescriptions on the equipment and tactics of the *kataphraktoi*, the insistence on strict discipline, and the attention to the army's religious rituals are all consistent with practices well attested in Phokas' time.

The Moscow codex unquestionably preserves the original titles and plan of the *Praecepta*. The text is divided into six chapters: I. Περὶ πεζῶν, II. Περὶ τῶν ὀπλιτῶν, III. Περὶ τῶν καταφράκτων, IV. Διάταξις περὶ καβαλλαρικῆς συντάξεως, V. Περὶ ἀπλήκτου, and VI. Περὶ κατασκόπων. It can be proven conclusively that these headings were done at the same time as the text by examining the title and first sentence of chapter II, where the heading Περὶ τῶν ὀπλιτῶν is followed by the opening words, Εἰ δυνατόν, περιπατεῖν αὐτοὺς πεζοὺς πανταχοῦ . . . , in which case the antecedent for αὐτοὺς must be ὀπλιτῶν in the title. Although the titles of chapters II and VI apply only to the first parts of those chapters, the other four titles accurately convey the contents of the chapters which they introduce.

Brief references in the text to the "offspring of Hagar" (*Agarenoi*) and to swift horsemen called *Arabitai* identify the enemy as the Arabs and their Bedouin auxiliaries, and thus connect the treatise to the wars against the Hamdan-

⁴The title and list of sources of the *Taktika* of Nikephoros Ouranos are given on the initial folio of the *Constantinopolitanus* gr. 36 (Seraglio, fourteenth century), reproduced by Dain, "Stratēgistes," 371: Τακτικά ἔχουν στρατηγικά Ἀρριανοῦ, Αἰλιανοῦ . . . Μαυρικίου, Νικηφόρου καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν, συλλεγὲν παρὰ Νικηφόρου μαγίστρου τοῦ Οὐρανοῦ.

ids in Cilicia and northern Syria. The series of instructions (curtly introduced by πρέπον, χρή, ὀφείλει, δεῖ or a verb in the imperative) are addressed directly and indirectly to the commander (χρῆ ἔχειν σέ, τὸν ἀρχηγὸν / δεῖ τὸν ἀρχηγὸν . . . ἔχειν), and indicate that the *Praecepta* was written for commanders leading Byzantine armies into the Muslim regions beyond the empire's eastern frontiers.]

Although the authenticity of the title and text is unassailable, the *Praecepta* is commonly assumed to have been the work of one of Phokas' officers and not of the emperor himself. This may seem a minor point, but the question of authorship is fundamental to understanding the inspiration not only of the *Praecepta* but also of the contemporary *De velitatione* and *De re militari*. Is the *Praecepta* the work of Nikephoros Phokas himself?

The rudimentary nature of the text offers an approach to this question. For a work under an emperor's name the *Praecepta* is surprisingly plain in presentation and style, while the treatise begins and ends without the formulaic preface and conclusion normally accompanying works composed or sponsored by an emperor. The style, to put it generously, is terse and summary—in places the wording is so compressed that Kulakovsky was led to suspect the insertion of glosses into the text⁵—and displays the characteristics associated with "low style" in Byzantine prose:⁶ simple, paratactic sentence structure (with frequent recourse to genitive absolute constructions as connectives between clauses), replacement of the dative case by the genitive, and many words of Latin origin.⁷

Ironically, however, these plain traits can be taken as proof that the *Praecepta* is the work of Nikephoros Phokas himself, a conclusion supported by comparison with the other treatise under his name, the *De velitatione*. In the preface to this treatise the anonymous editor explains that the late emperor Nikephoros had committed his precepts on guerrilla warfare to writing for common benefit (ἐγγράφως πρὸς κοινὴν λυσιτέλειαν . . . ἐξέθετο), in other words,

⁵Cf. Kulakovsky's edition, *ZIAN* 8, 9 (1908), pp. 3.³⁻⁴, 6-7; 8.³⁰.

⁶See I. Ševčenko, "Levels of Style in Byzantine Prose," *XVI. Internationaler Byzantinistenkongress* = *JÖB* 31.1 (1981), 289–312; and R. Browning, "The Language of Byzantine Literature," in *The Past in Medieval and Modern Greek Culture*, ed. S. Vryonis (Malibu, 1979), 103–33. See also Haldon's comments on the stylistic traits in the contemporary technical treatises, *Imperial Expeditions*, 70–74.

⁷Sentence structure: cf. *PM* II.²⁸⁻³⁴, where no less than four subjects are strung together in the same conditional sentence (τῶν τοιούτων καβαλλαρίων . . . κρανηγῆς . . . ὁ λοιπὸς λαὸς . . . ὁ ἀρχηγὸς τοῦ στρατοῦ). The first two occur in genitive absolute constructions, the second two in the nominative case; the last one (ὁ ἀρχηγός) even manages to serve as the antecedent for an accusative and infinitive construction (συνέπεσθαι δὲ καὶ αὐτόν). The replacement of the instrumental dative by the genitive case occurs twice in the text: *PM* I.²⁶: . . . ὁπῶς ὁ μὲν τοῦτο, ὁ δὲ μετ' ἐκείνου . . . μάχεται; *PM* II.¹⁶⁵⁻¹⁶⁶: τοῦ ἔχειν for τῷ ἔχειν. The Latinized vocabulary of the *Praecepta* is discussed below.

for consultation by fellow soldiers participating in the same campaigns, and had subsequently turned his notes over to the editor—one of the officers in his circle—to be written up in a proper version.⁸ Consequently, the *De velitatione* contains a fitting introduction and conclusion, and, although no literary masterpiece, the text is noticeably more polished than the *Praecepta*. It is therefore tempting to regard the summary, unrefined text of the *Praecepta* as Phokas' own list of instructions akin to the notes on guerrilla tactics which formed the basis for the *De velitatione*. If he likewise planned to have the cursory text (which in all probability he dictated rather than wrote himself) transformed into a properly imperial treatise, the project was never carried out.

A comparative reading of the two treatises isolates a number of parallels and contrasts between them to support the contention that the *Praecepta* is Nikephoros Phokas' own composition. The parallels fall into the following four categories:

1. Context

Both treatises issue from Phokas' campaigns against the Hamdanids and attest his familiarity with enemy habits: *PM* II.¹⁰⁴⁻¹⁰⁵: οἱ δὲ Ἀραβῖται . . . ὡς ἔθος αὐτοῖς ἐστὶν / *DV* X.¹³²: ὡς ἔθος ἐστὶ τοῖς Ταρσίταις, and the similar phrases ὡς ἔθος αὐτοῖς / ἐστὶ (*DV* V.¹³; XIV.¹⁰; XXII.²²). Note too Phokas' references to Bedouin light horsemen in both works (*PM* Ἀραβῖται / *DV* Ἀραβες). The *De velitatione* also shares the didactic character of the *Praecepta*, likewise listing a series of instructions (introduced by χρή, ὀφείλει, etc.) addressed directly and indirectly to the commander (σοὶ μέν, τῷ τοῦ . . . ἡγεμόνι / χρή τὸν στρατηγὸν . . . ποιεῖσθαι).

2. Appeals for divine aid

That divine aid is indispensable in vanquishing the enemy runs as a leitmotiv through both treatises. The most common formulae are συνεργία Θεοῦ and βοηθεία Θεοῦ; but note also the similar expressions Θεοῦ ἐπινεύσει (*PM* II.⁴⁷) and Θεοῦ δὲ νεύσει (*DV* V.¹⁵). Divine intervention secured through the intercession of "the immaculate Mother of God" is heralded in similarly worded passages: *PM* IV.¹⁴⁸⁻¹⁴⁹: καὶ Θεοῦ συνεργία καὶ διὰ πρεσβειῶν τῆς παναχράντου αὐτοῦ μητρὸς . . . / *DV* XXIV.⁴⁷: τῇ βοηθείᾳ τοῦ Θεοῦ . . . διὰ πρεσβειῶν τῆς παναχράντου μητρὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ Θεοτόκου.

⁸ *DV* praef. 39-41, and Dagron's comments in *Le traité*, 161-65.

By contrast, the unwelcome prospect of enemy success elicits a similarly dismissive response in both treatises: *PM* I.¹¹⁶: καὶ ἐὰν συμβῇ—ὁ οὐκ ἐλπίζομεν—συντριβῆναι τὰ τρία κοντάρια / *DV* XVII.⁸³⁻⁸⁴: εἰ δὲ—ὅπερ πάντῃ ἀνέλπιστόν ἐστι—ισχύσουσιν οἱ πολέμιοι, and *DV* XVIII.²: ὅπερ ἀνέλπιστόν ἐστι.

3. Technical terminology

[Two terms in the *Praecepta* and *De velitatione* are used in meanings unattested in the military treatises before the mid-tenth century:]

φοῦλκον, the commander's escort: *PM* IV.¹⁹ / *DV* VIII.²³; IX.^{70,72}; X.⁹⁹ *et al.* The word φοῦλκον in this sense differs from the meaning in the *Strategikon* of Maurice (XII B 14.⁹ = *LT* VII.66) where it designates a dense body of foot soldiers advancing with their spears protruding through closely packed shields.

πολεμιστής, in the specific sense of "cavalryman": *PM* I.¹⁶²; II.^{73, 75, 187}; IV.^{41, 164} / *DV* XIV.⁹; XVII.¹⁸.

4. Similar wording and instructions

The following passages in the *Praecepta* find echoes in the *De velitatione*:

PM II.¹⁵⁰⁻¹⁵¹: ἅτινα ἐπωφελῇ τυγχάνοντα, οὐκ ὀκνητέον ἐκτίθεσθαι.

Cf. *DV* X.²: ἃ δὲ ἡμεῖς ἐθεασάμεθα, ἐκθέσθαι οὐδαμῶς κατοκνήσομεν.

PM I.⁸⁷⁻⁸⁹: . . . οἱ τε τῷ καμάτῳ ἀτονοῦντες καὶ οἱ πληγάδες . . . προσαναπαύονται.

Cf. *DV* IX.⁸¹⁻⁸²: . . . καὶ τὸν λαὸν αὐτοῦ κατάκοπον ὄντα . . . διαναπαυσάτω . . .

PM II.⁴²⁻⁴³: . . . καὶ μάθης καὶ παρὰ δεσμίῶν καὶ παρὰ προσφύγων . . .

Cf. *DV* X.⁵⁹⁻⁶⁰: . . . ὁ στρατηγὸς ἐπιγνῶ . . . δι' αὐτομόλων ἢ διὰ δεσμωντῶν . . .

[Both treatises issue a number of the same prescriptions, some expressed in similarly worded passages:]

each man must use the weapon he handles best:

PM I.²⁶⁻²⁷: . . . σπαθία ζωστήκια καὶ τζικούρια ἢ καὶ σιδηροραβδία, ὅπως ὁ μὲν τούτῳ, ὁ δὲ μετ' ἐκείνου, καθὰ εὐχερὲς ἕκαστος, μάχεται.

Cf. *DV* VIII.²¹: . . . ἐπὶ χεῖρας ἕκαστος τὸ μεταχειριζόμενον ὄπλον κατέχων . . .

XVI.¹²⁻¹³: . . . ἐκάστου τὸ ἐπιτήδειον πρὸς τὸ πολεμεῖν ὄπλον ἐν χερσὶν ἔχοντος . . .

detail men and distribute waterskins to maintain a supply of water for the combatants during battle:

PM I.¹⁴³⁻¹⁴⁸: . . . ἀφορισθῆναι . . . ἄνδρας ἐκ μιᾶς ἐκάστης παρατάξεως ὅκτω εἴτε καὶ δέκα . . . οἱ δ' αὐτοὶ καὶ ὕδωρ διὰ τῶν ἀσκῶν κοιμίζεωσαν, ἐπιφερόμενοι καὶ βαυκάλια πρὸς τὸ παραμυθῆσαι τὴν τῶν ἀγωνιζομένων δίψαν. Cf. *DV* V.⁷⁻¹⁰: . . . ἀσκούς διορισάτω ἐν ἐκάστη ἑκατονταρχία δέκα ἐπιφέρεσθαι καὶ δι' αὐτῶν τὸ ὕδωρ ἐπικομίζεσθαι καὶ ἐν ὥρᾳ τῆς μάχης εἰς πόσιν καὶ ἀνανυχὴν τοῖς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ ἀγωνιζομένοις ἐπιχορηγεῖσθαι.

keep the *tagmata* and *themata* separate in battle formation and on the march:

PM I.¹⁵⁵⁻¹⁵⁸: . . . αἱ δὲ τοῦ καβαλλαρικοῦ παρατάξεις . . . αἱ δὲ τῶν ταγμάτων ἰδίως, αἱ δὲ τῶν θεμάτων μετὰ τῶν τουρμῶν αὐτῶν. Cf. *DV* XVI.¹⁴⁻¹⁵: . . . δέον ἰδίως ἐν ἑκαστον θέμα, ἢ καὶ τάγμα, εἰ πάρεσιν, ὁδοιπορεῖν . . .

send the light infantrymen forward into the *melee* against a persistent enemy:

PM II.⁸⁶⁻⁹¹: καὶ ἐὰν τοσοῦτον οἱ ὑπεναντίοι . . . οὐ καταπτῆξωσιν καὶ τραπῶσι, τότε ὀφείλει ἀκοντιστὰς πεζοὺς καὶ τοξότας καὶ σφενδοβολιστὰς . . . παροτρῦναι πρὸς συμμαχίαν . . . Cf. *DV* XXIV.³⁸⁻³⁹: καὶ εἰ ἔτι καρτεροῦσιν οἱ πολέμιοι καὶ μὴ πρὸς φυγὴν ὀρμήσωσιν, οἱ ταχεῖς ψιλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἔμπροσθεν ἀποσταλέντες παρορμηθήτωσαν παρὰ τῶν ἀρχόντων . . .

the commander must come to the aid of his forces, where, in his judgment, the course of battle dictates:

PM IV.¹⁷⁶⁻¹⁷⁷: καὶ ἀπλῶς, καθὼς βλέπει τὴν τοῦ πολέμου συμπλοκὴν, οὕτω ποιεῖται καὶ τῶν παραταγῶν πρόνοιαν. Cf. *DV* XVI.⁵²⁻⁵³: καὶ ἡνίκα αἱ πρῶται παρατάξεις τῆς ἐκ χειρῶν μάχης ἄρξονται, καθὼς ὁρᾷ τοὺς οἰκείους ἀγωνιζομένους, οὕτω καὶ βοήθειαν παρέχειν . . . X.¹⁰²⁻¹⁰³: . . . ὁ στρατηγὸς . . . καθὼς ὁρᾷ συναφθέντα τὸν πόλεμον, οὕτω καὶ διατέθηται.

engage the enemy when they are crippled and demoralized while the Byzantines are full of courage and confidence:

PM IV.¹⁹⁹⁻²⁰³: . . . ὅταν . . . τραπῶσιν οἱ ἐχθροὶ καὶ τραυματισθῶσιν καὶ δειλανδρήσωσιν, τοῦ ἡμετέρου λαοῦ δηλονότι τε τεθαρσοποιούντος καὶ τῶν φρονιμάτων τῆς ἀνδρείας αὐτῶν διεγχευμένων. Cf. *DV* III.³⁷⁻³⁸: . . . τὸ αὐτοὺς μὲν δειλανδρῆσαι καὶ ἀθυμῖα ὑποβληθῆναι, τοὺς δὲ Ῥωμαίους προθυμωτέρους καὶ εὐτολμωτέρους πρὸς τὸν κατ' αὐτῶν πόλεμον γενέσθαι . . .

Both treatises emphasize the importance of terrain (ἡ τοῦ τόπου θέσις) when deploying or preparing for battle: cf. *PM* II.¹⁵¹⁻¹⁷⁵ / *DV* III.^{10, 14}; XI.⁴⁻⁵; XXIV.^{8, 15, 27, 30}.

The parallels in context, usage, and instructions between the *Praecepta* and *De velitatione* testify to Phokas' preparation of both treatises, whereas the differences in style and vocabulary reveal the effects of the "metaphrasis" of the *De velitatione*. The essential difference, as noted, lies in the more accomplished style and presentation of the *De velitatione*. The feature best illustrating this difference in the level of style is the use of military terminology of Greek or Latin derivation in either treatise. Although Byzantine military Greek was deeply saturated with technical terms of Latin origin, the following examples demonstrate that upon comparison with the *Praecepta*, both the *De velitatione* and *De re militari* are more consciously "hellenized" (avoidance of Latin words being a trait of a more refined prose style):⁹

PM: τὸ κλιβάνιον—*DV*: ὁ θώραξ

PM: τὰ ἄρματα—*DV*: τὰ ὄπλα

PM: τὰ πετζίμεντα—*DV*: ἡ ἀποσκευή

PM: τὸ κοντάριον—*DV*: τὸ δόρυ

PM: τὸ καβαλλαρικόν, οἱ καβαλλάριοι—*DV/DRM*: τὸ ἵππικόν, οἱ ἵππεῖς

PM: ἡ τένδα—*DV/DRM*: ἡ σκηνή

PM: τὸ σκουτάριον—*DV/DRM*: ἡ ἀσπίς

PM: τὸ κοντουβέρνιον—*DRM*: ἡ δεκαρχία

PM: ἡ πόρτα—*DV/DRM*: ἡ πύλη

The prevalence of a Latinized vocabulary in the *Praecepta* is also reflected in words such as σέλ(λ)α, ἀκκουμπίζω, κασιδία, βουττίον, ἀκία, and ὄρδινος, which have no comparable Greek synonyms in the *De velitatione* and *De re militari*.

Common authorship accounts for the many similarities between the *Praecepta* and the *De velitatione*, while the revision of the latter treatise by an anonymous, hellenizing editor explains the differences in style and presentation. It follows then that the text of the *Praecepta* should be accepted as the work of Nikephoros Phokas himself, exactly as the title proclaims. The rough text will

⁹The same hellenizing process in the metaphrasis of tenth-century hagiography was noted by H. Zilliacus, "Das lateinische Lehnwort in der griechische Hagiographie: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der klassizistischen Bestrebungen im X. Jahrhundert," *BZ* 37 (1937), 302-44, with tables on pp. 328-34 listing "pre-metaphrastic" words of Latin derivation and the pure Greek replacements.

have been circulated among the officers under his command and was never re-written for inclusion among the treatises assembled in the great military manuscripts of the tenth and eleventh centuries, as were the contemporary *De velitatione* and *De re militari*.¹⁰ The pedestrian style of the text may in turn explain why the *Praecepta* has survived in a single fourteenth-century codex unassociated with the manuscript tradition of classical and Byzantine military writings, but it is likely too that the suppression of Phokas' memory by his murderer and successor John Tzimiskes played a role in discouraging interest in the late emperor's treatise.

Nikephoros Phokas composed the *Praecepta militaria*, his notes formed the basis for the *De velitatione*, and his call for a treatise on campaigning in the west inspired the *De re militari*.¹¹ It remains now to review the historical background and the reasons for his composition or encouragement of these handbooks.

On 27 January 945 a group of collaborators including Bardas Phokas and his sons Nikephoros and Leo succeeded in deposing the brothers Stephanos and Constantine Lekapenos and establishing Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos as sole ruler of the empire. As a reward to the Phokas family, staunch allies of the Macedonian dynasty and whose ancestors had risen to prominence under his grandfather Basil I and father Leo VI,¹² Constantine VII made Bardas Phokas supreme commander of the army by promoting him to Domestic of the Schools of the East and appointed his sons to the next highest positions of command. The eldest, Nikephoros, became *strategos* of the Anatolikon, the second, Leo, *strategos* of Cappadocia, and a third son, Constantine, became *strategos* of Selukia.¹³

The elevation of the Phokades to the highest echelons of military command marks the opening of a new era in the wars between the Byzantines and their Muslim enemies, in particular the Hamdanid dynasty of Aleppo.¹⁴ Under their leadership the Byzantine army embarked on an aggressive policy of conquest to which Constantine VII, eager to emulate the past glories of his dynasty, lent the full support of the state. The opening words of his famous decree on the soldiers' properties—"as the head is to the body, so is the army to the state; as their condition varies, so too must the whole undergo a similar change"—pro-

¹⁰ Dagron, *Le traité*, 157–60.

¹¹ *DV* praef. 41–44; cf. Dagron, *Le traité*, 171–75.

¹² On the history of the Phokas family, see J. C. Cheynet's study in Dagron, *Le traité*, 289–315, with a genealogical table.

¹³ Skyl. 238.^{35–40}.

¹⁴ On the background and course of these wars, see Canard, *Hamdanides*, 715–838.

claim his commitment to the welfare of the army; in turn, the phrase which introduces the regulations on soldiers' properties—"we therefore fix by law the same rule which unwritten custom has hitherto established"—attests his intention to consolidate the military resources of the state and place them at the disposal of his commanders.¹⁵

Yet despite these efforts to create an invincible army, between 945 and 954 the Byzantines met with few successes and many defeats, the most severe of which was the loss of the impressive force dispatched to conquer Crete in 949. But it was the rout of the splendid host at the battle of Hadat in October 954 which confirmed the verdict on Bardas Phokas as "a marvelous general when under the authority of others, but who did little or nothing of value for the Byzantine Empire when command of all the forces depended on his judgment."¹⁶ In the wake of this disaster, the aged Bardas was dismissed and replaced by his far abler son Nikephoros.

The promotion of Nikephoros Phokas to supreme commander in 955 represents a turning point in the history of the Byzantine army in the tenth century, for Phokas assumed this office with a mandate to improve both the army's morale (*τὰ φρονήματα*) and its performance (*τὰ πράγματα*). The twelfth-century chronicler John Zonaras relates:¹⁷

The story goes that at the beginning of the reign of Romanos, the emperor was driven to despair by the Agarenes' laying waste to all the land and that Nikephoros Phokas was summoned to tell him why Byzantine fortunes had been reversed. He held nothing back and spoke his mind freely, "It is because you are emperor and my father is in charge of the army. You do not exercise power the way you should, while he is a profiteer. If you truly desire it, the performance of the Byzantines will be transformed, only this change will not take place at once." When the emperor heard these words, he authorized Phokas to deal with the situation as he wished. He immediately took charge of the army, marshaling the existing forces, raising others, and training them thoroughly in the conduct of war. And so he filled the ranks

¹⁵ *JGR* I, 222.^{1–2, 9–10}; see also Dagron's remarks, *Le traité*, 275–77.

¹⁶ Skyl. 240.^{4–241.8}.

¹⁷ Zon. III 492.^{15–493.14}; cf. the similar version of this story recorded in Michael Psellos' *Historia Syntomos*, ed. W. J. Aerts, CFHB 30 (Berlin, 1990), pp. 96.^{33–49}. It was of course Constantine VII, not Romanos II, who appointed Nikephoros Domestic of the Schools in place of his incompetent father Bardas in 955 (Theoph. cont. 459.^{13–460.12}; Skyl. 241.^{4–18}). It would appear that Zonaras and Psellos have conflated accounts of Phokas' promotion to Domestic of the Schools by Constantine VII with others recording his selection by Romanos II to command the expedition to Crete in 960.

and armed the tillers of the soil, applying to them inversely the words of the prophet, "beating their ploughshares into swords and their pruning-hooks into lances," and with these men he went on to achieve his celebrated victories with little trouble.

This account lists the steps taken by Phokas to select, arm, and train the army which he fashioned into an instrument capable of overcoming the Hamdanids and their allies in Cilicia and northern Syria. Upon becoming supreme commander, he concentrated on destroying this Muslim archenemy, but at the same time it is evident in light of Zonaras' passage that the *Praecepta* and its two companion treatises bespeak his larger purpose to define the correct preparations and procedures for Byzantine field armies campaigning in east and west. Taken together, all three treatises represent the theoretical, instructional complement to Phokas' practical measures and bear witness to the thoroughness with which he conceived and carried out his military program.

The precise date of the treatise remains an open question. The words Νικηφόρου δεσπότης in the title have a "Nikephoros who?" ring to them, as though a later copyist tacked on the author's imperial status to identify him. It is not impossible that the treatise circulated among his fellow officers under the name "Nikephoros" while Phokas was Domestic of the Schools between 955 and 963. But a short passage in the treatise stating that the leader of the light cavalry skirmishers must be a *strategos* or a *topoteretes* appointed by the emperor (*PM* IV.⁹⁻¹⁰) puts the *Praecepta* in the years of Phokas' reign between 963 and 969. Such an appointment would have been made in the field, and as Phokas was the first emperor since Basil I (867-886) to accompany his armies on eastern campaigns, the attribution in the title to the "emperor Nikephoros" should be accepted at face value. It is a reasonable, if unprovable, hypothesis that he composed the treatise while preparing for the grand assault on Cilicia in 965, since, as we shall see, it was in the course of this campaign against Tarsos and Mopuestia that his prized *kataphraktoi* distinguished themselves by using the tactics prescribed for them in the *Praecepta*.

Some small refinements concerning the sequence and inspiration of the *De velitatione* and *De re militari* arise from the foregoing discussion of the *Praecepta*. The evidence shows that Phokas had composed and distributed a set of notes on guerrilla tactics among his officers during the period when the Byzantines were largely on the defensive along the eastern frontiers; these notes eventually became the *De velitatione*. The military reforms which followed the restoration of Constantine VII and the transition from a defensive to an offensive policy necessitated the composition of the *Praecepta* on the new army and tac-

tics, but the ebb and flow of the long Byzantine-Arab struggle persuaded Phokas of the benefit of having his notes on guerrilla warfare written up in case the Arab raids ever recommenced, as the editor of the *De velitatione* explains in his preface. In turn, Phokas' call for a corresponding treatise on warfare in the west appears to have been inspired by his first (and only) foray into Bulgaria in 968, a campaign which vividly impressed upon him the great difficulties Byzantine armies would encounter in the mountainous, heavily wooded terrain there,¹⁸ and hence the need for a set of guidelines for armies on campaign along the empire's northwestern frontiers. The circumstances of Phokas' death at the hands of John Tzimiskes put a temporary halt to this project; moreover, in the wake of Tzimiskes' triumph over the Russians in 971, the northwestern frontier remained relatively quiet until the resumption of Byzantine-Bulgarian hostilities in 986 with Basil II's ill-fated expedition into Bulgaria. It was not until the Byzantines had committed their main military effort to the subjugation of Bulgaria during the 990s that the late emperor's wish for a treatise on warfare in the west was finally fulfilled.

Tradition and Originality in the *Praecepta militaria*

At first sight, the plainly written *Praecepta* appears to be an original work of Nikephoros Phokas, outlining the formations and tactics that he devised for his armies. This initial impression is misleading, however, since a comparative reading of the *Praecepta* with previous military literature reveals the influence of earlier tactical writings on Phokas and his close reliance on two contemporary works. Good soldier that he was, Phokas familiarized himself with classical and Byzantine military literature, and his awareness of tradition and precedent is evident in his own treatises. His references to the *Taktika* of Leo VI and to manuals on siege warfare in the *De velitatione* identify some of the texts within his ken,¹⁹ but as he alludes to none directly in the *Praecepta*, it is up to the modern reader to identify the works that he knew or consulted when preparing the treatise. Identification of these works will in turn clarify the extent to which Phokas' thinking was shaped by predecessors of the distant and recent past and, more importantly, isolate the points where he felt it necessary to modify or depart from their recommendations.

His knowledge of classical military terminology is shown by his use of technical terms drawn from unspecified "ancient" authors (παρὰ τοῖς παλαιοῖς / τῶν

¹⁸ Leo diac. 62.¹³-63.⁴; the passage is quoted in the preface to Chapter V below.

¹⁹ *DV* XX.⁸⁻¹⁰; XXI.⁸⁻¹³

παλαιῶν): ψιλοί (archers), τετράπλευρος (a square formation), προκουρσάτορες (mounted scouts and skirmishers), and ὑπερκερασταί (mounted archers stationed on the right flank to encircle the enemy left).²⁰ Phokas' references to these terms as ancient need not mean that he took them directly from the classical tacticians, however, since tenth-century Byzantine compilers listed and defined standard tactical terminology from ancient writers,²¹ and so are more likely to have been the sources for his recondate vocabulary.

Whether he acquired these terms directly or indirectly, it bears noting that Phokas' adoption of "ancient" terminology served a practical purpose in standardizing military usage. His use of the term προκουρσάτορες implies as much. These light cavalrymen went by different names in different times and places (ἐλαφροί, κούρσορες, κουρσάτορες, προκλάσται, συνοδικοί, τασινάριοι, τραπεζίται, χονσάριοι / χωσάριοι), [nomenclature so diverse that it suggests that Phokas resorted to the "ancient" term προκουρσάτορες as a means of imposing a single, uniform label which would ensure general understanding.]

His brief excursus comparing the seven-man depth of his Byzantine infantry formation with the much deeper Macedonian phalanx (16, 12, or 10 men)—employed by Alexander the Great to face "Ethiopians" borne by elephants and unleashing wild beasts against him (*PM* I.⁶⁵⁻⁷⁴)—is based on a source of unknown provenance. Phokas may have come across the story of Alexander's encounter with elephants and wild animals in the *Alexander Romance* or among the tales recounting the exploits of famous soldiers (*strategemata*), while the Macedonian phalanx was the standard tactical paradigm for infantry in the military textbooks. The comparison implies that Phokas was aware that his recommended depth of seven men ran counter to the usual prescriptions for deep infantry formations, but he supports his recommendation by citing this "historical" example to point out that the deep formations of the past conformed with tactics now obsolete. Times change and with them tactics, since "nowadays these formations are no longer used and such a phalanx is impractical; even the offspring of Hagar have greatly lessened the depth of their formations when compared to the wars of the ancients." [The excerpt as a whole reveals the degree to which Phokas' thinking—and that of his military readers—was guided by tradition and testifies to the lasting prestige of Alexander and the Macedonian phalanx, a precedent from which any change required justification.]

Phokas offers two recommendations in the *Praecepta* which had long been standard in military theory. The first is that the smallest infantry and cavalry

²⁰ *PM* I.^{33, 40-41}; II.¹⁹⁻²⁰; IV.²⁷⁻²⁸; see the notes to the text for the sources for these terms.

²¹ Cf. *ST* 41-42.

units (*kontubernia* and *banda*, akin to platoons) should keep kinsmen and friends together at all times (κατὰ συγγένειαν καὶ φιλίαν . . . ἐπὶ παντὸς πράγμα-τος; *PM* I.¹⁰⁻¹³; cf. III.⁷³⁻⁷⁵, IV.²⁻⁵). [That the ties between kinsmen and friends would inspire mutual courage among them and deter them from deserting their fellows in battle] was a notion expressed by Homer and Plato in antiquity.²² It first appears in the military writers with Onasander (1st century A.D.), whose counsel was repeated by several Byzantine tacticians, any one of whom may have been known to Phokas.²³ Although this maxim eventually hardened into a cliché in the tactical treatises, its essential truth should not be overlooked. For reasons both of self-esteem and comradeship, men do fight better in units forged by friendship and common ties.

The acquaintance between the soldiers served another purpose. In case there is reason to suspect that spies have entered the camp, Phokas advises securing the gates and having the soldiers return to their quarters as a means of isolating the infiltrators, who will be detected as outsiders not belonging to any of the army's units (*PM* VI.¹⁻¹³). He thus repeats the method for catching spies outlined in earlier treatises,²⁴ but once again the practicality of his advice should be recognized. [In an army full of foreigners, without a standard uniform, and bound to attract a horde of camp followers, the familiarity between soldiers in the same units was the only barrier against the intrusion of spies.]

These two recommendations derived from previous tacticians indicate that Phokas incorporated into his treatise the traditional wisdom and methods that in his judgment still served a practical end. Another of his precepts will show that he also combined the stipulations of earlier manuals with the conditions of his own time. In the opening words of the *Praecepta*, Phokas declares that "it is both best and necessary to pick foot soldiers from Byzantines and Armenians, heavy infantrymen large in stature and no more than forty years of age . . ." (*PM* I.¹⁻³). Youth, size, and strength were the desirable qualities in recruits specified by Phokas' predecessors,²⁵ but his stated preference for Byzantine and Armenian infantrymen is unique to the *Praecepta*. His interpolation reflects the

²² Homer, *Iliad* II.³⁶²⁻³⁶⁸; Plato, *Symposium* 179a-b.

²³ Onasander, *Strategikos* 24; cf. *Byz. Anon.* 27.³⁻¹⁰; *Parecbolae* 44.9; *LT* IV.39, XX.160; *ST* 44.6. Arranging the right mix of young and old (i.e., vigor with experience) was also recommended: cf. *LT* XII.49.

²⁴ *SM* IX.5.⁹⁹⁻¹²⁴ = *LT* XVII.109-111. The author of the *De re militari* also states that the familiarity between officers and men will strengthen the bonds between them and facilitate the capture of spies (*DRM* 2.⁴⁻¹³).

²⁵ Cf. *LT* IV.1: ἐκλέξῃ δὲ στρατιώτας . . . μήτε παῖδας μήτε γέροντας, ἀλλὰ ἀνδρείους, εὐρώ-τους, εὐψύχους . . . ; *ST* 36.1: δεῖ δὲ στρατιώτας ἐκλέγεσθαι μὴ τοὺς ἄγαν νέους μήτε ἐλάττους τῶν εἰκοσι ὄντας ἐτῶν μήτε μὴν ὑπὲρ τὰ τεσσαράκοντα. τολμηροὺς τε καὶ ῥωμαλέους εἶναι . . .

demographic and organizational changes in the empire's easternmost regions resulting from the steady migration of Armenians into Byzantine territory and the creation of small *themata* along the frontiers. The Byzantines, Armenians, and other peoples settled as *stratiotai* in these zones furnished much of the manpower in Byzantine field armies during the tenth century, particularly as infantry; it is to these men that Phokas' passage refers. These developments will be discussed more fully in the following chapter, but the passage itself presents a brief yet trenchant example of how his knowledge of traditional authorities and recognition of contemporary reality converged in Phokas' thinking as he prepared his treatise.

When it came to current equipment, formations, and tactics, Phokas relied on two closely contemporary texts which can be precisely identified. One was a short piece known as the *Syntaxis armatorum quadrata* (ca. 950), which consists of a text and diagram outlining the design of a hollow square formation for infantry protecting the cavalry within. Copied almost word for word into the *Praecepta* (PM I.³⁹⁻⁵¹),²⁶ the text of the *Syntaxis* formed the basis for Phokas' discussion of infantry tactics, but there is nothing to indicate that he incorporated the diagram of the infantry square into the *Praecepta*.

The textbook which guided Phokas' thinking most, however, was the *Sylloge tacticorum* (Συλλογή τακτικῶν), a collection of tactics and stratagems in 102 chapters compiled about the year 950.²⁷ Chapters 38 and 39 of the *Sylloge* list current infantry and cavalry equipment, while chapters 46 and 47 present the defensive and offensive systems for infantry and cavalry that formed the basis for Byzantine field tactics throughout the later tenth century. These chapters served as the main sources for Phokas' instructions on equipment and deployment for infantry and cavalry, but at the same time a comparison of certain prescriptions in the *Sylloge* with their counterparts in the *Praecepta* will demonstrate that Phokas read his main source with a critical eye, condensing its recommendations and introducing important modifications in equipment and tactics.

Phokas borrowed from the *Sylloge* directly but selectively. The main difference between this text and the *Praecepta* is between an exhaustively detailed compilation and a practical handbook pared down to essentials. A telling example of this difference appears in the lists of protective equipment for infan-

²⁶ See McGeer, "Syntaxis armatorum quadrata."

²⁷ The *Sylloge* was studied by R. Vári, "Die sogenannten *Inedita Tactica Leonis*," BZ 27 (1927), 241-70, but his attribution of the text to Alexander, the brother of Leo VI, must be rejected. The sole manuscript to preserve the *Sylloge* contains medical and hippiatric texts dating from the reign of Constantine VII, which, along with the mention of the *kataphraktoi* and the *menavlatoi*, soldiers first attested in the middle of the tenth century, put the treatise about the year 950.

trymen in either work; the list in the *Praecepta* is closely based on the *Sylloge* but begins at a noteworthy turn:

ST 38.4: πρὸς τούτοις λωρίκια φορεῖτωσαν ἢ καὶ κλιβάνια καὶ ταῦτα ἢ σιδηρὰ ἢ κεράτινα, τούτων δὲ μὴ ὄντων, καβάδια ἐχέτωσαν μετὰ βαμβάκης καὶ κουκουλίου μέχρι γονάτων φθάνοντα, τὰ μανίκια μέχρι τῶν ἀγκῶνων ἔχοντα σχίσματά τε περὶ τὰς ὠλένας πρὸς τὸ ἐκείθεν ἐκβάλλειν τὰς χεῖρας. κρατεῖσθω δὲ τὰ μανίκια διὰ κομποθηλύκων τῶν ὤμων ὅπισθεν.

In addition to these, let them wear *lorikia* or *klibania*, which are either of iron or horn, *but in the absence of these items*, let them have tunics made of cotton or coarse silk reaching as far as the knees, the sleeves with slits at the forearms all the way up to the elbows so as to put the hands through. Let the sleeves be fastened behind the shoulders with loops and buttons.

PM I.¹⁴⁻²⁰: ὀφείλουσιν δὲ ἐπιταγῆναι καὶ καβάδια κοντὰ μέχρι τῶν γονάτων διήκοντα, ἔχοντα δὲ βαμβάκιν καὶ κουκούλιν. τὰ δὲ μανίκια αὐτῶν εἶναι κοντὰ καὶ πλατέα, ἔχοντα εἰς τὰς μασχάλας σχίσματα πρὸς τὸ ῥαδίως ὁμοῦ καὶ εὐκόλως τὰς αὐτῶν χεῖρας ἐκβάλλειν καὶ μάχεσθαι. τὰ δὲ μανίκια αὐτῶν ὅπισθεν εἰς τοὺς ὤμους ὑπὸ κομποθηλικῶν κρατεῖσθαι.

Short tunics reaching to the knees are to be required, made of cotton or coarse silk. Their sleeves must be short and broad with slits up to the shoulder-joints so that they can put their arms through easily and comfortably to fight. Their sleeves should be fastened with loops and buttons back on the shoulders.

It is no accident that Phokas' list begins precisely at the point where the compiler of the *Sylloge* turns from armor made of iron or horn to simpler protective garments made of coarse silk or cotton.²⁸ The comparative simplicity of Phokas' list inspires confidence in its realism, and his deliberate omission of iron or horn corslets is a sure sign that such armor was beyond the modest means of the self-equipped soldiers recruited from the frontier themes whose lowly economic station compelled them to use protective garments that were less expensive and difficult to manufacture than mail or lamellar corslets.

On the other hand, Phokas copied the specifications for the *menavlion* (a thick spear for use primarily against heavy cavalry) from the *Sylloge* into the *Praecepta* with further instructions of his own:

²⁸ See the discussion on infantry equipment below, pp. 204-6.

ST 38.3: τὰ μέντοι μεναύλια μὴ ἀπὸ πελεκητῶν ἔστωσαν ξύλων, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ νεακίων δρυῶν ἢ κρανειῶν ἢ τῶν λεγομένων ἀρτζηκιδίων ἢ ἀπὸ ἐτέρου τοιούτου τινός

The *menavlia* are not to be made from wood cut into sections, but from saplings of oak, cornel, or those called *artzekidia*, or else from any other of this sort.

PM I.¹¹⁹⁻¹²⁴: τὰ δὲ μέναυλα αὐτῶν μὴ εἶναι ἀπὸ πελεκητῶν ξύλων, ἀλλὰ ἀπὸ νεακίων δρυῶν ἢ κρανειῶν ἢ τῶν λεγομένων ἀρτζηκιδίων. εἰ δὲ καὶ αὐτοφυῆ ξύλα οὐχ εὐρίσκονται, γενέσθωσαν ἀπὸ πελεκητῶν, πλὴν ἔστωσαν ἀπὸ ἰσχυρῶν ξύλων καὶ παχέα τοσοῦτον, ὅσον δύνανται χεῖρες κυβερνᾶν.

Their *menavla* must not be made from wood cut into sections, but from saplings of oak, cornel, or those called *atzekidia*. If saplings in one piece cannot be found, then let them be made from wood cut into sections, but they must be made of hard wood and just so thick that hands can wield them.

As we shall see below in Chapter IV, the increasing use of heavy cavalry during the later tenth century made the proper construction of such anti-cavalry weapons as the *menavlion* all the more necessary. Phokas' additional instructions bear witness to the importance he attached to these heavy spears as he sought to ensure that they would be thick and solid enough to withstand the impact of an armored cavalry charge.

Comparison of the lists of infantry equipment in either treatise reveals one of Phokas' intentions to issue only practical, realistic instructions in his treatise and to supply further details where necessary. The same critical approach characterizes his presentation of infantry and cavalry deployment and procedures. His recommendations in the *Praecepta* are closely based on the *Sylloge*, but again, a comparative reading shows that he passed over the laborious calculations and extraneous details in his source and restricted himself to the realistic, workable directives compatible with the army at his disposal.²⁹

It was also one of his intentions to revise certain tactical procedures. He introduced changes and adjustments into the *Praecepta* that reflect the Byzantines' continuing efforts to find the most effective means for their infantry to resist enemy cavalry and, conversely, for their own heavy cavalry to deliver a decisive attack and break enemy infantry. With regard to the first problem, not

²⁹ For example, Phokas omits the complicated measurements of the infantry square worked out in the *Sylloge* 47.6-13.

only did Phokas add details to the construction of the *menavlion*, he also revised the tactics of the soldiers armed with this weapon (*menavlatoi*). The author of the *Sylloge* had advised sending these heavy pikemen out in a body before the front lines to intercept attacking cavalymen and disrupt their charge by using their heavy spears to kill the enemy warhorses (ST 47.16). Phokas' experience had taught him that this tactic needed to be revised, however, since he adamantly opposes separating the *menavlatoi* from their fellow infantrymen: "the *menavlatoi* should be positioned at the ready in the front line of the heavy infantrymen—by no means isolated from them, but instead closely joined together" (PM I.¹⁰⁵⁻¹⁰⁶: . . . μὴ μέντοι μεμονωμένους ἀπ' αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον συγκεκολλημένους).

He records a small but noteworthy adjustment in cavalry tactics. The *Sylloge* (46.9) had assigned the *prokoursatores*, in their capacity as light horsemen, the task of opening battle by skirmishing with the enemy, then breaking off contact and withdrawing through the intervals in the forward line of the Byzantine cavalry force, that is, between the triangular formation of the *kataphraktoi* and the regular cavalry units trailing the *kataphraktoi* on both flanks. Phokas likewise prescribed this opening role for the *prokoursatores* (PM IV.⁹³⁻¹⁰⁶), but he then assigned them the further task of forming a screen along both sides of the *kataphraktoi* to prevent enemy horsemen from driving in on their flanks and disrupting their orderly advance (PM IV.¹²⁵⁻¹²⁶).

These adjustments in tactics will be discussed in greater detail below in Chapter 4, but for the moment it is important to note how the examination of Phokas' sources clarifies the balance between his reliance on traditional theory and his reaction to current realities. His choice of "ancient" terminology and his comparison of the Macedonian phalanx with his own infantry formation make it clear that he was attentive to established tradition and the precedents of the past. But he did not feel bound by tradition or precedent since it is equally clear from a comparison of the *Sylloge* with the *Praecepta* that he included in his treatise only that which he deemed realistic or effective and freely rejected or changed what was not. The underlying attitude is that although useful and necessary to the study of war, the authorities of the distant or recent past were not definitive—conditions change and with them enemies, tactics, weapons, and even the element of morale, all calling for constant review of the army's procedures.

The *Praecepta*, then, is not an original treatise presenting new tactics. It is instead a work in which Phokas combined existing tactical precepts with his own experience and observations, in the light of which he retained, modified, or rejected the instructions of his predecessors. The *Syntaxis* and the *Sylloge* demonstrate that the tactical systems—defensive and offensive—employed by

Byzantine armies throughout the later tenth century had already taken shape by the time Phokas wrote the *Praecepta* as part of his military program. It is not surprising that the changes he made within these systems concerned the *menavlatoi* and *kataphraktoi*, since perfecting the use of these newly created soldiers would naturally have entailed a process of trial and error. Nor was his treatise the last word in tactics, for once part of Byzantine military theory it too was subject to revision by later soldiers. [The paraphrase of Phokas' treatise written by Nikephoros Ouranos during the first decade of the eleventh century records a significant change in infantry tactics which will have been introduced during the intervening years; what is more, Ouranos added three chapters of his own to his version of the *Praecepta* to bring the treatise up to date with the military situation in the east in his own day.³⁰ Taken together, the *Sylloge tacticorum*, *Praecepta militaria*, and *Taktika* of Nikephoros Ouranos record the evolution of Byzantine tactics throughout the second half of the tenth century, showing both the coherence of contemporary tactical theory and the efforts of Byzantine commanders to keep military doctrine abreast of changing times and conditions.]

Tactics and Battle in the *Praecepta militaria*

In the final analysis, the subject at the very heart of the *Praecepta* is battle tactics: put simply, how to deploy infantry and cavalry and use them to annihilate the enemy in a general engagement. It is worth examining Phokas' treatment of battle tactics to see where he conforms with or departs from the traditional conception of tactics in the military texts.

The majority of classical and Byzantine military writers were not soldiers and did not write for specialists. They were instead rhetoricians and philosophers who explained *tactics* and *strategy* in literary/theoretical rather than in practical terms. The science of "tactics" (ἡ τακτικὴ ἐπιστήμη / θεωρία) categorized the various types of infantryman and cavalryman, analyzed their deployment and maneuvers, and defined technical terminology. The classical writers Asklepiodotos, Aelian the Tactician, and Arrian were the standard authorities on tactics and terminology, and even Byzantine laymen consulted their works for a basic grasp of tactical theory and vocabulary.³¹ "Strategy" (στρατηγία) was

³⁰ Cf. the directions in the two treatises on reinforcing the infantry lines before a cavalry attack: *PM* I. 106–115—*TNO* 56. 111–115, and below, pp. 275–77. On Ouranos' updated version of the *Praecepta*, see McGeer, "Tradition and Reality," 129–34.

³¹ Michael Psellos, for example, wrote a short piece on tactics based on Aelian the Tactician, ed. H. Köchly and W. Rüstow, *Griechische Kriegsschriftsteller* II.2 (Leipzig, 1855), 232–38.

the art of generalship, concentrating on the necessary qualities and exemplary conduct of the general (*strategos*). The recognized authority on strategy in this rhetorical vein was Onasander, whose *Strategikos* enjoyed great popularity not only in Byzantium but also during the Renaissance and beyond.³²

We have seen that Phokas was acquainted with the standard tacticians and to a certain degree his discussion of tactics in the *Praecepta* conforms with the traditional academic definition. He methodically lists the categories of infantrymen in his army (ὀπλῖται, ψιλοί, ἀκοντισταί, μεναυλάτοι), their numbers, equipment, and deployment, and goes on to give a detailed outline of the square infantry formation, with occasional recourse to the ancient technical terms noted above. The same is true of his discussion of cavalry tactics, where the totals, composition, and deployment of each contingent (κατάφρακτοι, πολεμισταί, προκουρσάτορες, ὑπερκερασταί, ἀποσοβηταί) are carefully specified.

But there is another dimension of tactics in the *Praecepta*, one which represents a significant departure from previous military literature. It is a curious feature of the classical and Byzantine treatises—even the *Strategikon* of Maurice—that no matter how much useful information they may supply on the army's organization, equipment, deployment, procedures, or enemies, they afford surprisingly little insight into the event of battle itself—how it might begin, evolve, and conclude, what steps a particular enemy might take, and what the reaction of the soldiers and the commander ought to be in a variety of circumstances. The unfailing tendency of most treatises, if they broach the subject of battle at all, is to review the army's deployment and the commander's duties before battle, offer some brief commonplaces on the conduct of battle, and then pass on to the army's routines following battle.³³ In nearly every military text,³⁴ battle is portrayed as a featureless, undifferentiated occurrence; the enemy too remains an indistinct presence, a faceless entity without particular weapons, tactics, or habits to distinguish him.

The *Praecepta*, however, is an exception to the usual static presentation of tactics and battle. As an active commander writing for his peers, Phokas was more concerned with the practical application of tactics than he was with theoretical norms, and so, once having prescribed his infantry and cavalry forma-

³² See Dain's remarks, "Stratégistes," 327–29.

³³ For instance, book 14 of the *Taktika* of Leo VI, entitled "On the Day of Battle," offers advice (culled from the *Strategikon* of Maurice, VII B) on various precautions to be observed in battle, but there is no mention of any particular enemy nor any difference made between levels of engagement.

³⁴ A noteworthy exception to this pattern is Arrian's *Ectaxis contra Alanos*; see A. B. Bosworth, "Arrian and the Alani," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 81 (1977), 217–55.

tions, he then goes on to develop two paradigms of battle situations. The first treats combined tactics for infantry and cavalry (*PM* II.3–13), and the second, tactics for cavalry operating without infantry in support (*PM* IV.10–17). These two paradigms range in scale from preliminary skirmishes with enemy advance parties to all-out assaults by one army against the other, and were intended, *mutatis mutandis*, to enable a commander to diagnose the situation before his eyes and choose the proper course of action. To this end Phokas uses both sets of paradigms to list “most likely” scenarios and advise the commander on the direction of his men and the precautions to be observed in each one. His message to the commander is implicit: battles do not begin and evolve the same way every time, but experience has shown that situations *a . . . b . . . c* are likeliest to occur, in which case the most effective responses have proven to be *x . . . y . . . z*. But the cardinal tenet throughout Phokas’ action-reaction sequence of battle scenarios is that the army’s tactics and the commander’s choices will depend very much upon what the enemy chooses to do.

It was thus not merely deployment for battle, but the conduct thereof, in varying levels of engagement, that Phokas attempted to regulate for his armies and commanders. The battle paradigms in the *Praecepta*, imposing a certain order on the course of a battle, correspond with the paradigms of guerrilla campaigns that Phokas developed in the *De velitatione*, where he listed the various types of Arab raids and the measures the Byzantine commander should take in dealing with each one.³⁵ His paradigmatic approach in both treatises, distilling personal observations and experience into a set of tactical guidelines, is without parallel in Byzantine military literature and marks Nikephoros Phokas as one of the few truly innovative figures in the long tradition of classical and Byzantine military theory. His active conception and presentation of campaigns and battles show the practical dimension of Byzantine tactics and strategy, and invite comparison with a modern definition of these terms. Clausewitz defined tactics and strategy as follows:³⁶

The conduct of War is, therefore, the formation and conduct of the fighting . . . the fight is composed of a greater or less number of single acts, complete in themselves, which we call combats. . . . From this arise the totally different activities, that of the *formation* and *conduct* of these single combats in themselves, and the combination of them with one another, with a view to the ultimate object of the War. The first is called *tactics*, the other *strat-*

³⁵Noted and discussed by Dagron, *Le traité*, 177–81.

³⁶Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, tr. Col. F. N. Maude, ed. A. Rapoport (Harmondsworth, 1968; repr. 1987), 172–73. The italics are those of the translator.

egy. . . . According to our classification, therefore, tactics is the theory of the use of military forces in combat. Strategy is the theory of the use of combats for the object of the War.

This definition of tactics as “the formation and conduct of combats within themselves” and “the theory of the use of military forces in combat” encompasses both Phokas’ conception and application of tactics in the *Praecepta*. It comprehends his proceeding from a careful outline of his army’s deployment to the proper conduct of combat in varying levels of confrontation, all, as he makes clear in his emphasis on a disciplined but relentless pursuit of the beaten foe, to culminate in the complete destruction of the enemy force. At the same time, it is equally apparent that in the *Praecepta* Phokas treats battle (in its several forms) as a single event in itself, not as part of a greater whole; the long-term strategic value of victory in battle (i.e. in gaining the object of the war, in Clausewitz’s terms) does not enter the discussion. This singular, one step at a time approach to engaging the enemy in turn distinguishes the *Praecepta* from the *De velitatione*, in which Phokas instead forged a combination of combats into the conduct of an extended defensive campaign more broadly strategic (“with a view to the ultimate object of the War”) than strictly tactical in conception and application.

Military Literature and the Profession of Arms

It is difficult to think of any other medieval society in which a commander such as Nikephoros Phokas—no Constantinopolitan bureaucrat but a warrior from the distant frontiers—would not only school himself in traditional military theory but also set himself and his officers the task of recording and revising current military precepts. That Phokas and other soldiers translated their own knowledge and experience into a series of practical handbooks says much about the systematic approach the Byzantines took to warfare—among other things—during the tenth century; in turn, that the men who commanded Byzantine expeditionary forces along the eastern and western frontiers of the empire could consult the guidelines of seasoned peers and predecessors does much to account for the overall effectiveness of the Byzantine army of the time. Given that the men who commanded Byzantine armies could consult a wide range of military writings, it would be worthwhile to review the evidence casting light on the reception and use of military treatises by soldiers of the tenth and eleventh centuries. What was the place of military literature in the profession of arms?

Writings on war naturally had a strong appeal for members of the rising military aristocracy of the tenth and eleventh centuries. As noted above, not all

of this literature was strictly technical in application, since within the corpus of *militaria* are many ancient works collected and read for their intellectual character. Soldiers were often ardent bibliophiles,³⁷ and some, such as Psellos' acquaintance John Doukas, prided themselves on their mastery of tactical theory and terminology "acquired from the works of Aelian and Apollodoros."³⁸ In this connection, currency with this erudite vocabulary seems to have been the military aristocrat's social as well as intellectual cachet, since it gave him a refined brand of speech—a sort of military *katharevousa*—to use in learned circles, as opposed to the Latinized, hybrid language of the army.³⁹ Still other military works were edifying in nature and thus reflected the conventional preference of Byzantine readers for instructive and moralizing fare. The *strategemata*, for instance, which recorded the sayings and deeds of famous soldiers of the past, resemble the *apophthegmata*, or sayings of the church fathers and monks, since both genres, despite the differences in content, present models of exemplary conduct and so fulfill the didactic role of so much of Byzantine literature. But the great popularity of the *strategemata*, with their heroes and exploits of the distant past, combines with the tales of illustrious warriors written during the tenth and eleventh centuries—such as the chronicles, now lost, of John Kourkouas, Katakalon Kekaumenos, and the Phokas clan—to show that the Byzantine military aristocracy was well on its way to creating its own ideals of valorous conduct and military proficiency.

In a more applied sense, the military handbooks were certainly used for the training of prospective commanders and for the continuing instruction of active soldiers. A soldierly upbringing combined mastery of martial skills, acquired through military exercises and the related pursuits of hunting and athletics, with knowledge of tactical procedures gleaned from the military handbooks. This is how the soldier Nikephoros Bryennios described the military education of the boys John and Isaac Komnenos, whose care their father at his death had entrusted to the emperor Basil II:⁴⁰

... Basil appointed instructors and teachers for them; some he bade shape the boys' character, others he told to teach them the arts of war, how to arm themselves properly and use their shields to defend themselves against

the strokes of their opponents, to handle a lance and to ride a horse with skill, to shoot an arrow right at the mark, and, to put the matter concisely, to study the tactical treatises [*taktika*] so that they would know how to deploy a phalanx and array the files, how to prepare a camp correctly and set up a palisaded encampment, and the many other things which the tactical treatises teach. The Studion monastery was assigned as their place of residence, for two reasons: to acquire virtue by imitating the finest men and to be able to leave the City easily to go hunting or to take part in military exercises.

As part of their training the sons of emperors or career soldiers might be taken along on campaign to observe battles and so gain firsthand experience of military operations. The emperor Basil I (867–886) is said to have taken his eldest son (and intended successor) Constantine with him on an expedition to Syria "so that he might give him, as the royal cub, a taste of the death of enemies and be a teacher to him of tactics and the height of courage in the face of dangers."⁴¹

Experienced soldiers known to have read the military treatises regarded them as a useful source of ideas and inspiration. Psellos records that Basil II prepared his army's formations "taking some from the handbooks and devising others by virtue of his own expertise in reaction to the circumstances,"⁴² an approach reminiscent of Phokas' evaluation of existing tactical precepts in the light of his own observations. The eleventh-century veteran Kekaumenos was himself steeped in military literature and advised consulting ancient manuals for ideas on formations,⁴³ but at the same time he hastened to point out that in combat against a capable opponent there was no substitute for a commander's native ingenuity and resourcefulness:⁴⁴

You yourself have to come up with what is necessary, not merely the things that you have learned or gathered from the ancients. Contrive something original that you have been able to conjure up by using your own wits.

³⁷R. Browning, "Literacy in the Byzantine World," *BMGS* 4 (1978), 42–44.

³⁸Psellos, *Chronographia*, II, 180–82.

³⁹The historical writings of the soldier and courtier Nikephoros Bryennios furnish a good example of this purified military language, which must have borne little resemblance to the Greek spoken in the army's ranks.

⁴⁰Bryennios 75.^{15–77.4}.

⁴¹Theoph. cont. 278.^{12–15}. It is pertinent here to recall that military books were taken along on campaigns during the tenth century. A treatise on imperial expeditions lists among the items to be included in the emperor's baggage "books on warfare [βιβλία στρατηγικά], books on siege instruments [βιβλία μηχανικά], treatises on artillery [βελουποιικά], as well as others pertaining to the subject, that is, to battle and sieges, above all Polyainos and Syrianos." See Haldon, *Imperial Expeditions*, 106.^{196–199} (Text C), and commentary, 210–11.

⁴²Psellos, *Chronographia*, I, 20–21.

⁴³Kek. 136.^{20–29}; on his acquaintance with tactical literature, see G. Buckler, "Writings Familiar to Kekaumenos," *Byzantion* 15 (1941), 133–43.

⁴⁴Kek. 142.^{12–18}.

Don't say that there is nothing on the subject in the ancient authorities, for I will say in reply that human nature is forever ripe with guile and craft. Just as those men of old hit upon their devices, you too must make your own clever invention and claim the victory. They were certainly human beings too, just as you are.

What stands out in these veteran soldiers is their willingness to innovate and adapt to the prevailing conditions. They impressed this freedom—and necessity—to change or improvise upon the commander when on campaign. The enterprising attitude expressed by Kekaumenos echoes Phokas' reminder in the *De velitatione*, "I have set forth the lessons of experience, but it is up to you to adapt them to the pressing needs of the moment and to the circumstances."⁴⁵ The message of both experienced campaigners is the same: that a thorough knowledge of the treatises was an essential component of a good soldier's background and training, but in the end the procedures listed in a handbook could never be strictly applied in all situations. At a given moment the commander had to be ready to intervene according to his diagnosis of the events before his eyes, and at that point nothing but his own instincts, experience, and judgment could instruct him as to the proper course of action.

The purpose of this chapter has been to establish the contemporaneity and realism of the *Praecepta militaria*, and hence its reliability as a source for the study of Byzantine warfare. It is time now to identify the aspects of this subject which the treatise should lead us to explore.

Here again the issue of contemporaneity and realism will serve as the point of departure. In his study of the *De velitatione*, Dagron proposed three criteria by which to judge the relative modernity of the military treatises.⁴⁶ Does the text in question record changes or innovations in military equipment; does it present a distinct enemy (or enemies) with particular tactics and characteristics; and does it shed light on the relations between the army and the society from which it is drawn, particularly on the administrative, political, or social status of the soldiers who fill the army's ranks? To these aptly chosen criteria I will add one more. Does the treatise testify to the role of psychological as well as physical factors in deciding the outcome of battles—does it acknowledge, in Smail's words, "the interplay of morale, individual prowess and good fortune" in war?

⁴⁵ *DV* XVI.⁶⁰⁻⁶¹.

⁴⁶ Dagron, *Le traité*, 141–44.

These are useful questions to apply to the *Praecepta*. Not only do they bring its contemporaneity and realism into high relief, they also point to the aspects of the treatise most receptive to analysis. The succeeding chapters will therefore examine the composition of Phokas' field armies, the adversary whom these armies were prepared to face, how the Byzantine army performed in battle and on campaign, and above all, how Phokas and his successors strove to mold their armies into efficient, intimidating military machines impervious to the effects of indiscipline and fear, and fully convinced of their invincibility.

*Ils ont marché contre toi, bardés de fer. On eût dit même qu'ils s'avançaient sur des chevaux qui n'avaient pas de jambes.
 Dans les éclairs qu'ils jetaient, on les confondait avec leurs sabres, car leurs vêtements et leurs turbans étaient de fer comme leurs sabres.
 C'était une armée dont les rangs successifs couvraient l'Orient et l'Occident et dont la rumeur confuse montait jusqu'à l'oreille des Gémeaux.
 Des gens de toutes langues et de toutes nations étaient là réunis, dont seuls les interprètes pouvaient comprendre le langage.*

Al-Mutanabbi's description of the Byzantine army
 at the battle of Hadat, 30 October 954
 (Byz. Arabes II.2, 333)

During his reign there was no end of registrars, assessors, military officials, and those called *protonotarioi* dispatched into every last region, who oppressed his subjects with all manner of evils and drove them to the extremes of poverty, sparing not even the completely indigent. These they enlisted in the service of the public post while those formerly subject to these charges they reinscribed in the naval services; sailors they turned into foot soldiers, those previously of this station they counted among the cavalrymen, the cavalrymen they changed into heavy cavalrymen, and they imposed a heavier burden of military obligations on each. It seemed as though he was enrolling every last one of his subjects into military service.

John Zonaras' account of the heavy exactions
 imposed by Nikephoros Phokas to support his
 military policy
 (Zon. III, 505.¹⁶–506.¹⁰)

THE BYZANTINE EXPEDITIONARY ARMY

In the spring of 963, Nikephoros Phokas set out for a campaign in which his objective was the capture of Tarsos. The contemporary historian Leo the Deacon described his preparations as follows:¹

By the time it was the middle of spring . . . Nikephoros made his way from Byzantium and crossed to the Asian shore opposite. Arriving in the region of Cappadocia . . . and there setting up his quarters, he sent out dispatches in every direction, raising and summoning the army to him with all haste. While his forces were gathering, he trained the men with him in the conduct of war; he sharpened their mettle and toughened them with daily exercises, he drilled them in their combat maneuvers, constantly giving the command to sound the trumpets, beat the drums, and clash the cymbals, to leap upon their horses, shoot with their bows at the target, and hurl their spears straight at the mark. Nothing devised for the art of war escaped his notice.

The scene depicted by Leo is the *adnoumion*, or the mobilization of a Byzantine field army, during which the soldiers called up for service were inspected, organized, and trained. It is precisely within such a setting that we should imagine the *Praecepta* being used. The opening words of the treatise—"it is both best and necessary to pick out foot soldiers from Byzantines and Armenians, heavy infantrymen large in stature and no more than forty years of age . . ."—and the terse checklist of instructions which follows illustrates the process by which Phokas and his commanders selected, armed, organized, and trained

¹ Leo diac. 35.¹–36.⁹. The phrase "in the region of Cappadocia" must mean that Phokas gathered the army at Caesarea, one of the seven permanent camps (ἄπληκτα) that served as mobilization points for campaigns beyond the eastern frontiers; see now Haldon, *Imperial Expeditions*, Text A, with commentary and bibliography.

their armies for campaigns. When viewed through the lens of the *Praecepta* and other sources of the time, these armies appear as the sums of many parts, comprising men of diverse nationalities, social stations, and martial skills. The task before Phokas and his commanders during the *adnoumion* was to assess the varying quantities and qualities of the men who presented themselves for service and assign them to the units and roles to which they were best suited. Foremost in their minds was the need to identify the men whose attributes and abilities commended them to the roles crucial to the army's success in battle.

This chapter will examine the soldiers who made up the armies led by Phokas and the other great commanders of his time. It will begin with a brief review of the changes to the Byzantine army in the tenth century, a subject on which previous research has been concentrated, and then take for separate study the three bodies within the army portrayed in the *Praecepta*: infantry, cavalry, and heavy cavalry (*kataphraktoi*). The focus will be on the men who formed each body, their background, their equipment, their units and ranks, and the skills which they brought to their roles. The methods used to train the army will then be discussed, with particular attention to the soldiers overlooked in studies of the Byzantine army—the contingents of private retainers and bodyguards who were among the most talented men in the army.

Changes in Military Institutions and Policy during the Tenth Century

The Byzantine army of the ninth and tenth centuries consisted of two principal institutions. The first was the *themata*, or the armies based in the themes (θέματα, or provinces), which from the creation in the seventh century until their gradual disappearance in the eleventh were the empire's greatest reservoir of manpower and resources.² Each theme was under the command of a *strategos* who supervised the recruitment and maintenance of the forces in his theme and commanded them on campaign. The persons obliged to perform military service (*strateia*) were called *stratiotai* and either served on campaign themselves or equipped and supported a soldier in their place. Although the *stratiotai* who took part in campaigns were paid for their services, they were responsible for

²The literature on the creation of the themes is vast; cited here are the most important recent works: I. Shahîd, "Heraclius and the Theme System: New Light from the Arabic," *Byzantion* 57 (1987), 391–406, and idem, "Heraclius and the Theme System: Further Observations," *Byzantion* 59 (1989), 208–43; J. F. Haldon, *Byzantium in the Seventh Century* (Cambridge, 1990), 208–53. On the themes in the ninth and tenth centuries, see H. Ahrweiler, "Recherches sur l'administration de l'empire byzantin aux IX^e–XI^e siècles," in *Etudes sur les structures administratives et sociales de Byzance* (London, 1971), pt. VIII, 2–24; and Oikonomidès, *Listes*, 340–63.

supplying their own horses and equipment. These expenses they met from the revenues derived from their lands (the *stratitika ktemata*, or "soldiers' properties").³

The second was the imperial *tagmata* (τὰ βασιλικά τάγματα), or the elite cavalry regiments stationed in or around Constantinople. By the mid-tenth century these were four in number: the *Scholai* (or Schools), the *Exkoubitores*, the *Vigla*, and the *Hikanatoi*; a fifth *tagma*, the *Athanatoi* ("Immortals") was created by John Tzimiskes in 970. With the exception of the *Vigla*, commanded by a *droungarios*, the *tagmata* were commanded by *domestikoi*; senior among them was the Domestic of the Schools who after the emperor was the supreme commander of the Byzantine army. As opposed to their counterparts in the thematic armies, the soldiers (*scholarioi*) of the *tagmata* were recruited, equipped, and paid by the state.⁴

The *themata* and *tagmata* were of long standing by the mid-tenth century, but the transition to an offensive military policy which began with the accession of Constantine VII and the promotion of the Phokas family to the high command entailed a number of reforms to the recruitment, organization, and structure of the army. As these developments have been discussed in detail by previous scholars, they need only be briefly summarized here to provide the background necessary for the study of the field army portrayed in the *Praecepta militaria*.

The first is the creation of small themes along the eastern (and later the western) frontiers as the Byzantines established their hold over their newly conquered territories. This policy, first attested under Constantine VII and continued by Nikephoros Phokas and his successors, saw the *kleisourai* (buffer zones along the Byzantine-Muslim frontier) and the regions surrounding conquered towns or fortresses elevated to the rank of themes under the command of "lesser" (μικροί) *strategoi*. In the east these new themes were known either as "the frontier themes" (τὰ ἀκρίτικὰ θέματα: cf. *TNO* 65.¹⁹) or "the Armenian themes" (τὰ ἀρμενικὰ θέματα, in contrast to the larger "Byzantine themes" [τὰ ῥωμαϊκὰ θέματα] lying to the interior) since Armenian immigrants were the largest of the heterogeneous populations settled in these regions. These settlers received small plots of land sufficient to support military service as infantrymen,

³On the *strateia* and the *stratitika ktemata*, see Haldon, *Recruitment*, and idem, "Military Service, Military Lands, and the Status of Soldiers: Current Problems and Interpretations," *DOP* 47 (1993), 1–67; Oikonomidès, "Middle-Byzantine Provincial Recruits."

⁴On the history and organization of the *tagmata*, see J. F. Haldon, *Praetorians*; H. J. Kühn, *Armee*; Oikonomidès, *Listes*, 329–35.

a process of colonization which provided the Byzantines with a ready, if fluctuating,⁵ supply of foot soldiers whose proximity to the war zones ensured their rapid mobilization for campaigns. Phokas' advice to select Armenians as heavy infantrymen (*PM* I.¹⁻³) is one of several contemporary references to the presence and role of Armenian soldiers in Byzantine field armies resulting from this organizational and demographic restructuring of the eastern frontiers.⁶

A second reform concerns the *strateia* and the *stratitika ktemata*. The novel of Constantine VII on the soldiers' properties (issued between 945 and 959) imposed a number of conditions regulating the *strateia* and the military properties to which a *strateia* was attached: that henceforth the minimum inalienable value of military properties supporting a *strateia* was to be fixed at four pounds of gold for cavalymen and two pounds of gold for sailors; that all lands supporting a *strateia* were to be registered on the military rolls according to the value of the *strateia*; that these registered lands and the attached *strateia* might be transmitted to the family or fairly named inheritors of the *stratitotes*, but could not otherwise be alienated; and that those who had acquired registered military property in any way whatsoever within a forty-year period were to restore it to the original owners or their heirs without compensation.⁷ The purpose of these measures was to consolidate the military resources of the empire as the policy of conquest got under way. Upon becoming emperor, Nikephoros Phokas was to take these measures to their furthest extent. As the famous passage from Zonaras (cited in the preface) records, he made every effort to register the lands of his subjects and extract from them the highest level of military service which they could support; he also raised the minimum inalienable value of the military properties from four to twelve pounds of gold.⁸

It becomes apparent during this period that the nature of the *strateia* itself was changing as it was gradually converted from an alternately personal or fiscal obligation to a mainly (but never completely) fiscal one. The principal reason for the fiscalization of the *strateia*—reflecting the preference of the state for

⁵E. McGeer, "The Legal Decree of Nikephoros II Phokas concerning Armenian *stratitotai*," in *Peace and War in Byzantium: Essays in Honor of George T. Dennis, S. J.*, ed. by T. S. Miller and J. W. Nesbitt (Washington, D. C., 1995), 123–37.

⁶On the Armenian immigration into Cappadocia and the development of the Armenian themes, see Oikonomidès, "L'organisation"; Dagron, *Le traité*, 239–45; Kühn, *Armee*, 61–66; G. Dédayan, "Les Arméniens en Cappadoce aux X^e et XI^e siècles," *Le aree omogenee della civiltà rupestre nell'ambito dell'imperio bizantino: la Cappadocia* (Galatine, 1981), 75–95.

⁷JGR I, 222–26; on this Novel, see P. Lemerle, *The Agrarian History of Byzantium from the Origins to the Twelfth Century: The Sources and the Problems* (Galway, 1979), 116–25.

⁸JGR I, 255–56; see also Lemerle, *Agrarian History*, 128–31; Dagron, *Le traité*, 275–83; and now T. G. Kolias, Νικηφόρος Β' Φωκάς (963–969). Ο στρατηγός αυτοκράτωρ καὶ τὸ μεταρρυθμιστικό του ἔργο, (Athens, 1993).

military revenues rather than the personal military service of its indigenous manpower—was the increased reliance on foreign mercenaries. The Byzantines had long employed mercenaries in their armies, but from the 950s on the ethnic diversity of Byzantine field armies amazed contemporary observers. Al-Mutanabbi's poem on the battle of Hadat vividly expresses the Arabs' astonishment at the many nations present in the Byzantine host ("men of all nations and all languages were gathered there, whose speech only the interpreters could understand"), while other Arab accounts of the battle identify Armenians, Russians (*Rus*), Slavs, Bulgars, Hungarians, and Chazars (or possibly Georgians) alongside the Greeks.⁹ The recruitment of foreign mercenaries, which appears to have intensified during the reign of Constantine VII,¹⁰ is a development widely attested in sources of the tenth to eleventh centuries and is already in evidence in the *Praecepta*, where Phokas refers to "*Rhos* or other foreigners" (*PM* I.⁵²).

Finally, there were two important reforms to the *tagmata*. As noted above, overall command of the Byzantine army had traditionally lain in the hands of the Domestic of the Schools, but during the reign of Romanos II (959–963) the high command was divided into two. Henceforth, a Domestic of the Schools "of the East" commanded the armies of Asia Minor, while his counterpart, the Domestic of the Schools "of the West" commanded the armies in the European part of the empire, an arrangement which enabled the empire to conduct military operations on both fronts.¹¹ The second reform was the installation of the *tagmata* along the frontiers. Until the middle of the tenth century, the four imperial regiments had been stationed within or nearby the capital, but with the implementation of an offensive military policy in the 950s, detachments of the *tagmata* were shifted to the frontiers, where they would be immediately available for campaigns. These tagmatic forces were under the authority of a *doux* or *katepano* (officers first attested in this capacity during the reign of Nikephoros Phokas) who supervised not only the *tagmata* stationed in his district (*doukaton*, *katepanat*), but also the "lesser" *strategoi* in the local frontier themes.¹²

⁹Ibn Zafir (*Byz. Arabes* II.2, 125), Dahabi (ibid., 243–44), and Abu Firas (ibid., 364–65); see also Canard's summary of these accounts (*Byz. Arabes* II.1, 352–53), where he notes the possible confusion between Khazars and Georgians in the Arabic rendering of these nations.

¹⁰Noted by the Arab historian Abu Firas: *Byz. Arabes* II.2, 368. The fiscalization of the *strateia* and the replacement of the indigenous armies of the themes with foreign mercenaries are discussed by Ahrweiler, "L'administration," 21–24; P. Lemerle, *Cinq études sur le XI^e siècle byzantin*, (Paris, 1977), 263–71; and N. Oikonomidès, "L'évolution de l'organisation administrative de l'empire byzantin au XI^e siècle (1025–1118)," *TM* 6 (1976), 141–44.

¹¹Ahrweiler, "L'administration," 52–67; Kühn, *Armee*, 123–57.

¹²Oikonomidès, *Listes* 344–45, 354, and "L'organisation," 299–301; J.-C. Cheynet, "Du stratège de thème au duc: chronologie de l'évolution au cours du XI^e siècle," *TM* 9 (1985), 181–94; and Kühn, *Armee*, 158–242.

Taken collectively, the reforms and changes to the *themata* and *tagmata* reflect the efforts undertaken by the Byzantines to consolidate their military strength and to marshal it along the frontiers—policies in which Nikephoros Phokas took a leading role. It is against this background that we may examine the field army described in the *Praecepta*, which displays Phokas' military program in its most immediate application.

The Army of Nikephoros Phokas

The expeditionary army portrayed in the *Praecepta* is in many ways a faithful reflection of the state which put it in the field. The ethnic diversity of the Byzantine Empire and its contacts with a wide range of foreign peoples are evident in the array of nations within the army's ranks, while at the same time the indigenous soldiery represent an interesting cross-section of Byzantine society that reflects current social, demographic, and administrative changes. The close adherence between the army and society satisfies one of Dagron's criteria for the modernity of a military treatise; the *Praecepta* also records a number of changes and developments in military technology ensuing from Phokas' attempts to improve the army's equipment and performance in battle.

Part 1: The Infantry

As one among the faceless many, of lowly and often Armenian or foreign stock, the humble foot soldier receives little mention in the historical sources of the tenth and eleventh centuries.¹³ This silence, however, should not obscure the considerable part they played in the warfare of the time. Their numbers alone testify to their importance, since infantry (τὸ πεζικόν) represented the bulk of the manpower in Byzantine field armies, outnumbering the cavalry by a ratio of 2:1 on the basis of the figures given in the treatises. That Phokas devoted the first two chapters of the *Praecepta* to the infantry is a further sign of their importance, and his detailed instructions bear witness to the revitalization of infantry within the Byzantine tactical system.

¹³ St. Theodore appears as a patron of the foot soldier in an oration of the eleventh-century bishop of Euchaita, John Mauropous, "in honor of the martyr St. Theodore 'the foot-soldier'" (εἰς τὴν μνήμην τοῦ ἁγίου μεγαλομάρτυρος Θεοδώρου ἡτοῦ τοῦ πεζοῦ), in which the saint's benefactions to the poor and humble (πένητες) are extolled even beyond those performed on behalf of the "mounted and brilliant and covered with gold." See A. Kazhdan, "Hagiographical Notes 2: On Horseback or on Foot? A 'Sociological' Approach in an Eleventh-Century Saint's Life," *Byzantion* 53 (1983), 544–45.

Organization and Equipment

It is evident from the *Praecepta* and other sources that a restructuring of units and command had recently taken place in the infantry. The *Praecepta* is the first treatise to attest the newly created rank of taxiarch (ταξιάρχης, also called a chiliarch, χιλιάρχης; cf. *PM* I.¹⁴¹), the commanding officer of an infantry unit called either a taxiarchy (ταξιαρχία) or a chiliarchy (χιλιαρχία), which contained one thousand soldiers. Both the taxiarch and the thousand-man taxiarchy are cited in sources from the tenth and eleventh centuries,¹⁴ as is another recently created officer, the *archegetes* (ἀρχηγέτης) or *hoplitarches* (ὀπλιτάρχης), first mentioned in the *De re militari* as the officer in charge of the entire infantry force on campaign.¹⁵

According to the *Praecepta* (I.^{75–84}), the infantry force consisted of twelve taxiarchies,¹⁶ each of which included four hundred heavy infantrymen (ὀπλίται); three hundred archers (τοξόται); two hundred light infantrymen, who acted as javeliners and slingers (ἀκοντισταί or ῥιπταρισταί, σφενδοβολισταί); and one hundred *menavlatoi* (μεναυλάτοι), soldiers named for the heavy spear (μεναύλιον) they carried as their main weapon. To a certain extent, this classification of soldier and role reflects the Byzantine preoccupation with *taxis* ("order") so typical of the tenth century, but it also points to the high degree of specialization within the army, which must be counted as one of its principal strengths. Each of these four types of infantryman within a taxiarchy required specific attributes and equipment in order to perform the tasks demanded of them in battle. We may take each type separately, beginning with the heavy infantrymen.

1. *The heavy infantrymen.* The heavy infantrymen were the single largest body of men in the army. Phokas prescribes a total of 11,200 heavy infantrymen (*PM*

¹⁴ Kühn, *Armee*, 273–80; Oikonomidès, *Listes*, 335–36, and idem, "Ὁ ταξιάρχης Κρήτης," *Ariadne* 5 (1989), 119–24; V. von Falkenhausen, *La dominazione bizantina nell'Italia meridionale dal IX all'XI secolo* (Bari, 1978), 125–27; J.-C. Cheynet, "Note sur l'axiarque et le taxiarche," *REB* 44 (1986), 233–35. To the sources referring directly to the taxiarchy should be added an indirect reference from Leo the Deacon (74.^{17–20}). He records that at the end of his campaign of 969, Phokas "left a phalanx [φάλαγγα] of five hundred horsemen and a cohort [σπεῖραν] of one thousand infantrymen" in the fortress of Bighras to continue operations against Antioch. Leo's thousand-strong "cohort" is to be equated with the current taxiarchy, while the five-hundred-man cavalry "phalanx" conforms exactly with the strength of a regular cavalry division (παράταξις) in the *Praecepta* (IV.^{33–36}).

¹⁵ *DRM* 3.⁶, 4.^{31–32}; cf. Kühn, *Armee*, 270–72; Oikonomidès, *Listes*, 335.

¹⁶ Cf. *DRM* I.^{11–12}, presenting an infantry force of sixteen taxiarchies, reflecting the greater number of foot soldiers needed for campaigns in Bulgaria. This treatise outlines the same composition of a taxiarchy, except that the *menavlatoi* (mentioned in chapter 20.¹³⁰) have presumably been counted among the heavy infantrymen.



4. Byzantine infantrymen; note the knee-length tunics and kite-shaped shields

I. 13-14), of which the twelve taxiarchies would have taken six thousand, including the *menavlatoi*, while those left over were presumably attached as reserves to each taxiarchy to make up losses incurred over the campaign or kept apart for use in other duties. Youth, size, and strength were the qualities necessary in soldiers chosen as heavy infantrymen; but the biggest and strongest of them would in turn have been detailed to serve as *menavlatoi*, as these soldiers required exceptional strength and courage to handle their weapons in the performance of their role in combat (see below). Once selected, the infantrymen were drilled in the use of their weapons and in their tactical maneuvers, and their line officers were appointed (PM I. 3-10). Subordinate to the taxiarchs were hekatonarchs, in charge of one hundred men, pentekontarchs, in charge of fifty men, and dekarchs, in charge of ten men. These squads of ten, called *kontoubernia* in the *Praecepta*, and *dekarchiai* in the *De re militari*, were the smallest units within a taxiarchy and were to be formed "on the basis of kinship and friendship" (PM I. 10-13).

The protective equipment that Phokas prescribed for infantry falls into the category of "ersatz" armor and shows how modestly Byzantine foot soldiers were dressed for battle.¹⁷ As noted in Chapter I, Phokas restricted his list of

¹⁷ Cf. Kolias, *Waffen*, 54-58.

equipment to the modest means of his foot soldiers, beginning with "short tunics (καβάδια κοντά) reaching to the knees . . . with cotton or coarse silk (βαμβάκιν καὶ κουκούλιν)" (PM I. 14-16). These were padded or quilted garments which, from Phokas' insistence that they extend to the knees, were short enough to allow the soldiers to walk unencumbered in all manner of terrain. The sleeves (μανίκια) on the soldiers' tunics were to be "short and broad with slits up to the pit of the arm so that they can put their hands through easily as well as comfortably to fight" (PM I. 16-19), which suggests that the "short" sleeves came down to the soldiers' forearms, not to their wrists, and were slit underneath (where they were perhaps buttoned or laced together) so that they could easily be folded back. The sleeves were hung from the shoulders with loops slipped over buttons (ὑπὸ κομποθηλυκίων: PM I. 19-20).

The headgear worn by infantrymen also belongs to the "ersatz" category. Instead of the iron helmets worn by cavalrymen, the foot soldiers wore thick caps made of felt (καμελαύκια ἀπὸ κενδοῦκλων παχέα: PM I. 23-24), which, as other contemporary texts indicate, was a simple type of headgear used in place of iron helmets.¹⁸ These felt caps were held fast by strips of cloth (ὑπὸ φακιολίων) wound about the head in the manner of a turban; this combination of a felt cap and cloth bands protected the wearer not only against the blows exchanged in combat but also from the sun.

Phokas refers to several kinds of footwear worn by the soldiers (PM I. 20-23).¹⁹ He first recommends "short boots" (ὑποδήματα κοντά), which when folded (διπλᾶ) reached to the knees, or unfolded (μονοπλά) to the thighs. These directions indicate that their boots were combined with long leggings that could be folded down from the knee—probably before battle as a means of protecting the shins. Otherwise the soldiers were to wear simple boots, "*sandalia*, that is to say *mouzakia*, or else the ones called *tzerboulia* in colloquial speech."

Completing the infantryman's defensive equipment was the most important item of all—his shield. Phokas gives instructions that the shields must be "no less than six *spithamai* [140 cm], but if possible, should be even larger" (PM I. 28-29), but he does not refer to their shape. Since the sources refer to shields of all designs—round, oval, rectangular, even triangular—it is not possible on the basis of this passage to specify the shape of the shields which Phokas prescribes. It is most likely that his infantrymen carried shields broad at the top and narrowing toward the bottom, a type of shield recommended in the *Sylloge* (38.1) and shown in the Madrid Skylitzes. The shields were made of wood and

¹⁸ Cf. *De obsid.* 48. 5-6; Kolias, *Waffen*, 85-87.

¹⁹ See above, p. 62; Kolias, *Waffen*, 72-73.

sheathed in leather (or a similarly strong material such as linen), and in addition to the grip on the inner side seem to have had a strap allowing the soldiers to hang the shield over their shoulders while on the march.²⁰

The weapons of the infantrymen included swords girded at the waist (σπαθία ζωστήκια), axes (τξικούρια), and iron maces (σιδηροράβδια). But since the main purpose of infantrymen was to stand fast against enemy cavalry, their principal weapon was the spear (κοντάριον). According to Phokas' instructions, the spears were "to be thick and sturdy, from twenty-five to thirty *spithamai* in length" (*PM I*.²⁹⁻³¹). The figures themselves are undoubtedly reliable, as they are repeated by Ouranos (*TNO* 56.³³⁻³⁵), but they work out to the improbable lengths of 5.8 and 7 m if Schilbach's equivalent of 23.4 cm is used. It is more reasonable to assume that Phokas' lengths match with those given in the *Sylloge* (38.3), where spears of eight to ten cubits are prescribed (3.7–4.7 m). This is still a considerable length, but Leo the Deacon's observation that the Byzantines used very long (ἐπιμήκεις) spears in battle corresponds with the evidence of the treatises concerning the length of the spear.²¹ Finally, Phokas stipulates that the spearpoints (ξιφάρια) and fastenings (κουσπία) should be "fit for the task" (ἐπιτήδεια). On the evidence of the treatises, spearpoints were one and one-half *spithamai* in length (47 cm). The socket fitted over the spearshaft was secured with rivets (κουσπία).²²

2. *The archers.* Phokas' review of the infantry force includes a short section on the archers (*PM I*.³²⁻³⁹). He begins by stating that 4,800 "proficient" archers (τοξόται ἐπιτήδαιοι) must be selected, of whom 3,600 would have been distributed among the twelve taxiarchies (each of which had three hundred archers), while the remaining 1,200 archers were assigned to units of the light infantry (*PM I*.⁸⁹⁻⁹¹), or else reserved for other duties (cf. *DRM* 3.⁶⁻⁸) and as replacements. Each archer was to have two bows (τοξάρια); four bowstrings (κόρδαι); and two quivers (κούκουρα), one with sixty arrows, the other with forty. In addition to the arrows which they supplied themselves, the archers in each taxiarchy received another fifty arrows from the huge stock of "imperial arrows"

²⁰ Kolias, *Waffen*, 88–131; see also below, note 39.

²¹ Leo diac. 143.¹⁹⁻²¹. In his list, Phokas uses the *spithame* (σπιθαμή, "span") as his main unit of measure. It is calculated as 23.4 cm by Schilbach (*Metrologie*, 19–23), but this equivalent is too large when applied to Phokas' figures. The reader is therefore advised to take the equivalents as maximum figures only and understand that Phokas was using a *spithame* smaller than the standard unit. On the thrusting spear, see Kolias, *Waffen*, 191–213.

²² See above, p. 63.

(βασιλικά σαγίται).²³ Besides their principal weapon, the archers were to be armed with swords or axes for hand-to-hand clashes, and, as did the heavy infantrymen, they carried slings in their belts. They also carried small shields (χεροσκούταρα), which were small and light enough to be supported on the left arm that held the bow.²⁴

The details in the *Praecepta* concerning archers and their role demonstrate that these soldiers made up approximately one-quarter of the infantry force and that archery was an integral part of both infantry and cavalry tactics. Yet in spite of this testimony to the important place of archery in Byzantine warfare, the evidence of tenth-century sources is too scanty to form a coherent picture of the Byzantine bow and the archer's technique. Brief observations based on fuller sources and studies treating the bow in the fourth through sixth centuries will therefore be offered here.

The Byzantine bow was the composite or compound bow introduced during the fourth century by the Huns, whose weapon and skills the Byzantines incorporated into their own military repertoire.²⁵ This type of bow has been defined as "any weapon where the constituent layers of the stave have been joined with any kind of adhesive, and where the materials employed have been selected so as to make the back stretch around an incompressible belly, and where at least one ingredient, generally wood, gives the necessary dimensional stability."²⁶ What should also be noted is that these bows were constructed in a reflexed shape, that is, they were to be strung in reverse of the bow's natural flex when unstrung. The flight range of the Byzantine bow in this period is estimated at 300 m (although the "killing range" would have been much less),²⁷ but more importantly, it possessed considerable striking power at shorter distances and is reputed to have given Byzantine archers the advantage over their Persian counterparts during the sixth century.²⁸

A short treatise on archery, traditionally assigned to the sixth century, iden-

²³ Each taxiarchy received fifteen thousand "imperial arrows" (arrows collected by imperial requisition) to be distributed to its three hundred archers (*PM I*.¹³⁷⁻¹⁴³); cf. *TNO* 56.¹³⁷⁻¹⁴⁷, where Ouranos totals the stock of "imperial arrows" at one hundred eighty thousand and notes that a supply of four hundred thousand arrows is best.

²⁴ Kolias, *Waffen*, 110.

²⁵ Bivar, "Cavalry Equipment," 282–87.

²⁶ On the evolution and construction of the late Roman bow, see J. C. Coulston, "Roman Archery Equipment," in *The Production and Distribution of Roman Military Equipment*, ed. M. C. Bishop, BAR International Series 275 (Oxford, 1985), 220–366.

²⁷ W. McLeod, "The Range of the Ancient Bow," *Phoenix* 19 (1965), 1–14.

²⁸ Noted by Kolias, *Waffen*, 220–21.

tifies rapidity, accuracy and force of shot as the essential skills to be mastered by archers, and sets out a number of drills aimed at developing these abilities.²⁹ Byzantine archers knew two kinds of draw and release: the Mongolian draw, in which the bowstring was pulled back by the thumb (usually protected by a ring) supported by the index and middle fingers; and the Mediterranean draw, in which the bowman used the top three fingers to draw the bowstring while holding the arrow between the index and middle fingers.³⁰ Although silent on the techniques employed by contemporary archers, sources from the tenth century do record the Byzantines' appreciation of the bow as a weapon and their admiration of good bowmanship. Leo VI had bidden his generals ensure that each man under their authority possessed his own bow, or at least that there was a bow and forty arrows in every domicile (*LT* XX.81); Leo the Deacon includes practice with the bow among the skills Phokas drilled into his soldiers, and claims that John Tzimiskes could send an arrow through a finger ring, thus surpassing even "the islander" (Odysseus) as an archer.³¹

3. *The light infantrymen.* Attached to each taxiarchy were two hundred javeliners and slingers who served as light infantry and skirmishers (*PM* I.⁸⁰⁻⁸⁷). The javeliners (called ἀκοντισταί or ριπταρισταί) took their name from the casting spear (ἀκόντιον, ριπτάριον) that served as their main weapon. Phokas does not give the length of these spears, but the *Sylloge* (38.6; 39.8) records their length at one and one-third *orgui* or twelve *spithamai* (2.7–2.8 m) and recommends that each javelinier carry two or three such spears with him. Otherwise they were equipped as the heavy infantrymen were, although their shields were to be more modest in size (σκουτάρια σεμνότερα: *PM* I.⁹⁵⁻⁹⁷).

Among the men selected as javeliners were "either *Rhos* or other foreigners" (*PM* I.⁵²). By Phokas' time the people called *Rhos*, who are to be identified as the commingled Scandinavians, Slavs, and Finns who created the Kievan state in the early tenth century (the *Rhosia* of the *De administrando imperio*), had long been known to the Byzantines. First mentioned in the sources in 839, the *Rhos* made an attack on Constantinople in 860, followed by additional attacks in 907 and 941; but as the tenth-century treaties between Byzantium and

Kievan Russia record, the Byzantines were eager to obtain the services of the *Rhos* in their armies.³² Seven hundred of them are listed in the expedition to Crete in 911, 415 in the expedition to Longobardia in 935, and 629 in the second expedition to Crete in 949, while the army which Phokas took to Crete in 960 included an unspecified number of *Rhos*.³³ By all accounts a consistent presence in Byzantine armies by the mid-tenth century, the *Rhos* won renown in 988–989 when a force of six thousand sent by the Kievan ruler Vladimir enabled Basil II to defeat the rebel Bardas Phokas. From this time on, a unit of *Rhos*, which came to be known as the Varangian Guard, attended the emperor as his personal escort on campaign (*DRM* 10.³⁸, 19.³⁴⁻³⁵).

The slingers (σφενδοβολισταί) were the humblest soldiers in the army. The sling (σφενδοβόλον) was easily prepared and mastered, and for these reasons was the poor man's weapon, useful for hunting as well as for warfare; it also served as a reserve weapon for the heavy infantrymen and the archers. The *Sylloge* (38.10) records that the Byzantine sling was to be no shorter than six *spithamai* (140 cm), which Koliai has rightly taken to mean as the length of an unfolded sling, with a pouch in the center to cradle a stone. The simplicity of the sling should not obscure its effectiveness as a weapon, however, since evidence from classical sources attests the great range and velocity of shot achieved by practiced slingers, so much so that the wounds inflicted by their stones were reckoned to be more severe than those caused by arrows.³⁴ Although individual slingers were also capable of great accuracy, the weapon's real effect lay in its collective use by a body of slingers who, in the parlance of the sources, could bring down "showers" or "a hail" of stones upon the enemy.

4. *The menavlatoi.* Filling out the complement of each taxiarchy were one hundred soldiers called *menavlatoi*. These infantrymen are first cited in the military treatises from the middle of the tenth century (*ST* 47.16, 22; *PM* I.⁹⁴) and represent a new type of foot soldier armed with a heavy spear (*menavlion*). Although

³² D. Obolensky, "Russia and Byzantium in the Mid-Tenth Century: The Problem of the Baptism of the Princess Olga," *GOTR* 28.2 (1983), 157–71; I. Sorlin, "Les traités de Byzance avec la Russie au X^e siècle," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique* 2.3–4 (1961), 313–60, 447–75.

³³ *De cer.* 651.¹⁸ (911), 660.¹⁸ (935), 664.¹⁵⁻¹⁶ (949); Theoph. cont. 476.¹⁴, 481.⁶ (960–961). On the history of the Varangian Guard during the tenth and eleventh centuries, see B. S. Benediktz, "The Evolution of the Varangian Guard in the Byzantine Army," *BZ* 62 (1969), 20–24, *ibid.*, 63 (1970), 26; S. Blöndal, *The Varangians of Byzantium: An Aspect of Byzantine Military History* (Cambridge, 1978), although he overstates the presence and role of the *Rhos* in the later tenth century.

³⁴ Koliai, *Waffen*, 254–59; W. B. Griffiths, "The Sling and Its Place in the Roman Imperial Army," in *Roman Military Equipment: The Sources of Evidence*, BAR International Series 476 (Oxford, 1989), 255–79.

²⁹ Edited and translated by G. T. Dennis, *Three Byzantine Military Treatises*, CFHB 25 (Washington, D. C., 1985), 129–35; see also Koliai, *Waffen*, 229–38.

³⁰ On these techniques, see S. James, "Dura-Europos and the Introduction of the 'Mongolian Release,'" in *Roman Military Equipment: The Accoutrements of War*, BAR International Series 336 (Oxford, 1987), 77–84; Koliai, *Waffen*, 235.

³¹ Cited below, note 56.

these soldiers and their weapon have been the subject of previous studies,³⁵ problems concerning the construction and length of this weapon have remained and will be clarified here.

The term *menavlion* commonly referred to a heavy spear used for thrusting, not for casting, but the term acquired a specific sense in the mid-tenth century. The *Sylloge* (38.3) prescribes a spear made "not from wood cut into sections (μὴ ἀπὸ πελεκητῶν . . . ξύλων) but from saplings (ἀπὸ νεακίων) of oak, cornel, or those called *artzekidia*, or else from any other of this sort," specifications which Phokas copied into the *Praecepta* (PM I.¹¹⁹⁻¹²⁴) with further instructions that "if saplings in one piece (αὐτοφυῆ ξύλα) cannot be found, let them be made from wood cut into sections, but they must be made of hard wood and just so thick that hands can wield them (παχέα τοσοῦτον, ὅσον δύνανται χεῖρες κυβερνᾶν)." From these passages it appears that the soldiers searched out young trees of the types long preferred for their hardness,³⁶ uprooted and planed them into spearshafts thick and heavy enough to withstand the impact of a charging horseman.

The length of the *menavlion*, which previously could not be established from the sources available, can now be determined on the basis of evidence hitherto inaccessible to scholars. The *Sylloge* does not record the weapon's length, while the relevant passage in the *Praecepta* (I.⁸³⁻⁸⁴) is corrupt; fortunately, the corresponding passage in the *Taktika* (56.⁸²⁻⁸⁵) restores the reading: . . . οἱ δὲ ἑκατὸν ἵνα ἔχωσι μεναύλια παχέα ἔχοντα τὸ μήκος ἀπὸ ἑν ἡμισυ οὐργυρίων εἴτε καὶ ἀπὸ δύο, τὰ δὲ ξιφάρια αὐτῶν ἵνα ἔχωσιν ἀπὸ μιᾶς ἡμίσεος σπιθαμῆς εἴτε καὶ ἀπὸ δύο . . . (. . . one hundred must have thick *menavlia* with a length of one and a half or two *ourguiiai*, while their spearpoints must be one and a half or two *spithamai* . . .).

When calculated with Schilbach's equivalents, these measures work out to an approximate length of 2.7–3.6 m for the shaft of the *menavlion*, and 35–47 cm for the spearpoint. These are maximum figures, of course, but even with some reduction allowed, they combine with the details on its construction to show that the *menavlion* was a very long as well as a very solid spear.

Aside from the main weapon of the *menavlatoi*, Phokas has little to say about the rest of their equipment, noting only that, like the javeliners, the *menavlatoi* were to carry shields smaller than those used by the heavy infantrymen but were otherwise to be equipped with the same protective garments (PM

³⁵E. McGeer, "Μεναύλιον—Μεναυλάτοι," ΔΙΠΤΥΧΑ 4 (1986), 53–58; Kolias, *Waffen*, 194–95; for a different view concerning the size of the *menavlion* and its use in battle, see M. P. Anastasiadis, "On Handling the Menavlion," *BMGS* 18 (1994), 1–10.

³⁶On the trees (ash, oak, cornel) preferred by the ancients for their spears, see Theophrastos, *Historia Plantarum* III.12.2, V.1.2, V.6.4.

I.⁹⁵⁻⁹⁷). He does insist, however, that the *menavlatoi* themselves had to be extremely strong and valiant men. As he declares (PM I.¹²⁴⁻¹²⁵), "the *menavlatoi* must be brave and stalwart," since it was their task to stand fast with their heavy spears in the front ranks of the infantry formation as a barrier against attacking cavalry. This was the principal role for which their qualities commended them, although they were also used with the javeliners for skirmishing or fighting in hilly terrain (PM I.⁸⁴⁻⁸⁷; *DRM* 20.¹²⁸⁻¹³²).

Part 2: The Cavalry

The development which most clearly distinguishes the Byzantine army from its Roman ancestor is the gradual transition from an infantry- to a cavalry-based system of warfare during the third through sixth centuries. This process of change was set in motion as the Roman Empire confronted its enemies in the east, the Sassanid Persians and the Steppe peoples (principally the Huns and Avars) whose weapons and tactics completely transformed the Roman way of war. It was in response to the Sassanid heavy horsemen that the Romans developed their own mailed cavalry, the *clibanarii*; but the influence of the Steppe peoples was even more pronounced. From the Hunnic horse-archers the Romans learned of the powerful composite bow, and from the Avars they acquired the stirrup and a sophisticated set of cavalry tactics which emphasized mobility and flexibility. The ultimate effect of these innovations in equipment and tactics was to elevate the importance of cavalry warfare and relegate the infantry to a secondary, supportive role; and this revolution in warfare inspired the first distinctly Byzantine tactical treatise, the *Strategikon* of Maurice (ca. 600), in which the dominant role in war belongs to the cavalry.³⁷

Composition

True to this tradition, the *Praecepta* outlines a highly developed system of cavalry warfare featuring three types of cavalryman: the *prokoursatores*, or light scouts and skirmishers; the regular cavalrymen, drawn from the thematic levies; and the *kataphraktoi*, the heavily armored cavalrymen of the *tagmata*.⁷

1. The *prokoursatores*. A small but important unit of the cavalry force was the body of light horsemen known as the *prokoursatores* ("forerunners"). Depending on the size of the army, they numbered either five hundred or three

³⁷Bivar, "Cavalry Equipment,"; J. C. Coulston, "Roman, Parthian, and Sassanid Tactical Developments," in *The Defence of the Roman and Byzantine East*, BAR International Series 297 (Oxford, 1986), 59–75.

hundred, and were commanded by a *topoteretes* or a *strategos* (PM IV.⁷⁻²²). Used primarily as scouts and skirmishers, the *prokoursatores* were a combined force of lancers and archers who for sake of speed and mobility wore only waist-length corslets of scale or lamellar (*klibania*) or coats of mail (*lorikia*) (PM II.¹⁷⁻²², IV.⁸⁻¹¹).

The tactics employed by the *prokoursatores* for conducting reconnaissance and skirmishing demanded great skill and versatility. To obtain the men best suited to these roles, it is likely that Phokas and his officers sought out the horsemen known as *tasinarioi* or *trapezitai* along the eastern frontiers. They were of mixed Greek, Armenian, or Arab stock selected for their vigor and courage from the frontiersmen (*akritai*) for whom raids and brigandage were a way of life.³⁸ The *tasinarioi*/*trapezitai* are described by Phokas in the *De velitatione* as small detachments of scouts and raiders who penetrated into enemy territory to ravage the countryside and seize captives for interrogation (DV II.¹⁵⁻²⁴). The skills developed in these pursuits naturally lent themselves to light cavalry warfare, while the men appointed to lead these bands of horsemen were well acquainted with the roads and terrain of Cilicia and Syria. It is also evident from the *De velitatione* that the *tasinarioi*/*trapezitai* were registered on the military lists (ἐν ματρικίοις), and hence could be summoned to the *adnoumion* to provide the army with the light cavalrymen it required.

2. *The regular cavalry.* Whereas the recently enhanced role of infantry and heavy cavalry had made a detailed exposition of their organization and equipment necessary, neither the *Praecepta* nor the other handbooks have a great deal to say about the organization and equipment of the regular cavalrymen. This brevity should be taken as a sign that these subjects were familiar enough not to require extensive treatment.

As did the *prokoursatores*, the regular cavalrymen wore waist-length *klibania* or *lorikia*. They wore iron helmets, and carried shields measuring four to five *spithamai* (93.6 cm-1.27 m), smaller than those carried by the heavy infantrymen (PM IV.³⁶⁻³⁹). Phokas does not specify the shape of the cavalryman's shield in the *Praecepta*, but illustrations of Byzantine horsemen show them carrying shields of several types, whether round, oval, or kite-shaped.³⁹

³⁸ Dagron, *Le traité*, 245-57; see also A. Pertusi, "Tra storia e leggenda: Akritai e ghâzi sulla frontiera orientale di Bisanzio," in *Actes du XIV^e Congrès international des études byzantines*, I (Bucharest, 1974), 237-83.

³⁹ See Koliass' discussion (cited in note 20, above); A. Grabar and M. Manoussacas, *L'illustration du manuscrit de Skylitzès de la Bibliothèque Nationale de Madrid* (Venice, 1979), pls. xvii, xxxv, xl, and figs. 259, 264.



5. Byzantine cavalrymen; note the *klibania* and helmets

The regular cavalrymen fought primarily as lancers (κονταράτοι) or as mounted archers. Phokas does not give the length of the lance, nor does the *Praecepta* indicate how Byzantine cavalrymen wielded their lances in combat; but it is most probable that they carried their shields with their left arms, controlling the reins with their left hands, and held their lances in their right hands either at waist level for an underhand thrust, or at shoulder level for an overhand thrust. So handled, the lance functioned not as an impact but as a fencing and jabbing weapon for horsemen engaged in combat against other horsemen, or in riding down and striking at fleeing foot soldiers.⁴⁰ In this connection it is worth noting that the impact weapons of Byzantine cavalrymen in this period were swords and maces (PM IV.¹⁰⁻¹¹).

Approximately forty percent of the cavalrymen were mounted archers. The compiler of the *Sylloge* (39.4) records the length of the cavalry bow as fifteen to sixteen *palaistai* (1.17-1.25 m) and comments that it was "much reduced in force." These details, brief as they are, indicate that for easier handling the cavalry bow was smaller and less tightly strung than the bow used by infantrymen.

⁴⁰ See Coulston's comments on the use of the lance in "Roman, Parthian, and Sassanid Tactical Developments."


Phokas offers no further information on the equipment of his mounted archers, however, and we are left to surmise on the basis of the *Sylloge* that they carried forty to fifty arrows in a single quiver (*ST* 39.4).

3. *The kataphraktoi*. The poem composed by al-Mutanabbi to commemorate Sayf al-Dawla's triumph over Bardas Phokas at the battle of Hadat records the Arabs' amazement at the sight of the cavalymen "who advanced on horses which seemed to have no legs" and whose "helmets and garments were of iron like their swords." This picturesque description heralds the most significant development in the Byzantine army of the tenth century—the revival of the heavy cavalymen known as the *kataphraktoi*.

The Byzantine *kataphraktoi* were the descendants of the armored cavalymen who formed the dominant element in the armies of the Parthian and Sassanian empires long before being adopted by the Romans in the third century A.D. The term *kataphraktos* comes from the Greek verb καταφράσσω, "enclose," or "wall up," which along with the other terms applied to these soldiers—*clibanarii* ("boiler boys") and πανσίδηροι ἵπποται ("ironclad horsemen")—conveys the image of a warrior encased in armor and mounted on a horse covered by a carapace. A famous third-century graffito from Dura Europos depicts the composite armor worn by this type of horseman. The rider is shown wearing a conical helmet with pieces of chain mail hanging down over his face and neck, a mail corslet supplemented by lamellar armor over his torso, and padded armguards and leg-guards; his horse is shown draped in a carapace of scale armor reaching to its knees.⁴¹

The Byzantine *kataphraktoi* of the tenth century were by far the best equipped soldiers in the army. In contrast to the lowly infantrymen from the frontier zones with their "ersatz" felt tunics and padded headgear, the *kataphraktoi* of the imperial *tagmata* wore body armor of lamellar or mail and iron helmets (*PM* III.²⁵⁻³⁷). Phokas begins his review of their equipment by stating that each man was to wear a *klibanion*. To this waist-length corslet sleeves were attached at the shoulders to cover the upper arm down to the elbows. To protect their hands and forearms they wore combined gauntlets and armguards

⁴¹On the *kataphraktoi/clibanarii* in Persian, Roman, and early Byzantine armies, see P. Brown, *The World of Late Antiquity* (London, 1971), 160–71; Bivar, "Cavalry Equipment" (with illustrations); H. von Gall, *Das Reiterkampfbild in der iranischen und iranisch beeinflussten Kunst parthischer und sassanidischer Zeit* (Berlin, 1990) (with illustrations); J. R. Eadie, "The Development of Roman Mailed Cavalry," *JRS* 57 (1967), 161–73; O. Gamber, "Kataphrakten, Clibanarier, Normannenreiter," *Jahrbuch der kunsthistorischen Sammlungen in Wien* 64 (1968), 7–44; J. M. Diethart and P. Dintsis, "Die Leontoklibanarier: Versuch einer archäologisch-papyrologischen Zusammenschau," in *BYZANTIOΣ: Festschrift für H. Hunger zum 70. Geburtstag* (Vienna, 1984), 67–84.



6. Graffito of a *clibanarius* from Dura Europos (third century A.D.)

(μανικέλια) made from pieces of coarse silk or cotton as thick as could be stitched together.⁴² At this point in his discussion, Phokas uses two terms of which the meaning is not entirely clear. The first, *zabai*, is usually taken to mean sections of chain mail, or plates of leather or horn, which the *kataphraktoi* wore over their armguards for additional protection.⁴³ The second term, *kremasmata* (literally, "hanging pieces"), has been interpreted by Schreiner as skirt- or apron-like coverings which protected the wearer from the waist to the knees,

⁴²See above, p. 69.

⁴³See above, p. 70.

whereas Kolias identifies them with the felt coverings (καβάδια) that the mounted archers hung from their belts to cover their legs and part of their horses (*PM* III.⁶⁷⁻⁶⁹).⁴⁴ The *kremasmata* too were to be reinforced with pieces of mail. Over their corslets the *kataphraktoi* wore sleeveless padded surcoats (ἐπιλώρικα) made of coarse silk or cotton,⁴⁵ a combination which furnished the horseman with protection against penetrative and concussive blows.

The body armor worn by the *kataphraktoi* thus consisted of a corslet to which various pieces were added. Two observations are in order concerning this composite armor: first, that it was necessary for sake of comfort in a hot climate, since it allowed the horseman to wear part of his armor on the march and add the rest just before going into battle. Second, it allowed for greater tactical diversity, since by wearing some or all of his equipment a horseman could serve in a variety of roles. The use of *kataphraktoi* primarily against massed infantry dictated the heavy armor and weapons with which they were equipped, but it is also apparent that the *kataphraktoi* might also leave most of their armor with the baggage train to participate in raids as light cavalymen (*TNO* 63.²⁹⁻³²).

To protect their heads, necks, and faces, the *kataphraktoi* wore strong iron helmets from which strips of mail two or three layers thick were attached (*PM* III.³⁴⁻³⁷).⁴⁶ With their heads and faces so covered, only their eyes showed through—an effect which certainly must have contributed to their imposing appearance. Greaves (χαλκότουβα) completed their protective equipment.⁴⁷

The horses on which the *kataphraktoi* rode into battle were also covered in armor. Phokas prescribes two kinds of carapaces (*PM* III.³⁷⁻⁴⁵). One was made from quilted felt (κεντούκλων) or pieces of boiled leather fastened together (νεύρων κεκολλημένων) and covered the horse's face (except for the eyes and nostrils) and its body down to the knees. The other was made of bison hides (βουβαλείων βυσσών) and likewise covered the animal's body and legs down to the knees. From the horse's shoulders down the carapace was split to allow the legs to move freely.⁴⁸

The weapons prescribed for the *kataphraktoi* were designed for use in combat at close quarters (*PM* III.⁵³⁻⁶⁰). Most carried an iron mace (σιδηροράβδιον) as their main weapon; the type recommended was made entirely of iron with a

⁴⁴ See above, pp. 69–70.

⁴⁵ Note the terms κλιβανοφόροι and ἐπιλωρικοφόροι used in reference to the *kataphraktoi* in Phokas' decree on the soldiers' properties: *JGR* I, 256.⁹⁻¹⁰.

⁴⁶ See the illustrations of helmets with chain mail covering the wearer's face in von Gall, *Reiterkampfbild*, Tafel 16.

⁴⁷ Kolias, *Waffen*, 70–74.

⁴⁸ On late Roman horse armor, see M. C. Bishop and J. C. Coulston, *Roman Military Equipment* (London, 1993), 157–59 (with illustrations).

sharply cornered iron head (three-, four-, or six-cornered).⁴⁹ Others carried a curved, single-edged sword (the παραμήριον) as their main weapon.⁵⁰ Since these weapons were liable to be broken or lost in the clash of battle, Phokas issued further instructions that all the *kataphraktoi* were to have swords (σαθία, double-edged as opposed to the *paramerion*) and carry extra maces attached to their belts or saddles.

Although the *kataphraktoi* represented the elite of the army, it must be remembered that the proportion of such well-armed men to the rest of the soldiery was very low. The numbers cited in the *Praecepta* indicate that an army of approximately twenty-five thousand men contained no more than five or six hundred *kataphraktoi*. The formation which Phokas recommends for the *kataphraktoi* required 504 men, of whom 150 were to be mounted archers, while a smaller version comprised 384 men, eighty of whom were archers (*PM* III.⁴⁶⁻⁵³). Not only do these passages put the total of true *kataphraktoi* at 300 to 350, Phokas also suggests that to compensate for a shortage of heavy cavalymen the inner ranks of their formation might have to be filled with lancers (*PM* III.⁶⁹⁻⁷²). A rough but fair estimate would be that the *kataphraktoi* thus counted for less than 5 percent of the army's strength.

Training

Once the soldiers had been selected and equipped, the final stage in preparing for an expedition was training the army in all aspects of campaigning, including the conduct of battle, the line of march, and the preparation of temporary encampments. Of interest here are the methods used to train the army for battle.

Training for battle took place in three stages, of which the first involved instructing the soldiers in the use of their weapons. Descriptions of military training in Leo the Deacon's history record that Phokas and Tzimiskes drilled their men in the handling of the lance, spear, sword, and bow; equestrian exercises are also mentioned.⁵¹ The initial emphasis on individual skills is evident from the steps which Phokas lists for training the heavy infantrymen: "... then train them properly to use their shields . . . to maneuver with their spears, to defend themselves capably, and to fight against infantrymen with the same skills as theirs" (*PM* I.³⁻⁷).

⁴⁹ Kolias, *Waffen*, 173–85.

⁵⁰ See above, p. 71.

⁵¹ Military training: Leo diac. 16.¹⁹⁻²¹, 17.⁵⁻⁷, 36.²⁻¹², 51.⁶⁻¹⁰, 54.³⁻⁴, 56.²¹⁻²², 78.¹⁹⁻²¹ (Phokas); 108.¹¹⁻¹², 111.⁷⁻¹², 127.¹⁶⁻¹⁹ (Tzimiskes).

The second stage saw each unit rehearse the deployment and maneuvers it would employ in battle. In his discussion of infantry tactics, Phokas outlines a maneuver by which the foot soldiers stationed in the rear lines of their formation moved forward to bolster the front lines against attacking cavalry (*PM* I.¹⁰⁷⁻¹¹⁴; see below, pp. 268-69); they were to perform this maneuver "at the signals which they have been taught in training exercises (ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίοις)." Another maneuver to be perfected in training was the orderly retirement of the *prokoursatores* in two units through the first line of the cavalry force during the opening stages of an engagement (*PM* IV.⁹⁶⁻¹⁰⁶; see below, pp. 303-5). It was the responsibility of the leader of the *prokoursatores* to plan and practice this maneuver beforehand with his entire contingent (τοῦτο δὲ προμεμελετημένον καὶ διατετυπωμένον); and the rehearsal of the *prokoursatores* in this battle tactic is surely typical of the separate training which all soldiers with specialized roles, such as the *menavlatoi* and the *kataphraktoi*, would have received in training.⁵²

Finally, the army as a whole was trained for battle by simulating the conditions and situations which they were likely to face in combat. The use of simulated combat to train armies had long been recommended in the treatises and is attested in the training of Phokas' armies,⁵³ but the best description of "the habituation of the army to war" is found in Theophanes' account of the emperor Herakleios' preparations for his campaign against the Persians in 622:⁵⁴

Once more he equipped his host for military exercises and set up two armed contingents. There were trumpet calls and ranks of shields, and the host stood armed for battle. When the two formations were securely arrayed, he bade them join battle with one another and violent clashes and encounters ensued between them, and the spectacle of a battle appeared. One could witness a dreadful sight yet without fear of real danger, the convergence of men bent on slaughter but without actual bloodshed, and the means of force before its real application, so that every man gaining his initiation from the dangerless butchery would remain the more steadfast.

⁵²The *Strategikon* of Maurice (VI.1-5) outlines drills that the different units of the cavalry force might use for training in their particular roles.

⁵³Leo the Deacon (63.^{13-64.1}) describes an incident where Phokas commanded some of his cavalymen to put on a display of combat in the Hippodrome; divided into two sides they were to "go against each other in sport and in this way train for battle." The spectators were unused to the sight of these exercises and in their panic at the simulated attacks suffered considerable loss of life, "an event which became a cause of great hatred among the citizens of Constantinople towards the emperor."

⁵⁴Theophanes 304.³⁻¹¹.

In the case of Phokas' armies, exercises in simulated combat would have followed the patterns of the two battle paradigms laid out in the *Praecepta*. By rehearsing each of the scenarios, all the units of the army could practice and coordinate their routines in a series of tactical situations ranging from skirmishes to general engagements.

The descriptions in the sources of the rigorous and methodical training to which Nikephoros Phokas and John Tzimiskes subjected their armies point to the main reason for the great success of these commanders. At the same time, these descriptions draw attention to soldiers whose considerable presence and role in Byzantine field armies are seldom recognized. These are the warriors in the private service of military magnates, who themselves were coming to form a distinctly military aristocracy during the tenth century.

Forming a large part of the aristocratic household (*oikos*) in its extended sense were soldiers bound to their master by ties of kinship or personal service.⁵⁵ Among these military retainers, the diligent cultivation of martial prowess through military exercises and the related pursuits of horsemanship and hunting was both a way of life and a means of advancement. Equestrian skills, so vital in a tactical system dependent on cavalry for mobility and striking power, could win a man fame, as in the case of Philorais, a guardsman (ὑπασπιστής) of the *magistros* Romanos Mosele:⁵⁶

About this time [ca. 962] there appeared a man by the name of Philorais . . . this man, on a very swift horse, stood upright on the saddle holding a sword in his hands, and while his horse ran as fast as it could, he made his way around the circuit of the Hippodrome twirling his sword up and down without losing his balance.

Horsemanship was but one of the skills mastered by the men in these military circles. The full repertoire of athletic and martial abilities appears in Leo the Deacon's portrait of John Tzimiskes:⁵⁷

He was this way in appearance. He had a fair complexion with a ruddy aspect, blond hair, and a cheerful demeanor. His eyes were manly and

⁵⁵On these military retinues in the tenth century, see H.-G. Beck, *Byzantinisches Gefolgschaftswesen* (Munich, 1965); P. Magdalino, "The Byzantine Aristocratic *Oikos*," in *The Byzantine Aristocracy, IX-XIII Centuries*, ed. M. Angold, BAR International Series 221 (Oxford, 1984), 92-111; and K. Inoue, "A Provincial Aristocratic *oikos* in 11th-Century Byzantium," *GRBS* 30 (1989), 545-67.

⁵⁶Skyl. 251.⁸⁷⁻⁹².

⁵⁷Leo diac. 96.^{16-97.22}.



7. Philorais displays his equestrian skills in the Hippodrome

bright. He had a small, well-proportioned nose. His cheeks were tawny and evenly proportioned, squareset, while his jaw was nicely tapered and full. He was short in stature, although very broadchested, and he was also broad across the back. He possessed the strength of a giant and was well coordinated, a man who stood unrivaled in might. A heroic spirit reigned within him, fearless and unshakable, a spirit of excessive daring displayed in such a short frame. He was not afraid to attack a whole body of the enemy by himself, killing many of them before returning with great dash to his own formation without suffering a scratch. In agility, in games with balls [polo], jousting and shooting the bow, he towered over all men of his generation. The story goes that setting four horses side by side, he could vault over them from one side to the other and land on the ground light as a bird. Loosing an arrow, he was so much on the mark that he could send an arrow through a finger ring. To this extent he surpassed the islander, so vaunted by Homer, who shot the arrow through the axeheads. He used to place a leather ball at the bottom of a glass bowl, and then, spurring his horse to a great speed, he struck the ball and made it leap up and fly through the

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air; the glass bowl he left undisturbed lying in its place. He was very generous and the most munificent of all men.

Leo's portrayal of John Tzimiskes as the consummate athlete and warrior displays the ideals of the military aristocracy and its attendant circles of kinsmen, householders, and guardsmen. Their equestrian and martial skills, which commanded admiration among friend and foe alike,⁵⁸ found their ultimate expression and purpose on the field of battle. Leo the Deacon records the intensive training through which Nikephoros Phokas put his own attendants and householders (θεραπευτικὸν καὶ οἰκίδιον) and the reasons for this:⁵⁹

He spent the winter in Constantinople partaking in equestrian contests and all sorts of spectacles . . . the attendants and householders who accompanied him he trained in daily exercises as thoroughly as possible in the arts of war, to draw the bow flawlessly, to bring the arrow back to the chest and shoot directly at the target; to brandish their lances and wield them easily from side to side; to swing their swords unerringly through the air; and to spring nimbly upon their horses, so that in time of battle they would not prove inferior to the foe, since they were the ones who had to bear the brunt of battle and stand fast in formation.

A select body of householders and retainers thus served as its commander's escort and provided an elite force whose loyalty and battleworthiness ensured him of at least one reliable contingent. In this light it is tempting to suggest that when John Tzimiskes created the *tagma* of the *Athanatoi* ("Immortals") in 970, he filled its ranks with the soldiers of his own retinue—a body of men similar to Phokas' householders described in the passage above—since he had need of a select force in the impending struggle against the Russians.⁶⁰ This *tagma*, which served as his bodyguard on campaign and distinguished itself in the Balkan wars, also shielded Tzimiskes against the vengeful kinsmen of the murdered Phokas.

In battle, these private contingents were held in reserve with the commander until called upon to exploit a favorable opportunity or to intervene in support of the units already engaged in combat. But we most often hear of these

⁵⁸ As shown in the chivalrous display of martial and equestrian skills between John Tzimiskes and the Turkish emir of Damascus, Alptekin, in 975; Canard, "Sources arabes," 295–96.

⁵⁹ Leo diac. 50.21–51.5.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 107.11–13, 132.15–19; see also Kühn, *Armee*, 243–46.

personal retainers intervening to save their leader from death or capture when the rest of his forces had fled, a role which best displays the personal bonds of loyalty between a leader and his retinue. Skylitzes records that in one battle (not identified but probably Hadat in 954), Bardas Phokas would have been captured "had not his attendants formed a wall of shields (συνασπίσαντες οἱ θεράποντες) and saved him from captivity."⁶¹ Similarly, after most of the army had broken and fled in a battle against the Patzinaks in 1049, Katakalon Kekaumenos stood firm with his own attendants (μετὰ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ στάς θεραπόντων) and a handful of kinsmen (καὶ τινῶν συγγενῶν ὀλιγοστών), fighting on until all around him had fallen and he was nearly dead of his wounds himself.⁶²

Together with the units of the *tagmata*, the contingents of private retainers formed a well-equipped, solid core of troops with the discipline and skill to perform the most important tasks in battle. They also show that the army did not operate solely along the hierarchical chain of command so carefully defined in the *taktika* and the lists of precedence. We have seen the emphasis on kinship and friendship in assigning soldiers to their units, but these ties loom even larger among the foremost leaders and their retainers. Much more than the chain of command, the sinews of kinship, dependence, and personal loyalty bound them together as a crack fighting force.

⁶¹ Skyl. 241.9-12.

⁶² Ibid., 469.43-45.

*Six years I held the God-guided reins of state
And for as many years I restrained the warring spirit of the Scyths,
I forced the towns of the Assyrians to yield, and the Phoenicians all,
I brought impregnable Tarsos beneath the yoke,
I swept the islands clean, I drove out the barbarian foe
In spacious Crete and splendid Cyprus.
East and West cowered before my threats,
The abundant Nile, and rugged Libya.
And yet I fell within the depths of the palace, the hands of
A feeble woman I could not evade, alas.
There was a city, an army, and a double wall within,
But, in truth, nothing is weaker than mortal man.*

John Geometres, *On the Lord emperor Nikephoros*,
PG 106, 927A

*Aye, the sword struck off my head, out of the dark
The ruler seized his kingdom with a murderous hand.
But why the malice against unfeeling portraits, to tear them down?
One would allow Phalaris, one would allow Echetos his fury,
But who in his spite could destroy the monuments of my victories,
Spacious Crete and splendid Cyprus,
Impregnable Tarsos, the fallen citadels of the Cilicians,
The walls of Antioch, the towns of the Assyrians,
The Persians, the Phoenicians, the Arabs? The myriad peoples of the earth
All yielded to my brandished spear.
Who could diminish these? Tear down the portraits on the walls,
My mark in lands and hearts endures nonetheless.*

John Geometres, *The late Lord emperor Nikephoros'*
response to the destruction of his portraits,
PG 106, 932B



8. The inhabitants of Tarsos surrender the city to Nikephoros Phokas

THE OFFSPRING OF HAGAR

[A fundamental principle of the Byzantine conduct of war was that attention and adaptation to enemy tactics and characteristics were essential to success in arms.] The flexibility of Byzantine strategy was best expressed by the author of the *Strategikon* of Maurice in the preamble to his survey of the empire's enemies:¹

... it is necessary to go over the tactics and characteristics of each nation threatening the empire so as to enable those intending to wage war against them to adapt themselves appropriately. For not all nations fight in one formation and with the same methods so that one can deal with them all in the same way; some, owing to limitless audacity, are guided more by a rash spirit, while others attack their foes with cunning and in good order.

The words on which this declaration turns—"adapt themselves appropriately" (ικανῶς ἀρμόζεσθαι)—epitomize the Byzantines' willingness to adjust their tactics to counter the methods and skills of a particular foe. It will be the purpose of this chapter to examine the Muslim armies that the Byzantines confronted in the course of their incursions into Cilicia and northern Syria and to single out the strengths of these armies that influenced the Byzantine tactics prescribed by Phokas in the *Praecepta*.

The premise of this chapter—that the tactics of Phokas' armies were designed with a particular enemy in mind—requires justification, however, since it is by no means obvious from the treatise itself exactly who the enemy is. To

¹ *SM* XI, praef.⁶⁻¹². The chapter on foreign peoples in the *Strategikon* has been analysed by J. Wiita, "The Ethnika in Byzantine Military Treatises," Ph.D. dissertation (University of Minnesota, 1977). On the descriptions of foreign peoples in this and other treatises, see G. Dagron, "Ceux d'en face: les peuples étrangers dans les traités militaires byzantins," *TM* 10 (1987), 207-32; idem, "Byzance et le modèle islamique au X^e siècle," *CRAI* (Paris, 1983), 219-43.


identify the adversary against whom Phokas' armies matched their strength and to explain the remote image of the enemy in the treatise, it is first necessary to review the historical background and place the *Praecepta* in the context of the wars along the eastern frontiers.

The Byzantine-Hamdanid Wars and the *Praecepta militaria*

The restoration of Constantine VII in 945 and his elevation of the Phokas family to the highest levels of military command in the east coincide with the establishment of the Hamdanid dynasty of Aleppo under its famous emir Ali ibn Hamdan, better known as Sayf al-Dawla ("Sword of the Dynasty").² He was the younger of two sons of the emir of Mosul, Abulhayja Abdullah ibn Hamdan, who died in 929. During the 930s the elder son, al-Hasan (later known as Nasir al-Dawla or "Defender of the Dynasty"), strove to gain control of Mosul and the surrounding territories and eventually created the Hamdanid emirate of Mosul in 944. The same year his brother Sayf al-Dawla seized Aleppo, and after a three-year struggle against the Ikhshidites of Egypt—then nominal masters of Syria—and a number of rivals including local Bedouin tribes, he consolidated his hold over an emirate embracing Syria and the frontier zones bordering the Byzantine Empire from Cilicia in the southwest to the regions of the Diyar Bakr in the northeast (see Map 1 and below).

Between 947 and 967, the year of his death, Sayf al-Dawla was the Byzantines' archenemy in the east. In the late 930s he had already furnished proof of his military ability while fighting in his brother's service against John Kourkouas along the upper Euphrates, but once having established his own capital at Aleppo, Sayf al-Dawla took up the brunt of the struggle against the Byzantines as they continued to encroach upon the Syro-Mesopotamian frontiers. By dint of his considerable prowess and a heroic aura promoted by a brilliant circle of court poets, he gave new life to the war against the infidel by leading yearly raids into Byzantine territory, which, as in the campaigns of 953 and 956, were crowned with success and greatly enhanced his prestige. He also recorded some memorable triumphs against the massive armies that began to appear in the mid 950s, as at Hadat in 954, but in the years following the replacement of the

²The standard work on the Hamdanids is that of M. Canard, *Hamdanides*. The religious and ideological overtones of the struggle between Christian Byzantium and the "impious Hamdan" are sounded in two rhetorical works of Constantine VII: see R. Vári, "Zum historischen Excerptenwerke des Konstantinos Porphyrogenetos," *BZ* 17 (1908), 75–85, and H. Ahrweiler, "Un discours inédit de Constantin VII Porphyrogénète," *TM* 2 (1967), 393–404.



Map 1. The eastern frontiers of the Byzantine Empire (Cilicia and northern Syria), ca. 950

hapless Bardas Phokas by his son Nikephoros in 955, Sayf al-Dawla's star began to wane. His dominions steadily eroded before the relentless waves of Byzantine invaders who between 962 and 965 isolated and captured the principal strongholds of Cilicia (Adana, Mopsuestia, and Tarsos) and then went on to seize control of northern Syria. In his 966 campaign Phokas' armies roamed freely between Aleppo and Antioch; he arrogantly rebuffed Sayf al-Dawla's desperate offer of tribute by naming half of Syria as his price for a truce with the Hamdanids. The death of the Hamdanid emir the next year was soon followed by the fall of Antioch in 969 and the reduction of his successors at Aleppo to vassals of the Byzantine Empire. During the last three decades of the tenth century the once mighty Hamdanid dynasty of Aleppo was but a pawn in the greater conflict between the Byzantines and the new Muslim power in the east, the Fatimids of Cairo.

The Byzantine-Hamdanid wars thus fall into two distinct stages. The first saw the Byzantines largely on the defensive against Sayf al-Dawla's incursions, the second saw them unleash their great offensives, which ultimately broke the power of their adversary. Set against this background, Phokas' two treatises form a sort of diptych, in which the *De velitatione* records the guerrilla tactics employed during the first phase of these wars when Hamdanid forces made annual raids into Byzantine territory, while the *Praecepta* sets forth the field tactics used in the second phase, when the Byzantines took the offensive and embarked on the conquest of Cilicia and northern Syria.

It is this opposition between the recent past and the immediate present in Phokas' two treatises that explains the virtual absence of references to the enemy by name or to the theater of operations in the *Praecepta*. Phokas identifies the main enemy as the Arabs exactly once in the treatise (*Agarenoi*, and that in an aside: *PM* I.⁷³⁻⁷⁴) and refers to their Bedouin auxiliaries in three passages (*PM* II.^{101-111, 126-129, IV.¹⁸⁰⁻¹⁸⁹); he makes no mention, however, of contemporary places, routes, individuals, or events. The *Praecepta* stands in sharp contrast to the amply detailed *De velitatione*, in which the enemy is precisely identified (Sayf al-Dawla is mentioned by name three times) and a number of historical examples and geographical indications are cited to show how the tactics recorded in the treatise were put to use by the soldiers of the frontier zones as they bravely defended the Christian realm against its Muslim adversaries. But whereas Phokas wrote the *Praecepta* for contemporary commanders familiar with the enemy and the lands in which they would be campaigning, the anonymous editor of the *De velitatione* rewrote the treatise in its official version when the times and conditions it portrays were already passing into history and legend in the wake of the Byzantine conquests in the east. By setting the guerrilla tactics perfected by the Phokades and their kinsmen in their precise historical and geographical}

context, the anonymous editor preserved the memory of the wars and warriors of the eastern frontiers for succeeding generations unacquainted with the places, people, and events involved.³ The two treatises under Phokas' name then, differ not only in presentation and style, but also in their proximity to the military situation to which they apply. It is fair to speculate that had the *Praecepta* been rewritten in an official version, as was the *De velitatione*, such a version would have been similarly dressed with the historical and geographical backdrop and cast of characters necessary for the understanding of the treatise by later readers.

It will be recalled from Chapter I that one of Dagron's criteria determining the relative modernity of a military treatise was the description of the enemy. Ironically, in the case of the *Praecepta*, the opaque view of the enemy must be taken as a sign that the treatise is firmly riveted to the immediate present. There is no doubt, however, that Phokas' knowledge and anticipation of enemy tactics guided his thinking as he wrote the *Praecepta*. His prescriptions for his soldiers' equipment and tactics were governed by what he expected the enemy to do in battle (cf. *PM* I.⁹⁷⁻¹⁰⁶) and he emphasized the need for an accurate assessment of their numbers and equipment before meeting them in the open field (*PM* IV.¹⁹²⁻¹⁹⁵). But where his familiarity with the enemy blurs our view of them in the *Praecepta*, consultation of sources and studies available in Western languages will bring the Hamdanid armies into clearer focus and enable us to gain some picture of the enemy whom Phokas and his commanders knew so well.

Hamdanid Armies

Phokas' single reference in the *Praecepta* to the enemy as the "offspring of Hagar" applies broadly to the Muslim forces in Cilicia and northern Syria under the authority of the Hamdanid dynasty of Aleppo. His description in the *De velitatione* of the large field armies mustered by the Hamdanids for their expeditions into Byzantine lands gives a more detailed portrait of the armies that he had grown accustomed to seeing:⁴

On receiving word that a large expeditionary force is ready and under way, at the time when these large expeditionary forces most often tended to assemble, namely in the month of August—for that was the time when hordes from Egypt, Palestine, Phoenicia and central Syria made their way

³ Dagron, *Le traité*, 161-71.

⁴ Cf. *DV* VII.³⁻⁸, and Dagron's comments in *Le traité*, 179-81.

up to Cilicia and the regions of Antioch and Aleppo and, taking along Bedouin Arabs, they would proceed in September against the Byzantines . . .

Any large Hamdanid army was thus a composite force that drew most of its manpower from the Muslim frontier districts (*al-thughur*) skirting the easternmost reaches of the Byzantine Empire; but the soldiers, local and transient, who gathered in the *thughur* were reinforced by contingents of foreign mercenaries and Bedouin auxiliaries who provided these armies with infantrymen and cavalrymen whose talents suited them to particular roles. These three principal elements in Hamdanid field armies—the forces of the *thughur*, foreign mercenaries, and the Bedouin—will be taken singly to discern the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy that Phokas prepared his soldiers to meet.

The forces of the *thughur*

The bulk of Hamdanid military strength lay in the towns and populations of the Muslim frontier districts (*al-thughur*, *al-awasim*) that formed the bulwark between the Byzantine Empire and the central provinces of the Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad. The frontier districts had been in existence for nearly two centuries by the time Sayf al-Dawla established his Hamdanid emirate at Aleppo in 944, the last of the regional dynasties to wield control over the *thughur*; these districts in turn, particularly the most important military and commercial centers within them, were the primary targets of the Byzantine offensives led by Nikephoros Phokas and his lieutenants. Since the *thughur* have been well covered by previous scholars,⁵ it will suffice here to review their work in a brief account of the history and the military system of these regions.

The frontier zones were the creation of the early Abbasid caliphs who sought to populate and fortify the regions bordering the Byzantine Empire on a southwest to northeast axis from the Cilician plain as far as the Armenian principalities. Continuing the efforts of his predecessors, the caliph Harun al-Rashid (786–809) gave these regions their final form by dividing the Syro-Mesopotamian frontier into two large districts. One, called *al-Sham*, embraced Cilicia and northern Syria, the other, *al-Jazira*, the areas lying to the northeast. Each of these two districts was subsequently divided into two zones. Those im-

⁵M. D. Bonner, "The Emergence of the Thughur: The Arab-Byzantine Frontier in the Early Abbasid Age," Ph.D. dissertation (Princeton University, 1987); P. von Sivers, "Taxes and Trade in the Abbasid *thughur*, 750–962/133–351," *JESHO* 25 (1982), 71–99; Haldon and Kennedy, "Arab-Byzantine Frontier"; Dagron, *Le traité*, 149–53.

mediately adjacent to Byzantine territory were called *al-thughur* ("clefs"); those lying to the interior were called *al-awasim* ("protectors"). During the eighth century, the principal towns of the *thughur*—Mopsuestia, Adana, and Tarsos in Cilicia, Marash (Germanikeia) and Hadat in northern Syria, Malatya (Meli-tene) in the *Jazira*—and a number of smaller fortresses and outposts were built (or rebuilt) and populated by soldiers (many of them from Khorasan in north-east Iran) or other settlers brought in from various parts of the Abbasid dominions. The soldiers settled in the *thughur* received salaries from the central government along with small plots of land, while the costs of the volunteers who streamed into the *thughur* to take part in expeditions were supported by private donations (*waqf*).⁶

The *thughur* were predominantly urban in character and military in purpose.⁷ Originally conceived as the bases from which the final conquest of Byzantium could be undertaken, the *thughur* came to form the buffer zone between the Byzantine and Abbasid empires once the Abbasids had to all practical purposes given up the dream of capturing Constantinople. The towns, forts, and outposts built throughout the *thughur* formed the barrier against Byzantine aggression and shielded the Euphrates-Mediterranean trade route that passed through Aleppo to Antioch, the military and commercial hub of Syria. Equally importantly, however, during the ninth and tenth centuries the larger towns of the *thughur* were the points of assembly for seasonal raids into Byzantine territory that netted plunder and prisoners for the participants and nourished the spirit of holy war against the Christian infidel.

"Impregnable Tarsos" was the capital of Cilicia and is the best described of the towns in the *thughur* that anchored the defenses of the region and served as bases for campaigns into Byzantine lands.⁸ Both Byzantine and Arab ac-

⁶The organization of the *thughur* and the payment of the soldiers settled there are discussed by Haldon and Kennedy, "Arab-Byzantine Frontier," 106–110, and von Sivers, "Taxes and Trade," 74–81. The institution of the *waqf* is discussed by C. Cahen, "Réflexions sur le *waqf* ancien," in *Les peuples musulmans dans l'histoire médiévale* (Damascus, 1977), 287–306.

⁷Many towns did become centers of local trade and commerce; see Ibn Hauqal's description of Syria in *Configuration de la terre*, 163–86; Haldon and Kennedy, "Arab-Byzantine Frontier," 107 and note 107; on the principal towns in Cilicia, see now Hild and Hellenkemper, *Kilikien*, 154–56 (Adana), 178–80 (Anazarba), 351–56 (Mopsuestia). The competition between military and commercial interests in the *thughur* is the subject of von Sivers' article "Taxes and Trade," cited in note 5 above.

⁸Hild and Hellenkemper, *Kilikien*, 428–33; C. E. Bosworth, "The City of Tarsus and the Arab-Byzantine Frontiers in Early and Middle Abbasid Times," *Oriens* 33 (1992), 268–86; M. Canard, "Quelques observations sur l'introduction géographique de la *Bughyat al-'alab* de Kamal ad-Din ibn al-'Adim d'Alep," *Annales de l'Institut d'études orientales* 15 (1957), 41–53. On Tarsiot raids into Byzantine territory, see *DV IX*,^{37–45}, *X*,^{131–141}, *XVI*,^{18–31}, and Dagron, *Le traité*, 239–45.

counts from the tenth century speak of its impressive fortifications consisting of a double wall, the innermost of which was lined with stone- and arrow-shooting instruments along the battlements, surrounded by a deep trench.⁹ Even though Tarsos lay in fertile surroundings and had become a flourishing center of trade and commerce,¹⁰ it was the thoroughly military character of the place that struck all Arab observers. One of them noted that the entire population, regardless of age, social station, or livelihood, dedicated itself to war and the military and equestrian arts.¹¹ The town supported a large garrison of soldiers reinforced by volunteers (*ghazis* or "fighters for the faith") domiciled in quarters maintained by donations from their respective provinces.¹² Donations from the caliphal family financed billets and arms storehouses for the corps of *ghulam*, or the slave soldiers who formed the army's elite units.¹³ Although the wealth and strength of Tarsos were exceptional, the mixture of regular troops, volunteers, and *ghulam* described there during the tenth century is reflective of the populations in the other towns in Cilicia, northern Syria, or the Jaziran district that furnished Sayf al-Dawla with the manpower and resources for his expeditionary armies.

"The myriad peoples of the earth"

If the local soldiers and volunteers from the towns of the *thughur* made up the body of Hamdanid armies, the contingents of foreign mercenaries and *ghulam* formed the backbone of these forces. Whereas the *thughur* have attracted the attention of scholars, however, the part played by mercenaries in Sayf al-Dawla's forces has not yet been fully appreciated. As these foreign soldiers were often specialists who performed particular roles in battle or on campaign, it is therefore worth identifying and examining the most prominent groups cited in the sources. To recognize the distinct traits and talents of each one is to recognize the real strengths of the Hamdanid armies that the Byzantines sought to defeat in the open field.

The Hamdanids were no less eager than the Byzantines to recruit foreign soldiers who offered skills and tactics that they themselves did not possess. As a result, the Byzantines were no less impressed by the foreign contingents in

⁹ Cf. Canard, "Quelques observations," 47–48; Leo diac. 29.3–30.8.

¹⁰ Canard, "Quelques observations," 47, "... l'industrie des étoffes précieuses de Tarse... qui s'exportent, les productions de *zabib* (raisin sec), l'importation, en provenance du pays byzantin, des slouguis et des faucons..."

¹¹ Canard, "Quelques observations," 46–47; 51.

¹² Haldon and Kennedy, "Arab-Byzantine Frontier," 110.

¹³ Canard, "Quelques observations," 48–49.

Hamdanid armies than al-Mutanabbi had been by the many nations in their own. An anonymous Byzantine source recounting Phokas' successful attack on Aleppo in December 962 records the presence of the following groups in the army hastily mustered by the Hamdanid emir to defend his capital against the advancing Byzantines:¹⁴

... upon reaching the aforementioned citadel, he [Nikephoros Phokas] found the Hamdanid [Sayf al-Dawla] marshaled before it with a large force, to wit, of Bedouin Arabs, Daylamites, and Kurds, the rest of the host being that assembled from the surrounding region (ἤτοι Ἀράβων, Δελεμιτῶν, Κούρτων, καὶ τοῦ λοιποῦ λαοῦ τοῦ ἐκ τῆς χώρας συναθροισθέντος).

The diverse peoples named in this passage lived on in the legends of the Byzantine-Arab clashes along the eastern frontiers. The tale of *Digenes Akritas* describes the Arab emir embarking on a raid into *Romania* with a force that included Turks, Daylami, Bedouin, and a thousand *ghulam* as his personal companions (Τούρκους καὶ Διλέμιτας, Ἀραβίτας τε ἐκλεκτούς... εἶχε καὶ τοὺς ἀγούρους του χιλίους Γουλαμίους).¹⁵

Although neither of these brief excerpts is exhaustive (Armenians, Slavs, and even Greeks are found in Muslim armies during the tenth and eleventh centuries), they do specify the peoples—Daylami, Turks, Kurds, and Bedouin—that appear to have made the deepest impression on the Byzantines. We may therefore take each group in turn and examine the role that it played not only in Hamdanid armies but also in the Fatimid armies that the Byzantines met in Syria and Palestine during the last three decades of the tenth century.

1. *The Daylami*. The Daylami were tribesmen from the highlands of northern Iran between the shores of the Caspian Sea and the Elburz mountain range.¹⁶

¹⁴ A. Markopoulos, "Le témoignage du *Vaticanus gr.* 163 pour la période entre 945–963," Σύμμεκτα 3 (1979), 83–119, here p. 99, §22.8–9; Hase also quotes this passage from the *Vaticanus gr.* in the Bonn edition of Leo the Deacon, 423–24. Canard, *Hamdanides*, 809–17, reviews the Arabic sources for the campaign and notes the surprisingly brief mention of this event in Byzantine sources.

¹⁵ Ed. J. Mavrogordato (Oxford, 1957), bk. I.45–47. The following studies have served as the basis of this section on the foreign soldiers in Hamdanid and Fatimid armies: C. E. Bosworth, "Military Organisation under the Buyids of Persia and Iraq," *Oriens* 18–19 (1965–66), 143–67; idem, "Ghaznevid Military Organisation," *Der Islam* 36 (1961), 37–77, idem, "Recruitment, Muster and Review in Medieval Islamic Armies," in V. E. Parry and M. E. Yapp, *War, Technology and Society* (London-New York, 1975), 59–77; and B. J. Beshir, "Fatimid Military Organization," *Der Islam* 55 (1978), 37–56.

¹⁶ On the history and customs of the Daylami, see Ibn Hauqal, *Configuration de la terre*, 365–75, and the article "Daylam" in *EI*².

Their rugged homelands had made them hardy warriors, patient of cold and hardship, and it was above all for their prowess as foot soldiers that their services were sought throughout the Islamic world. During the ninth century their presence as mercenaries and palace guards in the Abbasid Caliphate steadily increased, and they were widely employed in the armies of the regional dynasties that emerged out of the disintegrating Caliphate during the tenth century, one of which, the Buyids of Baghdad (946–1055), was Daylami in origin.¹⁷

Both their weapons and characteristics made a lasting impression on friend and foe alike. The Byzantines had encountered Daylami mercenaries in Persian service as early as the sixth century and singled out their distinctive traits. Prokopios, noting their independent spirit, described the Daylami (οἱ δὲ Δολομίται) as agile infantrymen armed with sword, shield, and three spears each; his contemporary Agathias also commended their independent spirit but went into greater detail on their talents as foot soldiers:¹⁸

The Daylami [οἱ δὲ Διλιμνῖται] are among the largest of the nations on the far side of the Tigris whose territory borders on Persia. They are warlike in the extreme and, unlike most of the Persians, do not fight principally with the bow and the sling. They carry spears and pikes and wear a sword slung over one shoulder. To the left arm they tie a very small dirk and they hold out shields and bucklers to protect themselves with. One could hardly describe them simply as light-armed troops, nor for that matter as the type of heavy-armed infantry that fight exclusively at close quarters. For they both discharge missiles from a distance when the occasion arises and engage in hand-to-hand fighting, and they are expert at charging an enemy phalanx and breaking its close-knit ranks with the weight of their charge. They can re-form their own ranks with ease and adapt themselves to any contingency. Even steep hills they run up without difficulty, thus seizing in advance all points of vantage, and when put to flight they escape with lightning rapidity, whereas when they are the attackers they press the pursuit with perfect timing and co-ordination. Well-versed as they are in practically every type of warfare, they inflict considerable harm on their enemies. They are accustomed for the most part to fight alongside the Persians, though not as the conscript contingents of a subject people, since they are

¹⁷ Bosworth, "Buyids," 146–59.

¹⁸ Cf. Prokopios, *Wars*, VIII.14.5–9; *Agathiae Myrinaei historiarum libri quinque*, ed. R. Keydell, CFHB 2 (Berlin, 1967), III.17.7–9 (106.²²–107.⁷). I have cited J. D. Frendo's translation (substituting "Daylami" for "Dilimnites") in *Agathias: The Histories*, CFHB 2a (New York-Berlin, 1975), 87–88.

in fact free and independent and it is not in their nature to submit to any form of compulsion.

The Daylami used the same weapons and skills as infantrymen in Muslim armies during the tenth and eleventh centuries. A Persian observer who saw Daylami foot soldiers in a review of the Fatimid army in the early eleventh century spoke of their large, colorful shields and the two-pronged spears (called *zhupins*, used for thrusting and casting) and battle axes they carried as their main weapons,¹⁹ although they were equally famed for their skill as bowmen. When moving to the attack they advanced upon the enemy behind a solid wall of shields brandishing their *zhupins* and axes, but when compelled to defend themselves they linked their large shields together and made their stand behind this rampart. They remained exclusively infantrymen and so were vulnerable against mobile enemy horsemen in the open field, but they excelled in rough, hilly terrain where cavalry could not operate. Their aptitude, indeed their preference, for fighting in mountainous regions made them a valuable asset to the Hamdanids, whose forays into Byzantine territory took them through the Taurus range, where the ability to win control of routes, passes, and high ground was vital to success.

In fortitude in battle and endurance on campaign they far exceeded other peoples, and there were times when the Daylami spearmen stood and fought to the death after their comrades had long since given way, although their unwillingness to flee was in part symptomatic of the inability of all foot soldiers to get away once their side had been defeated. The Byzantines had occasion to witness their tenacity in 953 when an entire corps of Daylami infantrymen went to their deaths in a fierce struggle against the Byzantines' own infantry specialists, the Armenians, in an attempt to clear a pass for Sayf al-Dawla,²⁰ and again in 962 when a small but resolute Daylami detachment held out against them on the citadel of Aleppo and even managed to kill the nephew of Nikephoros Phokas in the process.²¹

Episodes such as these seem to have earned the Daylami a certain notoriety among the Byzantines. Toward the end of his epic poem celebrating Phokas' capture of Crete in 961, Theodosios the Deacon boasts of the impending blow against the Hamdanids and their Daylami spearmen (τῶν Δελεμιτῶν βελεμ-

¹⁹ Bosworth, "Buyids," 149–51; Beshir, "Fatimids," 42–43.

²⁰ *Byz. Arabes* II.1, 349; Canard, *Hamdanides*, 775.

²¹ Canard, *Hamdanides*, 814–15; other sources identify this man as a relative of John Tzimiskes.

ἱπῶν),²² but his taunt nonetheless belies the Byzantines' wariness of these formidable foot soldiers. They furnished Sayf al-Dawla's armies with a stalwart defensive core, and it is difficult not to suspect that these were the soldiers uppermost in Phokas' thoughts as he laid increasing emphasis on heavy cavalry tactics during the 950s and 960s.

The reduction of the Hamdanid dynasty to a Byzantine protectorate did not rid the Byzantines of these hardened foes, however, since when the Fatimids first met the Daylami in battle in 978, they were so impressed that they eagerly recruited them into their own service. At the battle of Apamea in 998 the Byzantines were to behold a corps of Daylami infantrymen in the center of the Fatimid line.²³

2. *The Turks.* Since the fierce Daylami were foot soldiers only, the Hamdanids and Fatimids turned to other peoples when seeking skilled cavalymen for their armies. Foremost among these were the nomadic Turks from the Eurasian steppes who steadily infiltrated the armies of the Caliphate during the ninth and tenth centuries.²⁴ They were usually inducted into the elite corps of slave-soldiers (*ghulam*), an institution which initially formed the ruler's or commander's retinue but eventually came to represent the nucleus of Muslim armies during and after the tenth century.²⁵

The enlistment of Turks alongside Daylami was complicated by the enmity between the two peoples,²⁶ yet even though their mutual hatred was a continual threat to the stability of Muslim armies, the Hamdanids and Fatimids both recruited Turkish cavalymen in addition to Daylami infantrymen. Like their Daylami rivals, the Turks were renowned for their endurance. Nasir al-Dawla, the Hamdanid emir of Mosul, hired both Daylami infantry and Turkish cavalry on whom he could depend to campaign through the winter if necessary, unlike his Bedouin auxiliaries who occasionally refused to do so. But most of all the Turks were in demand for the exceptional skills they offered as mounted archers. The Byzantines could testify to the power of the Turkish mounted archers as a result of their experience at the battle of Dazimon in 838, when a Turkish de-

tachment with the Caliph al-Mutasim's army had inflicted a steady rain of arrows on them and turned the tide of battle in favor of the Arabs.²⁷ Although the tenth-century Greek sources say nothing of the Turks as horse-archers, this first punishing encounter prefigured many more during the eleventh century. The difficulty that the Turkish horse-archers posed to the Byzantines bespeaks their vulnerability to all mounted archers (Hungarians, Patzinaks), whether they met them on the eastern or western frontiers.²⁸

[Although the sources record the presence of Turks in Hamdanid armies, they say little of their number or how their particular talents were used. Since the Hamdanids did not depend on large corps of *ghulam* to the extent that other dynastic armies of the time were beginning to, the number of Turks in their service never seems to have been very high.] The five hundred *ghulam* led by Sayf al-Dawla himself in the decisive charge at Hadat probably included Turkish horsemen, but the only reference to Turkish *ghulam* in his army has them implicated in a plot (fomented by the Byzantines) against him in 957. This he suppressed by using his Daylami troops to surround the Turkish quarters and massacre or mutilate as many as 380 of them (a task they were no doubt pleased to perform), while a handful managed to get away.²⁹ It would thus appear that Sayf al-Dawla had perhaps four or five hundred Turks in his service at any one time, but their absence from the list of nations at Aleppo suggests that he did not hire them again after the abortive plot of 957. The Fatimids, however, were quick to recruit Turks after seeing them in combat, and from the late tenth century onward Fatimid armies contained a considerable Turkish element.³⁰

3. *The Kurds.* Kurdish warriors were also a common source of cavalymen throughout the medieval Islamic world, and the Byzantines had met them in Muslim armies during the ninth century.³¹ While consolidating his authority over northern Syria in the late 940s Sayf al-Dawla had been compelled to suppress a band of Kurdish brigands as well as rebellious Bedouin tribes, but he later employed the two races (singly or in combination) as light horsemen specializing in raiding and scouting. Kurds are also attested in Fatimid armies, and Ibn Qalanisi's description of the Kurdish horseman who killed the Byzantine

²² *Theodosii diaconii de Creta capta*, ed. H. Criscuolo (Leipzig, 1979), lines 938–45.

²³ Beshir, "Fatimids," 41–43; Canard, "Sources arabes," 299.

²⁴ C. E. Bosworth surveys the growing Turkish element in the armies of the Caliphate and regional dynasties during the ninth and tenth centuries in "Barbarian Incursions: The Coming of the Turks into the Islamic World," *The Medieval History of Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia* (London, 1977), art. XXIII.

²⁵ See the article "Ghulam" in *EP*; and P. Crone, *Slaves on Horses* (Cambridge, 1980).

²⁶ On Turkish-Daylami rivalry, see Bosworth, "Buyids," 153–59; idem, "Ghaznevids," 52–54; Beshir, "Fatimids," 41–43.

²⁷ *Genesios* 48.42–49.

²⁸ On the Byzantines' difficulty in coping with horse-archers, see W. E. Kaegi, "The Contribution of Archery to the Turkish Conquest of Anatolia," *Speculum* 39 (1964), 96–108.

²⁹ Canard, *Hamdanides*, 794, and note 165; *Byz. Arabes*, II.1, 361–62; von Sivers, "Taxes and Trade," 98.

³⁰ Beshir, "Fatimids," 41–43.

³¹ See the article "Kurds, Kurdistan," in *EP*; for their role in tenth-century armies, see Bosworth, "Ghaznevids," 56–57. Basil I had encountered Kurds in Arab armies in 877: *Skyl.* 143.^{12–13}.

general Damianos Dalassenos at Apamea indicates that at least some of them were very well equipped: "Un Kurde . . . monté sur un excellent cheval, couvert d'une cotte de cuir, coiffé d'un casque, tenant de la main droite une pique courte et de la main gauche ses rênes et un autre *khisht* [une sorte d'épieu ou de courte pique] . . ."³²

Other Muslim sources paint an ambiguous picture of the Kurds. Muhammad al-Mangli, a fourteenth-century soldier and military writer who looked back to the early period of the Crusades in his work, included them in a review of various peoples. His remarks on the Kurds follow a description of the Bedouin (cited below), and he likens both races with respect to their ancestral pride and shared aptitude for surprise attacks, qualities offset by a similar thirst for ill-gotten gains:³³

The Kurds resemble the Arabs, for indeed they belong to them. They too have tribal loyalty and pride of ancestry, but they possess a stability and physical strength which the Arabs do not have. They fight on foot and on horseback and they are masters of fighting at night, ambushes, and thievery as no others are. . . they have an exceptional capacity for creeping up on the enemy during the night and then making off with whatever they find among humans or livestock. It is as though stealing lay in their blood.

4. *The Bedouin.* Bedouin light horsemen regularly accompanied Hamdanid armies during the tenth century, and later played a significant role in Fatimid armies. The Bedouin tribes (Banu Kilab, Banu Numair) that dwelt in northern Syria were the descendants of the nomads who had migrated north in the wake of the Arab outbreak in the early seventh century.³⁴ Living alongside the sedentary populations in these regions they preserved not only their nomadic way of life but also the traditional Arab conduct and spirit of warfare. They also retained a fiercely independent nature, and it had taken Sayf al-Dawla three years to subject the Bedouin tribes of northern Syria to his authority.³⁵

The historical sources make only passing mention of Phokas' encounters with the Bedouin, as in 962 when they monitored his advance on Aleppo and

in 966 when he fought a series of running engagements with them during his campaign in northern Syria.³⁶ His two treatises, however, show that he was long familiar with the Bedouin and their ways. In the *De velitatione* he had noted Bedouin participation in Muslim raids into Byzantine territory, and in the *Praecepta* he paid particular attention to the tactics of these light horsemen and the measures necessary to cope with them. Calling them *Arabitai* to distinguish them from the main body of *Agarenoi*,³⁷ he predicts that these skirmishers will encircle the Byzantine square infantry formation in a swarm (ἀτάκτως), in keeping with their customary practice (ὡς ἔθος αὐτοῖς ἐστίν), relying on their swift horses to keep them out of the clutches of their pursuers (*PM* II.¹⁰⁴⁻¹¹¹). Phokas strictly forbids his soldiers from chasing after these men, "since when they are pursued they are not caught, and they quickly wheel about, aided by the speed of their horses, and strike at our men," a warning with the ring of past frustrations about it.

The great speed of the Bedouin horsemen also compelled the Byzantine cavalry to guard against their practice of coming up from behind on the units pursuing the main Arab force. As a precaution against this danger Phokas advised keeping cavalry units in reserve for the task of fending off Bedouin horsemen who might attempt to encircle or strike from behind at the Byzantine cavalrymen riding ahead in pursuit of the enemy (*PM* II.¹²⁶⁻¹²⁹; IV.¹⁸⁰⁻¹⁸⁴). Here again he insists that his cavalrymen are not to give chase to the Bedouin.

Since the Bedouin wore little or no armor and fought mainly with the lance, they quite naturally resorted to speed and surprise in combat. Reliance on swift horses was the trademark of Bedouin warfare, and the Byzantines generally conceded that the Arab horses were superior to their own.³⁸ Greater speed and mobility gave them the upper hand in skirmishing tactics, against which the Byzantines seem to have been powerless to do very much beyond maintaining formation and discipline by resisting the temptation to go after their tormentors. The *Praecepta* shows that Byzantine armies did adjust their tactics to nullify the Bedouin advantages of speed and surprise, but a later source indicates that they continued to remain a thorn in the sides of the Byzantines. The eleventh-century historian Michael Attaleiates accompanied Romanos IV Diogenes' expedition to Syria in 1068, and his firsthand observations corroborate Phokas' description of Bedouin tactics in the *Praecepta* one century before. At-

³²Canard, "Sources arabes," 299.

³³Muhammad al-Mangli was commander of the Sultan's guard in the reign of al-Ashraf Shaban and is thought to have died in 1362 or 1379. His remarks on the Franks, Greeks, Turks, Bedouin, and Kurds were translated into German by H. Ritter, "La Parure des Cavaliers und die Literatur über die ritterlichen Künste," *Der Islam* 18 (1929), 146-48. The reader is advised that the English translates Ritter's German version of the original Arabic.

³⁴On the Bedouin, see the article "Badw" in *ET*².

³⁵Canard, *Hamdanides*, 598-618.

³⁶*Ibid.*, 810-11; 825-26. On the full range of Byzantine-Bedouin relations in this period, see A. J. Cappel, "The Byzantine Response to the Arab (10th-11th Centuries)," *BF* 20 (1994), 113-32.

³⁷On the terms *Arabes*, *Arabitai*, see the linear commentary on *PM* II.¹⁰⁴ (p. 68).

³⁸Dagron, *Le traité*, 185 note 23, notes Leo VI's attention to the horses of the Arabs, "les φάρια, dont le nom est devenu synonyme de cheval de prix."

taleiates reports that during Romanos' campaign the army was subjected to constant harassment from these raiders:³⁹

... he [Romanos] beheld the Bedouin [Ἀραβας] swirling around and giving the impression that they were about to attack. But they were not so bold as to come to grips with the Byzantines and join battle, except for some skirmishing by a few who dashed forward and sped ahead of their contingent. The Byzantines proceeded in good order with rank and file while the Bedouin, accompanied by no small number of Turks, followed at a distance, acting almost as an escort or else racing around to make their presence known.

... they began to appear in scattered groups at a distance, in their customary fashion [κατὰ τὸ εἰθισμένον αὐτοῖς], and by attacking from behind or against the men out gathering provisions they did great harm to the Byzantines since they made their attacks unexpectedly on the spur of the moment and from ambush. . . .

Attaleiates likewise attributed the Bedouins' effectiveness to the speed of their horses and the confidence that they derived from this advantage. Eventually they wore down Byzantine morale to the point that Romanos decided to break camp at the onset of winter and return to Byzantine territory, "seeing that the enemy was dispersed all around, emboldened as ever by the ability of their horses to run very quickly."⁴⁰ But the Byzantines' frustration may have blinded them to a weakness in the Arab horses noted by Attaleiates, who insisted that their endurance was not great: "... for although the Arab horses can run very swiftly for a time, they do not bear up well over a long distance."⁴¹ In his view, it was the failure to appreciate this lack of stamina in the enemy horses that cost Romanos a decisive victory over the emir of Aleppo, since the Byzantines reined in their horses at the very moment when they should have pressed on with the pursuit.

A Muslim description of the Bedouin and their swirling, opportunistic manner of fighting complements the Byzantine accounts. The military writer Muhammad al-Mangli recorded the following observations on the clannish na-

³⁹ Attal. 108.¹⁶-109.³; 116.¹⁶-20.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 117.¹⁷ 18; the Byzantines were to endure further torment on the return journey when two Bedouin horsemen vaulted over the camp ditch, speared two foot soldiers, and got away before the Byzantines could react: 118.⁷ 13.

⁴¹ Ibid., 114.¹⁶-19.

ture of the Bedouin, their love of language and their calculated approach to warfare:⁴²

As for the Arabs, they have a tribal loyalty which they preserve, a pride of ancestry which forms their mainstay, and laws to which they adhere. The vein of prophecy pulses through them and they possess an eloquent manner of speech and beautiful poetry, and they take delight in elegant language. They turn to flight, leading one to believe they will not return, but then back they come again, leading one to believe they will not flee. They are like eagles who hover over their prey and swoop down as soon as the opportunity presents itself to them. They are victorious more often than they are vanquished, but their infantry is weak and their strength is fighting on horseback.

Bedouin auxiliaries were frequently the "eyes" of the commander and they provided Hamdanid and Fatimid armies with a rapid reconnaissance and strike force that the Byzantines (and other enemies) were hard pressed to match.⁴³ They were equally a threat when operating on their own, as when in July 1029 Bedouin contingents in the service of the emir of Aleppo surprised and routed the katepano of Antioch, Michael Spondyles, who had laid siege to Qaibar in northern Syria.⁴⁴ But for all their usefulness as scouts and skirmishers, the Bedouin could be just as much a headache to their allies as to the enemy since, like the Armenians in Byzantine armies, they tended to remain steadfast allies only as long as the going was good.⁴⁵ They were also notorious for their greed and insatiable desire for loot, and although they ostensibly maintained the spirit of the *djihad*, contemporary observers identified the hope of plunder as the primary motivation behind their participation in campaigns.⁴⁶

To make matters worse, they did not trouble themselves a great deal about whose side it was that they were plundering. Their voracious appetite for booty led at times to a rampant indiscipline, of which the best (or worst) example is their behavior at the battle of Apamea, where a force of one thousand light

⁴² Ritter, "Parure des Cavaliers," 147.

⁴³ Although Yahya tells the chilling story of Basil II having the hands of forty Bedouin captives cut off before sending them back to their fellows as a warning not to interfere with his advance through northern Syria in 995. This grim warning was heeded: PO 23, 442-43.

⁴⁴ Canard, "Sources arabes," 304; Felix, *Byz. Islam. Welt*, 82.

⁴⁵ The Bedouin contingents with Sayf al-Dawla in the disastrous expedition of 950 quickly deserted him when the outlook seemed ominous: Canard, *Hamdanides*, 766.

⁴⁶ Yahya, for instance, characterized the followers of a Bedouin rebel as "un grand nombre d'Arabes et d'autres gens avides de gain": PO 18, 790.

horsemen from the Banu Kilab accompanied the Fatimid army. When at first the Byzantines put the Fatimids to flight, relates Ibn Qalanisi, "les Grecs pour-suivirent les Musulmans et en tuèrent 2.000. Ils s'emparèrent de leurs bagages, de leurs armes, de leurs bêtes et les Banû Kilâb firent main basse sur ce butin encore plus que les Grecs."⁴⁷ The morning after the subsequent Fatimid recovery and defeat of the Byzantine army, the Banu Kilab reappeared with their recently acquired treasures:

Les arabes bédouins vinrent le lendemain matin avec les chevaux des Musulmans qu'ils avaient pris dans le pillage lors de la fuite des Musulmans. Les uns les rendirent, les autres les vendirent à bas prix, parce que Djaish b. Samsâma, commandant de l'armée, fit crier dans son camp: «Que personne n'achète aux Arabes bédouins autre chose que ce qu'il a reconnu et qui lui a été pris.» Et il ne trouva que ce qu'avaient pris ses propres hommes.

Apart from the entitlement of the victims to reclaim or repurchase goods stolen from them by the Bedouin, Ibn Qalanisi reports no retributive measures of any sort taken against the Banu Kilab. It would thus appear that Hamdanid and Fatimid commanders were prepared to indulge the rapacious habits of the Bedouin no matter what the effect on their discipline might be when the baggage train of either side seemed ripe for the taking.⁴⁸ Nikephoros Phokas certainly knew this tendency of theirs well enough. One of his directives states that the entire cavalry force should be committed to the pursuit of the enemy only "as long as there are no *Arabitai* threatening the baggage train" (PM IV.¹⁸⁶⁻¹⁸⁹).

Hamdanid tactics

With their solid stock of infantry and cavalry from the towns of the *thughur*, their contingents of skilled mercenaries, and their swift Bedouin horsemen, Hamdanid armies possessed the strength and flexibility required for success in operations along the eastern frontiers, whether in raids through Byzantine lands or in encounters with the enemy in the open field. Their mastery of both aspects

⁴⁷ Canard, "Sources arabes," 299-300.

⁴⁸ The observations of Jean de Joinville, who accompanied the Seventh Crusade to Egypt with Louis IX in 1248, are of interest here. After the Bedouin had looted the camp of their Turkish allies during the battle of Mansourah (1250) he relates, "I did not hear, however, that the Bedouins, though they were subject to the Saracens, were any less well thought of for stealing and carrying off this booty—it being well known that the habit of this people is to regard the weaker side as their lawful prey." Joinville and Villehardouin, *Chronicles of the Crusades*, tr. M. R. B. Shaw (Baltimore, 1963), 226-27.

of warfare is best shown in the prose account of Sayf al-Dawla's campaign in Anzitone (the Byzantine frontier zone to the east of Melitene) in April-May 956. This account, which has been well studied,⁴⁹ paints an impressive picture of Sayf al-Dawla's generalship and the versatility of his men in each phase of the campaign. Sayf and his advisers carefully planned the campaign, relying on reconnaissance and their knowledge of the terrain to determine the choice of routes and using feints to deceive the Byzantine forces attempting to block their way. With their efficient crossing of the Arsanias River and their swift passage through hostile territory, his infantry and cavalry showed considerable skill in coping with the rigors of a rapid march and the obstacles of the terrain. On the retreat homeward, the Hamdanids came face to face with the Byzantines in a pass and grimly fought their way through, inflicting a severe defeat on them. According to one of al-Mutanabbi's two poems on this campaign, the Hamdanid cavalymen once more crossed the Arsanias in pursuit of the survivors and dealt the Byzantines, commanded by John Tzimiskes, a second defeat at Tall Bitriq from which Tzimiskes barely escaped with his life.⁵⁰

Apart from the descriptions of the foreign mercenaries and the Bedouin in Sayf al-Dawla's forces, however, the sources offer little information on the deployment and tactics used by Hamdanid armies in battle.⁵¹ Some general ob-

⁴⁹ The prose account is given in *Byz. Arabes* II.2, 340-42, followed by al-Mutanabbi's two poems on pp. 342-44, 345-47; analyses of the campaign are found in *Byz. Arabes* II.1, pp. 356-57; Canard, *Hamdanides*, 787-93; and in J. D. Howard-Johnston's excellent historico-geographical study, "Byzantine Anzitone," *Armies and Frontiers in Roman and Byzantine Anatolia*, BAR International Series 156 (Oxford, 1983), 239-90, esp. 241-46.

⁵⁰ Recorded in al-Mutanabbi's second poem: *Byz. Arabes* II.2, 345-47.

⁵¹ Although the medieval Islamic world brought forth a rich tradition of military theory combining early Arab and Sassanian influences with some knowledge of classical Greek military writings, much of this literature was written during the era of the Crusades and so has no direct bearing on the Hamdanids. Surveys of Muslim military works indicate that they were devoted to one of three aspects of warfare: the equestrian arts, archery, and military organization and tactics. This last branch lists many of the same recommendations found in the Byzantine treatises concerning reconnaissance, types of formations, the layout of the marching camp, and preparations for battle, but these precepts are so general in nature that they cannot tell us anything of Hamdanid practices. For surveys of this literature, see Ritter, "Parure des Cavaliers"; A. Zaki, "Military Literature of the Arabs," *Cahiers d'histoire égyptienne* 7.3 (1955), 149-60; G. T. Scanlon, *A Muslim Manual of War* (Cairo, 1961), 6-20. On the Arabs' knowledge of Greek military theory, see F. Wüstenfeld, "Das Heerwesen der Muhammedaner und die Arabische Übersetzung der Taktik des Aelianus," *Abhandlungen der Königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen* 26 (Göttingen, 1880), and the comments of W. E. Kaegi, "Observations on Warfare between Byzantium and the Umayyads in Northern Syria," *IVth International Congress on Bilad al-Sham*, II (Amman, 1989), 49-70. On Muslim military theory and practice, see Scanlon's comments in *A Muslim Manual*, 22-31; M. Reinaud, "De l'art militaire chez les Arabes au moyen âge," *Journal asiatique* 11-12 (Sept. 1848), 193-237; D. Nicolle, "An Introduction to Arms and Warfare in Classical Islam," in *Islamic Arms and Armour*, ed. R. Elgood (London, 1979). Arab military equipment at the time of the Crusades is

servations on Hamdanid infantry and cavalry tactics may be ventured on the basis of descriptions of their tactics in Phokas' two treatises.

Seen from this perspective, the Hamdanids—not surprisingly—appear to have fought in much the same fashion as the Byzantines. The foot soldiers played the same rôle in support of cavalry as their Byzantine counterparts did by securing routes and holding passes in enemy territory, and their deployment was fitted to these primarily defensive responsibilities. In the *De velitatione*, Phokas characterized one type of Arab raiding expedition as that proceeding *φοσσατικῶς*, in other words, from one temporary encampment (*φοσσάτον*) to the next (*DV XIII*). As we shall see below in Chapters IV and V, the Byzantine *modus operandi* for infantry supporting cavalry saw the infantry maintain the four-sided formation used for temporary encampments on the march and in battle. In this light, Phokas' term *φοσσατικῶς* suggests that whenever possible the Arab infantrymen likewise used a square as an all-purpose formation while on campaign so as to provide a mobile defensive base for the cavalry.⁵² They also appear to have deployed for battle in a square. In the *Praecepta*, Phokas raises the possibility that the enemy infantrymen will be deployed in a four-sided formation (*PM I*.^{133–134}); he also indicates that they will put up a formidable defense to the charging *kataphraktoi* by massing heavy infantrymen armed with spears and pikes and supported by archers (*PM II*.^{115–123}; *IV*.^{137–141}), the same defensive wall that Byzantine foot soldiers formed against heavy cavalry.

Phokas says nothing of the battle formations and tactics used by the cavalrymen in Hamdanid armies. He did anticipate, however, that his own infantrymen would have to withstand powerful attacks by heavy cavalrymen, accompanied by the Bedouin light skirmishers described above, and his careful attention to infantry deployment and tactics in the *Praecepta* in itself testifies to the strength of the Hamdanid cavalry with its contingents of Turkish and Kurdish horsemen.

[Hamdanid armies, well manned and well led, were formidable opponents for the Byzantines. But the system of the *thughur*, the source of Hamdanid military strength, contained weaknesses which contributed to the rapid collapse of Hamdanid power in Cilicia and northern Syria. Scholars have identified two weaknesses in particular that bear noting here.

The first was the great disparity between the high cost of maintaining this

military system and the low fiscal revenues generated by the frontier zones.) According to one Arab source, the *thughur* produced no more than half the revenues necessary to meet their military expenses.⁵³ This fiscal crisis was compounded by the indifference of the Turkish-dominated military in Baghdad toward the *thughur* once these zones, and their tax revenues, had come under the control of regional dynasties such as the Hamdanids.⁵⁴ With little or no support from the central treasury at Baghdad, the Hamdanids were increasingly hard pressed to bear the financial burden of the wars against the Byzantines. In turn, the Byzantine policy of destroying everything in the path of their advance exacerbated this already serious problem. The most telling example of the steady evaporation of Hamdanid military resources is an incident from the year 964, when a force of five thousand men from Khorasan arrived to lend help to Sayf al-Dawla, only to find themselves obliged to return home for lack of provisions in the war-ravaged *thughur*.⁵⁵

[The fractious nature of the *thughur* when faced with adversity was also a crippling weakness. What had united them was the charismatic figure of Sayf al-Dawla, and as long as his prestige was sustained by a series of well publicized victories against the Byzantines, his leadership was accepted rather than imposed. But once the tide had turned irreversibly in favor of the Byzantines and his aura of invincibility had faded, a series of internal rebellions ensued which diverted him from the struggle against the Byzantines. Consequently, the towns in Cilicia began to look to their own survival and no longer counted on help from Syria; after 962, they had no other choice. That year Phokas left Anazarba in ruins, achieved the capture of Duluk, Raban, Marash, and Aleppo (a humiliating blow to Hamdanid prestige), and cut a swath of destruction through northern Syria that separated Cilicia from all sources of support.⁵⁶ The major towns then fell one by one—Adana in 964, Mopsuestia and Tarsos the following year—and once Cilicia was in Byzantine hands, the fall of Antioch was only a

⁵³ Haldon and Kennedy, "Arab-Byzantine Frontier," 113; *Byz. Arabes I*, 96–97.

⁵⁴ This estrangement of the frontier zones from the central Abbasid military is discussed by von Sivers, "Taxes and Trade," 89–99.

⁵⁵ Yahya, PO 18, 794; Canard, *Hamdanides*, 819–20.

⁵⁶ Canard, (*Hamdanides*, 805–27) discusses the disintegration of Hamdanid power and the internal dissension that beset Sayf al-Dawla as the tide of Byzantine victories steadily accumulated. Their 962 campaigns (pp. 805–17) did much to deepen the fractures between the already demoralized populations in the *thughur*. The Greek sources (Leo diac. 29.³–30.⁸) record that in these campaigns Phokas overran more than sixty strongholds (*φρούρια*); by ravaging the territories through which his army passed, he created a wasteland between Syria and Cilicia that broke the lines of supply between the two regions. Tarsos became a house divided against itself as the stream of volunteers from Egypt and Khorasan dried up and quarrels broke out between various factions: cf. Canard, "Quelques observations," 47.

discussed by C. Cahen, "Un traité d'armurerie composé pour Saladin," *Bulletin des études orientales* 12 (1947–48), 102–63.

⁵² Half a century earlier Leo VI had described the Arab infantry using a square or rectangular formation (*τετραγώνον ἐπιμήκη*) in battle and on the march, noting also their tenacity in combat: *LT XVIII*.118–121.

matter of time. Its capture by the Byzantines in 969 ended the system of the *thughur* forever.

Fatimid Armies

The *Praecepta* belongs to the era of the 950s and 960s when the Byzantines were fighting the Hamdanids in Cilicia and northern Syria. Nikephoros Ouranos' later version of the treatise belongs to the period of the Byzantine-Fatimid conflict in Palestine and Syria, which began shortly after the Fatimids took power in Cairo in 969. To promote their influence among the initially unresponsive Muslim populations in Palestine and Syria, the Fatimids presented themselves as the successors to the Hamdanids as the defenders of Islam against the aggression of Christian Byzantium. They tried to retake Antioch soon after its capture by the Byzantines and opposed John Tzimiskes' inroads into Palestine in the 970s; during the 990s Fatimid military successes twice forced Basil II to leave his Bulgarian wars and intervene in the east. The two powers vied for military and political control of Syria for thirty years until Basil and the Caliph al-Hakim agreed to a ten-year truce in 1001, thereby ending three decades of Byzantine-Fatimid hostilities and leaving Basil free to concentrate on the task of subjugating Bulgaria.⁵⁷

Nikephoros Ouranos became governor of Antioch in December 999. He had seen service on both frontiers of the empire, and in his capacity as governor of Antioch he undertook a number of local campaigns simply to maintain order along the now secondary eastern frontiers while Basil campaigned in Bulgaria. Although Ouranos' expanded version of the *Praecepta* is of primary interest for the local raiding and siege tactics that characterized Byzantine military activity in Syria once peace had been concluded with the Fatimids,⁵⁸ a brief examination of Fatimid armies will be offered here to see whether the Byzantines had found themselves compelled to make any adjustments in tactics against this new rival.

The Fatimid armies that gained control of Egypt in 969 were composed of many nationalities, but the cornerstone of their forces were the Kitama Berbers

(among other Berber tribes) and the black slave-soldiers obtained from the Sudan—"the abominable Africans" mentioned by John Tzimiskes in his letter to the Armenian king Ashot.⁵⁹ Soon after their push into Palestine and Syria in the early 970s, however, the Fatimids began to suppress the Berber elements in their army and replaced them with many of the same peoples (Daylami, Turks, Kurds, Bedouin) who had served in Hamdanid armies. There was also a significant number of non-Islamic troops in Fatimid armies, including Slavs (*Saqaliba*), Armenians, and Greeks (*Rum*). With its heavy reliance on mercenaries and large corps of slave-soldiers, the Fatimid army was thus more typical of the dynastic armies that evolved in the contemporary Islamic world than was the Hamdanid army based on the *thughur*.

To judge from the available studies of Fatimid armies,⁶⁰ it appears that the Fatimids had to adjust their tactics to the Byzantines more than the Byzantines did to them. This is especially true of armor and weapons. The sources indicate that their encounters with the more heavily equipped Byzantines (and other Muslim rivals) led the Fatimids to equip their hitherto lightly armed infantry and cavalry (man and horse) more heavily during the later tenth century.⁶¹ The increased weight of Fatimid cavalry may in turn have prompted the only significant change in tactics recorded by Ouranos in his paraphrase of the *Praecepta*. This adjustment, discussed in the following chapter, involved the method of reinforcing the infantry lines before receiving a cavalry charge, a change fully in keeping with the reports of heavier equipment by the Fatimids and their recruitment of Turkish and Kurdish cavalymen.

Descriptions of Fatimid infantry tactics from the period of the early crusades may throw some light retrospectively on Fatimid tactics against the Byzantines.⁶² The infantry screened the cavalry in battle. The first rows of infantrymen were armed with spears and shields, and when under attack from enemy cavalry, they knelt down behind their shields and inclined their spears forward at an angle, meanwhile allowing the archers behind them to launch their arrows

⁵⁷ For a general review of Byzantine-Fatimid contacts in the tenth to eleventh century, see Y. Lev, "The Fatimid Navy, Byzantium, and the Mediterranean Sea, 909-1036 C. E. / 297-427 A.-H.," *Byzantion* 54 (1984), 220-252. The initial clashes between the two powers in the 970s are discussed by P. E. Walker, "A Byzantine Victory over the Fatimids at Alexandretta (971)," *Byzantion* 42 (1972), 431-40, and idem, "The 'Crusade' of John Tzimiskes in the Light of New Arabic Evidence," *Byzantion* 47 (1977), 301-27. For a survey of the military-political contest in Syria and Palestine during the later tenth century, see W. E. Farag, "The Aleppo Question: A Byzantine-Fatimid Conflict of Interests in Northern Syria in the Later 10th Century A.D.," *BMGS* 14 (1990), 44-60; Felix, *Byz. Islam. Welt*, 39-123; and Forsyth, "Byz.-Arab Chronicle," 416-531.

⁵⁸ McGeer, "Tradition and Reality," 129-34.

⁵⁹ Beshir, "Fatimids," 38-41, and J. L. Bachrach, "African Military Slaves in the Medieval Middle East," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 13 (1981), 471-95. Tzimiskes' letter has been translated into English by A. E. Dostourian, "The Chronicle of Matthew of Edessa: Translated from the Original Armenian with a Commentary and Introduction," 2 vols., Ph.D. dissertation (Rutgers University, 1972) I, 22-30. On earlier Byzantine encounters with black soldiers in Muslim armies, see I. B. Papadopoulos, *Ἡ Κρήνη ὑπὸ τοῦ Σαρακηνοῦς* (824-961) (Athens, 1948), 85-87; Dagron, *Le traité*, 179.

⁶⁰ Beshir, "Fatimids," and W. J. Hamblin, "The Fatimid Army during the Early Crusades," Ph.D. dissertation (University of Michigan, 1985).

⁶¹ Beshir, "Fatimids," 48-49; Hamblin, "Fatimid Army," 138-49.

⁶² Hamblin, "Fatimid Army," 163-69.

Part II: Historical Commentary

into the oncoming horsemen. These defensive tactics recorded in the twelfth century are very similar to the infantry tactics employed by the Byzantines and Hamdanids in the tenth, and it may thus have been in recognition of the strong Fatimid infantry that Ouranos retained Phokas' directions on the *kataphraktoi*. The continuing presence of heavy cavalry in the east, attested by Ouranos in the first decade of the eleventh century (*TNO* 63.²⁹⁻³²), may be a sign that the Byzantines maintained this powerful offensive force as the instrument necessary to break Fatimid infantry as it had been previously to break Hamdanid infantry.

On the basis of the evidence available, it would appear that Phokas prepared his men to face an enemy who fought very much as they did. The Byzantines and their Muslim enemies in the east both relied on powerful cavalry to supply their offensive force and on strong infantry formations to provide a solid defensive base in battle and on campaign. Even though both sides had contingents of light cavalry and infantry, in the end neither seems to have counted on maneuverability to win battles; rather, once the issue was joined, it was a matter of pitting strength against strength, specialists against specialists, in a contest as much psychological as physical. The infantry and cavalry tactics that the Byzantines devised to break the strength and will of their enemies in battle are the subject of the chapter to follow.

Once more the earth has brought forth the dragon's seed,
 Giant men striving against each other in mortal combat.
 A wondrous sight, something foreign to belief,
 An apparition all in bronze, all iron is its nature,
 An onslaught of wild beasts, the dreadful spectacle of Gorgons.
 Who is that man pitted against the giants,
 This powerful man plunging into them one against all,
 So strange in shape, so extraordinary,
 Of gold in splendor, of iron in nature?
 In motion, he is fire; when challenged, a lion,
 Standing firm, he is adamant; resplendent, glancing all around,
 In his gaze, a thunderbolt, exhaling blood and slaughter.
 Yet he is not adamant, nor iron nor stone,
 Nor of gold, nor a giant in nature,
 But a triad composed of desirable elements,
 Courage, prudence, valor in the toils of war,
 Embodied as though combined for battle,
 They show how great is the might of his valor.
 How in battles against giants and titans together
 He prevails against them with the chorus of lesser stars!
 With such an appearance he cast radiance from on high,
 Crowning his virtues most nobly with his victories.

John Geometres, *On a battle of the Byzantines*,
 PG 106, 910B-911A



9 and 10. Scenes of Byzantines and Arabs in combat

SOWING THE DRAGON'S TEETH: THE BYZANTINE ARMY IN BATTLE

The steps taken by Nikephoros Phokas to select, arm, and train his armies were directed to a straightforward end: to enable his soldiers to confront and destroy enemy forces in battle. As noted in Chapter 1, the value of the *Praecepta* as a tactical treatise lies not only in Phokas' methodical presentation of his army's deployment for battle, but even more so in the paradigms of battle situations in which he demonstrates how his infantry and cavalry were to put their formations, weapons, and skills to use in combat. What is more, a comparative reading of the *Praecepta* with the *Sylloge tacticorum* and the *Taktika* of Nikephoros Ouranos 56 through 65 will make it possible to identify a series of adjustments in Byzantine field tactics during the later tenth century. Consultation of both Byzantine accounts and Arabic sources in translation will permit us to compare the tactics outlined in these treatises with recorded practice.

The battle tactics employed by Byzantine infantry and cavalry will be the main subject of this chapter. But in a broader perspective, the examination of these tactics should lead to the investigation of other factors affecting the outcome of battles, and the tendencies—especially the weaknesses—that Phokas sought to control in his own men and exploit in the enemy. Good tactics alone did not guarantee success in battle, since victory or defeat frequently resulted from circumstances that no commander could fully control or predict. To discern the considerations behind the formations and tactics prescribed by Phokas, it is helpful to read the *Praecepta* and the accounts of battles in the historical sources in the light of Smail's remarks in his classic study of Crusader warfare:¹

Before battle a commander could make a plan, in accordance with which he could draw up his troops and send them into action. But once he had

¹ Smail, *Crusading Warfare*, 12–13 (italics mine).

launched them into the battle, he had little or no control over them, and this limitation applied especially to the most effective troops, the mailed mounted knights. If the knights had charged, and then something occurred to upset his plan, the medieval commander could not usually rearrange his forces. The result of the battle must then be left to *the interplay of morale, individual prowess, and good fortune*. It was these conditions which made doubtful the outcome of medieval battles and in that age the decision to give battle was usually the conscious acceptance of risk. The greater the issues at stake, the more must the thought of the element of chance have influenced the mind of the commander.

A lifelong soldier, Nikephoros Phokas knew that battle was as much a contest of will, riding on the ebb and flow of conflicting emotions, as it was a brutal physical encounter, and that it was not the intrinsic soundness of the tactics that he prescribed but the willingness of his soldiers to carry them out that mattered most in the end. His awareness of the risks inherent in giving battle and "the interplay of morale, individual prowess and good fortune" in deciding the outcome permeates the *Praecepta*. He openly acknowledges that the *kataphraktoi* will have to quell their fears at the prospect of attacking heavy infantrymen and declares that the propensity of cavalrymen to plunder during battle must be curbed by the proclamation of punitive measures, while within his battle formations for infantry and heavy cavalry lurk tacit constraints and coercion. He relied on his strongest and bravest soldiers, the *menavlatoi* and the *kataphraktoi*, first to intimidate and then to bludgeon the enemy into giving way, but his tactics also make allowance for a possible reverse in battle. What Phokas offers in the *Praecepta*, beyond a detailed presentation of contemporary field tactics, are glimpses into the psychological as well as the physical factors that dominated Byzantine warfare. How, then, did he attempt to suppress, control, or exploit these factors in his tactical systems and, in the final analysis—to judge by the treatises and the narrative sources—how were battles lost or won?

Precautions before Battle

The campaigns led by Phokas and Tzimiskes into Cilicia and northern Syria were infused with an aggressive spirit tempered nonetheless by the realization that certain times and places were better than others for seeking a general engagement (δημόσιος πόλεμος). In the *Praecepta*, Phokas reminded the commander of the precautions to be observed before offering battle.

Foremost among these was obtaining accurate reconnaissance on the strength and equipment of the enemy host. On the basis of information culled

from scouts, deserters, and prisoners, it was necessary to assess the enemy's strength, and if outnumbered, the Byzantine commander was to avoid a general engagement until a series of successful feints, ambushes, and skirmishes had undermined the opponent's strength and morale while boosting the spirits of his own troops. At this point, asserts Phokas, they need not recoil before an enemy force even twice their number (*PM* IV.¹⁹⁹⁻²¹²).

The use of stratagems and ruses to wear down a superior enemy and postpone battle until the moment most propitious was the trademark of Byzantine warfare, and the delaying, guerrilla tactics outlined by Phokas in the *De velitatione* are more typical of the Byzantine conduct of war than the battle tactics in the *Praecepta*. Since Byzantine guerrilla tactics have now been thoroughly discussed by Dāgron, it will suffice to note here that the ablest soldiers of the age relied on ruses and ambushes to wear down a superior foe before delivering the decisive blow. Leo Phokas, for example, displayed his mastery of guerrilla tactics in successive triumphs over the Hungarians in the west and Sayf al-Dawla in the east during the year 960.² Others resorted to guile to outdo their adversaries. In 976, the rebel Bardas Skleros had his men prepare their main meal to deceive Peter the Stratopedarches into thinking that no battle would take place that day and then swept down on his camp in a surprise attack. Not long afterwards, Skleros himself was duped by Manuel Erotikos, who was allowed to leave Nicaea on favorable terms after convincing Skleros that the besieged town had food enough for two years by showing him barrels of sand topped off with grain.³ These are but two examples recording how Byzantine commanders used their wits to gain the advantage or extricate themselves from precarious situations, but they combine with Phokas' counsel in the *Praecepta* to show that giving battle was not necessarily the first and only option. Commanders might achieve the desired result as effectively—and more economically—by surprise and deception as by open confrontation.

Another important precaution was to ensure that sufficient supply of water was at hand. As the campaigning season normally began in March and lasted through the summer into late autumn, the effects of thirst on soldiers toiling in the heat of Syria or the Balkans are easily imagined.⁴ Ready access to water therefore dictated an army's choice of routes and place of encampment; it was

² Leo diac. 18.¹⁹–24.⁸.

³ Skyl. 318.⁷²–320.²¹; 322.⁸⁶–323.³¹. In 1030, George Maniakes appeared to agree to terms with an Arab force attacking his citadel in Telouch. When the Arabs spent the night in celebration, Maniakes swept down on their camp and massacred them (381.³⁸–382.⁵⁸).

⁴ On the factors of climate and supply, see W. Kaegi, "Challenges to Late Roman and Byzantine Military Operations in Iraq (4th–9th Centuries)," *Klio* 73 (1991), 586–94.

equally a factor in choosing where to deploy for battle. Phokas warns the commander that setting up his forces in uncharted, waterless places may bring his army to ruin (*PM* II¹¹⁻¹⁴), and in both his treatises he advises detaching a handful of men from each infantry unit (*hekatontarchia*) to fetch and pass out water to the combatants during battle (*PM* I.¹⁴⁶⁻¹⁴⁸; *DV* V.⁷⁻¹⁰). Something of this system in practice is seen in Skylitzes' account of John Tzimiskes' second battle against the Russians (or "Scyths") outside Dorostolon in July 971:⁵

A fierce battle was joined and because the barbarians were fighting with a will, the Byzantines, suffering from the heat of the sun and oppressed by thirst since they were in full armor (for it was the high point of the day), began to give way. When he perceived this, the emperor hastily came to their aid with his own units and took up the brunt of the battle himself; he also gave orders to bring skins full of wine and water to the contingent wearied by the sun and thirst. When they availed themselves of these and shook off their thirst and the sun's heat, they regained their strength and rose up against the Scyths with great determination and force.

Phokas' reminder of the need to provide water for the soldiers during battle acquires added force in light of Skylitzes' account, since the chronicler states that the effects of heat and thirst were even more severe on the Byzantines because they were in full armor (ὡς πανοπλῖται). We shall see below that the heavy armor worn by Byzantine soldiers of the time did protect them when at close quarters with the enemy, but not, according to this excerpt, without imposing the disadvantage of lessening their endurance and increasing their need for water when fighting in hot weather. Further testimony that heavier armor made Byzantine soldiers more vulnerable to the effects of heat and thirst is found in the arguments of Romanos III Argyros' military advisers against his proposed expedition to Syria in the summer of 1030. They warned him that sources of water would be scarce and that the fully armored Byzantines (οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι πανοπλῖται τυγχάνοντες) would find the heat intolerable.⁶ Despite these warnings, Romanos went ahead, only to see his army come to grief in the very conditions predicted by his more experienced advisers.

⁵ Skyl. 306.⁴⁴⁻⁵².

⁶ Ibid., 379.^{81-390.90}.

Battle


The tactical prescriptions issued by Phokas in the *Praecepta* can be summarized as follows. He begins with deployment and tactics for infantry (*PM* I.5-13) and goes on to his first paradigm of battle situations in which he discusses tactics for cavalry with infantry in close support against a combined enemy force of infantry and cavalry (*PM* II.3-13). Having outlined the deployment of the *kataphraktoi* (*PM* III.1-2, 6-9), he incorporates their formation and tactics into his discussion of deployment and tactics for cavalry operating independently against infantry and cavalry (*PM* IV.2-9), the subject of his second paradigm of battle situations (*PM* IV.10-17). When presenting his tactical systems and paradigms, Phokas paid particular attention to three aspects of battle: how the Byzantine infantry were to defend their position against enemy cavalry; how the Byzantine cavalry, spearheaded by the *kataphraktoi*, were to launch an attack against enemy infantry, in his eyes, the pivotal contest on the battlefield; and finally, how a victorious army should conduct a disciplined, relentless pursuit. It is on these three aspects of battle that we shall concentrate, beginning with his presentation of infantry tactics.

Part 1: Infantry Deployment and Tactics

Although cavalry played the more illustrious role as the army's *force de frappe*, reliable infantrymen were indispensable to success in campaigns, whether to provide a safe haven for cavalry or as an offensive force in their own right when the army was compelled to fight in broken terrain or conduct sieges, conditions in which cavalry could not operate. The military treatises cover all aspects of infantry warfare and amply attest to the important part they played. The *Praecepta* records how Byzantine infantrymen were deployed and used in battle.

Phokas opens his discussion of infantry tactics with a brief outline of the standard battle formation for infantry. The men were to be deployed in a hollow square, which he describes as "a double-ribbed square (τετραγώνος διττή, explained below), thus called 'a four-sided formation' by the ancients, which has three units on each side so that on all four sides there are twelve units" (*PM* I.³⁹⁻⁴³). Between the twelve units—that is, the twelve taxiarchies of one thousand men each—there were twelve intervals, each wide enough to accommodate twelve to fifteen cavalymen abreast, allowing the cavalry to enter or leave the square. In the event that the Byzantine cavalry force was small and the enemy had a large body of infantry, the number of intervals could be reduced from twelve to eight in the interests of greater security.

Phokas' directions on the basic design and function of the infantry square



11. Byzantine square infantry formation (*Parisinus graecus* 2442, folio 23^v, eleventh century)

are more easily understood with reference to the accompanying illustration of the square, one of three found in manuscripts of the early eleventh century (Fig. 11). The diagram is part of a short work known as the *Syntaxis armatorum quadrata* (ca. 950) and depicts "a square infantry formation keeping the cavalry inside." Comparison of the text of the *Syntaxis* with the *Praecepta* (PM I.³⁹⁻⁵¹) demonstrates that Phokas repeated the directions of the *Syntaxis* word for word


on the alignment of the twelve infantry units, the width of each interval and the reduction from twelve to eight intervals if the circumstances dictated.⁷ The diagram, however, corrects the impression given by the text that three units side by side in a straight line formed one side of the square, since it shows that one of the three units was rounded to form the corner of the square. From the diagram it would also appear that reducing the number of intervals from twelve to eight was accomplished by closing the ones situated in the very center of all four sides.

The square formation outlined in the *Syntaxis* and the *Praecepta* was simple enough in design and application. It had the further attribute of being easily adjusted to conform with the terrain or to cope with emergencies. On wide, level ground, suggests Phokas, the commander might prefer to deploy four or five divisions in front and back, one or two along the flanks so as to match the length of the enemy line (PM II.¹⁵¹⁻¹⁷⁰ and Fig. 12). He might do just the opposite in narrow, constricted terrain by placing one or two divisions in front and back with four or five along the flanks (PM II.¹⁷⁰⁻¹⁷⁵ and Fig. 13). A final variation "that is also four-cornered and four-sided and protects the cavalry inside" was apparently for use in emergencies. This formation kept the infantry units linked together along the flanks and in the corners but left the middle units in the front and back unattached, thereby creating two lanes through the square (PM II.¹⁷⁵⁻¹⁹¹ and Fig. 14). The cavalry lined up along these two lanes within the square while the baggage train and the noncombatants were sheltered in the four corners; the light infantrymen stood guard in the intervals so that the square was completely closed off.


The standard deployment for Byzantine infantry was thus a quadrilateral formation punctuated by openings that permitted the cavalry to enter or leave the formation. On the evidence of the military treatises, this was a relatively new formation developed in the first half of the tenth century. The use of a square was in itself nothing new, of course, since Greek and Roman infantry had frequently formed square in battle and on the march, but this Byzantine version has no parallel among the formations discussed by the classical tacticians. Among the Byzantine treatises, neither the *Strategikon* of Maurice (ca. 600) nor the *Taktika* of Leo VI (ca. 900) make any mention of this type of infantry square;⁸ the texts in which this formation first appears are clustered about the

⁷McGeer, "*Syntaxis armatorum quadrata*."


⁸The *Strategikon* (VII B 11.⁴⁵⁻⁵² = LT XIV.24) recommends forming a square keeping the pack animals and baggage train inside, the archers outside, in case of defeat by Persian or Avar horsemen, but this formation was for emergencies only and bears little resemblance to the square outlined in the tenth-century treatises.



12. The infantry formation adjusted for open terrain (see p. 259)



13. The infantry formation adjusted for narrow terrain (see p. 259)



- K Cavalryman
- λ Baggage train
- d Light infantryman (slinger or javelinier)

14. The compact infantry formation (see p. 259)

middle of the tenth century. Before going on to see how the Byzantine square operated as a battle formation, we may pause for a moment to explore its origins and the reasons for its use.

Two texts prepared a decade or two before the *Praecepta* present this infantry formation. One, the *Syntaxis armatorum quadrata*, has already been mentioned as the text copied by Phokas into the *Praecepta* at the beginning of his section on infantry deployment. The *Syntaxis* is one of three short texts added


to the interpolated tradition of Aelian the Tactician and seems to have been composed about the middle of the tenth century.⁹

The other text to present the square infantry formation is the anonymous *Sylloge tacticorum* (ca. 950). Chapter 47 of this military encyclopedia offers a meticulous description of an infantry square protecting the cavalry force inside while allowing the horsemen passage into and out of the formation through intervals in all four sides. With its laboriously calculated measurements of the square and totals of manpower, the *Sylloge* presents an idealized model more academic than practical, but the compiler's remarks on the square as a distinctly Byzantine formation are of particular interest here. One of the more striking features of the *Sylloge* as a military encyclopaedia is the compiler's juxtaposition of ancient and Byzantine weaponry and deployment (κατ' αὐτούς—κατὰ Ῥωμαίους). When he came to the section on the formation and tactics for Byzantine infantry in support of cavalry, he noted in the preface that "when there is a combined army, namely of infantry and cavalry, the Byzantines prepare their formations in a different manner, quite unlike those used for the infantry and cavalry formations discussed above" (*ST* 47.1).

It is clear from these remarks that the Byzantines themselves thought of this square formation as a fairly recent development. Although the hypothesis is unprovable, the origins of the formation probably lie in the campaigns along the Mesopotamian frontier led by the celebrated general John Kourkouas during his long tenure as Domestic of the Schools between 922 and 944. The well-defined, mutually consistent models of the square in the *Syntaxis* and the *Sylloge* point to a formation already in use for some time; the *Praecepta* and the *Taktika* of Nikephoros Ouranos 56 through 65 record the further use and modifications of the square throughout the second half of the tenth century.

The question of its inspiration remains. The square in which Byzantine infantry deployed for battle was not originally a battle formation at all but was patterned after the standard groundplan for temporary encampments. Comparison between the diagram of the battle square and the typical camp layout—a square bisected by two roads running north to south and two east to west (cf. Fig. 15)—shows their close resemblance. The Byzantine marching camp will be discussed at greater length in the following chapter, but for the moment it will be observed that in both formations, the infantry was arrayed along the perimeter to protect the cavalry and baggage train within; furthermore, the openings in each side of the battle square correspond with the alignment of the camp

⁹See note 7 above.



15. The basic camp groundplan: a square with centrally crossed roads (see pp. 262–64)

entrances—two or three gates on each of the four sides—and served the same purpose in offering passage into and out of the formation.

This square camp plan was adapted for use as a battle formation because of the advantages it offered as a defensive disposition. The author of the *De re militari* listed the following attributes of the square as a camping formation (*DRM* I.^{18–24}):

... if the camp is laid out in a square, four-sided pattern. This one is superior to other camp plans since in battle it cannot easily be encircled by the enemy, for they will have to attack it on one side or two; if they decide to make an assault on three sides or even four, their forces will be dispersed and weakened, easy to repulse.

The same defensive advantages naturally obtained in battle, since the infantry square, facing four ways, could not be attacked except by direct frontal assault, while attempts to attack on all sides would dilute the adversary's forces. There were also advantages of morale and discipline inherent in these practical aspects

of the square, since the men under attack could face the enemy with the reassurance that they could not be outflanked or taken from behind. Adding to this sense of collective security was the awareness that men overcome by fatigue or wounds could find relief within the formation (*PM I*.⁸⁷⁻⁸⁹). But one suspects that a compelling, if unspoken, advantage of the square was to prevent easy flight, an effect achieved by its very shape, which denied the soldiers under attack any convenient avenue of escape.⁷ It was for these reasons that the Byzantines preferred the square to all other infantry formations and kept their infantry in this deployment whenever possible on the march, in camp, and in battle (cf. *DRM I*.³⁰⁻³⁵).

If the infantry square presented in the tenth-century treatises appears to be a recently improvised battle formation, its central purpose to provide a base for cavalry was consistent with the long-established pattern of Byzantine warfare in which cavalry attacked and infantry defended. To cope with the possibility of defeat, it was common practice to keep the infantry deployed nearby or to use the camp as an immediate refuge for cavalry put to flight by the enemy. These tactics were already very old, as shown, for instance, by the sixth-century historian Prokopios, who records a number of battles in which defeated cavalry retired behind a wall of infantry or inside their camp to reorganize and mount a defense.¹⁰ The tenth-century battle square—basically a camp plan converted into a battle formation—was ideally suited to this defensive role of infantry. This is how the compiler of the *Sylloge* defined the use of the square in battle (*ST 47.19*):

The cavalrymen are the first to begin battle by moving out through the largest intervals in the flanks of the infantry units described above. Should they put the enemy to flight, they pursue them with all their might, with the infantry divisions trailing behind. In case they are defeated, they turn and go back to the infantry units once again. They either take their place inside the infantry units by coming in through the intervals—that is, inside the vacant place where they were before—or to the outside, on the wings of the infantry units, and on both its flanks they fight alongside the infantry formation, as we said previously.

According to current tactical precepts, then, the cavalry employed the infantry square as a base from which to prepare and deliver an attack upon the

¹⁰ Deploying infantry to support cavalry: cf. Prokopios, *Wars*, V.28.22; VIII.8.16; VIII.32.6. Defeated armies falling back on their camp: cf. IV.3.15-25; IV.17.22-29; IV.19.8-9; V.18.16.

enemy, which, if successful, would see the infantry move up in the wake of the pursuit to secure booty and prisoners, both presumably kept within the square. In the event that the cavalry were repulsed, however, they could fall back on the infantry and regather inside or around the square to help defend the position against a counterattack. This is also the system at work in the *Praecepta*. Phokas portrays the infantry square as a base for his cavalry units, from which they can organize and launch an attack should the enemy choose to confront the main Byzantine force (cf. *PM II*.5-6, 11, 13). If successful, they pressed on in pursuit with the infantry trailing in their wake to secure prisoners and plunder (*PM II*.^{53-55, 76-77, 129-133}), but if the cavalry met with determined resistance, the infantry formation moved up in close support and light infantrymen dashed forward into the *melee* to help them (*PM II*.⁸⁵⁻⁹¹). But most importantly of all, the infantry square represented the army's last line of defense in case the enemy drove off the Byzantine cavalry and then followed up with a counterattack (*PM II*.⁹⁴⁻¹⁰¹):

If it should happen that the enemy contingents strike hard against our cavalry units and drive them back—God grant that this not come to pass—they must flee inside the infantry formations and save themselves. Then the heavy infantrymen must come forward in good order with the *menavlatoi* against the enemy, with the cavalry on the inside for their support.

It was for this unwelcome, but in the long run inevitable, moment that Phokas prepared his infantrymen. Once having sketched out the basic design of the infantry square, he goes on to prescribe the placement and role in battle for each type of foot soldier included in a taxiarchy.¹¹


Each of the twelve taxiarchies forming the square was to be deployed as follows (cf. Fig. 16). The soldiers stood seven deep and one hundred across. The four hundred heavy infantrymen—all spearmen—were arrayed in two rows of one hundred in the face of the formation and two rows in the back; between them stood the three hundred bowmen in three lines of one hundred. Phokas twice refers to this alignment of two rows of infantrymen, three rows of bowmen, and two rows of infantrymen as “double-faced” (ἀμφίστομος; *PM I*.^{63, 78}), by which he means that each unit kept two rows of spearmen in the back as a safeguard to ensure that if the enemy broke through into the square, the spearmen in the rear rows could turn around to deal with them and so protect their comrades' backs. This in turn explains what Phokas meant by calling his infan-

¹¹ The following discussion of infantry deployment and tactics expands on E. McGeer, “Infantry versus Cavalry: The Byzantine Response,” *REB* 46 (1988), 135-45.

Taxiarchy

Interval

Taxiarchy



⚔ Heavy infantryman

🏹 Archer

🗡 Light infantryman (slinger or javelinier)

16. Deployment of a taxiarchy (see pp. 265–67)

try formation “a double-ribbed square” (τετράγωνος διττή), a phrase he added to the text of the *Syntaxis* as he copied it into the *Praecepta*. Since neither the text nor the diagram of the *Syntaxis* indicate a line of spearmen kept in the back of each infantry unit, Phokas’ insistence on his soldiers’ “double” deployment should be taken as a sign that this was a recently added precaution.

The placement of the line officers can be partially reconstructed from the *Praecepta*. Each row of one hundred men was commanded by a hekatontarch stationed in the center of the line and by two pentekontarchs who stood on the wings (*PM I*.^{8–10}). The place of the dekarch, the lowest grade of infantry officer mentioned in the treatise, is not specified, but it is likely that these officers stood at the head of each file.¹² What Phokas does not mention is the file-closer (οὐραγός), or the soldier at the end of each file. The importance of this post should not be underestimated since a resolute man at the end of the file could help keep

¹² As according, for instance, to the schema in the *Strategikon*, XII A 7.

Sowing the Dragon's Teeth

the men ahead in place; it was all the more necessary in Phokas’ “double-faced” formation to have reliable soldiers at the back as potential defenders against an attack from behind should the enemy break into the square. There may thus have been officers of lower rank than the dekarch (pentarch, tetrarch) who formed the rear line of each taxiarchy not only for reasons of security but also of discipline. In this way, the line officers would have anchored the formation laterally (pentekontarch—hekatontarch—pentekontarch) and in depth (dekarch—file-closer).

⌊ We have seen that each taxiarchy also included two hundred light infantrymen (javeliners, slingers, and archers). These men did not take their places within the battle line, but instead performed various duties consistent with their attributes as skirmishers. One of their responsibilities was to make their way out through the intervals and engage an approaching enemy, thus allowing the infantry units time to form up properly without disruption (*PM I*.^{80–87}), but their main task was to block off the intervals between the taxiarchies. Phokas issues instructions that thirty, forty, or fifty javeliners should be stationed in each interval alongside the rear rows of the heavy infantrymen (a point he makes twice: *PM I*.^{51–57, 89–93}), with the additional slingers and archers in their detachment placed behind them. The javeliners remained at the back of the interval directly facing the opening “so that whenever the cavalry wheels round under pursuit from the enemy and enters the formation, the javeliners will rush forward up to the front and turn the enemy away, with the archers and slingers ranked in with them cooperating in this task” (*PM I*.^{58–62}).

Each taxiarchy in the square, then, stood seven deep while contingents of light infantry were positioned in the intervals, ready to seal them off when the enemy drew near. In the event that the enemy did embark on an assault against the Byzantine position, Phokas foresaw an attack by their main force against one side of the infantry square, while their Bedouin light cavalry auxiliaries would encircle the square formation (*PM II*.^{101–111}). We have seen in the previous chapter that Byzantine cavalymen were unable to match the speed of the Bedouin and were strictly forbidden to pursue them, but at the same time, these light horsemen were more of a nuisance than a threat to infantry deployed in a square since this formation effectively nullified their principal tactic of encirclement.


The Byzantine infantry could easily stalemate the Bedouin horsemen, but these skirmishers were the least of their worries. The real test lay in resisting the attacks of the Arab regular cavalry, or even, as Phokas expected, of their heavy *kataphraktoi*. His regulations on the tactics and weapons to be employed by his foot soldiers reveal an action-reaction pendulum in the contest between infantry and cavalry during the later tenth century, for the revival of armored cavalry

prompted the creation of a distinct type of infantryman in the Byzantine army, the *menavlato*s, and a series of adjustments in the tactics for infantry confronting cavalry. It will be necessary to use the corps of *menavlatoi* with their thick pikes in the reinforced front lines, declares Phokas, "in the likely event that the enemy gets word of these [infantry] formations and decides to react with equal force and equip heavy cavalrymen—so as to keep the men and horses protected by means of armor—so that the spears of the infantrymen will be smashed by these men and by using them the enemy will destroy our infantry units" (*PM* I.⁹⁸⁻¹⁰³). The interest of his remarks lies in their testimony to the proven effectiveness of Byzantine infantry deployed in square formation, which has as a result led the Arabs to increase the weight and force of their cavalry attacks by outfitting both the men and horses with heavier armor. The elite corps of *ghulam* and the Turkish and Kurdish horsemen who served in Hamdanid armies will have furnished most of these heavy cavalrymen.

The *menavlatoi* were the linchpin in Phokas' defensive system. Selected for their exceptional strength and valor,¹³ these men with their heavy pikes took up a position in the face of the formation, in front of the infantrymen in the first line (ἐν τῷ μετωπαίῳ τῶν προμάχων), and so made the formation eight men deep (*PM* I.⁹⁴⁻⁹⁵). Their original position is not stated in the *Praecepta*, but the *Taktika* indicates that they waited behind their taxiarchy to see if the enemy was attacking their side of the square and, if so, made their way forward through the intervals into the front lines (*TNO* 56.¹⁰⁶⁻¹¹¹). As the enemy *kataphraktoi* closed in, the *menavlatoi* stood immediately before the first line of infantrymen to form the front of the formation: "the *menavlatoi* must be at the ready in front of the formation of heavy infantrymen, by no means isolated from them, but instead closely attached" (*PM* I.¹⁰⁴⁻¹⁰⁶). The reasons for his emphatic tone will emerge below.

Bringing the *menavlatoi* forward into the front ranks was one of two steps taken to bolster the infantry formation against attacking cavalry. The second involved advancing one of the two rear lines of heavy infantrymen into the front lines. Phokas prescribed the following maneuver—which the soldiers had been taught in training—in which one of the two rear rows came forward. At a given signal, the two pentekontarchs on opposite ends of the one hundred man line were to conduct their contingents of fifty men forward through the intervals and bring them in behind the second line of infantrymen in the front of the formation (*PM* I.¹⁰⁶⁻¹¹⁴), with the result that "they will make the formation three

¹³ *PM* I.¹²⁴⁻¹²⁵; one wonders if they were not induced by some reward, as there can hardly have been many volunteers for this particular role.



17. The front lines of the taxiarchy reinforced (see pp. 268–69)

lines deep so that with the *menavlatoi* it will become four deep" (*PM* I.¹¹⁴⁻¹¹⁵). One line of heavy infantry thus remained in the rear to preserve the "double-faced" formation noted above. In the meantime, the javeliners and other light infantrymen came up from the back of the intervals in which they were stationed to block off the entrances. This transformation of the taxiarchy and the closing of the intervals are illustrated in the accompanying diagram (Fig. 17).

Lurking in these routines is the element of deception. The enemy *kataphraktoi* who had expected to be confronted with only two lines of spearmen now found themselves opposed by four. Even more disconcertingly, one of these four lines was made up of very strong men who were armed, quite literally, with a tree trunk capped by a long point to form a weapon expressly designed to withstand the impact of their charge. Phokas' description of the *menavlion* as "just so thick that hands can wield it" suggests that the *menavlatoi* knelt or crouched down to anchor the butt ends of their pikes against the ground and aimed the points at an angle into the oncoming warhorses. The rest of the foot soldiers surely did the same with their long spears, but as Phokas declares, "if it

should happen—and we do hope not—that the three-deep spears of the heavy infantrymen are shattered by the enemy *kataphraktoi*, then the *menavlatoi*, firmly set, stand their ground bravely as they receive the enemy charge and turn them away” (*PM* I.^{115–119}).¹⁴

Once the *kataphraktoi* had reached the infantry lines and were embroiled with the *menavlatoi* and spearmen directly in front of them, it was then up to the javeliners within the square to “head out through both intervals on either flank and engage the enemy *kataphraktoi* and force them away” (*PM* I.^{125–127}). As light infantry, the javeliners could dash in and out of the *melee* to strike at the *kataphraktoi* from the side or from behind, or to kill unhorsed riders. They were used to the same purpose when Byzantine cavalymen were at close quarters with enemy horsemen (*PM* II.^{88–91}), since by mixing among the cavalymen the javeliners could single out enemy riders already engaged or injured and finish them off. This was how the Bulgar czar John Vladislav met his death at the siege of Dyrrachion in 1018: “when battle was joined, he fell in combat with the *strategos* and *patrikios* Niketas Pegonites; he fell as they fought on horseback and received a mortal wound to the body from two foot soldiers who rushed into the fray, although it never became clear who had struck him down.”¹⁵

The serried ranks of the spearmen and *menavlatoi* presented a formidable barrier to attacking cavalry. But whereas Phokas devoted careful attention to their tactics and routines, he said very little on the role played by the bowmen in helping to defend the infantry position. That bowmen constituted approximately one-third of the infantry force is a sign that archery was regarded as a vital part of infantry tactics, however, and the passing details in the *Praecepta* indicate that their role in battle was by no means negligible. On each side of the infantry square there were nine hundred archers, each of whom carried one hundred arrows in his two quivers and received fifty more from the huge stock of “imperial arrows” (*PM* I.^{34–35, 137–140}). Moreover, Phokas advised that a handful of men be detailed to replenish their supply of arrows so as to avoid the archers having to leave their places during combat in search of more ammunition (*PM* I.^{143–146}). This large number of arrows and the system of resupply were

¹⁴This passage gives the impression that the *menavlatoi* were behind the three lines of infantrymen instead of in front of them, which contradicts Phokas’ instructions above (*PM* I.^{94–95}). It would appear that Phokas is envisioning the *melee* that broke out once the enemy cavalry had closed with the massed Byzantine infantry. The spears of the heavy infantrymen might be shattered either on first impact with the attackers or during the hand-to-hand fighting, so depriving them of their principal weapon, whereas the solid *menavlia* will remain unbroken and so enable the *menavlatoi* to fight on. See also the comments of M. P. Anastasiadis, “On Handling the Menavlion,” *BMGS* 18 (1994), 1–10.

¹⁵Skyl. 357.^{54–60}.

necessary because of the skirmishing which opened hostilities as both opponents sought to disperse each other’s ranks before attacking in strength.

But these scant details are not enough to form a coherent picture of Byzantine bowmen in battle. There is simply no information in the *Praecepta* or other sources of the time to describe how they were commanded during battle, what their rate of shot was expected to be, the weight of their arrows, and what their effect on charging cavalry was. To compensate for this lack of information on Byzantine archers, we may venture some tentative comparisons based on descriptions of western and Islamic archers.

Two main factors were at play in the overall effectiveness of archers against cavalry. How many volleys they could unleash into the attackers depended both on the distance that the enemy had to cover and the speed at which they moved; how many of the enemy the archers could bring down depended on the effective target range of their bows. Given the range of medieval bows and the speed of the attackers, the plain fact is that archers, no matter how proficient, did not have much time at all to deliver accurate, powerful volleys against charging cavalry. For instance, in his study of the battle of Courtrai (1302), Verbruggen estimated that the French knights moving at a trot would have covered a distance of 250 m in about one minute’s time, twice as fast at a gallop, which would have allowed the Flemish archers perhaps fifteen to twenty-four seconds to discharge their arrows within effective range—two volleys at most—while their accuracy will doubtless have suffered under stress as the knights drew near.¹⁶ According to Keegan’s analysis of the battle of Agincourt (1415), the English archers—trained to loose an arrow every ten seconds—likely managed to send four to five volleys into the French knights who attacked over a distance of 250 to three hundred yards.¹⁷ Studies of Saracen archery by Latham and Paterson present similar findings on the speed and accuracy of Islamic bowmen.¹⁸ They cite a full target range of 280 yards, a distance at which a trained archer’s rate of accuracy might be one in four against a mounted man. Although a low proportion for an individual, a group of archers shooting at this range could achieve a fair number of hits against a massed body of men, although few would be lethal. But as the distance between shooters and targets decreased, the accuracy and terminal velocity of shot correspondingly increased: “one may presume that the trained archer, on foot, should hit a man every time at about sixty

¹⁶Verbruggen, *Art of Warfare*, 163.

¹⁷J. Keegan, *The Face of Battle* (London, 1976), 90–96.

¹⁸J. D. Latham and W. F. Paterson, *Saracen Archery* (London, 1970), 142, on the speed and accuracy of shot attained by Muslim archers. See also W. F. Paterson, “The Archers of Islam,” *JESHO* 9 (1966), 69–87, esp. 82–86 on the effective range of Saracen bows.

yards," while the force of shot would enable the arrows to pierce most armor. But as Latham and Paterson remark, "accuracy naturally diminishes with increased speed, and field trials suggest that it is difficult to exceed eight *well-aimed* shots per minute." If increased speed diminishes accuracy in field trials, how much more, then, would the din and stress of battle have curtailed an archer's rate and accuracy of shot.

These calculations may be loosely applied to the Byzantine archers. As a unit of measure, the Byzantine bowshot (σαγιτόβολον) is calculated at 330 m,¹⁹ but the actual target—or, more candidly, killing—range will of course have been much less. Allowing for a maximum target range of 150 m and assuming that the enemy cavalry would have launched their charge from a point just out of this range, we may reckon that the Byzantine archers had less than one minute to get off perhaps four volleys, or one every ten to twelve seconds. If, as proposed above, the front rows of infantrymen and the *menavlatoi* crouched down to anchor their spears against the ground, the archers would have been able to shoot over them all the more easily and to within fairly short range as the enemy drew near. There is no gauging the results achieved, however, beyond supposing that nine hundred archers shooting in unison must have had a withering effect at close range, but even so, they were expected not to repulse the enemy but to break up the cohesion of their attack. From his emphasis on the spearmen and *menavlatoi* it is clear that Phokas expected the enemy cavalry to come through the volleys of arrows, and that, in the end, it would fall to the *menavlatoi* and the dense infantry lines to stop them. That he included swords and axes among the reserve weapons for archers (*PM* I.³⁶⁻³⁸) would indicate that he expected the attacking cavalry to close with the infantry, at which point the archers would have had to put down their bows and fight with their weapons in hand-to-hand combat.

Changes in infantry tactics

The placement of the *menavlatoi* within the front ranks of the spearmen and the reinforcement of the front lines stand out as the crucial steps in Phokas' defensive tactics against enemy *kataphraktoi*. The combination of the *menavlatoi* with dense infantry formations in withstanding heavy cavalry represents but one approach to this aspect of infantry tactics, however, since both the positioning of the *menavlatoi* and the methods of reinforcing the infantry formation underwent revision during the tenth century. Both revisions deserve analysis for

¹⁹Schilbach, *Metrologie*, 42.

the light they shed on the continually shifting balance between infantry defenders and cavalry attackers in this period.

1. *The tactics of the menavlatoi.* The *menavlatos* represented a new type of infantryman created in response to the revival of heavy cavalry in the mid-tenth century. As is usually the case with newly introduced soldiers, finding the most effective way to use them involves a process of trial and error, and the *menavlatoi* were no exception. We have already seen that in his regulations on infantry tactics Phokas strongly insisted that the *menavlatoi* must not be separated from the heavy infantrymen but should instead be joined closely with them in the front lines when preparing to receive the enemy charge (μη μέντοι μεμονωμένους . . . ἀλλὰ μάλλον συγκεκολλημένους). The passage indicates that the *menavlatoi* had first been used as a separate unit apart from the infantrymen in the front lines. This was in fact how the compiler of the *Sylloge* had recommended using these men to meet the charge of the enemy *kataphraktoi* (*ST* 47.16):

The third unit, that of the so-called *menavlatoi*, consists of three hundred infantrymen. The *menavlatoi* first take their position up at the front of the intervals. When the enemy approaches to within a bowshot, they make their way out from the intervals and form up at a distance of at most 30–40 *ourguiai* from the infantry units, either maintaining an even front or in the shape of a triangle, as described in chapter 45. By using their *menavla* with great courage, it is their task to stab the horses of the heavy cavalrymen.

Comparison of this passage in the *Sylloge* with Phokas' directions on the *menavlatoi* in the *Praecepta* identifies another change besides the revision in their tactics. The compiler of the *Sylloge* refers to the *menavlatoi* as a single unit of three hundred men, whereas Phokas includes one hundred *menavlatoi* in each of the twelve *taxiarchiai*, making twelve hundred all told—four times as many as in the *Sylloge*. In the decade or so between the two texts, then, the number of *menavlatoi* in the infantry force had been greatly increased as the counterweight to the growing number of heavy cavalry. Their use in battle had also undergone a significant change. According to the *Sylloge*, they moved out through the intervals to a distance of fifty-five to seventy-five m from the front lines to meet the enemy charge, which they sought to disrupt by killing the attackers' horses. The most instructive account describing how this tactic worked in practice comes not from a Byzantine source, nor even a historical source, but from the *Ethiopian Tale* by Heliodoros (third century A.D.). In the ninth book of his novel, Heliodoros tells the story of the battle of Syene, fought between the forces of the Ethiopian king Hydaspes and the Persians, during

which Hydaspes' allies, tribesmen known as the Blemmyes, employ measures very similar to those outlined in the *Sylloge* to break up the charge of the Persian *kataphraktoi*.²⁰

When they were already within range and the Blemmyes saw the *kataphraktoi* spurring their horses into the charge, they began to carry out Hydaspes' orders. . . . they advanced well ahead of the formations as quickly as they could and rushed toward the *kataphraktoi*, an act of sheer lunacy as it appeared to the onlookers as they watched so few men move forward against a far greater number of men who were so well protected. The Persians incited their horses even more than before and drove to the attack, viewing the boldness of these men as a stroke of luck, since they expected to overwhelm them at the first clash of arms. At the moment when the Blemmyes were at close quarters with them, all but within reach of their lancepoints, at a signal they suddenly crouched down and ducked underneath the horses, fixing one knee on the ground and barely keeping their heads and backs from being trampled. What they did was incredible—they wounded the horses by slashing at them under the belly with their swords as they went by, with the result that not a few of the horsemen tumbled off when the horses in agony went out of control and threw their riders, whom the Blemmyes stabbed from below their thighs as they lay like tree trunks on the ground, for once deprived of his mount the Persian *kataphraktos* is immobile.


It is not difficult to imagine the Byzantine *menavlatoi* doing much the same, for the compiler of the *Sylloge* declares that it was their task to kill the enemy warhorses by using their pikes to stab them. The *menavlatoi* probably crouched down and inclined their weapons at such an angle that the horses would impale themselves on the long points by virtue of their own momentum, especially if the *menavlatos* could direct the point toward the animal's unprotected underbelly. Killing or wounding the horses would bring their riders crashing down, at which point they could be finished off as they lay injured or motionless on the ground. If enough horses were injured or killed and enough riders unhorsed, further waves of cavalry would be impeded by the obstacle of their own fallen lying in heaps.



²⁰ *Heliodori Aethiopica*, ed. I. Bekker (Leipzig, 1855), 261.¹⁷–262.¹⁰. The fictional battle of Syene appears to have been based on Plutarch's account of the battle of Carrhae in the *Life of Crassus*, 25, in which tactics similar to those used by the Blemmyes are mentioned; see E. Feuillâtre, *Etudes sur les Ethiopiennes d'Héliodore* (Paris, 1966), 133.

The *menavlatoi* were therefore first employed as a sort of human break-water against charging *kataphraktoi*, in keeping with a method that had long been used against heavy cavalry. But isolating the *menavlatoi* in this way is the very measure opposed so strenuously by Phokas, which naturally leads one to ask why he discarded this tactic in favor of keeping them closely attached to the front lines. Among the reasons that come to mind is that there was not much time for the *menavlatoi* to move out thirty to forty fathoms, the distance prescribed in the *Sylloge*; besides, an enemy familiar with this tactic might also have been able to ride around them and cut them off. Sending them so far ahead of the infantry lines would also have prevented the archers from shooting at attacking cavalry for fear of hitting their own men, so that keeping the *menavlatoi* within the front ranks of the spearmen may have been a revision intended to achieve a more efficient way of combining archers with spearmen to stop a cavalry charge. Instead of moving one line of men out to act in isolation—which demanded great courage—Phokas saw greater advantage in four mutually supportive lines of infantry in the face of the formation, a deployment which allowed the archers more time and opportunity to disrupt the charging horsemen before the infantrymen and *menavlatoi* were forced to engage them.

2. *Increasing the depth of the infantry lines.* When rewriting the *Praecepta* as chapters 56 through 62 of his *Taktika*, Nikephoros Ouranos adhered closely to Phokas' regulations on infantry tactics, but he did record one significant change for infantrymen facing heavy cavalry. This involved deepening the infantry lines before an enemy cavalry attack. Ouranos has the *menavlatoi* follow the same procedures prescribed by Phokas, but instead of bringing one of the rear lines of infantry forward into the front lines, as was the system in Phokas' time, he instead has the infantrymen double the depth of their formation. He explains the new maneuver as follows (*TNO* 56.^{111–117}; see also Fig. 18):

. . . the *menavlatoi* must be at the ready in the rear and identify the side on which the enemy *kataphraktoi* have begun to make their attack. Those *menavlatoi* must head out through the aforementioned intervals and take their place in front of the line of infantrymen; they must not, however, be far apart from them but should be closely attached to those infantrymen. At this point it is necessary to combine two files of infantrymen and make them into one; that is, one file must move into the next one and the seven men must become fourteen and thicken the formation. The *menavlatoi* must stand their ground and bravely resist the onslaught of the *kataphraktoi* and the rest of the enemy and turn them away.



 Heavy infantryman
 Archer

18. The taxiarchy doubled in depth; note the loss of only one file in width (see pp. 275–77)

The diagram demonstrates that moving every second file of spearmen and archers sideways into the adjacent file would have made the formation twice as deep with the loss of only one file in width. This adjustment seems to have been introduced to gain two advantages simultaneously over the system laid out by Phokas. Not only was the new maneuver much simpler and quicker, it also transformed the infantry formation into a much denser body of men, expanded now from seven to fourteen lines deep, sixteen including the *menavlatoi*, and so

Sowing the Dragon's Teeth

twice as deep as the maximum depth of eight lines achieved by Phokas' system. More importantly, the frontal depth of the formation was now six lines of heavy infantrymen and *menavlatoi* instead of the four lines in the earlier system. As suggested in the previous chapter, Ouranos may have been recording a change in infantry tactics devised in response to the Fatimids' efforts to equip their soldiers in heavy armor, but in itself the change bears witness to the overall effectiveness of heavy cavalry in this period, indicating as it does that infantry found themselves obliged to resort not only to anti-cavalry specialists such as the *menavlatoi* but also to much denser formations to resist a cavalry attack.

In a broader light, however, these two changes in infantry tactics reveal an important—and ironical—dimension of Byzantine warfare. Neither the Byzantines nor their foes were slow to incorporate each other's most effective weapons or tactics into their own repertoires, with the result that innovation in warfare demanded not only the ability to devise a solution to a problem (developing *kataphraktoi* to break infantry) in order to gain a meaningful advantage over the enemy, but also the ability to come up with a solution to the solution (creating the *menavlatoi* for use against *kataphraktoi*) in order to negate the effect of the innovation once turned against its creator.

The study of Byzantine infantry tactics in the tenth century is, unfortunately, confined to the treatises. The references to foot soldiers in the historical sources are so scant that they cannot be used to corroborate or enhance the tactical prescriptions of the treatises. In face of these limitations, the best we can do is to offer some suggestive parallels from other periods to arrive at a general assessment of the formation and routines set out in the *Praecepta*.

Tactics were very uncomplicated in the medieval period—infantry tactics especially so—and a fundamental attribute of the Byzantine infantry tactics outlined in the tenth-century treatises was their simplicity. Their formation was stationary, very simple and hence well suited to their defensive role, as were their battle deployment and routines. Each type of foot soldier (whether spearman, archer, light infantryman, or *menavlatos*) had one specific task to perform in this defensive system designed to force attacking cavalry to ride through a hail of arrows into a thick wall of spearmen and pikemen. Byzantine infantrymen were by no means the skilled warriors that many of their cavalry counterparts were, but it would not have required great prowess to master the elementary formation and tactics prescribed for them; and the one truly key role, that of *menavlatos*, went to the bravest and strongest among them.

There is no evidence by which to measure the effectiveness of Byzantine infantry in the tenth century, but examples of infantry-cavalry encounters from other times show that massed spearmen—with and without the support of ar-

chers—determined to stand their ground usually prevailed against attacking cavalry. A handful of instances from Prokopios may be cited. During a battle in 530, the Persian cavalry routed the Byzantine cavalry, compelling Belisarios and his retinue to fall back upon the infantry force. The foot soldiers stood with their backs to a river to prevent encirclement by the Persian horsemen, whose frontal attacks were successfully resisted.²¹ In 544 a Byzantine infantry force achieved a similar success against Persian cavalry by deploying in a very dense formation (ἐς φάλαγγά τε ὡς βαθυτάτην ταξάμενοι πεζοί) and holding their spears straight ahead (τὰ δόρατα ἐπανατεινόμενοι σφίσιν). The Persians failed to break the infantry on this occasion because the horses recoiled before the serried ranks and the bristling spearpoints; they were also terrified by the din created by the Byzantine infantrymen beating on their shields.²² And in 551, the general Narses put a small unit of fifty foot soldiers across a key mountain path to block Totila's Gothic horsemen. The Byzantine soldiers lined up with their spears protruding through densely packed shields and repeatedly stood off the Goths who were forced by the hilly terrain into making direct frontal assaults. Again, the spearpoints and the clamor of the soldiers' striking their shields combined to frighten off the horses.²³

The formations and tactics used by the foot soldiers in Crusader armies in Syria during the twelfth century, and the solid defense they could mount against enemy cavalry, also make for instructive comparison with Byzantine infantry tactics of the tenth century. In his review of foreign nations, Muhammad al-Mangli offered this description of the Frankish formation and tactics:²⁴

... They have a solid formation in battle and as long as they maintain this there is no getting past them, but if the formation comes apart and disperses, they are soon overcome and let themselves be taken prisoner. And this is the shape of the formation [a square] . . . : The cavalry stand together and the infantry form a ring around them with large shields, like a wall that surrounds them. Between every two shields is a lance aimed at the enemy and behind this is a crossbow, which is called an *alzburg*. They march step by step up to the enemy and come to halt when they have no room left, and when they find the right moment, they let forth a prearranged cry and the infantry creates an opening for the cavalry which then bursts forward and attacks the enemy, who rarely withstands this onslaught, while the in-

²¹ Prokopios, *Wars* I.18.41–45.

²² *Ibid.*, VIII.29.11–21.

²³ *Ibid.*, VIII.8.30–32.

²⁴ Ritter, "Parure des Cavaliers," 146–47.

fantry continues behind. If they do not attain their objective, they then turn about and head back again through the opening which closes around them as it had before. This formation is akin to a walking city.

The description indicates that the Frankish infantry likewise formed square in battle, and, as did Byzantine infantrymen, used the formation as a base and a refuge for cavalry. Deploying infantry in a line to form a wall for the cavalry was also common practice and, whenever possible, the Frankish foot soldiers used natural obstacles as barriers to deny flank attacks or encirclement and so to limit the enemy to direct frontal assaults against massed spearmen and bowmen.²⁵ Accounts of Crusader battles in Syria during the twelfth century show that the combination of spearmen and archers (or crossbowmen) employed by the Frankish infantry was quite capable of withstanding attacks by the Turkish and Saracen cavalry, even to the point that Saladin's horsemen declined to confront Richard the Lionhearted's formidable array of spearmen and crossbowmen at Jaffa in 1192.²⁶

These random episodes from the sixth and the twelfth centuries have been cited to demonstrate that the battle formation and tactics prescribed for Byzantine infantrymen in the tenth century proved effective in other times and places, largely because two essential conditions were met: first, that by the shape of their formation or their choice of terrain the defenders were able to force the attackers to fight on their terms, and second, that the defenders were determined, or compelled, to stand firm because their formation or placement (e.g., before a river) eliminated the possibility of flight. As we have seen, the Byzantine square met these conditions openly and implicitly.

And as long as these two conditions were met, it would appear that infantry held the upper hand both in the physical clash of arms and, more importantly, in the war of nerves between defender and attacker. The surest testimony to this lies in Phokas' own words, where he states that the Byzantine *kataphraktoi* about to launch an attack against an enemy line made up of heavy infantrymen "must not be frightened (οὐ χρεὶ . . . δειλιᾶν) but must proceed very calmly" (*PM* II. 115–117), remarks conceding that not only Phokas but also his cavalrymen recognized that theirs was the more daunting task. In the following section on cavalry tactics we shall see that the Byzantine *kataphraktoi* cultivated an intimidating demeanor to break the nerve of the enemy infantrymen as the crucial

²⁵ On the tactics employed by the Frankish foot soldiers in twelfth-century Syria and Palestine, see Smail, *Crusading Warfare*, 115–20; 165–89 *passim*.

²⁶ Smail, *Crusading Warfare*, 188–89; for other examples, see Verbruggen, *Art of Warfare*, 50–52.

first step to breaking them physically; that the foot soldiers in Hamdanid armies seem to have deployed and fought much like their Byzantine counterparts does much to explain why this should have been so.

Part 2: Cavalry Deployment and Tactics

In a characteristically forthright declaration, Phokas stated that the commander "with five or six thousand mounted warriors and the aid of God will stand in need of nothing more" (*DV* XVII.¹⁷⁻¹⁹). The regulations on cavalry deployment and tactics in the *Praecepta* might best be viewed as the *quod erat demonstrandum* of his confident assertion. Envisioning a cavalry contingent of approximately six thousand horsemen, Phokas outlines the structure of each unit and its place within the general deployment of the cavalry force, defines the tactical role for each unit—skirmishers, flankguards, outflankers, regular cavalymen, and *kataphraktoi*—and in the two battle paradigms demonstrates how the commander must coordinate the skills and tactics of his various cavalry units when seeking contact with the enemy, launching an attack, and conducting an unrelenting pursuit. In a manner wholly consistent with the ruthlessness typifying the Byzantine conduct of war in this period, Phokas' cavalry tactics are infused with an aggressive spirit that sought to shatter the enemy morally as well as physically. The fearsome *kataphraktoi*—the mailed fist that inflicted the decisive blow—embody his determination to break both the enemy's capacity and will to resist.

As was the case with infantry tactics, Phokas' prescriptions on cavalry tactics in the *Praecepta* combine with those in other contemporary treatises to reveal a number of modifications in cavalry warfare during the tenth century. But where contemporary historians are silent on the role of infantry, their accounts of battles offer much useful information on cavalry and cavalymen. The interest of the Byzantine chroniclers and their audience was attracted by the heroic aura of wars and battles and thus by the exploits of the mighty warriors who fought on horseback; the descriptions of Byzantine cavalry in action and the *aristeia* of individual heroes recorded in the historical sources thus form a valuable complement to the military treatises. Both will be used to illuminate Phokas' discussion of Byzantine cavalry tactics.

The deployment of the cavalry

According to Phokas' directions in Chapter IV of the *Praecepta*, the cavalry force was divided into sixteen units (*PM* IV.²⁴), deployed as follows. A unit of skirmishers operating in open order went ahead of the main force, which consisted of a first line of three units spearheaded by the *kataphraktoi*, a second line

of four units, a third line of three units, and a last line of three units guarding the baggage train. Out on the right wing of the first line stood one unit of outflankers, while out on the left wing stood one unit of flankguards (cf. Fig. 19). This general deployment and the disposition of each unit will be reviewed presently in greater detail, but a brief comparison of Phokas' plan with the traditional plan is necessary first to trace the evolution of Byzantine cavalry tactics and identify the modifications introduced during the tenth century.


The study of cavalry warfare begins with the bible of Byzantine military theory, the *Strategikon* of Maurice (ca. 600),²⁷ in which the standard disposition for cavalry and its inherent tactical principles were first laid down. In the second and third books of the treatise, the author recommends deploying the cavalry force in two lines: the first, called the "front" line (τάξις λεγομένη ἡ πρόμαχος), comprised three divisions flanked on the right by a unit of outflankers and on the left by a unit of flankguards; the second, called the "support" line (τάξις δευτέρα, ἡ λεγομένη βοηθός), consisted of four divisions separated by wide intervals to allow the units of the first line to pass through them. Trailing these two lines were the baggage train, the spare horses, and two units of rearguards.²⁸

Behind this deployment lie a number of tactical considerations prompted by the Byzantines' encounter with the nomadic peoples from the eastern Steppes. In the preface to his discussion of cavalry tactics, the author points out that unlike the Byzantines and Persians, the Avars and the Huns do not put their horsemen in one battle line to decide the issue at a single blow, but keep a second and even a third line for greater diversity in attack (*SM* II.1.¹⁹⁻²⁷).²⁹ He goes on to say that a single line is unwieldy, inadequate to cope with uneven ground and surprise attacks from the flanks or rear and, worst of all, makes no provision for fleeing men to rally. On the other hand, deployment in two lines presents the following advantages: the men in the first line fight more earnestly knowing that they are protected from behind by the second line; the second line prevents the men in front from deserting in battle (the decisive advantage in the author's eyes); the second line can rally the first line if defeated or guarantee its security if pursuing a beaten enemy; if the first line is hopelessly defeated, an organized second line can confront the enemy now in disarray from the initial encounter; and finally, deployment in two lines is effective against an enemy not only equal but also superior in number (*SM* II.1.⁵⁶⁻⁸¹).

²⁷ On the *Strategikon*, see A. Kollautz, "Das militärwissenschaftliche Werk des sog. Maurikios," *BYZANTIKA* 5 (1985), 87-135.

²⁸ A full diagram of this deployment is given in the *Strategikon* III.8.

²⁹ Bivar, "Cavalry Equipment," 288-90, and Coulston, "Roman, Parthian and Sassanid Tactical Developments," 68-71.



19. The general deployment of the cavalry force (see pp. 280–85)

The *Strategikon* remained the sole attested Byzantine military textbook until the revival of military science during the reign of Leo VI (886–912). Leo made the treatise the basis for his own writings on warfare, and in book XII of his *Taktika* (ca. 900) recapitulated his predecessor's instructions on cavalry deployment. More importantly from the standpoint of current military theory, however, Leo condensed these directions into a brief reprise of cavalry tactics for use against the Arabs — “this barbarous people” — in conclusion to his analysis of their characteristics and tactics (*LT* XVIII.109–142 / 143–148). Calling this “the manifold deployment” (ἡ ποικίλη παράταξις) for a thematic army of four thousand men, Leo prescribes the same plan keeping one line of three units in front, a second line of four units in reserve, with detachments of skirmishers, outflankers, flankguards, and rearguards. In the *De velitatione*, Phokas also prescribed this general deployment for cavalry about to confront the main Arab body.³⁰

This traditional model for the deployment of cavalry, set out first in the *Strategikon* and revived (at least in theory) early in the tenth century for use against the Arabs, had undergone two modifications by the middle of the tenth century. Chapter 46 of the *Sylloge tacticorum* demonstrates that the standard pattern of three units in the first line, four in the second line, with detachments of skirmishers, outflankers and flankguards, and rearguards, had been kept; now, however, a triangular formation of heavy cavalry occupied the center of the first line, while a third line of three units was placed behind the second line. The formation and placement of the heavy *kataphraktoi* will be analyzed separately below, but the addition of the third line also marks a significant change and deserves attention.

The addition of a third line demonstrates that Byzantine tacticians of the tenth century were as receptive to influences from their Arab enemies as their predecessors had been to those of the Avars and Huns in the sixth century. The compiler of the *Sylloge* refers to the third line as the *saka* (σάκα), a term borrowed from Arabic. The word *saqah* was the technical term used by Muslim military writers to denote the army's rearguard, and was used in its Greek form by Byzantine writers to designate the body of men posted as a rearguard in battle or on the march in Byzantine armies.³¹ The derivation of the Greek term

³⁰ Dagron, *Le traité*, 208, with a diagram and comments on the instructions for cavalry deployment which derive from the standard plan in Maurice and Leo.

³¹ Cf. Scanlon, *A Muslim Manual*, 84: “the vanguard . . . composed of the cavalry which should be the forefront of the army and the rest of the army should be behind in set order, these, back to the *saqah* and it is the rear echelon of the army”; and p. 90: “a rearguard, *saqah*.” On *saka* in the Greek sources, see Dagron, *Le traité*, 59 note 4.

from the Arabic is obvious and suggests that in adding a third line to the cavalry deployment the Byzantines were simply imitating Arab practice. The third line afforded greater flexibility and security to the cavalry force in battle, since the commander could have the three rear units move forward through the intervals in the second line either to support an attack by the first line or to take up the pursuit (*PM* IV.^{152-154, 166-171}), thus allowing him to keep the second line intact even longer to await or react to the course of events. It would seem that these reserve units were also responsible for fending off the Bedouin if they tried to come up from behind against the Byzantine units in pursuit of the main force (*PM* II.¹²⁶⁻¹²⁹).

The tactical model for cavalry deployment and subsequent modifications were thus already well established in Byzantine military theory by the time Nikephoros Phokas wrote the *Praecepta*. He closely followed the pattern laid out in the *Sylloge* when presenting the battle deployment of his cavalry units, but once again, as in his tactics for infantry, he converted the detailed academic model of his source into a realistic, workable tactical system for the types and number of cavalymen at his disposal. His prescriptions may be summarized here.

Forging ahead as scouts and skirmishers were the *prokoursatores*, or light cavalymen armed as lancers or bowmen. Ideally, there were to be five hundred of these men, of whom 110 or 120 were to be mounted archers, but if the army was not large enough to furnish five hundred *prokoursatores*, then three hundred men could be detailed, with sixty of them to be mounted archers. The *prokoursatores* were to be commanded by a high-ranking officer (either a *strategos* or *topoteretes* named by the emperor: *PM* IV.¹²⁻¹⁴); in the force of five hundred the commander kept 150 men—or one hundred men out of the smaller force of three hundred—with him as his bodyguard (φοῦλκον) and reserve for the safety of the remaining force.³² Since they were used for reconnaissance and skirmishing, the *prokoursatores* kept to no fixed formation but ranged about in open order (*PM* IV.¹⁶⁻¹⁸; cf. *TNO* 61.¹⁹⁻²¹).

The regular cavalymen making up the bulk of the cavalry force were grouped in fifty-men *banda*—the *bandon* was the smallest tactical unit in the cavalry—and arrayed for battle in formations of five hundred men. Each of these formations lined up one hundred riders across and five riders deep; two *banda* formed one row of one hundred riders. The first two rows were composed of lancers, the next two rows of mounted archers, and the last row of lancers once more (*PM* IV.³³⁻⁴⁷); thus making the formation “double-faced,” as had been

³²On this term see the linear commentary: *PM* IV.¹⁹ (pp. 71-72).

standard in cavalry tactics since the sixth century.³³ Whatever the number of men on hand, insists Phokas, the five-man depth and the ratio of three lancers to two archers was to be maintained (*PM* IV.⁵⁶⁻⁶⁰).

The first line of the cavalry force had the *kataphraktoi* in the center, flanked by two units of regular cavalry. Smaller units of one hundred horsemen were posted on the wings. The men on the right wing were called ὑπερκερασταί or outflankers, composed mainly of mounted archers, who swung out to encircle the enemy left. On the left wing were their counterparts, called ἀποσοβηταί by Phokas, whose task it was to “fend off” (ἀποσοβεῖν, hence their name) the enemy outflankers who pressed in on the Byzantine left (*PM* IV.^{31-33, 84-86}). This traditional disposition of outflankers and flankguards, showing as it does the essential “right-handedness” of Byzantine armies and tactics—and, apparently, of their enemies—is an interesting example of how want of skills may limit the scope and effectiveness of an army's tactics. Outflankers shooting from the right wing naturally launched their arrows against their adversaries' shield sides (i.e., their left), but even though this would have lessened their effect, it was natural for right-handed archers on horseback, attacking from the right, to draw the bow across their bodies for a shot to the left. It was far more difficult, however, for horse-archers attacking from the left to make the awkward motion necessary for the more telling shot to the right against their adversaries' unprotected right sides. This difficulty was compounded by the reciprocal vulnerability of outflankers attacking from the left to enemy arrows launched against their own unshielded right sides.

Finally, several references in the *Praecepta* indicate that the commander's place was in the second line of four units (e.g., *PM* II.^{31-36, 63-66}; IV.¹⁶⁰⁻¹⁶²). Although Phokas does not specify exactly where the commander stood, it is likely that he and his retinue took their place between the two innermost units, as recommended in other treatises.³⁴ Between the four units were spacious intervals permitting unhindered passage back and forth, so that the three forward units could easily retire or the three rear units advance through the three intervals in the second line (*PM* IV.⁶⁰⁻⁶⁵). The three units in the third line deployed directly opposite these intervals at the distance of a bowshot from the second line (*PM* IV.⁶⁵⁻⁶⁹; cf. *TNO* 61.¹⁰⁴⁻¹¹²). Behind the third line was the baggage train, guarded by three small units of one hundred men each.

³³*SM* II.4.⁹⁻¹⁰.

³⁴Cf. *SM* III.8.¹⁶; 15.²⁻³; *ST* 46.17; 24: “. . . ἡ βοηθός . . . παράταξις ἐν τέσσασι τάγμασιν (ἐνθα ὁ στρατηγὸς σὺν τοῖς βανδοφόροις καὶ σαλπικταῖς ἐν αὐτῷ δηλαδὴ τῷ μεσαιτάτῳ διαλείμματα). . . .” Phokas does not describe the commander's escort, but ensign-bearers or trumpeters would surely have been among his retinue to transmit orders visually or by sound.


The formation of the kataphraktoi

The insertion of the *kataphraktoi* into the standard tactical disposition for Byzantine cavalry represented a change to the structure and tactics of the front or "attack" line. For the *kataphraktoi* to achieve the greatest effect, their deployment and tactics demanded meticulous preparation and precise coordination with the units that escorted their charge. Phokas therefore outlined their formation and placement within the attack line in minute detail.

Throughout his discussion of cavalry tactics Phokas refers to the formation used by the *kataphraktoi* as a "triangle" (ἡ τρίγωνος τῶν καταφράκτων παρά-ταξις), although to be pedantically exact the figure that he presents is in fact a trapezium. The formation was very simple in design and easy to create. It stood twelve rows deep with each row adding two men to either wing as the formation went back, thereby increasing the total of men in successive rows by four at a time. Two models are offered in the *Praecepta*, the first for a body of 504 men in which the first row contained twenty men, the second twenty-four, the third twenty-eight, and so on down to the last row of sixty-four (*PM* III.¹⁻⁹; see also Fig. 20); the second model is of a reduced version comprising 384 men, in which the first row contained ten men, the second fourteen, the third eighteen, and so on down to the last row of fifty-four (*PM* III.⁹⁻¹⁷). It was not the numbers but the pattern that was most important in Phokas' view, however, since he instructs the commander to follow this basic pattern adding two men to the wings of successive rows no matter the number of men available (*PM* III.¹⁷⁻²³).

The cavalymen forming the triangle were arranged as follows. The first four lines were to be composed exclusively of *kataphraktoi* wielding iron maces as shock weapons; from the fifth row to the twelfth, the two horsemen on each wing alternated between lancers and soldiers armed with sabers or maces (*PM* III.⁶⁰⁻⁶⁵). In the middle of the triangle, from the fifth row to the twelfth, were mounted archers enclosed within the surrounding *kataphraktoi*. The formation of 504 men contained 150 mounted archers; the smaller version of 384 contained eighty (*PM* III.⁴⁶⁻⁵³). Also enclosed within the ranks of the *kataphraktoi* were light cavalry lancers who might be used to fill out the formation in case there were not enough heavy cavalymen on hand (*PM* III.⁶⁹⁻⁷⁰).

From the way he placed his men in the triangle it is clear that Phokas presaged an attack in three stages: the approach, during which the mounted archers would attempt to open gaps in the ranks of the defenders; the moment of impact and the *melee*, when the first four rows of shock troops would use their heavy iron maces to hammer their way through the defenders; and the pursuit, to which the weapons of the lancers on the flanks—and the light cavalymen inside the triangle—were better suited by virtue of their greater reach in striking at fleeing enemies as both attackers and defenders dispersed.



So run Phokas' directions on the composition of the triangle of *kataphraktoi*. As with the infantry and cavalry formations surveyed above, the triangle was not of his own inspiration but was based on an existing model. The two versions of the triangle presented by Phokas in the *Praecepta* adhere closely to the patterns laid out earlier in the *Sylloge* for triangular formations of 504 men (ST 46.26) and of 384 (46.29). Once again, the well-established models in the *Sylloge* point to a formation and tactics in use for some time, but it is more pertinent to note that the treatises prescribe no other formation for the *kataphraktoi*. The reasons for its adoption as the sole disposition for Byzantine heavy cavalry are connected with the origins of the formation.

The Byzantine triangle first appears in the tenth-century manuals, but it is the descendant of a cavalry formation created in antiquity. According to the classical tactician Arrian (second century A.D.), the cavalry wedge (ἔμβολον) had been invented by the Scyths who passed it on to the Thracians, from whom Philip of Macedonia learned of the formation and in turn perfected its use for his own cavalry.³⁵ When listing the attributes of the cavalry wedge, Arrian noted that the formation shifted direction as easily as cranes in flight, since all eyes were trained on the leader; its principal virtue as an attacking formation was that "the face tapering to a point enables it to pierce any enemy formation." The maneuverability and the penetrative capacity of the wedge commended it for use by infantry and cavalry throughout the classical period—the *cuneus* used by Roman cavalry is among the ancestors of the Byzantine formation—and we shall see that the Byzantines, too, counted on this main asset of the wedge as an attacking formation to strike and break through the enemy line at a given point.

Deploying the *kataphraktoi* in a blunt wedge may have tacitly addressed another concern. We have already seen that Phokas acknowledged the apprehension of his heavy horsemen at the prospect of attacking heavy infantry; and in this light the wedge with its narrow face may have served the ends of discipline by compelling the *kataphraktoi* to drive home their charge.³⁶ It was imper-

³⁵ Arrian, *Ars tactica* 16.6–8. On the use of this formation by infantry and cavalry in Greek and Macedonian warfare, see E. W. Marsden, *The Campaign of Gaugamela* (Liverpool, 1964), 68–73.

³⁶ Captain Louis Edward Nolan, a British cavalry theorist in the nineteenth century, maintained that the width of the attackers' line had to be much narrower than that of the defenders as a means of countering the natural—and understandable—tendency in riders and horses to drift out to the flanks and so avoid closing with the defenders, a trait often shown by cavalry when attacking infantry. In view of the concerns voiced by Phokas, the comparison is not too anachronistic. See H. Moyse-Bartlett, *Louis Edward Nolan and His Influence on the British Cavalry* (London, 1971), 144–

ative that the charging *kataphraktoi*—especially the shock troops in the first four rows—not shear off from the point of attack but drive into the enemy line. [The wedge formation with a blunt face much narrower than the line of defenders may thus have been a measure intended to keep the *kataphraktoi* on course—even if they perceived that the defenders had not been panicked into flight at the sight of them but were firmly awaiting their onslaught.]

The triangular formation of the *kataphraktoi* was the centerpiece in the front line of the cavalry force. They stood between, but not linked to, two units of regular cavalry five hundred strong, thereby leaving two openings between the *kataphraktoi* and their escorts on either side. Phokas further specifies that the front rows of the two flanking units were to be level with the rear row of the *kataphraktoi* so that the main body of the wedge would project well in advance of the accompanying units of regular cavalry (PM IV.^{86–93}).

Thus deployed and placed, the *kataphraktoi* were ready for action. These heavy cavalymen represented the army's *force de frappe*, and their formation and tactics were designed to enable them to win a battle outright with one carefully timed and executed charge. Sometimes, though, one charge might not be enough. It was presumably for this reason that both the *Sylloge* and the *Praecepta* proposed that if there were enough *kataphraktoi* on hand, the third line of cavalry could be set up in the same way as the first, that is, with a triangle of *kataphraktoi* in the middle.³⁷ This provision would have given the commander the chance to launch a second assault by his heavy cavalry in case a first attack had been unsuccessful, a highly desirable recourse since, as Smail pointed out with regard to the Crusader knights of the twelfth century, once sent into action, medieval horsemen could not be reorganized and used a second time: "A squadron of knights was like a projectile in the hands of the commander. When directed against the enemy it could strike him only once, and therefore to succeed must strike and shatter him *uno impetu*, in a single attack."³⁸ A charge by the Byzantine *kataphraktoi* was likewise an effort to rout the enemy *uno impetu*, and it would have been beyond their limits to form up and charge once more in the event that their first attack had failed. It was therefore advisable for the Byzantine commander to keep a second body in reserve if he hoped to hurl a corps of *kataphraktoi* at the enemy a second time.

49. Nolan's real place in history, of course, is as the unwitting instigator of the charge of the Light Brigade at Balaclava in 1855; he was killed at the very outset.

³⁷ Cf. PM IV.^{65–69}, where the text is defective; the full sense of the passage is restored by comparison with the TNO 61.^{104–111}. The *Sylloge* (46.19) also recommends stationing a second formation of *kataphraktoi* in the third line.

³⁸ Smail, *Crusading Warfare*, 114–15.

The cavalry in action

The arrangement of the cavalry force was designed to provide a combination of power and flexibility in attack while maintaining a body of reserves for use as the circumstances—favorable or otherwise—dictated. It is time now to examine how Byzantine cavalry performed in battle using the formations and tactics prescribed for them. The following study of cavalry warfare will begin with a synopsis of Phokas' two battle paradigms in the *Praecepta*, which treat cavalry tactics in detail; his tactical prescriptions will then be compared with a detailed account of a contemporary battle to demonstrate how closely his discussion of battle tactics conforms with recorded use. We will then go on to make a separate analysis of the three main stages involved in the cavalryman's battle—initial contact with the enemy, an attack led by the *kataphraktoi*, and the pursuit—and explore the reasoning behind the tactics that Phokas listed for each one.

The first paradigm presents the battle situations that may arise when engaging the enemy with a combined force of infantry and cavalry. The Byzantine army is to be imagined proceeding through hostile territory; the infantry are marching along deployed in their square with the main cavalry units in close attendance while light cavalry skirmishers forge ahead to seek contact with the enemy. The situations in both paradigms have been numbered to facilitate cross-references and comparison with Skylitzes' account of a battle fought by Bardas Skleros that follows this synopsis. It should also be noted that the infantry tactics surveyed above come into play in the sections numbered 1.7 and 1.8:

1.1 (*PM II*.^{16–28}—*TNO 57*.^{32–44}): If the enemy is advancing against the Byzantine forces, the *prokoursatores* must be sent ahead to intercept the enemy skirmishers and ambush them, if they are proceeding carelessly, to spread the panic of the men taken by surprise into their main force and to seize prisoners who will furnish information on the enemy's strength and intentions.

1.2 (*PM II*.^{28–37}—*TNO 57*.^{44–54}): Once the *prokoursatores* are engaged with the enemy skirmishers, if the main enemy force comes after them, the commander must send one or two units ahead to keep them out of danger while following up in support with his four units; he will aid the men under pursuit and strike a blow at the enemy.

1.3 (*PM II*.^{37–55}—*TNO 57*.^{54–73}): If the enemy stays after the *prokoursatores*, give way to them until they draw near the infantry formations, then have three (or

more) cavalry units move out from the infantry square and make an orderly attack on the enemy; the commander follows with his four units in support. If the enemy flees, he must keep his four units intact until he ascertains that they are in full flight and that there is no other enemy force in the vicinity, at which point he should send two units forward in pursuit and keep two with him for the security of the men pursuing the enemy. The infantry and remaining host trails behind in good order.

1.4 (*PM II*.^{55–66}—*TNO 57*.^{73–83}): If the enemy pursuing the *prokoursatores* does not come near the infantry formation but instead remains at a distance in a disorganized mass (μήκοθεν . . . σεσωρευμένοι), the commander must send three cavalry units out through one side of the square, three out through the other. The three units in both groups proceed one by one and come to a halt opposite either wing of the enemy line, but out of bowshot. The commander with his four units moves out last of all.

1.5 (*PM II*.^{66–78}—*TNO 57*.^{83–95}): If the enemy turns and flees before this show of force, the *prokoursatores* and the other units must give chase in good order until the enemy is in full flight. They must not break ranks until there is a general rout of the enemy. The cavalrymen must not stop to plunder during battle; the infantry and noncombatants are to collect prisoners and booty. Penalties against looting must be fixed and announced.

1.6 (*PM II*.^{78–94}—*TNO 57*.^{95–113}): If the enemy is not intimidated into flight but remains firmly in place, the *prokoursatores* must commence hostilities by skirmishing with the enemy, and then the two groups of three cavalry units opposite the wings of the enemy line must join battle with the enemy while the four units in reserve move up in support. The infantry square draws up close by; if the enemy offers determined resistance, light infantrymen must hasten forward into the fray to help the cavalrymen. If the enemy perseveres in the struggle, the Byzantines must fight hard at close quarters until the hand of God intervenes and routs the foe.

1.7 (*PM II*.^{94–101}—*TNO 57*.^{113–121}): If it happens that the enemy repulses the cavalry units—God forbid—they must seek refuge inside the infantry square. The heavy infantrymen and the *menavlatoi* must hasten forward in good order to meet the enemy (that is, to reinforce the front lines in the maneuver discussed above); the cavalrymen inside the square must support the infantrymen in defending the position.

1.8 (PM II.¹⁰¹⁻¹¹¹—TNO 57.¹²¹⁻¹³³): If the enemy moves to the attack systematically and in good order against one side of the square, the Bedouin on their swift horses will ride round the square hoping to lure the Byzantine cavalrymen into pursuing them; but in no circumstances are the cavalry to go chasing after the Bedouin.

1.9 (PM II.¹¹¹⁻¹²⁴—TNO 57.¹³³⁻¹⁵²): (It is to be understood that either the infantry have stood off the enemy cavalry or that the enemy is advancing slowly toward one side of the infantry square). The commander should have the triangle of *kataphraktoi* with its two escorting units ready and send them out from the square on the side facing the enemy. Even if the enemy lines are composed of heavy infantrymen, the *kataphraktoi* must not be afraid but should proceed very calmly in good order and aim their charge right at the enemy commander. They will come through the volleys of arrows unscathed and smash through the enemy, and with the help of God the enemy will give way.

1.10 (PM II.¹²⁴⁻¹³³—TNO 57.¹⁵³⁻¹⁵⁹): Once the enemy is in flight, the *kataphraktoi* do not pursue but regroup with the infantry while their two escorting units and the rest of the cavalry force chase after the enemy. The commander must send out reserve units through the flanks of the square to scatter—but not chase—any Bedouin horsemen attempting to come up from behind on the Byzantine units in pursuit of the main force. The commander and his four units follow up.

1.11 (PM II.¹³³⁻¹³⁹—TNO 57.¹⁵⁹⁻¹⁶⁸): If the enemy formation moves quickly and engages the Byzantine infantry, leaving no room for the *kataphraktoi* to move out on the side of the square under attack, the *kataphraktoi* and their two accompanying units must then move out through the intervals on one of the sides of the square and launch their attack against the enemy from the flank. If the enemy breaks and runs, the remaining units may head out through the front of the square and join in the destruction of the enemy force.

The situation presented by the second paradigm has the Byzantine cavalry forging ahead of the infantry force to find and engage the enemy independently (the passages cited from the *Taktika* of Nikephoros Ouranos are especially helpful in sections 2.4 and 2.5, where the text of the *Praecepta* is defective):

2.1 (PM IV.⁹³⁻¹⁰⁶—TNO 61.¹⁴⁹⁻¹⁵⁹): As the enemy advances, the *prokoursatores* move ahead to intercept them with ambushes if they are proceeding in a careless manner (cf. 1.1); if their advance is an orderly one, the *prokoursatores* fall back to the main force and, in a prearranged maneuver, divide into two groups and

pass through the intervals between the *kataphraktoi* and their two escorting units to form up once more directly behind the two intervals.

2.2 (PM IV.¹⁰⁶⁻¹²⁰—TNO 61.¹⁵⁹⁻¹⁷²): As the enemy approaches, the entire army intones the first prescribed prayer and then begins their advance in complete silence, pausing at a signal to say the second prescribed prayer.

2.3 (PM IV.¹²⁰⁻¹³⁷—TNO 61.¹⁷²⁻¹⁹²): It is necessary to identify the place of the enemy commander and aim the *kataphraktoi* directly at him (cf. 1.9). As they move to the attack, their two escorting units, the *prokoursatores*, the outflankers and flankguards, and the rest of the cavalry force move along in unison with them. The commander of the *prokoursatores* must then send two units of fifty men (more if need be) to form a screen along the sides of the *kataphraktoi* to keep the enemy from harrying them and disrupting their charge. At the same time the outflankers must move to encircle the enemy while the *kataphraktoi* and their escorting units continue to advance in proper order.

2.4 (PM IV.¹³⁷⁻¹⁵⁰—TNO 61.¹⁹²⁻²¹⁹): If the enemy stands firm as the *kataphraktoi* draw near, the mounted archers must begin shooting back at the enemy once their arrows begin to fall on the front rows of the *kataphraktoi*; they must proceed at their steady pace and crash into the enemy commander's unit while the outflankers encircle the enemy; with the aid of God the enemy will be routed by the *kataphraktoi* who will smash their way into and through the defenders. Neither the *kataphraktoi* nor their two escorts are to pursue the enemy; it is the task of the *prokoursatores* and outflankers to begin the pursuit (cf. 1.9 and 1.10).

2.5 (PM IV.¹⁵⁰⁻¹⁶⁶—TNO 61.²²⁰⁻²⁴²): If there is a general rout of the enemy, then the two units with the *kataphraktoi* break ranks and head off in pursuit; the three units in the third line also come forward to join in the pursuit. The second line of four units picks its way through the *kataphraktoi* and follows up the pursuit. The units in the second and third lines are to be committed to the pursuit depending on the strength of the enemy army, but the commander should keep at least two of his four units in reserve. The cavalrymen are not to plunder during battle; their attendants and the noncombatants are to collect prisoners and booty.

2.6 (PM IV.¹⁶⁶⁻¹⁷³—TNO 61.²⁴²⁻²⁴⁹): If the enemy have and use *kataphraktoi* armed just as well as their Byzantine counterparts, the three units in the third line must come forward and surround the enemy; by attacking them on all sides, they will succeed in achieving a rout.

Part II: Historical Commentary


2.7 (*PM* IV.¹⁷³⁻¹⁷⁷—*TNO* 61.²⁴⁹⁻²⁵³): If the enemy perseveres against these forces, the commander should send in two of his own four units forward in support. He must direct his units according to his diagnosis of events.

2.8 (*PM* IV.¹⁷⁷⁻¹⁸⁹—*TNO* 61.²⁵³⁻²⁶²): If the enemy gives way to flight, the commander and his two remaining units come to the support of the men already engaged. If the enemy has many Bedouin auxiliaries who try to encircle the Byzantine units, they must be driven off with volleys of arrows, but not pursued. If the enemy is completely surrounded, and there are no Bedouin threatening the baggage train, the units guarding the baggage train and all the remaining units must join in the battle.

As discussed earlier in Chapter 1, the great worth of the *Praecepta* as a tactical treatise lies in Phokas' battle paradigms, which were distilled from his own experience and portray the situations that he deemed likeliest to occur during an engagement with the enemy—in this case, the Hamdanid armies of Sayf al-Dawla. The situations that he foresaw and the tactics that he recommended naturally invite comparison with accounts of contemporary battles in the historical sources. The description of a battle best suited for such a comparison is not of an encounter between the Byzantines and the Hamdanids, however, but of one between a Byzantine army led by Bardas Skleros and a combined force of Patzinaks, Hungarians, and Bulgars allied with the Russian prince Svyatoslav. As he prepared to meet Svyatoslav's challenge for supremacy in the Balkans, the emperor John Tzimiskes sent forces under Skleros and Peter the Stratopedarches into Bulgaria where Skleros came upon the aforementioned contingents. The battle was fought in the autumn of 970 near Arkadiopolis, but the exact location is not specified. Skylitzes describes the course of events as follows:³⁹

When the *magistros* Bardas Skleros perceived that he was vastly inferior to this horde (the entire army with him came to twelve thousand), he decided

³⁹ Skyl. 288.^{23-291.4}; cf. Leo diac. 108.^{18-111.5}. It is not clear from either account whether the action described took place on the same day or over a two-day span. That Skylitzes' account seems to derive from a "war diary" compiled shortly after the Balkan campaigns was suggested by F. Dölger, "Die Chronologie des grossen Feldzuges des Kaisers Johannes Tzimiskes gegen die Russen," *BZ* 32 (1932), 275-92; cf. S. McGrath, "The Battles of Dorostolon (971): Rhetoric and Reality," in *Peace and War in Byzantium: Essays in Honor of George T. Dennis, S. J.*, ed. T. S. Miller and J. W. Nesbitt (Washington, D.C., 1995), 152-64. See also A. D. Stokes, "The Background and Chronology of the Balkan Campaigns of Svyatoslav Igorevich," *Slavonic and East European Review* 40 (1960/1961), 44-57, 466-96.



Map 2. The northwestern frontier (Bulgaria and northern Greece), ca. 975

to overcome the enemy with stratagems and to operate against such great numbers methodically and resourcefully. Which is what ensued. He closed himself up inside the walls with his army and paid no heed to the frequent challenges from the enemy to come out and decide the whole issue in one battle. Instead, he waited as though afraid, watching to see how his antagonists bore up under the circumstances and conducted themselves. This decision produced great contempt in the barbarians. Because they believed that in truth Skleros, in the grip of terror, had penned the Byzantine forces inside the wall and dared not venture outside, they wandered about without fear, camped negligently and disregarded proper security, spending their nights with excessive drinking, the music of flutes and cymbals and savage dances, without attending to any necessities. Grasping that the moment was right, Bardas thought long and hard as to how he might attack the enemy. Deciding on the day and hour, he set up traps and ambushes at night in the most favorable places and dispatched the *patrikios* John Alakasseus with a small force, ordering him to ride ahead and inspect the enemy, then quickly report back to him and inform him of their whereabouts; he also instructed him to engage those nearest and, as soon as they were joined in combat, to turn tail and give the impression that they were fleeing. By no means were they to flee uncontrollably, giving full rein to the horses, but instead calmly and in good order. They were to wheel about wherever they could and clash with the enemy and to keep doing so until they had lured them into the traps and ambushes, at which point they could flee headlong in no order. The barbarians were divided into three groups. The Bulgars and Russians made up the first body, while the Turks [Hungarians] were isolated on their own, as were the Patzinaks. As he went along, John fell in with the Patzinaks whom he happened to encounter first and, exactly as he had been instructed, pretended to flee while making an unhurried retreat. The Patzinaks broke ranks and pressed on with their attack as though they wanted to kill every last one of the fleeing men. These men, however, first fleeing in order, then wheeling about to defend themselves, hastened on toward the places of ambush. When they came among these, they gave full rein to their horses and fled without restraint, and the dispersed Patzinaks gave chase in no order. At the sudden appearance of the *magistros* with all his army, they checked their pursuit, startled by this unexpected turn; they did not seek recourse to flight, however, but remained where they were, waiting to receive an attack. When with a violent rush the men with the *magistros* closed with them—as the rest of his force followed up behind in proper array and battle order—the more mighty of the Scyths fell slain immediately. As the Byzantine force was widely separated, the

[illegible]

21. John Alakasseus lures the Patzinaks into an ambush (see pp. 296–97)

Patzinaks plunged into the middle of the ambush whereupon the wings closed together and completed the encirclement. After holding out a short while they gave way and nearly all of them were cut down.

And so having routed these men and learning from the prisoners that the remaining contingents were fresh and waiting in battle array, Bardas turned swiftly to deal with them. As they had just learned of the Patzinaks' defeat, they were shaken in spirit at the unexpectedness of the disaster. They nevertheless collected themselves and rallied the men scattered in flight, and attacked the Byzantines, the horsemen forging ahead and the foot soldiers coming up behind. When at the first assault the horsemen were stopped short in their attacks by the visible steadiness of the Byzantines, they withdrew and streamed back towards the foot soldiers. Once there they reassembled and awaited the onrushing Byzantines. For a time the issue of battle remained in doubt until one of the Scyths, vaunting his great size and courage, emerged from the rest and bore down on the *magistros* himself, who was riding alongside his units and exhorting them, and struck him on the helmet with his sword. The sword glanced off and the blow was without effect. The *magistros* in turn struck him on the helmet with his

sword. With the weight of his hand and the temper of the iron the blow was so mighty that the Scyth was cloven wholly in two. The *patrikios* Constantine, brother of the *magistros*, was helping his brother and attempted to strike another Scyth over the head who was accompanying the man mentioned and bearing down even more boldly. The man leaned to one side, but in missing the mark Constantine brought his sword down on the horse's nape and severed its head at the neck. Down went the Scyth, whereupon Constantine dismounted, seized the man's beard by the hand, and slew him. This deed inspired the Byzantines and emboldened them all the more while filling the Scyths with dread and terror. They swiftly forsook thoughts of valor and, turning their backs in flight, they fled disgracefully with much confusion. The Byzantines followed them and covered the field with corpses. There were more taken alive than there were fallen, but all save a few of the survivors were wounded. No one would have escaped the danger unless the onset of night had kept the Byzantines from the pursuit. Out of the thousands of barbarians very few came through unscathed; twenty-five Byzantines fell in the battle but nearly every last one of them was wounded.

When this account is compared with the tactical paradigms in the *Praecepta*, Skleros' preparation and execution of his battle plan against superior forces conform in virtual textbook fashion both with the stages of battle envisioned by Phokas and the procedures that he recommended. Skleros' initial decision to avoid confronting greater numbers until he could undermine their battleworthiness and devise his plan of attack adheres to Phokas' advice, noted earlier, to the commander faced with superior odds (*PM* IV.¹⁹²⁻²¹²). The reconnaissance mission assigned to the detachment under John Alakasseus and their feigned flight to lure the Patzinaks onto Skleros' main force are the principal tasks of the *prokoursatores* in Phokas' scheme (1.1; 2.1); the Patzinaks' startled reaction upon seeing the main force and their decision to remain at a distance and await an attack conforms to the scenario in 1.4. Having enveloped and destroyed this one contingent, Skleros obtained information from prisoners on the remaining forces (1.3) and moved off to meet them. They advanced with cavalry supported by infantry trailing behind and an exchange of attacks ensued; once the Byzantines had made their attack and were embroiled with the enemy at close quarters, the battle became an endurance contest of collective will and physical strength (1.6,) in which Skleros' men prevailed when the enemy's spirit was broken by the death of their two champions. The battle culminated in a slaughter of the fleeing enemy until nightfall interrupted the Byzantines' diligent pursuit (cf. 1.3, 1.5, 1.10, 2.5).

It is clear from the narrative that Skleros had a tactical plan and that his men carried it through to perfection. It is equally clear, however, that the elusive elements encapsulated in Smail's phrase "the interplay of morale, individual prowess, and good fortune" were just as influential in determining the outcome. The duels fought and won by Bardas Skleros and his brother Constantine against the assailants who singled them out attest the role of individual prowess amid the concentrated violence of a hand-to-hand encounter. Although included to celebrate the exploits of prominent warriors, the duels are typical of the many individual combats that would break out in the general melee; the deadly blows they struck and the terror they inspired recall Phokas' depiction of the murderous impact of the *kataphraktoi* (2.4). The same episodes also attest the role played by good fortune in battle. It was most fortunate for the Byzantines that the "Scyth" who struck Skleros over the helmet with his sword did not kill or unhorse their commander, for in this event, it would have been the Byzantines who broke and fled. As will be discussed at greater length below, the spectacle of the commander's death or flight in battle was a catastrophic blow to the morale of his men—precisely the reason why Phokas instructed his *kataphraktoi* to aim their charge straight for the enemy commander (1.9, 2.3-4).

In the final analysis, what is most striking in this account is the role of morale or emotion. The principal virtue of Skleros' plan and conduct of battle was that it kept the enemy off balance emotionally as well as tactically and so enabled the Byzantines to devise and carry out the routines necessary to the achievement of their aims. Skleros' initial decision to avoid the enemy provoked their contempt and led to a slackening of discipline; once Alakasseus' men had induced the Patzinaks to give chase by feigning flight, the bloodlust of the pursuers led them to break ranks and plunge as a dispersed mass into the trap set by the main Byzantine force. Caught in this unexpected situation, the Patzinaks were too startled (and their horses probably too tired) to do anything but await an attack, thereby conceding the initiative to the Byzantines who then completely enveloped them. Word of their destruction was a blow to the spirits of their allies, who nevertheless gathered for an attack. At the first assault, however, their horsemen recoiled before "the visible steadiness of the Byzantines" (κατὰ τὴν πρώτην προσβολὴν ἀνακόπησαν οἱ ἱππεῖς τὰς ὁρμὰς ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων ἀνυποστάτων φανέντων)—which means, in effect, that on this occasion the Byzantine infantry won the war of nerves between attacker and defender—and fell back to their infantry to meet the Byzantine charge. In the struggle that followed, the deaths of their two champions precipitated their moral and physical collapse and decided the issue in favor of the Byzantines.

As shown in Phokas' paradigms and in the description of Skleros' victory over the Patzinaks, Hungarians, and Bulgars, a cavalry battle usually comprised

three main stages: initial contact with the enemy and an opening skirmish, an attack or exchange of attacks, and the pursuit. Phokas' prescriptions for each of these stages will now be discussed with reference to accounts in the historical sources.

Reconnaissance and skirmishing

We have seen that swift light cavalrymen—called *prokoursatores* in the *Praecepta*, *tasinarioi* or *trapezitai* in the *De velitatione*, and *chosarioi* in the *De re militari*—constituted a distinct branch of the cavalry force.⁴⁰ Tactics for light cavalry fit into a separate category within the general theory of cavalry warfare. As defined in the *Praecepta*, the principal tasks of these versatile horsemen were to discover the location, numbers, and intentions of the enemy, then to intercept them and possibly sow panic among their forces, or else lure them back onto the main body. Phokas has little to say of their methods of reconnaissance and skirmishing in the *Praecepta*, but in the *De velitatione* he sketches out the full repertoire of tactics and tricks they used to shadow, harass, and ambush the enemy.⁴¹ The *prokoursatores*—picked from the *tasinarioi* or *trapezitai* of the frontiers who were well versed in light cavalry warfare—will have used the same guerrilla tactics in the opening stages of a battle to disrupt the enemy or lead them into a trap; the ruse of feigned flight employed by John Alakasseus to tempt the Patzinaks closely agrees in outline with one of the tactical plans set forth in the *De velitatione*.⁴² This was the favorite, and often successful, stratagem of advance parties which, as expressed in one of al-Mutanabbi's vivid metaphors, might seem as wisps to the enemy who, upon giving chase, soon found himself engulfed in storm clouds: "Le domestique a gourmandé ses yeux pour

⁴⁰ See above, pp. 211–12.

⁴¹ Dagron, *Le traité*, 215–18, 245–57.

⁴² Cf. Phokas' instructions (*DV* XI, XVII.2–12) and Dagron's two diagrams of the operations based on the text: *Le traité*, 205 and 209. Feigned flight was very common in eastern warfare. Herakleios used this tactic effectively against the Persian general Sarbaros in 621, but was later to see his own men succumb to the same trick despite his warnings in 625 (Theophanes 305.^{24–29}; 313.¹⁴–314.¹⁰). Skylitzes (306.⁵²–307.⁶⁵) relates how John Tzimiskes ordered his men to conduct an orderly withdrawal and then wheel about against the Russians once they had been lured onto ground more favorable to the Byzantines. Other eastern peoples employed this device, especially the Turks who used it to draw the Franks into ambushes or to wear them down; cf. Smail, *Crusading Warfare*, 78–79. On the use of feigned flight by the Normans at Hastings in 1066, see D. R. Cook, "The Norman Military Revolution in England," in *Proceedings of the Battle Conference on Anglo-Norman Studies*, I, ed. R. A. Brown (Woodbridge, 1980), 1–21. Knowledge that feigned flight was a device frequently employed by the enemy sometimes checked the ardor of the winning side. Following a victory over a Byzantine force in 1049, the Patzinaks "dared not pursue because they feared ambushes, and it was for this reason that the Byzantines were able to get away unharmed" (Skyl. 468.³⁹–469.³⁰).

s'être imaginé, quand apparurent de noires masses de nuages, que c'étaient seulement des flocons isolés."⁴³

The light cavalrymen so useful in the defensive guerrilla campaigns along the eastern frontiers thus continued to play an important part in offensive warfare. The description of Alakasseus' detachment in action is one example of *prokoursatores* going ahead of the main force for the purposes of reconnaissance and skirmishing stated by Phokas in the *Praecepta*. Another example of their use in this role is John Tzimiskes' assignment of a unit under Theodore of Mistheia to go ahead of the army and seek contact with the enemy during the emperor's campaign against Svyatoslav in 971.⁴⁴

When the scouts reported the arrival of some Scyths, he [Tzimiskes] sent out a picked unit. He appointed Theodore of Mistheia as the officer in charge of this force and instructed him to proceed ahead of the army to find out and let him know the enemy's numbers; if the opportunity arose, he was also to make a test of their strength in a skirmish. He himself followed behind accompanied by all the rest of the army. When the soldiers with Theodore came to grips with the enemy, they fell on them with a vengeance. The Russians would not venture forth because they feared a trap and gave way with many wounded and a few fallen. They scattered into the nearby mountains and the deep, thickly grown glens there and reached safety at Dorostolon through the mountain trails. They were a total force of seven thousand men, the Byzantines who engaged and routed them three hundred in number.

The excerpt indicates that Theodore carried out his instructions to test the mettle of the Russians in a skirmish; but it is interesting to note here that they were reluctant to go after the small Byzantine detachment "because they feared a trap," an indication that Svyatoslav's men had taken to heart the lessons of Skleros' crushing victory over their Patzinak allies the previous year.

The cavalry on the attack and the charge of the kataphraktoi

In an earlier section we reviewed Phokas' meticulous instructions on the wedge-like formation of the *kataphraktoi* and their alignment with the two regular cavalry units in the attack line. He devoted equal attention to the mechanics of their charge. In issuing his instructions for the *kataphraktoi* on the attack,

⁴³ *Byz. Arabes* II.2, p. 311, describing an engagement between Sayf al-Dawla and Bardas Phokas near Bath al Luqan in 950.

⁴⁴ Skyl. 298.²⁰–299.³².

Phokas concentrated on a number of interrelated aspects of their charge: their calm preparations, the pace and target of their onslaught, the role played by other units in support of their attack, and, above all, how the *kataphraktoi* were to combine their intimidating appearance with sheer physical might to shatter the defenders. We will concentrate on these aspects in the discussion to follow.

In his two paradigms, Phokas presents some of the initial steps to be taken when launching the *kataphraktoi* into action, but he leaves some questions unanswered. In his first paradigm, he advises the commander to have the *kataphraktoi* at the ready in their triangular formation and to send them, with their two accompanying units, out through the intervals on the side of the square where the enemy is facing (PM II.¹¹¹⁻¹¹⁵). He does not explain how they performed this maneuver, however, since, deployed as they were, the *kataphraktoi* could not have moved out through the intervals as one body. It would be reasonable to speculate that they first formed up within the square to ensure that each man knew his position and then, by some prearranged method, divided into small groups to pass through the intervals and reformed outside the square. There must also have been some method by which the *kataphraktoi* formed their wedge when the cavalry was out in the open, separated from the infantry force—the situation envisioned in the second paradigm—but again Phokas does not explain how they went about doing so.

What does stand out in Phokas' instructions to the *kataphraktoi* is his insistence on their orderly, calm deportment (εὐτάκτως μετὰ πολλῆς γαληνότητος) as they lined up for an attack (PM II.¹¹⁵; IV.¹⁰⁹⁻¹¹¹). Their deliberate steadiness, their strict silence, and their brief pause to repeat the prescribed prayers served several ends at once. For the attackers, these methodical procedures would have enabled the *kataphraktoi* and their two escorts to maintain formation, and the pause for prayer would have offered them a last chance to dress their order. The prayers would have helped the men compose themselves and steel their resolve before the prospect of killing or being killed. But most of all, this was a performance calculated to unnerve the defenders who had to watch this awe-inspiring host prepare their assault in an eerie, unnatural silence; the studied calm, the unhurried preparations, the pause for prayer, compelled the waiting defenders to contemplate at length the chilling spectacle of the *kataphraktoi*.⁴⁵


⁴⁵ There is, of course, no telling what the feelings of the *kataphraktoi* were as they prepared to charge the enemy, but the reactions to the prospect of combat recorded by British fighter pilots of the First World War may provide some insight. The initial response when an attack was signaled was one of terror. One pilot "likened the feeling to that of plunging into a cold bath." There were further physical manifestations of this fear: "the body prepared anyway for a display of violence with deeper, slower breathing, rapid heart beat, increased arterial blood pressure and cessation of

Eroding the defenders' will to resist was a crucial first step to a successful attack by the *kataphraktoi*, but for the heavy horsemen to drive home their charge with the greatest possible effect, they had to have an unimpeded course of attack, and they had to arrive *en masse* at a chosen point of impact, not as isolated individuals. Phokas records the measures by which the Byzantines sought to ensure that both conditions were met.

The wedge-like formation of the *kataphraktoi* was the spearhead of a Byzantine cavalry attack, but a successful charge required close cooperation between the heavy horsemen and the units that accompanied them. The light *prokoursatores* played a key role in the early stages of the attack. They went ahead of the main force to skirmish with the enemy, but if they could not turn these initial encounters to their advantage, they were to retire, drawing the enemy onto the main force and, in a previously planned and rehearsed maneuver, dividing into two groups to pass through the intervals between the *kataphraktoi* and the units trailing them on either flank. The *prokoursatores* then lined up directly behind these two intervals (PM IV.⁹³⁻¹⁰⁶).

In prescribing this maneuver for the *prokoursatores*, Phokas was following the guidelines laid down previously by the compiler of the *Sylloge* (46.9), but he then goes on to outline a further task to be performed by the *prokoursatores*. As the *kataphraktoi* moved to the attack, the leader of the *prokoursatores* was to send forward two detachments of fifty men to screen the flanks of the *kataphraktoi* and ward off (ἀποσοβεῖν) any enemy cavalrymen who might attempt to divert or impede them and so break off their charge (ἐκκόψαι τὴν ὁρμὴν αὐτῶν: PM IV.¹²⁵⁻¹³²). If a large number of enemy horsemen attempted to drive in on the flanks of the *kataphraktoi*, then the rest of the *prokoursatores* had to move forward to help their comrades keep them away from the heavy horsemen

digestion, the pilot being made aware of such metabolic change by a foul taste in a mouth as hot as a lime kiln and sweat trickling from his scalp to cut runnels through whale-oil smeared on his face." But as pilots went through a series of preparatory routines, these reactions gave way to feelings of calm and detachment. One pilot wrote that "my mental attitude became detached from all emotions so that I felt a feeling almost as of boredom creeping over me. This sense at such times was a strange one but I suppose it emanates from strangulation of the emotions into an intensity of concentration upon one definite object. It may be the outcome of a mental state which is called upon to encompass a great deal in a swift passage of time. . . ." Another recalled "a feeling of impersonality and calm . . . as if a secondary person were taking over, leaving the self to become detached, as a kind of impersonal observer" (cited from D. Winter, *The First of the Few* [Harmondsworth, 1983], 99). These accounts, recording a transition from a state of terror to one of emotional detachment just before an attack, suggest that the calm exterior which Phokas urged his *kataphraktoi* to display to the enemy may have been as much a part of a natural process, "strangulation of the emotions into an intensity of concentration upon one definite object," as it was a conscious effort of will.



Stage 1: The *prokoursatores* retire through the intervals in the forward line

Stage 2: The *prokoursatores* move forward and form a screen along the flanks of the *kataphraktoi*

22. The maneuvers of the *prokoursatores* (see pp. 303–5)

(*PM* IV.^{132–133}; cf. *TNO* 61.^{186–188}). It was imperative that the *prokoursatores* carried out this task promptly and efficiently, since even a small group of three or four brave enemy horsemen driving in on the front flanks of the *kataphraktoi* could easily achieve a bowling ball effect on the rest of the formation, especially if the space between the riders in each row was not very great, and so completely disrupt their charge (see Fig. 22).⁴⁶

The use of the *prokoursatores* to forestall attempts by enemy horsemen to break up the cohesion and momentum of the *kataphraktoi* is first attested in the *Praecepta* and marks another example of the action-reaction pendulum in the Byzantine-Hamdanid wars. It would appear that in the years between the composition of the *Sylloge* and the *Praecepta*, the Hamdanids had reflected on their encounters with the *kataphraktoi* and responded with this simple but effective remedy, forcing the Byzantines to counter with the measure described by Phokas.

Screening the flanks of the *kataphraktoi* was the first step in their assault. The second was to have them aim their charge at a steady pace right at the enemy commander. Phokas' instructions on the pace of their attack require explanation, and it is best to begin by citing the passage concerned:

PM IV.^{138–143}: . . . ἡνίκα ἄρξονται τὰ τῶν ἐχθρῶν βέλη πρὸς τὸ μέτωπον τῆς τριγώνου τῶν καταφράκτων παρατάξεως πέμπεσθαι, δεῖ τοὺς ἡμετέρους τοξότας καὶ αὐτοὺς διὰ τῶν βελῶν κατατιτρώσκειν τοὺς ἐχθρούς, εἴθ' οὕτως εὐτάκτως βῆμα τριπόδος ἐπελθεῖν τὸ μέτωπον τῆς τριγώνου παρατάξεως καὶ κρούσαι ἐν τῇ παρατάξει τοῦ ἀρχηγοῦ τῶν ἐχθρῶν . . .

. . . at the moment when the enemy's arrows begin to be launched against the front of the triangular formation of the *kataphraktoi*, our archers must themselves strike back at the enemy with their arrows, whereupon the front of the triangular formation must advance in good order at a trotting pace and crash into the position of the enemy commander . . .

The phrase βῆμα τριπόδος (emended from βήματι ποδός in the codex) used by Phokas to dictate the pace of the attackers,⁴⁷ is translated here as "at a trotting pace" to convey the meaning of a moderate gait maintained by the horsemen, as opposed to inciting their horses to run on at full speed. The reasons for understanding Phokas' instructions in this way become clear when his

⁴⁶The nineteenth-century theorist Captain Nolan warned of this tactic in his own day; see note 36.

⁴⁷At the same point Ouranos' text reads: εἴτα ὀφείλει ἀπελθεῖν τὸ βῆμα αὐτῆς ἡ τρίγωνος παραταγῇ τῶν καταφράκτων. . . .

passage is compared with the instructions for cavalymen on the attack first issued in the *Strategikon* of Maurice and repeated in the *Taktika* of Leo VI:

LT VII.35 (cf. SM III.5.²⁸⁻³⁶): . . . ὅταν ἡ τοξεία ἄρχεται γίνεσθαι, καὶ παραγγέλλει, Πάταξον . . . ἐπελαύνειν εὐτάκτως τριπόδω μόνῳ ἡγουν κινήματι συμμέτρῳ τῷ λεγομένῳ κάλπα, καὶ μὴ βιαίως τρέχειν ἵνα μὴ τῇ ὀξύτητι τῆς ἐλασίας διαλυθῇ ἡ τάξις πρὸ μίξεως χειρῶν, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐπικίνδυνον. τοὺς δὲ ὀπισθεν, ὅσοι τοξόται εἰσὶ, τοξεύειν.

. . . when the archery begins to take place, give the command "Charge!" . . . they should push on in good order keeping at a trot—in other words, at the measured pace called the *kalpa*—and not riding furiously lest their order dissolve in the speed of their onslaught before coming into the *melee*, which is very dangerous. The men in the rear who are bowmen must begin shooting.

In both passages, the arrival of enemy arrows marks the moment when the mounted archers were to begin shooting back—for this would have told them that the defenders were now within range—and when the attacking formation as a whole was to preserve its cohesion by advancing at a carefully regulated pace, that of a trot. Phokas' words εὐτάκτως βῆμα τριπόδος ἐπελθεῖν correspond to Leo's phrase ἐπελαύνειν εὐτάκτως τριπόδω μόνῳ, suggesting in turn that Phokas' βῆμα τριπόδος should be taken as a variant of Leo's term τρίποδον, defined by Du Cange as 'trot' ("incessus equi moderatus et ordinarius, nostris *le trot*") and equated with a moderate speed by Leo (ἡγουν κινήματι συμμέτρῳ).⁴⁸

Phokas' insistence that the *kataphraktoi* move at a trot may represent another revision in their tactics. His recommendation of a steady approach at a trot is at odds with the brief decree in the *Sylloge* (46.9) stating that once the *prokoursatores* had retired through the intervals in the first line, "the triangle will immediately, with irresistible force, go full out at the enemy (κατὰ τῶν πολεμίων χωρήσει πάντως)." On the other hand, the close similarity between Phokas' instructions and the standard instructions for a cavalry charge in the *Strategikon* and *Taktika* of Leo VI indicates that Phokas trained his *kataphraktoi* in the methods of attack traditionally employed by Byzantine cavalymen. They

⁴⁸ Leo here equates τρίποδον with κάλπα; other texts also make these terms synonymous. Cf. the hippiatric treatise of Pelagonius, ed. E. Oder and C. Hoppe, *Corpus hippiatricorum graecorum*, I (Stuttgart, 1971), 189.²⁸–190.³: . . . δρόμῳ τῷ διὰ κάλπης γύμναζε ἦτοι τῷ λεγομένῳ τριπόδῳ. . . . Du Cange, however, defines κάλπα as "gallop" (incessus equi vehementior, nostris inde *galop*) and the Souda lists the verb καλπάζειν with the definition "to run full out" (τὸ ἀκρῶς βαδίζειν).

moved slowly at first and accelerated into their charge upon receiving the first volley of arrows, but they maintained a steady gait at a trot to keep their formation from disintegrating before coming to grips with the enemy. They raised their shields to cover themselves and part of their horses as they closed in,⁴⁹ while the mounted archers to the rear attempted to open gaps in the defenders through which the attackers in front could pour. These were the procedures likely followed by the *kataphraktoi*, since the concern uppermost in Phokas' mind was that they not lose cohesion and with this their collective impact by making their attack at a speed too great for the formation as a whole—especially the first four rows of shock troops—to maintain.⁵⁰ The contrast between his instructions and those in the *Sylloge* imply that when first introduced, the *kataphraktoi* charged at full speed, but that this tactic was subsequently abandoned in favor of the slower, more controllable advance at a trot.

The explanation for this change is that the *kataphraktoi* relied on a precisely targeted attack as much as they did on the velocity of their charge. In both sections treating the tactics of the *kataphraktoi*, Phokas instructed them to pick out the place where the enemy commander was located and to aim their charge directly at him (*PM* II.¹¹⁵⁻¹²⁰; IV.¹²⁰⁻¹²³). This point of attack was chosen for good reason, since eliminating this one person was the surest way of all to win a battle by force of arms. Overdependence on the leader was the Achilles' heel of all medieval armies, since the chain of command, such as it was, was forged in the personal bonds between the leader and his men. In his followers' eyes the medieval commander, or perhaps a great champion, personified their own fortunes or divine favor, so much so that the sight of his death or flight in battle was a

⁴⁹ The standard Byzantine attacking tactics invite comparison with those reputedly used by the Saxons under Henry I against the Hungarian horse-archers at the battle of Riade in 933. Liutprand of Cremona recounts Henry's advice to his men that they should begin with an evenly paced advance toward the enemy, covering themselves and one another with their shields against the first volley of arrows, then ride in quickly before the Hungarians had time to launch a second volley: ". . . nemo sotium velotiori . . . verum clipeis altrinsecus operi primos super scuta sagittarum ictus recipite; deinde cursu rapido impetuque vehementissimo super eos irruite, quatinus non prius vobis secundo sagittarum possint ictus emittere. . . ." On this occasion, the Hungarians' nerve gave out before the steady Saxon advance and they fled before unloosing a second flight of arrows. This passage from Liutprand's *Antapodosis* is discussed by K. Leyser, "Henry I and the Beginnings of the Saxon Empire," *EHR* 83 (1968), 23–24.

⁵⁰ Smail's review of the accounts of Frankish cavalry charges indicates that the knights began their attack at a slow pace and gradually accelerated to the greatest speed of which their horses were capable. The result was that "the attack of the medieval horsemen, though it relied for effect on the collective mass of the participants, was essentially an aggregate of many individual charges . . .": *Crusading Warfare*, 112–15 and notes 1–3. It was this dissolution into a group of individual charges that Phokas wished to avoid.

psychological blow which invariably precipitated the moral collapse of his men. Their automatic reflex in such an event was to break and run.⁵¹

We have already seen this factor at work in Skylitzes' description of Bardas Skleros' victory over the Patzinaks, but the Byzantines themselves were no exception to the general rule. An Arabic account of the battle of Hadat, for instance, declares that Sayf al-Dawla decided the outcome by personally leading his élite horsemen in an attack straight against the Byzantine commander, Bardas Phokas:⁵²

Saif al-Daulah chargea en personne contre le Domestique [Ibn al-Fuqas] à la tête de 500 de ses «gulam» et autres troupes de son armée. Marchant droit sur la garde du Domestique, il le mit en déroute et Dieu le Très Haut lui donna la victoire.

Whole units might attack the enemy commander in this way, but it was just as common for individual soldiers to try and strike him down. Leo the Deacon tells the story of the valiant warrior Anemas who saw the Russian prince Svyatoslav in the thick of the fighting and went straight for him, even managing to land him a blow before being cut down by Svyatoslav's bodyguards.⁵³ Such an individual action, if successful, could win a battle outright or reverse the tide of a battle seemingly lost. At Apamea in 998, a Kurdish rider surprised and killed the Byzantine general Damianos Dalassenos after his men had routed an Arab army and were pursuing and looting in the wake of their success. At the news of Dalassenos' death, however, the Arabs rallied and routed the demoralized Byzantines.⁵⁴ In short, both the Byzantines and their foes were easily panicked at the loss of their leader—whether real or perceived—and it was this unfailing tendency that Nikephoros Phokas wished his *kataphraktoi* to exploit.⁵⁵

⁵¹ In all medieval armies, whether tribal, feudal, or imperial, it was more than a psychological blow to see the leader—a kinsman or lord—fall in battle. The practical consequences of this calamity were just as weighty, since his death dashed not only his followers' hopes of victory but also of pay or booty.

⁵² *Byz. Arabes* II.2, 331; see also II.1, 353, and Canard, *Hamdanides*, 779–80.

⁵³ Leo diac. 152.¹⁹–153.⁸; Skyl. 308.²⁻⁹.

⁵⁴ Canard, "Sources arabes," 299–300.

⁵⁵ Even the slightest hint of the commander's demise could strike terror into his army. Skylitzes offers this amazing explanation for the Byzantines' defeat by the Bulgars at the Acheloos River in 917. When the Byzantines, led by Leo Phokas, initially put the Bulgars to flight, Leo went to wash himself at a spring, only to have his horse slip its tether and go running across the battlefield. The sight of their leader's riderless horse threw the Byzantine soldiers into consternation, whereupon the Bulgar czar Symeon, observing their reaction, sent in a second body of men who routed Leo's army. Skyl. 203.⁹³–204.¹⁷, although this incredible occurrence which turned the tide for the Bulgars is not mentioned in other accounts: Theoph. cont. 389.¹⁰⁻¹⁷; Leo diac. 123.⁹–124.¹².



23. The carnage of battle

The *kataphraktoi*, therefore, were trained to bear down on the enemy commander in a silent, steady onslaught. That Phokas half-expected the enemy's nerve to give at the sight of the heavy horsemen is evident from the opening words in his description of the confrontation between the attackers and defenders, "should the enemy stand fast in formation as our men are conducting their attack against them" (*PM* IV.¹³⁷⁻¹³⁸); but if they did stand firm, the war of nerves turned into a brutal physical contest. In a passage lost from the *Praecepta* but preserved by Ouranos in the *Taktika*, Phokas envisioned the moment of impact (*TNO* 61.²⁰⁴⁻²¹⁴):

And with God lending us aid through the intercession of His immaculate Mother, the enemy will be routed by this triangular formation of *kataphraktoi*. For the enemy's spears and *menavlia* will be shattered by the *kataphraktoi* and their arrows will be ineffective, whereupon the *kataphraktoi*, gaining in courage and boldness, will smash in the heads and bodies of the enemy and their horses with their iron maces and sabers, they will break into and dismember their formations and from there break through and so completely destroy them.

This is the cavalry-infantry encounter seen now from the other side. The graphic depiction of the carnage resulting from an engagement at close quarters explains the Byzantine decision to encase horse and rider in heavy armor and arm the *kataphraktoi* with such powerful impact weapons as the iron maces carried by the men in the front rows. From Phokas' description it appears that the Hamdanid infantry also compelled direct attacks against dense lines of spearmen and archers, giving the Byzantines little choice but to resort to sheer physical force to break them. In this light, Phokas' reasoning was simple enough—the stronger the infantry defenders, the heavier the cavalry attackers had to be, first to come through several volleys of arrows and then to smash their way through the massed spearmen and pikemen into the ranks of cavalrymen behind them.

The rider's armor and the horse's carapace were meant to see them through the first phase of the attack by enabling them to withstand the volleys of arrows launched at them as they approached their target. Although the sources say nothing of the proficiency of the archers in Hamdanid armies, it was the vulnerability of cavalry to archers that prompted the creation of armored horses and riders in other times and places. At the same time that the Byzantines were developing their own *kataphraktoi*, the Saxons under Henry I and Otto I were also equipping mailed horsemen capable of withstanding the arrows of the Hungarian horse-archers; Otto's *milites loricati* went on to prove their worth in the crushing victory over the Hungarians at the Lechfeld in 955.⁵⁶ The composite armor worn by the Byzantine *kataphraktoi*—padded surcoats over corslets—was meant to resist both penetrative and concussive blows, and Phokas also ordained that “they must also carry shields to deflect away arrows” (*PM* III.45-46, 72-73).

When facing enemies adept with the bow, however, it was necessary to protect the horses as well as the riders since archers could take a heavy toll of their opponents' horses. The Patzinaks wrought havoc on Byzantine cavalymen in several eleventh-century battles by shooting at their mounts,⁵⁷ and, according to Leo the Deacon, during the great battle outside Dorostolon in 971, Svyatoslav's Russians, fighting on foot against the Byzantine cavalry, were adept at

⁵⁶ On the events leading up to the battle and the tactics adopted by Otto's Saxon *milites*, see K. Leyser, “The Battle at the Lech, 955: A Study in Tenth-Century Warfare,” *History* 50 (1965), 1-25.

⁵⁷ Attaleiates (32.21-33.1) records a battle (ca. 1040) in which the Byzantines attacked the Patzinaks who, by shooting from behind their wagon palisade, wounded the attackers' horses with arrows and forced them to flee. The same Patzinaks later sought to bring a retreating Byzantine force to bay by shooting down their horses (40.22-41.6). On these and other examples, see W. E. Kaegi, “The Contribution of Archery to the Turkish Conquest of Anatolia.”



24. Theodore of Mistheia uses a dead Russian to shield himself from his adversaries

“wounding the horses with their missiles and bringing the riders to the ground.”⁵⁸ The carapaces of felt or hides covering the horses of the *kataphraktoi* responded to a similar danger from the Daylami or Turkish bowmen in Hamdanid armies, and combined with the heavy armor worn by the riders to support Phokas' declaration that the enemy's arrows would be ineffective (*ἀνενέργητοι*) against the attackers.

Once through the barrage of arrows, the *kataphraktoi* could expect a far more lethal confrontation with the massed spearmen and pikemen. Phokas was counting on his heavy horsemen to smash the spears and pikes that the enemy infantry wielded against them (*τὰ μὲν κοντάρια τῶν ἐμπροσθεν πεζῶν . . . συνθλασθήσεται ὑπὸ τῶν καταφράκτων . . . ὡσαύτως τὰ τῶν ἀκοντιστῶν μέναυλα*) and so break through the enemy lines. This was the moment at which their heavy armor and weapons were intended to tip the scales of combat in their favor against strongly placed defenders bolstered, it will be recalled, by the resolute Daylami spearmen who formed the backbone of the Hamdanid infantry.

In these murderous struggles at close quarters, the horses were often singled

⁵⁸ Leo diac. 152.16-19.

out for attack. It will be recalled that the Byzantine *menavlatoi* used their weapons against the enemy warhorses, and several vignettes from the Byzantine-Russian battles of 971 indicate that the death or wounding of his horse gravely imperiled the life of the rider. The aforementioned Anemas was killed after his horse had been felled by the Russians' spears; in another engagement John Kourkouas was butchered (κρεουργηθείς) by his foes when his horse was struck by a spear and fell, bringing him down as well, while Theodore of Mistheia had his horse speared but escaped death by using a dead Russian as a shield against all assailants until his companions came to the rescue.⁵⁹ The best example of a horse's armor resisting blows in close combat, however, is recorded in Theophanes' account of the emperor Herakleios' first battle against the Persians in 622, during which his horse "took a lance-thrust in the flank and received many sword-blows to the face, but because he was wearing armor of layered felt (κατάφρακτα νευρικά) he was unharmed, nor did the swords have any effect."⁶⁰ Though distant from the period in question, this episode is still useful since Herakleios' horse was wearing protective coverings very similar to those used by the *kataphraktoi* of the tenth century.

Random incidents also show that a soldier's armor could save his life when trading blows at close quarters. Bardas Skleros' helmet saved him from his attacker's sword stroke; the Russian prince Svyatoslav was saved from a sword-blow by the coat of mail (ἀλυσιδωτὸς χιτῶν) that he had donned "because he feared the Byzantines' lances."⁶¹ When his forces were defeated by the Hamdanids in a battle near Tall Bitriq in 956, John Tzimiskes stood manfully to the end and survived only because his armor resisted the many blows rained upon him. In his poetic description of this episode, al-Mutanabbi recalled that the spear-points were no more harmful than feathers against his coat of mail:⁶²

Sa longue cotte de mailles, sur les plis de laquelle tombait sans arrêt une pluie de coups de lances, le protégeait contre nos cavaliers.
Les lances la marquaient sans la percer, comme si chaque pointe n'eût été qu'une plume.

Indirect testimony to the effectiveness of the heavier armor worn by Byzantine soldiers of the time comes from the casualty figures cited by Skylitzes and

⁵⁹ Ibid., 153.4-5; Skyl. 304.74-83; 307.65-74.

⁶⁰ Theophanes 318.25-28.

⁶¹ Leo diac. 152.19-153.4.

⁶² Byz. Arabes, II.2, p. 347.

Leo the Deacon from two battles against the Russians and their allies in 970 and 971. In Bardas Skleros' victory over the Patzinaks, Hungarians, and Russians, Skylitzes cites a total of twenty-five Byzantines killed, "though nearly every last one of them was wounded"; Leo the Deacon gives a figure of fifty-five Byzantine dead with a great many wounded (τραυματίας δὲ γενέσθαι συχνοῦς), remarking too that most of the horses had been speared. After the second battle at Dorostolon, Leo reports that the number of Byzantine dead came to 350, while there were "droves of wounded" (τρωθῆναι δὲ συχνοῦς).⁶³ What is to be inferred from the proportion of killed to wounded in these hard-fought contests is that even though many Byzantines were injured, their armor saved them from being killed despite the heavy blows received at close quarters.

On the other hand, they could certainly give as good as they got. It is enough to remember Bardas Skleros' splitting his assailant in half with one stroke and his brother Constantine's terrible blow to his foe's horse before he finished the man off. The ill-fated Anemas was also reputed to have carved a Russian champion in half the day before his own death in combat. Although one must allow for some exaggeration in these *aristeia*, they are not far from Phokas' chilling picture of the butcher's blows to be dealt by the *kataphraktoi* with their iron maces. Leo the Deacon, for instance, tells of the invincible warrior Theodore Lalakon who "slew a great many of the foe with an iron mace (σιδηρὰ κορύνη); bringing it down with the might of his hand, he shattered both the helmet and the head encased within it."⁶⁴

The episodes gathered here combine to show that it could be a very difficult task to kill an armored rider or his horse outright in hand-to-hand fighting; the solidly protected *kataphraktos* in turn had the weapons to make sure that his adversary did not get too many more chances to finish him off. Yet in spite of their heavy armor and weapons, the *kataphraktoi* were by no means an instant success on the battlefield. The battle in which their presence is first recorded, Hadat in 954, ended in disaster for the Byzantines. This initial failure, and the adjustments in their tactics noted above, bear witness to a phase of trial and error in the use of these horsemen, but once their tactics were ironed out, did the *kataphraktoi* become the decisive force that Nikephoros Phokas intended them to be?

This is not a question that can be answered on the basis of abundant evi-

⁶³ Casualties in Skleros' victory: Skyl. 291.3-4; Leo diac. 111.2-4; in the second battle of Dorostolon: Leo diac. 155.11-12.

⁶⁴ Leo diac. 144.23-145.3.



25. The valiant Anemas kills the Russian champion Ikmor

dence since they are described in action on just a handful of occasions. The only detailed description of them in battle, however, rendered in Leo the Deacon's account of Phokas' siege of Tarsos in 965, paints an impressive picture of the heavy horsemen and their effect on the enemy. It bears noting that the region around Tarsos was well suited to cavalry warfare since the town was situated in a wide, level plain (Ταρσοῦ . . . ἐφ' ἱππηλάτου πεδίου συνωκισμένης), and upon his arrival Phokas took the added step of devastating the surrounding countryside to eliminate possible sources of surprise attack. The Tarsiots nevertheless remained supremely confident owing to their many triumphs over the Byzantines in the past and moved out boldly to confront the besiegers. Leo describes the ensuing battle in which the emperor's "ironclad horsemen" led the Byzantine attack.⁶⁵

⁶⁵ Ibid., 59.2-22. That such a methodical attack can be more unnerving to defenders than a wild charge is shown by an episode from the Crimean War. During the battle of Balaclava in 1855, a British cavalry regiment of 250 to three hundred men was ordered to make a seemingly suicidal attack against a much larger Russian force of nearly four thousand men. Apparently indifferent to the odds against them, the British dressed their order with parade ground precision under the eyes of the waiting Russians, launched their charge, and succeeded, incredibly, in driving them back.

The emperor led the might and strength of his army out from the encampment in person and drew up his formations in battle array. He put the ironclad horsemen in front and instructed the archers and slingers to shoot from behind them at the enemy. He himself took his place on the right wing leading a vast array of horsemen, while John, surnamed Tzimiskes . . . fought on the left wing. At a sign from the emperor the signal for battle was sounded and one could see the Byzantine units proceeding in extraordinary good order, while the field gleamed with the brilliance of their arms. The Tarsiots could not withstand so great an assault. Overwhelmed by the impact of the lances and by the missiles shot by the men behind [the attackers], they at once gave way to flight and shamefully shut themselves up inside the town. A terrible fear overwhelmed them as they beheld so great a mass methodically advancing.

To a remarkable degree Leo's description corroborates the tactics prescribed by Phokas for an attack by the *kataphraktoi*. The placement of the ironclad horsemen in front between units of horsemen led by Phokas on the right wing and John Tzimiskes on the left is consistent with the deployment of the attack line as set out in the *Praecepta*; the use of archers and slingers to shoot at the enemy from behind the advancing cavalry is also in keeping with Phokas' directions to have the horse-archers inside the wedge rain arrows on the defenders to puncture gaps in their lines. What Leo describes as the signal to begin battle (τὸ ἐνυάλιον) may have been the moment when the soldiers halted to recite their prayers before moving to the attack. Most telling of all, however, is the manner in which Leo portrays their disciplined, orderly advance (ἀμηχάνῳ κόσμῳ) and the intimidating effect this had on the Tarsiots, who were seized with terror (δεινὴ . . . δειλία) at the sight of the massed *kataphraktoi* moving forward so methodically (τηλικαύτην μετ' ἐμπειρίας . . . χωροῦσαν πληθύν). It would appear that many of the defenders broke and ran before the attackers closed with them, while those who stood fast were overwhelmed by the impact of the charge. Leo's account confirms not only that the *kataphraktoi* followed the guidelines laid down by Phokas, but also that their steady pace and rigid discipline did achieve the twin effects of terror and physical force necessary to break the defenders.

Leo also records the *kataphraktoi* in action twice during John Tzimiskes' Balkan wars, first before Preslav in April 971 and then in the first battle at

"After the war Russian officers said that the *extraordinary unhurried deliberation* displayed in the movement of the tiny British force had done much to shake the Russian morale." C. Woodham-Smith, *The Reason Why* (New York, 1953), 220 (italics mine).

Dorostolon the following July. In his account of the battle outside the fortress of Preslav, Leo reports that the Russians, making their stand behind their large, strong shields, fought on even terms against the Byzantines until Tzimiskes ordered the newly created *tagma* of the *Athanatoi* into action.⁶⁶

The emperor then commanded the *Athanatoi* to charge against the left wing of the Scyths. They bore down on them, thrusting their lances forward and putting the spurs to their horses with alacrity. The Scyths, since they operate as foot soldiers—they are neither accustomed to fighting on horseback nor do they train for this—could not hold out against the massed lances of the Byzantines but, turning to flight, closed themselves up within the city walls. The Byzantines as they pursued them slaughtered them mercilessly.

Leo's description of the *kataphraktoi* at Dorostolon shows a slight change in their tactics. On this occasion Tzimiskes placed the ironclad horsemen on either wing of the battle line (τοὺς πανσιδήρους ἱππότητας κατὰ θάτερον κέρασ παραστησάμενος) instead of in the center, but, as Phokas had before, he placed archers and slingers behind them to shower the Russians with missiles as the *kataphraktoi* made their advance.⁶⁷ This excerpt indicates that the *kataphraktoi* did have a decisive effect in this battle, which the sources portray as an extremely hard fought contest that reportedly went back and forth twelve times before the Russians quit the field; but, more importantly, their performance here played a considerable part in grinding down the Russians' morale. That the Russians came to fear them is clear from the demoralized tenor of Svyatoslav's council of war during which his foremost warriors are reported to have declared that they were incapable of standing against the ironclad horsemen in combat (μὴ γὰρ οἷους τε καθεστάναι ἱππόταις πανσιδήροις ἀνδράσι συμπλέκεσθαι), and for this and other reasons advised abandoning the struggle and returning home.⁶⁸ The contribution of the *kataphraktoi* to Tzimiskes' triumph in the Balkan was proved to be just as telling as it had been during Phokas' offensive against Cilicia.

Nikephoros Ouranos retained Phokas' prescriptions on the formation and tactics of the *kataphraktoi* without change in his *Taktika*, and it is possible that they continued to be used against the Fatimids during the campaigns in Syria

⁶⁶ Leo diac. 133.^{22-134.7}.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 140.^{10-13, 22-23}.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 151.³⁻⁴.

and Palestine led by John Tzimiskes and Basil II during the 970s and 990s. But after the successful conclusion of Tzimiskes' Balkan campaign, the *kataphraktoi* are not mentioned again in the historical sources. Once Basil's treaty with al-Hakim (1001) had terminated hostilities with the Fatimids and left the emperor free to turn his attention to the subjugation of Bulgaria, heavy cavalry would have been of limited use in the local raids and police actions that characterized Byzantine military activity in the east during the early eleventh century. Ouranos, who after 999 supervised the eastern frontier from Antioch, indicates as much in his discussion of local raiding tactics where he recommends that the *kataphraktoi* accompanying a raid into enemy lands be left with the infantry force trailing in the wake of the more mobile cavalry detachments sent ahead in search of prisoners and plunder. He also proposes that forty or fifty of the *kataphraktoi* may leave their armor and their horses' carapaces with the baggage train and participate in the raid as light horsemen to obtain their share of the spoils (TNO 63.²⁹⁻³²).

If their use in Syria persisted in a limited capacity, however, the *kataphraktoi* seem to have been completely discarded in the west. The author of the *De re militari*, whose focus is mainly on the northwestern frontiers of the empire, makes no mention of them, and for obvious reasons. The mountainous, wooded terrain of the Balkans denied them the level ground they needed to perform effectively; furthermore, Basil's strategy hinged more on control of key routes, passes, and strongholds, a type of warfare that elevated the role of infantry, than on confrontations in the open field suited to cavalry. But their gradual disappearance should not be ascribed solely to the shift in military operations from east to west, since it is likely that they would soon have outlived their usefulness. Like all heavy cavalry, the *kataphraktoi* employed ponderous, inflexible tactics that required intensive training and ideal conditions to succeed, not least of which was an enemy willing to let himself be the stationary object of their charge. When these conditions prevailed, as at Tarsos in 965, the *kataphraktoi* could be a devastating weapon, yet in the end all but the most unimaginative adversary could easily forestall their charge by refusing to concede the advantages necessary to its proper execution. No longer needed to win battles, and an expensive obsolescence, the *kataphraktoi* probably passed out of use by the early eleventh century.

As a broad conclusion to this section on the *kataphraktoi*, it is worth noting that there was no continuous tradition of heavy cavalry in Byzantium. There were instead periodic attempts to create this type of soldier in different times, against different enemies. These efforts were not always crowned with success. The Romans achieved only mixed results with mailed cavalry in the fourth cen-

century,⁶⁹ while Manuel Komnenos' imitation of western knights in the twelfth century was ill-suited to the tactics of the Turks.⁷⁰ The tenth-century *kataphraktoi*, however, created and trained for a specific purpose, rank as one of the most successful experiments in all of Byzantine military history.

The use of reserves

As noted above in the section on cavalry deployment, it had long been a cardinal tenet in Byzantine tactical theory to maintain a second line of cavalry units in reserve as a counterweight to the uncertainties of battle. In case of victory, fresh reserves could be committed to the pursuit, while in case of defeat, they could be called on to rally their comrades and/or take up the fight once more, perhaps even to reverse the initial outcome. Most of all, however, prudent commanders kept reserves as a safeguard against an enemy recovery or such common ploys as feigned flight or the deliberate abandonment of the baggage train.

Although the historical sources say nothing of the standard tactical disposition of Byzantine cavalry as presented in the treatises, they do furnish a number of examples to show that commanders adhered to the tactical principles stated therein by withholding units in reserve for commitment as the circumstances dictated. Skylitzes and Leo the Deacon describe two occasions on which John Tzimiskes sent reserve units forward to bolster his forces embroiled in combat with Svyatoslav's Russians. During the first battle at Dorostolon in April 971, Tzimiskes ordered an attack against the Russian left; when they held fast against the Byzantines, "the emperor sent forward some of his own units to lend them aid" (τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν . . . εἰς ἐπικουρίαν ἐκπέμπει τινάς) and then came forward himself to encourage his men in their eventually successful efforts to break the Russians' resistance.⁷¹ In the course of the second battle in July, Tzimiskes intervened to rally retreating men for another assault. When he perceived that the Byzantines were faltering, he immediately launched an attack with his own units to prevent the Russians from exploiting a favorable opportunity for a counterattack of their own. According to Leo, "he summoned his companions (τοῖς ἀμφ' αὐτόν) . . . and went at the enemy. The Byzantines, put to shame by the emperor's onslaught, wheeled their horses about and went charging at the Scyths once more."⁷² Brief as they are, these excerpts nonetheless

⁶⁹ Eadie, "Roman Mailed Cavalry," 172–73.

⁷⁰ R. P. Lindner, "An Impact of the West on Comnenian Anatolia," *XVI. Internationaler Byzantinistenkongress, Akten II/2 = JÖB 32/2* (1982), 207–13.

⁷¹ Skyl. 299.⁵¹–300.⁶⁴.

⁷² Ibid., 306.⁴¹–50; Leo diac. 153.¹²–19.

tally with Phokas' picture in the *Praecepta* of the commander taking his place with the four units of the second line and remaining at a distance to supervise the battle and commit his own units when occasion demanded.

Reserves could be sent to reinforce an attack or support forces already engaged, but the opportunistic commitment of an intact reserve could also serve to reverse the tide of a battle. That keeping a reserve intact for such a purpose had long been standard in Byzantine warfare is shown by Skylitzes' account of a battle fought in 813 between the Byzantines under Leo the Armenian and the Bulgars under Krum. The Byzantines were at first put to flight, but the emperor Leo "positioned on a high vantage point with his retinue was surveying the action" and observed that the Bulgars had scattered in a disorganized pursuit. He brought the forces that he had kept with him down upon the Bulgars and, taking them completely by surprise, routed them and saved the day.⁷³ This is one example among many to show that initial success over the enemy was frequently a poisoned gift, since all medieval armies were notoriously prone to dissolve in search of booty or prisoners once their side had won, an incorrigible habit that made them extremely vulnerable to a well-organized counterattack by the enemy.


Finally, if commanders could not always rescue the outcome of a battle lost, they might still prevent defeats from turning into disasters by using a reserve to cover a withdrawal. When the rebel Bardas Skleros' forces defeated his men in their first battle in 978, Bardas Phokas secured their orderly retirement and forestalled a rout by acting as a rearguard (ὀπισθεὺς οὐραγῶν):⁷⁴

By no means was Phokas' army scattered in an uncontrolled retreat; instead it gave way a little at a time and conducted a proper retirement so as to give the impression that they were not driven by terror, but were yielding by order of the commander in proper formation and with discipline. For when his soldiers turned about and hastened away in flight, Phokas, staying behind in the role of rearguard, held off attackers and did not allow them to make an assault with great force and fury.

Skylitzes' narrative goes on to relate that Phokas checked the enemy's pursuit by killing one of their leaders in single combat, an exploit that disheartened the remaining pursuers and assured his own army's unharried escape. What is more, however, Phokas' actions demonstrate that the ability of good commanders

⁷³ Theoph. cont. 23.¹⁹–26.⁸; Skyl. 13.³⁶–14.³; Genesios 12.¹³–13.¹¹; Zon. III.321.⁴–322.⁹.

⁷⁴ Skyl. 324.³²–325.⁸²; Zon. III.544.⁹–545.².



26. Byzantine cavalymen in pursuit of a fleeing enemy

shone in adversity as much as it did in victory; by keeping his head and averting a panicked flight, Phokas was able to bring his army to battle with Skleros' forces shortly afterwards, with happier results.

The pursuit

The last phase of battle, the pursuit of the beaten foe, was as carefully regulated as the conduct of battle itself. It is worth noting at the outset that Phokas' methodical treatment of the pursuit in the *Praecepta* is another feature distinguishing the treatise from earlier classical and Byzantine manuals. For although these works had routinely emphasized the importance of a prudently conducted pursuit and the dangers of possible traps, only the *Praecepta* offers a detailed plan outlining the stages of the pursuit and the considerations which governed the commander's commitment of his reserves once the enemy had been put to flight.

If the enemy had been forced to flee—whether overwhelmed by fear or physical might—the Byzantine commander had to be certain of two things as he dispatched his units to the pursuit. The first was that the enemy was irreversibly in full flight (*PM* II. 44–46, 66–70; IV. 150), and the second was that there was no other hostile force of infantry or cavalry in the vicinity (*PM* II. 47–50). Only when

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he was convinced that both conditions applied could he throw most of his reserve units into the pursuit, including two of the four units that remained with him in the second line; as a general rule, the commander always retained two units as a safeguard for the cavalymen engaged in running down the enemy (*PM* II. 50–53; IV. 160–162). The gradual commitment of reserves to the pursuit and the commander's withholding two units as a precaution testify to Phokas' preoccupation with the tactic of feigned flight, which always had to be suspected if the enemy gave way without putting up much resistance, and with the possibility of an enemy rally since, as noted above, armies did maintain reserves either to protect fleeing comrades or to take a careless victor by surprise.

The real worry, however, was that the soldiers in pursuit of the enemy would yield to the powerful temptation of stopping to collect plunder or prisoners instead of pressing on after the main body of the enemy. Phokas sounds this warning twice in the *Praecepta* (II. 71–79; IV. 162–166), insisting that “the officers and cavalymen must concentrate on the battle, while their attendants and the infantrymen are to capture prisoners.” To prevent the combatants' voracity for loot from getting the better of them and so allowing the enemy to escape or, more dangerously, stage a counterattack, Phokas recommended proclaiming punitive measures for any soldier who broke the rule against plundering during the course of battle. Reminding the army of this and other transgressions was standard practice before battle, and the most serious crimes listed in the military codes (cowardice, looting) were punishable by death.⁷⁵

But there was a contradictory aspect to the problem of soldiers' plundering during battle. Since the spoils of war furnished a considerable portion of a soldier's income,⁷⁶ the hope of booty naturally supplied much—if not all—of his motivation to overcome the enemy. In the *De velitatione* (X. 122–124; XXIV. 35–44), Phokas declared that his soldiers' insatiable appetite for loot—“disdaining death to seize spoils in their hope of gain”—would kindle their lust for blood in attacks on an enemy camp laden with plunder, so much so that “when they

⁷⁵ The articles of war in the *Strategikon* (I.8.16–20 = *LT* VIII.18–26) and the military code (Περὶ στρατιωτικῶν ἐπιτιμίων, JGR II, 73–79) decreed the death penalty for soldiers who deserted or stopped to plunder during battle. Cf. *SM* I.8.16 (= *LT* VIII.20 and article 8 of the code). The *Strategikon* and the *Taktika* recommend reminding soldiers before battle of the risks and consequences of looting (*SM* VII A 14; *LT* IX.25, XII.124, XIII.14–15, XIV.93).

⁷⁶ The eighth-century *Ekloga* (XVI.2) listed salary (ρόγα), gratuities (φιλοτιμία), and booty (σκύλα) as the mainstays of the soldier's income. The rules of *peculium castrense* (στρατιωτικὸν πεκούλιον), or the soldier's right to keep his military revenues with no obligation to share them with family or dependents, were entrenched in Roman law but were modified in Byzantine law. A. Dain, “Sur le «Peculium castrense»,” *REB* 19 (1961), 253–57; Haldon, *Recruitment*, 67–72; and Oikonomides' analysis of the relevant passage in the *Ekloga* in “Middle-Byzantine Provincial Recruits,” 130–36. On the regulations governing the sale of prisoners, see the Appendix.

start to get their hands on horses or mules and the possessions of the enemy, and to take men prisoner, when this has begun in earnest, they will all hasten into this rush for spoils and will go through the tents sparing no one as they hack the enemy to pieces."⁷⁷ To provide similar inspiration to their men in battle, commanders might give out booty in reward for valor,⁷⁸ but the balance in soldiers' minds between booty as an incentive against the enemy and an end in itself was very precarious indeed. Although the hope of plunder certainly reinforced their fighting spirit, it also led to a complete breakdown of discipline when their greed overrode all other considerations. Prokopios, for example, candidly described the unbridled lust for spoils that possessed Belisarios' men following their capture of Gelimer's camp during the Vandal wars, or Germanos' men once they had broken into the camp of the rebel Stotzas, "there the soldiers, finding it easy to plunder the goods of the camp, neither took any account of the enemy nor paid any further heed to the exhortations of their general, since booty was at hand."⁷⁹

It was this susceptibility to greed and indiscipline that made feigned flight or the deliberate sacrifice of the baggage train such reliable ploys, for despite the constant warnings about these old tricks in the military manuals and the announcement of penalties for looting, armies rarely resisted the temptation offered by deceptively easy pickings and, throwing caution to the winds, laid themselves open to ambushes or counterattacks. Even soldiers who had decisively defeated the enemy might pounce on glittering wealth only to let the greater prize slip through their fingers. When Leo Phokas ambushed Sayf al-Dawla's forces in a mountain pass as they wearily made their way home from a raid into Byzantine territory, the Hamdanid emir reportedly evaded capture by scattering money to distract his pursuers:⁸⁰

All had their swords in their right hands and, wielding them this way and that, slaughtered the adversary exhausted from his journey, while they themselves closed in on him fresh. The Hamdanid himself was very nearly

⁷⁷ See Dagron's comments on booty in *Le traité*, 231–34.

⁷⁸ As did Bardanios Tourkos in the early ninth century (Theoph. cont. 8.²⁰–9.³). The division of spoils was regulated in theory according to the military and legal texts (cf. *Ekloga* XVIII; *ST* 50, and A. Dain, "Le partage du butin de guerre d'après les traités juridiques et militaires," *Actes du VI^e Congrès international d'études byzantines* I [Paris, 1950], 347–52), but in practice the distribution of booty was left to the judgment of the commander. For examples, see Dagron, *Le traité*, 233–34 and notes; Haldon, *Praetorians*, 317 and note 959.

⁷⁹ Prokopios, *Wars* IV.3.19–4.8; IV.17.27–31; H. B. Dewing's Loeb translation is quoted in the second passage.

⁸⁰ Leo diac. 22.²¹–23.⁵.



27. Byzantine cavalrymen evade capture by scattering coins before their pursuers

taken prisoner by the Byzantines and would have been captured had he not—being a shrewd man at the best of times and quick to hit upon the right answer when in adverse circumstances—given the order to scatter the gold and silver that he was carrying all over the trail. In this way he held up the Byzantines' onslaught and, as they busied themselves picking up the gold, he barely escaped the danger with a few of his bodyguards.

The propensity of victorious soldiers to loot could leave them vulnerable to counterattack or limit the results achieved by defeating, but not destroying, the enemy in battle. Nikephoros Phokas did not train his armies to win partial victories, however, and his prescriptions for a disciplined, relentless pursuit were meant to ensure the complete destruction of the enemy force. The historical sources have little to say about the conduct of pursuit beyond such formulaic passages in the manner of "when the enemy turned to flight, the victors pursued them with alacrity and worked a great slaughter," but among these featureless repetitions there is one grim incident to demonstrate that Phokas' armies carried out his intentions to the letter. In the year 964 a Byzantine army led by John Tzimiskes met a combined Tarsiot and Cilician force near Adana. Upon destroying the main body of the enemy, Tzimiskes and his cavalrymen gave

chase to a detachment that sought to foil the Byzantine pursuers by rallying on a steep hill inaccessible to men on horseback.⁸¹

In this year the emperor sent the *magistros* John Tzimiskes, who had by then been promoted Domestic of the Schools of the East, into Cilicia. Arriving before the city of Adana he came upon a select force of Arabs mobilized from all over Cilicia, joined battle with them and routed them completely. All the rest of the Arabs were cut down according to the rules of war, but a detachment of their army, about five thousand in number, fled to an insurmountable and very steep hill, and on foot, alighting from their horses, they drew confidence from their advantage of terrain and stoutly defended themselves against their attackers. John surrounded them but because he was unable to get at them on horseback, he ordered his soldiers to proceed on foot and went up with them on foot himself. Prevailing in the struggle, he massacred them all since none could flee, so that the blood flowed in torrents down to the plain, for which reason the hill came to be known as "the hill of blood." This exploit raised John's name to even greater renown and brought about the final downfall of the Saracens.

It is important to understand that the "final downfall" to which the chronicler refers is Phokas' capture of Tarsos and Mopsuestia the following year. In this context, the contrast in the passage between the fate of the main Arab force "cut down according to the rules of war" (νόμῳ πολέμου κατεκόπησαν) and that of the contingent surrounded on the hill and wiped out to the last man "because none could flee" (νότῳ μηδενὸς δεδωκότος) becomes clear. Skylitzes implies that the first stage of the battle; although a struggle to the death, was a fair fight, whereas the second stage, culminating in a massacre, was not. Whether the trapped men could or would have surrendered is uncertain from the narrative, but there is no doubt that Tzimiskes' purpose was to annihilate the Cilician army and its many Tarsiot soldiers. In so doing he was bent on paving the way for Phokas' impending assault on the principal Muslim strongholds in Cilicia, Tarsos and Mopsuestia. Their fall would not only assure Byzantine mastery of Cilicia but also open the way to Antioch, the key to military and commercial domination of northern Syria, and Nikephoros Phokas' ultimate objective.

When viewed in this wider perspective, the brutal episode at Adana stands

⁸¹ Skyl. 267.⁷⁴–268.⁸⁹; cf. Zon. III.501.^{9–14}. Yahya (PO 18 [1923], 793) reports that after the destruction of the main force, "le reste s'enfuit vers une colline près d'Adana et en atteignit le sommet. Les Grecs, après les avoir entourés, les combattirent de tous les côtés de la colline et les massacrèrent tous." See also Canard, *Hamdanides*, 818–19.

as a faithful reflection of the spirit and conduct of the total war that Phokas visited on the Muslim populations of Cilicia and northern Syria as he drove unrelentingly toward his target. The methods and aims of his yearly campaigns were straightforward enough—to extirpate all means of physical resistance by crushing the enemy on the battlefield and devastating and depopulating his lands so as to demoralize the inhabitants and make any thought of opposing his invasions seem hopeless. Testimony from Arab sources confirms the achievement of his aims. Ibn Hauqal recites a litany of the towns and regions ruined by the Byzantine invaders,⁸² but the most plaintive account describing the effects of Phokas' campaigns of fire and sword is transmitted by Yahya of Antioch:⁸³

Personne ne douta que l'empereur Nicéphore ne s'emparât de toute la Syrie . . . et que (tout cela) lui appartînt, parce qu'il avait conduit la guerre en se dirigeant vers les environs des villes et des villages qui les nourrissaient, et les avait attaqués, détruisant par le feu et emmenant leurs habitants et leurs troupeaux. Le temps de la moisson des céréales arrivé, il était sorti, avait brûlé la récolte et laissé les habitants des villes mourir de faim. Et il n'avait pas cessé de le faire à leur égard, d'année en année, jusqu'à ce que la nécessité les eût contraints à lui livrer les villes. (Nicéphore) s'empara par cette manière d'agir de toutes les villes frontières (*aç-Çoughour*) syriennes et mésopotamiennes, massacra et fit prisonniers un tel nombre de leurs habitants que le Dieu Suprême seul le sait à cause de leur quantité énorme. Les incursions de Nicéphore devinrent comme un plaisir pour ses soldats, parce que personne ne les attaquait, ni ne sortait contre eux; quant à lui, il marchait où il voulait, et dévastait comme il lui plaisait, sans rencontrer un musulman ou quelque autre qui pussent le détourner et l'empêcher de faire ce qu'il voulait.

Il avançait plusieurs fois contre les Arabes, les vainquit et en massacra un grand nombre. Après cela ils eurent peur de lui, se gardant de l'approcher; et les musulmans le redoutèrent horriblement. Personne ne put lui résister et on ne pouvait pas même s'imaginer qu'il fût possible de lui écrire; on ne parlait pas de lui résister.

By way of conclusion to this study of the Byzantine army in battle, it remains now to offer some general observations on the battle tactics prescribed

⁸² Ibn Hauqal, *Configuration de la terre*, 173–82.

⁸³ Yahya, PO 18 (1923), 825–26; see also the remarks of Dagron, "Minorités ethniques," 179–82.

by Phokas in the *Praecepta*. The first is that his tactical systems, defensive and offensive, were tailored to the varying quality and skills of the soldiers at his disposal. Infantry tactics, as we have seen, were very simple, as befitted foot soldiers with their humble equipment and modest military ability; cavalry tactics were more sophisticated, in keeping with the superior equipment and skills of cavalymen. But whether defending or attacking, the most critical roles in battle fell to the very small core of warriors who possessed true fighting ability—such as the exceptionally strong and courageous *menavlatoi*, the versatile *prokoursatores*, and the mighty *kataphraktoi*—who were carefully chosen and prepared for the roles in which we have seen them during the army's mobilization.

The divergence between the quantity and quality of the soldiers in a Byzantine field force is best illustrated by presenting the army as a pyramid, in which the lowly Byzantine and Armenian infantrymen form the broad base, with the *menavlatoi* as the top layer; the thematic cavalymen would form the next level, with the *prokoursatores* as the top layer; and the tagmatic soldiers and personal retainers from whom the *kataphraktoi* were drawn would represent the apex of the structure—in itself a fair reflection of the army's social basis as discussed above in Chapter II. More than any other manual, then, the *Praecepta* demonstrates the extent to which a Byzantine army's tactics were bound to the capacities of the soldiers in its ranks, and that in the end, only a small fraction of the men in that army were capable of anything more than the most elementary methods of defense and attack.

Discipline, however, forcing the men to suppress their emotions (particularly fear and greed) in combat, emerges as the key element in Phokas' battle tactics. That the words "in good order" (εὐτάκτως), or some synonymous expression, occur nearly twenty times in his battle paradigms is the most tangible sign of the importance he attached to his soldiers' disciplined performance of their routines. The constant training of his armies—especially of the elite corps of retainers and the tagmatic soldiers whose efficient performance in battle he deemed essential to success—served the ends of discipline which was imposed both openly (by public proclamation of the articles in the military codes) and tacitly (by the constraints that their formations placed on the foot soldiers and the heavy horsemen).

But discipline could also be inspired, and much of the reason for the success of their armies ultimately lies in the heroic figures that Nikephoros Phokas and John Tzimiskes presented to their men. Phokas' martial prowess was recognized even by chroniclers hostile to his memory, while Tzimiskes was famed for his skills as a warrior and horseman; and it was the aura of invincibility around them that made their men willing to submit to the stern discipline they enforced

and to the rigors of battle. The devotion that Phokas inspired in his soldiers and the reasons for this are captured in these excerpts from Leo the Deacon:⁸⁴

... for he was shrewd and energetic, the most adroit of men, of whom I know, in weighing the advantage and achieving his objective, austere and not given to pleasures; furthermore, he was adept in dealing with opportunities and events in the necessary manner, and he was unsurpassed in physical strength and might. The story goes that once when one of the foremost enemy champions met him in combat, Nikephoros aimed his spear at his chest and thrust with both hands, and that the blow was so forceful that the spear went right through and pierced the breastplate on both sides ...

... for the soldiery adored him to no end ... since he had been taken up with war from his youth and had proven himself a formidable warrior in the manly contests in battle-array or in single combats. Not only was he unmatched in physical prowess and highly skilled, he was also composed in spirit and unrivaled in every aspect of virtue.

Phokas' exemplary piety and courage lay at the source of his authority over his men, and in getting them to face the enemy resolutely in battle, he was asking no more of them than what he had done himself. By drilling his soldiers relentlessly and submitting them to the strict spiritual and physical discipline by which he lived and fought, he strove to make his soldiers function as an irresistible war machine. The many victories they won and the terror they inspired in the enemy were due in the end to his ability to shape his armies into the effective instrument of his own will.

⁸⁴ Leo diac. 10.¹⁸–11.³; 44.¹–7.

He surveyed the country, seeing its dense growth and precipitous nature (for to speak in the words of the poet, in the country of the Bulgars, "in every direction evil was set upon evil." Caverns and ridges succeed the dense, overgrown country, and then in turn do swamps and marshes. The country is extraordinarily watery and heavily wooded, everywhere enclosed by impassable mountains, settled along the Danube and the Rhodope, and girt by the greatest of rivers). Once the emperor Nikephoros beheld this country, he concluded that it served him no purpose leading the Byzantine force in disarray through precarious places, as though to provide flocks of sheep to be slaughtered by the Bulgars. For it is said that the Byzantines often stumble in the rough terrain of Bulgaria, to fall into complete destruction. He therefore decided not to risk venturing through impenetrable and perilous places, whereupon he recalled his army and returned to Constantinople . . .

Nikephoros Phokas' brief foray into Bulgaria (968)
(Leo diac. 62.¹³–63.⁶, quoting the *Iliad* XVI.¹¹¹)

THE ARMY ON CAMPAIGN

The ability of a Byzantine field army to proceed securely and efficiently through hostile territory was as vital to success in warfare as the ability to defeat the enemy in battle. Prolonged offensive campaigns in east and west imposed various hardships (difficult terrain, heat, lack of water and provisions) that sorely taxed the soldiers' stamina and morale. Already faced with the rigors of climate in northern Syria and the rugged topography of the Balkans, an army's cohesion, discipline, and vigilance became all the more urgent in case the enemy avoided an open confrontation and sought instead to wear the invaders down with guerrilla tactics. Byzantine armies campaigning in enemy lands therefore had not only to cope with the daily travails of marching and pitching camp, but also to be prepared to fight at times and places not of their choosing. This frequently meant being forced to fight while on the march or in camp.

Their recognition of these hazards prompted the experienced tacticians of the later tenth century to define the methods for conducting the day's march and pitching camp in enemy lands. Nikephoros Phokas briefly listed the procedures for soldiers on the march (*PM* II.1) and devoted the 5th chapter of his treatise to the field camp; in the *Taktika* 56 through 65, Nikephoros Ouranos included sections on the army's order of march and the tactics for an encamped army challenged by the enemy (*TNO* 64.1–4). The regulations of the *Praecepta* and the *Taktika*, recorded by soldiers active in the east, complement those of the *De re militari*. This treatise, the product of a soldier versed in campaign tactics along the empire's northwestern frontiers, contains the most comprehensive set of instructions outlining the layout of the Byzantine camp (*DRM* 1–7) and the army's marching formations and routines (9–20). What all three treatises combine to show is that marching and camping were as meticulously regulated as the conduct of battle itself.

Part II: Historical Commentary

Marching and Encampments

Two observations should be made at the outset concerning the prescriptions for marching and camping in the treatises. The first is that these prescriptions are strictly tactical in nature. It is evident from the *De re militari* that during training the army was rehearsed in the routines for marching and camping for use as the circumstances dictated while on campaign (*DRM* 30.⁴⁻¹²); but the authors of the treatises make no mention of specific routes or places of strategic value.¹ The second is that although the treatises differ in scope and depth of detail, they nevertheless prescribe essentially the same procedures. This consistency between the three treatises is in turn a reliable sign that during this period the Byzantine army had a standard set of campaign tactics that were used in East and West alike; moreover, these campaign tactics were closely integrated with the battle formations and tactics discussed in the previous chapter. The primary aim of this chapter will therefore be to examine Byzantine marching and camping procedures and to show their connection with battle tactics within the general tactical system of the period.

The accounts of contemporary chroniclers prove surprisingly useful to the study of Byzantine campaign tactics. At first glance, marching and camping are hardly heroic activities likely to stir the imagination of the chroniclers and their audience, and yet a number of historians, Byzantine and Arab—particularly those with military experience themselves—took an interest in these technical aspects of warfare. Not only do their narratives confirm and elucidate the practices recommended in the treatises, they also bear witness to the importance of these practices in determining the success or failure of a campaign. The chroniclers attribute several of the Byzantines' greatest triumphs to their skills in campaigning, but they are equally quick to attribute some of their worst defeats to neglect or ignorance of the proper routines. A further aim of this chapter will be to present evidence from the historical sources to show where the guidelines of the treatises reflect military practice and to reveal the effects that an army's adherence or indifference to these guidelines might have on the outcome of a campaign.

Part I: The Army on the March

The discussions of marching procedures in the treatises concentrate on the role of guides and advance parties, the order of march, the methods for coping with obstacles of terrain, and the tactics for fighting on the march. These aspects

¹On the routes used by Byzantine armies in the east, see F. Hild, *Strassensystem*, 118–29.

The Army on Campaign

of campaigning will be surveyed here, along with such topics of related interest as the rate of march and the conditions which the common soldier had to endure. By way of conclusion, excerpts from historical sources describing campaigns in which an army's conduct of march bore directly on the outcome will be cited and discussed.

Advance parties and guides

Byzantine commanders preparing to invade hostile lands required accurate information not only on the strength and location of enemy forces but also on the terrain and routes. They obtained this information through a network of spies (κατάσκοποι) and small bands of light horsemen (the *trapezitaitasinarioi* or the *chosarioi*) who infiltrated neighboring regions to monitor enemy activities and intentions and to seize prisoners for interrogation and use as hostages (*DV* II.¹⁵⁻²⁴; *DRM* 18.¹⁶⁻³³).² The intelligence they gathered was instrumental in the planning of a campaign; but once the army was set to embark, the commander was advised to send bands of scouts and guides (*doukatores*) ahead into hostile lands to examine key roads and passes and to determine whether or not the enemy had occupied them. If not, his first step was to dispatch the guides with units of infantry equipped with axes and other tools to take control of these crucial points and clear the army's path of advance (*DRM* 19.⁴⁻²⁸).

As the army proceeded through hostile territory, the commander relied on the same bands of light horsemen and guides to conduct reconnaissance. The role of the *prokoursatores* in seeking contact with the enemy has been discussed in the previous chapter; the *doukatores* went ahead with them to chart the army's course and to plan each day's march.³ It was particularly important that their knowledge of the country enabled them to warn of troublesome areas lying ahead (rough terrain, defiles, rivers) so as to give the commander time to prepare his army for these obstacles (*DRM* 14.⁴⁻⁶, 18.³⁻¹⁵). They also put their knowledge to use to conduct units along alternative routes in situations where the army was compelled to root out an enemy force lodged in a pass along the main road (*DRM* 20.²⁰⁻²⁵). Rounding out the tasks assigned to the *doukatores* was the selection of well-watered, level sites suitable for encampments, a role they shared with the *minsouratores*, or the surveyors who marked out the camp groundplans.

The *doukatores* are yet another example of the Byzantine army's reliance on specialists to perform particular tasks. The necessity of experienced guides,

²Dagron, (*Le traité*, 245–57) discusses the espionage network employed by the Byzantines along the eastern and western frontiers during the tenth and eleventh centuries.

³That their counsel was constantly sought during a campaign is evident from the assignment of their quarters close by the emperor's tent within the encampment: *DRM* 1.¹¹⁹⁻¹²².

however, lay not only in the daily planning and conduct of a campaign but also in presenting the commander with a range of options as to the choice of routes or campsites. As shown in the *De velitatione*, much of Byzantine defensive strategy hinged on anticipating the routes or campsites likely to be used by the invader and occupying these places in advance to set up ambushes or deny the enemy access to water and provisions. Byzantine armies invading Syria or Bulgaria could in turn expect the defenders to forestall them in the same manner, so that awareness by the *doukatores* of alternative routes or campsites allowed a commander to improvise in case the enemy already controlled his intended route or destination.

Finally, while it was sound practice to detail advance parties to explore and control the routes into hostile territory, it was equally necessary to observe the same precautions on the journey home. A favorite and often effective tactic of the Byzantines and their foes was to wait until the invader, laden with plunder and worn out from the expedition, had turned for home and then ambush him in a pass. Commanders were therefore advised either to leave men behind to hold key places on the route homeward or to send detachments ahead to explore and secure them for the safety of the returning army (*DRM* 20.⁴⁶⁻⁷¹).

The order of march

The *De re militari* and the *Taktika* of Nikephoros Ouranos combine to present a detailed account of the standard Byzantine order of march. Their instructions, outlining the alignment and mutual dependence of infantry and cavalry on the march, recommend a system in which the infantry square formed the center of the column while the units of the cavalry force were deployed on all four sides. As in battle, the formation and tactics for the army on the march emphasized the role of infantry in support of cavalry. Ouranos presents the following schema (*TNO* 64.²⁹⁻³⁹):

... they [the cavalry] should make their way in good order, some on the right side, some on the left, some in front, and some to the rear as the *saka*. You must proceed in the middle so that you can provide support on whichever side the enemy attacks. If the terrain is level and suitable, the flankguards and rearguards should proceed on the outside of the infantry units, as should those in the rear and front. The infantry units should march along inside them, three chiliarchs with their contingents on the right side, three on the left, three in front, and three behind in the rear.

It is evident from Ouranos' instructions that, as long as the terrain permitted, Byzantine infantry on the march maintained the same hollow square forma-

tion in which they deployed for battle.⁴ It was shown in the preceding chapter that the camp plan was the model for the square battle formation; the *De re militari* records instructions that indicate that in design and function the square marching formation was little more than a walking encampment (*DRM* 10.¹¹⁻¹⁶):⁵

... the front section of the infantry, the one directly facing the route, must follow them [the cavalry units ahead]. The infantry units on the flanks, and the rear section of the formation, should, if the terrain is flat and open, make their way adhering to the layout and design of the camp, encompassing the service corps with the baggage animals in the middle. ...

As described in the treatises, Byzantine infantrymen in their square marching formation functioned as a mobile human fortress safeguarding the servants and baggage train on the inside while maintaining a defensive base for the cavalry. This arrangement responded to the demands of security and cohesion on the march and enabled the army to prepare for battle quickly in case the enemy approached. The following excerpt from Ouranos' discussion of marching tactics demonstrates that the foot soldiers walked or rode along with their units, each soldier keeping to the position which he held in the battle line (*TNO* 64.³⁹⁻⁴⁷):

... the infantrymen should not, however, make their way clad in their equipment. Those with donkeys, horses or mules should ride along in good order with their *kontoubernia* and not in a confused array. Instead, each hekatontarch, pentekontarch and dekarch should march along with his chiliarchy, so that if there is a sudden attack by the enemy, everyone will be in his assigned station and place, they will swiftly take up their equipment, and all will stand in their formation and in their proper order.

The infantry square provided a secure rallying point for the army on the march and anchored the marching column. Outside the square on all four sides were the units of the cavalry force. The author of the *De re militari* explained

⁴The square marching formation with three taxiarchies on each of the four sides is of course suitable only to open country, but it is likely that in constricted terrain the marching formation was altered in the way Phokas advises for the battle formation (*PM* II.¹⁵¹⁻¹⁷⁵).

⁵Armies marching in a square were likened to "walking cities," as were the Crusader armies described by Muhammad al-Mangli ("eine wandelnde Stadt" in Ritter's translation, quoted above pp. 278-79).

the order in which they were to deploy and proceed on the march. His plan calls for a cavalry force divided into twenty-four units, arranged into four groups of six units. One such group of six formed the vanguard. One unit went ahead to conduct reconnaissance; behind this unit were three units (whether they proceeded in line or column is not specified), followed by two units on either side of the emperor's thousand-man escort (*DRM* 10.³⁻¹⁰). Alongside either flank of the infantry square were another six units, in two parallel columns of three; smaller contingents were detached and posted well out to the flanks to warn of an enemy attack from that quarter (10.¹⁸⁻²⁶). If, out of fatigue from a long or difficult journey, the foot soldiers began to lag, these parallel columns of three cavalry units covering the flanks of the infantry converged into a longer, single column of six to shepherd the stragglers (10.⁴⁶⁻⁵⁹). Trailing the infantry square were the six units of the rearguard (the *saka*), from which smaller contingents were likewise detached to intercept any hostile force coming up from behind (10.²⁷⁻³¹). This last precaution was directed to armies in East and West alike, since attacks from the rear were the standard tactics of the swift Bedouin raiders, and of the Hungarians (Τούρκοι), who used their proficiency in horse-archery to harass the marching Byzantines from afar.

The accompanying diagrams (Figs. 28 and 29) illustrate the line of march and the line of march extended as prescribed in the *De re militari*. Although schematic, they show the essential design and operation of the marching column and the combined advantages of security and flexibility which it offered. The primary attribute of this system, in which the cavalry covered all four sides of the square infantry formation, was that it would have been very difficult for an enemy to take the army by surprise. With sufficient warning the square marching formation could quickly be converted into the battle formation, and from this compact defensive disposition the Byzantines could give battle employing the combined tactics for infantry and cavalry reviewed in the previous chapter if the enemy attempted to engage them.

Persistent harassment or attacks were not the only difficulties which the army was likely to encounter in its path through hostile territory. Natural obstacles also impeded its progress and endangered its safety, since constricted terrain, crossings, and passes not only disrupted the order of march but were also ideal places for ambushes and attacks. The *De re militari* therefore defined the procedures for traversing narrow places, bridges, and fords (*DRM* 14), moving through a pass not held by the enemy (19), or through a pass in enemy hands (20, the source for *TNO* 64.5-8). It is unnecessary to recapitulate these instructions in detail here, except to note that the infantry square could easily be dismantled to cross a river or move through a defile. The three units in front went through first (in column), followed by the three on the right flank, the three in

the rear, and then by the three on the left flank, reforming the square when all had emerged on the other side (*DRM* 14.²⁰⁻²⁸).

Conditions and rates of march


Although the treatises focus mainly on the marching formations and routines for the army as a whole, they also issue instructions on the routines for infantrymen and so afford some insight into the conditions of the foot soldiers as they trudged along on the day's march. Indispensable as they were to the army's security on the march, their ability to maintain formation and keep pace naturally diminished over long distances and in hot weather. The authors of the treatises were attentive to these concerns and recorded the measures by which the common infantryman coped with the travails of marching.

In the *Praecepta* (II.¹⁻¹¹), Phokas indicates that in normal circumstances the infantrymen traveled everywhere on foot (περιπατεῖν αὐτοὺς πεζοὺς πανταχοῦ). Each pair of men brought along one mule to carry their shields, spears, and supplies, and each group of four had a servant to look after their belongings during battle. But Phokas also insists that each soldier was to "wear" his own shield (φορεῖν . . . τὸ ἴδιον σκουτάριον) and carry his spear and other weapons, which must mean that the shield was either strapped over the soldier's back or, as suggested by an illustration of a soldier in the ninth-century *Pantokrator* 61, hung from the spear carried over his shoulder. The men were thus equipped to deal with a sudden attack, but it is likely too that the shields over their backs combined with their felt caps to protect them against the sun. It is evident from Ouranos' instructions cited above that foot soldiers on the march did not wear or carry most of their equipment (μὴ περιπατῶσιν ἐνδεδυμένοι τὰ ὅπλα αὐτῶν οἱ πεζοί) but transported their remaining arms and armor on their pack animals, thereby keeping them within easy reach in case the enemy appeared (*TNO* 64.³⁹⁻⁴⁶).


Leo the Deacon's story of a tired infantryman who threw away his shield during Phokas' advance on Tarsos in 965 confirms the instructions in the treatises that the foot soldiers were required to carry their shields with them on the march so as to be ready to meet the enemy at a moment's notice; what is more, this rule was strictly enforced.⁶

While on the march, one of the light infantrymen weary from the hard going (the army happened to be proceeding through a very deep gorge enclosed by cliffs and caverns) lightened his load by throwing the shield he

⁶Leo diac. 57.⁴⁻¹⁸.



28. The standard line of march (see pp. 332–35)



29. The cavalry units flanking the infantry square extend their column to protect stragglers (see p. 334)

was carrying over his shoulders down on the trail. When the emperor passed by he saw it with his own eyes and ordered one of the men following behind to pick up the shield. The moment he came to the halting-place, he inquired under which of the line officers the man was assigned who, in the absence of any fighting or danger, had shown himself a coward by throwing away his equipment. The culprit had not escaped notice but was quickly rounded up; the emperor grimly looked askance at him and said, "Tell me, you miserable wretch, if an attack came in open combat, what defense would you use to fend off the enemy now that you have thrown your shield away on the path?"

As punishment Phokas ordered the unfortunate man to be paraded through the camp after having had his nose cut off. When the officer charged with this duty failed to carry it out, the emperor upbraided him (before inflicting the same punishment on him too): "I decreed that the man who threw away his own equipment should pay this penalty for the instruction of the rest, so that none of the others would do the same thing in imitation of his heedless, lazy deed, to be caught without their equipment in time of battle and end up the first to be killed by the enemy."⁷

The treatises also address the inevitable problem of stragglers. Phokas advises that foot soldiers unable to keep pace with the cavalry owing to fatigue or the length of march should each have an extra mule to carry him and his supplies (*PM* II.⁵⁻⁹); and as we have seen, the order of march called for the cavalry units on the flanks of the infantry square to drop back and cover foot soldiers lagging behind the main body. On the return journey, pack animals whose loads of equipment had been expended were distributed to soldiers slowed by wounds or heavy burdens to help them keep up (*DRM* 31.¹⁴⁻²³).

It is interesting to compare these details in the Byzantine treatises with field trials conducted in 1984, when a group of researchers clad in simulated Roman military equipment undertook marches of two days in England and four days in the Netherlands in an attempt to duplicate the daily marching conditions of Roman infantrymen.⁸ Although formed in a different context, a number of their observations shed light on the daily conditions and hardships of Byzantine foot soldiers on the march. Walking along good roads in temperatures of 70° F (=21° C) and higher, the participants found that the sweat accumulated while

⁷ Ibid., 58.³⁻⁸.

⁸ D. Atkinson and L. Morgan, "The Wellingborough and Nijmegen Marches," in *Roman Military Equipment: The Accoutrements of War*, BAR International Series 336 (Oxford, 1987), 99-107.

marching drenched their woollen garments which never fully dried, but this was a minor discomfort compared to the effects of wearing armor on the march. Not only was metal armor corroded by sweat; more seriously, armor enclosing the upper body and thus preventing air from circulating proved intolerable to the wearer after only three to four hours of walking, inducing nausea and dizziness. On the other hand, the participants who did not wear armor but simply carried their spears and shields (held by a strap over the shoulder) were far more comfortable and bore up well over a daily distance of twenty-five miles. These findings suggest that Byzantine infantrymen transported their armor on pack animals not only for the sake of comfort but also to avoid wear and tear on their equipment.

The debilitating effects which the deprivation of water and salt might have on marching soldiers were keenly felt by the participants. Without adequate intake of either, they were initially prone to spells of temporary blindness, disorientation, and dehydration, but these symptoms were quickly relieved with increased rations of water and salt. Each participant required half a pint of water every hour and consumed half a gallon each day. If such effects ensued in the relatively mild temperatures noted above, the toll of heat and thirst on Byzantine soldiers and their baggage animals during campaigns in northern Syria or the Balkans will certainly have been far heavier by comparison. Phokas' dire warnings in the *Praecepta* about the effects of thirst on soldiers in battle are echoed by the author of the *De re militari*, who insisted that the availability of water must govern the army's choice of route even if it meant taking the longer of two roads, since soldiers proceeding through waterless regions in the heat of summer would not last to the midday meal but would succumb to thirst along with their horses (*DRM* 13).

It is clear from the treatises that Byzantine armies maintained a very austere regime while on campaign. Phokas sternly insisted that his soldiers were to take with them supplies enough "for use in moderation, in no wise in excess or luxury," and declared that most of the noncombatants (χυδαῖος λαός) and pack animals were not to accompany the army into hostile territory but were to be left behind (*PM* I.¹⁶⁶⁻¹⁷¹). The author of the *De re militari* likewise inveighed against soldiers taking along needless comforts and extravagances at the expense of supplies, and warned against having too many non-combatants as a lot of idle mouths who slowed the army's progress, bred rumors and dissension, and consumed the supplies required by the fighting men (*DRM* 15-17).

The spartan conditions that were the soldier's lot on campaign are humorously recounted by Nikephoros Ouranos in a letter to Stephen, the metropolitan of Nicomedia. Recalling his experiences during an expedition to Syria with the

emperor Basil II (in 999), Ouranos dwelt on the near lethal diet and the endless, wearisome commotion.⁹

Let others speak of the gains and the luxuries if they wish. The costs, the toils, the sleepless nights, the days without wine or sustenance, the night marches, and "the noise of flutes and pipes and the din of men" even during sleep; but also the bread we eat, or rather the stone made into bread on which we break our teeth and nearly destroy our entire body—for grinding it without sparing the stones in it and swallowing it not when it is more readily digestible, but downing it half baked in one gulp like Kronos, so to speak, we suffer greatly from indigestion and put our very lives at risk—I forego mention of the swarm of cares and the multitude of tasks, the disputes, the jealousies and the enmities, or the terrors and the dangers, the windings hither and thither, the tumult and the confusion. All these things I had best leave aside.

By all accounts, Byzantine soldiers on the march had to endure many hardships and privations alleviated by few comforts. Fatigue was therefore a constant factor, always threatening to erode the army's physical endurance and battle-worthiness. It is this danger that lay behind the advice in the treatises to have the army rest for two or three days before engaging the enemy or embarking on a difficult operation (*DV IX*.⁹⁸⁻¹⁰¹; *DRM 20*.^{72-75, 105-109}). But if a surfeit either of comfort or toil undermined the army's strength, it had an equally corrosive effect on its morale. In the words of Kekaumenos, "if the expectation of battle hangs over men suffering from toils and weariness, it creates anxiety and confusion in their minds and provokes flight without battle. Avoid pleasures, general, lest you fall like a bird into a snare."¹⁰

A last question concerns the average daily rate of march of Byzantine armies. No detailed itineraries of the sort used to calculate the rates of march for Alexander the Great's armies, or those of the Crusaders,¹¹ exist by which to form an accurate figure for Byzantine armies, but an approximate rate of speed

may be ventured on the basis of evidence in the treatises and comparison with the figures cited in modern field manuals.

The *De re militari* states that the preparations for the day's march began shortly before dawn (*DRM 9*.⁴⁻⁶). Allowing time for getting under way, meals, rests, collecting stragglers, and preparing a camp for the following night, the army could conceivably have spent seven or eight hours a day on the march. Coupled with a feasible speed for infantrymen of two miles an hour in good conditions, this would suggest an average distance of fourteen to sixteen miles a day, a rate comparable to those cited for modern armies.¹² This admittedly rudimentary estimate finds support in a passage from the *De velitatione*. When faced with a large Arab army advancing φοσσατικῶς, or "camp to camp," Phokas advised the Byzantine commander to anticipate where their next camp was likely to be and there set up an ambush "if the distance from the present camp is extremely long, in the order of sixteen miles or further, so that the length of the journey will exhaust them as well as their horses" (*DV XIII*.⁵⁻⁸). That he considered sixteen miles (24 km) a very long distance (μακρότατον . . . διάστημα) for an army to travel in one day, and a journey likely to wear out men and horses, implies that Phokas would not have expected more of his own soldiers in ordinary circumstances.

In extraordinary circumstances, however, Byzantine armies proved themselves capable of covering great distances in short times. The best example is Basil II's rapid march across Anatolia to relieve Aleppo in 995. The Arab chroniclers record that upon receiving word in Bulgaria that the loss of northern Syria to the Fatimids appeared imminent, Basil returned to Constantinople, whence he set out for the east. Each soldier took his fastest mule and, without its baggage, the army undertook a series of forced marches which enabled it to complete in sixteen days a journey normally requiring two months. Of the forty thousand men who set out with the emperor, only seventeen thousand arrived with him at Antioch, but reports of the emperor's swift advance panicked the Fatimid forces into withdrawing and saved northern Syria for the Byzantines.¹³

⁹ *Epistoliers byzantins du X^e siècle*, ed. J. Darrouzès (Paris, 1960), 244-47 (no. 47.²⁶⁻³⁷); Ouranos quotes the *Iliad X*.¹³.

¹⁰ Kek. 166.²⁻⁶. On the diet and regime of Byzantine armies, see T. Kolias, "Essegewohnheiten und Verpflegung im byzantinischen Heer," in *BYZANTIOΣ: Festschrift für Herbert Hunger zum 70. Geburtstag*, ed. W. Hörandner (Vienna, 1984), 193-202.

¹¹ D. Engels, *The Logistics of the Macedonian Army* (Berkeley, 1978), and C. Neumann, "A Note on Alexander's March Rates," *Historia* 20 (1971), 196-98; J. W. Nesbitt, "The Rate of March of Crusader Armies in Europe: A Study and Computation," *Traditio* 19 (1963), 167-82.

¹² American army field manuals indicate an average speed for infantrymen of two and a half miles an hour on level roads, and one and a half miles an hour cross-country (figures quoted by Nesbitt, cited in note 11, 175 note 29). Lt. Col. Gunter's *The Officer's Field Note and Sketch Book* ([London, 1915], a British army manual for Palestine) gives the same speed of two and a half miles an hour for infantrymen marching in favorable conditions, two miles an hour with carts, and notes that a division would take eight hours (including one hour's rest time and one hour to bring up the rear) to cover fifteen miles. Similarly, British infantrymen on the Western Front were expected to cover twelve to fifteen miles in eight hours: D. Winter, *Death's Men* (London, 1978), 70-74.

¹³ Forsyth, "Byz. Arab Chronicle," 492-93.

Descriptions of campaigns in the historical sources

The descriptions of campaigns by contemporary chroniclers record a few details confirming the use of the marching routines outlined in the treatises; but, more importantly, they demonstrate that the tacticians' emphasis on reconnaissance and good order on the march, and their warnings about the effects of thirst and fatigue, were well founded. To armies on campaign in hostile lands, the lack of planning, the disintegration of order and discipline, and the collapse of morale were as ruinous to their fortunes as defeat in battle, and there are many episodes to show that a wily enemy who preyed upon these failings could inflict a severe defeat on the Byzantine invader at little or no risk to himself. The historical episodes gathered here will therefore not only show that the recommendations of the treatises reflect the Byzantines' lessons of experience in East and West, but will also demonstrate that a commander's ability to plan and conduct the march with due regard for the welfare of his soldiers played a large part in determining the success or failure of a campaign.


Scattered references in the sources to guides and advance parties add little to the details on their use in the treatises,¹⁴ but several passages indicate that the advice in the *De re militari* (19.²⁵⁻²⁸) to send units of infantrymen ahead with axes and other cutting tools to clear the army's path applied particularly to campaigns in Bulgaria. To deny the Byzantine invaders entry into their lands, the Bulgars resorted to erecting barricades of felled trees (*δέματα*) in the passes through which the Byzantines intended to proceed.¹⁵ These wooden walls figured prominently in Basil II's campaign of 1014. On his march into Bulgaria, Basil found his route through the Kleidion pass barred by such a palisade; although he was eventually able to circumvent this obstacle and overcome the Bulgars (discussed below), he was compelled to dispatch a unit under Theophylaktos Botaneiates "to burn down the barricades (*δέματα*) in their way along the roads and make the route leading to Thessalonika passable for him."¹⁶ During his advance on Prilep in 1041, Michael IV was likewise forced to break through a wooden barricade (*δέμα ξύλινον*) built by Manuel Ibatzes, an ally of the Bulgar rebel Peter Deljan.¹⁷

¹⁴The sources record commanders detailing advance parties (called *πρόδρομοι*, *προόπται* or *κατόπται*) to explore the route and monitor enemy activities: Theoph. cont. 278.¹⁸⁻²⁰ (Basil I); Skyl. 318.⁵⁹⁻⁶³ (Bardas Skleros).

¹⁵These wooden barricades are mentioned by Kekaumenos with reference to the battle at the Kleidion pass (152.⁶⁻²²); this and other uses of the term *δέμα* are discussed by Litavrin in the commentary (370-72, notes 242 and 246).

¹⁶Skyl. 350.^{67-351.81}; while performing this task Botaneiates' force was ambushed by the Bulgars and he was among the slain.

¹⁷Ibid, 414.⁴⁰⁻⁴⁵.



30. Bulgar soldiers (right) use a wooden barricade to oppose Byzantine invaders

Accounts of Byzantine armies on the march are rare, but the following excerpt from Leo the Deacon describes John Tzimiskes' advance on Preslav in the spring of 971. Tzimiskes, in the vanguard with the *tagma* of the *Athanatoi*, set out with a force of infantry and cavalry which he took care not to exhaust on the difficult journey:¹⁸

... he began the journey with the corps of the so-called *Athanatoi* forging ahead suitably attired in armor. Fifteen thousand of the sturdiest infantrymen and thirteen thousand horsemen followed him. Then, trailing on foot and bringing the siege engines and all sorts of devices, came the rest of the army with the service units accompanied by the *proedros* Basil, to whom the emperor had assigned their supervision. Since he was making his way through regions dangerous and steep beyond all expectation, he checked the intensity of the march, and on an impregnable hill with a river

¹⁸Leo diac. 132.^{15-133.4}; Skylitzes (295.²¹⁻²⁶) briefly describes Tzimiskes' departure from Constantinople and cites figures of five thousand infantrymen and four thousand cavalrymen in the emperor's select force.

flowing on one side, promising a plentiful supply of water, he rested the horses and the army.

There are no descriptions in the historical sources that shed further light on the methods outlined in the treatises for fighting on the march. Attaleiates, however, offers a lengthy account of a fighting retreat conducted by his hero Nikephoros Botaneiates (in 1048), which shows that soldiers proceeding in a compact formation and exploiting the advantages of terrain could reach their destination despite being subjected to constant attacks.¹⁹ After an encounter in which the main Byzantine force had been routed by the Patzinaks, Botaneiates "ordered his own men not to get scattered apart like sheep, as the other soldiers were seen doing, and turn their backs to the foe and present themselves as targets for the Scythians' [Patzinaks] arrows, but to stay with him and calmly follow in a solid formation [μετὰ καρτεροῦ τοῦ συντάγματος], since it was capable of offering stout resistance to the enemy." The Patzinak horse archers pursued this formation, riding about it and launching "showers of arrows," but they could not break into or disperse Botaneiates' men who prevented encirclement by marching alongside a river. They continued to maintain their close order on foot (ἐν πεζοπορίᾳ) after their horses had been killed by arrows, and resolutely fought off the Patzinak horsemen who closed with them. After eleven days and nights of fighting on the march, Botaneiates and his men finally succeeded in reaching safety at Adrianople.

The sources also record a number of campaigns in which a Byzantine army's ability to move swiftly or overcome natural obstacles caught an unwary opponent off guard.²⁰ Nikephoros Phokas' sudden and unexpected thrust at Aleppo in the dead of winter (December 962), which completely surprised Sayf al-Dawla and left him but little time to muster a force to defend his capital, is one example of Byzantine enterprise in campaigning.²¹ Other episodes from Basil's wars in Bulgaria show how effectively the Byzantines coped with difficult terrain to inflict crushing defeats on the Bulgar tzar Samuel. In 997, Nikephoros Ouranos set out from Thessalonika to intercept Samuel's army on the way back from ravaging central Greece. Ouranos crossed the mountains to Larissa where he left his baggage train, and then with a select force undertook a forced march (ὁδοπορίᾳ συντόνῳ) through Thessaly, crossed the Apidanos river and found

¹⁹ Attal. 39.¹⁹–43.¹⁰.

²⁰ Night marches are also recorded during the revolt of Bardas Skleros. Peter the Stratopedarches is reported to have moved his army at night to evade Skleros (Skyl. 319.⁹⁰⁻⁹¹), as did Bardas Phokas on his way to Caesarea (324.⁴³⁻⁴⁶).

²¹ Canard, *Hamdanides*, 811–12.

the Bulgar army on the opposite bank of the river Spercheios. He searched up and down the river for a crossing, brought his army across at night and annihilated the Bulgars in a surprise night attack on their camp; Samuel and his son escaped capture or death only by hiding beneath the slain.²² The Bulgar tzar suffered a similar defeat six years later. Samuel had responded to Basil's siege of Vodena by devastating the regions around Adrianople; as both armies returned homewards, they crossed paths near Skoplje. To avoid Basil's army Samuel pitched camp on the opposite side of the river Axeios (Vardar) in the belief that the river was impassable, but one of Basil's soldiers found a ford and led the imperial army across in a surprise attack on the Bulgar camp. Once again, the Byzantines annihilated the Bulgar force, even capturing Samuel's tent, although the tzar himself escaped.²³ But the episode which best displays Byzantine resourcefulness is Basil's victory over Samuel at the Kleidion pass in July 1014. As noted above, the Bulgars had blocked the pass with a wooden palisade through which the Byzantines were unable to break. Basil was on the point of giving up when Nikephoros Xiphias volunteered to lead a force around the mountain to the south of the pass, and by climbing through the rugged terrain (τραχυπορίαις καὶ ἀνοδίαῖς χρησάμενος) he managed to outflank the Bulgar defenders and fall upon them from behind. Trapped between the Byzantine forces, the Bulgars abandoned their palisade and took to flight, but those unfortunate enough to be taken prisoner (14,000 according to Kekaumenos) suffered the gruesome fate that earned Basil the epithet "the slayer of the Bulgars."²⁴

The episodes cited above show what Byzantine armies led by skilled commanders could achieve in adverse circumstances. But many Byzantine armies met disaster while on the march in hostile lands, and the historians who record these disasters attribute them to the commander's incompetence or inexperience in warfare. It is no accident that most of the expeditions that came to grief in this way did so in Bulgaria or the Balkans where the topography, notoriously rugged and dense, was the enemy's greatest ally. As the preface to this chapter shows, so forbidding was the terrain of Bulgaria that even the intrepid Nikephoros Phokas paled before the prospect of leading his army into such mountainous, thickly grown country. The following episodes reveal the errors born of a commander's negligence or ignorance which resulted in catastrophe for his men.

Nothing was as revealing of a commander's inexpertise as his lack of foresight and investigation as he led his forces into enemy lands. Failure to explore his route brought the eunuch George Probatas and his army to ruin in the year

²² Skyl. 341.²⁵⁻³⁵.

²³ Ibid., 346.⁵³⁻⁶⁴.

²⁴ Ibid., 348.^{9-349.44}; Kek. 152.⁶⁻²².

1040. He had been sent into Serbia by Michael V to reclaim imperial money seized by the rebel Stephanos Voeslav,²⁵ but "by blundering heedlessly (ἀπεισκέπτως ἐμπροσθόν) into difficult terrain, gullies, and impenetrable places" he caused his army to disintegrate even before meeting the enemy in battle. Armies struggling through rough country also made easy prey for the enemy, as in Sicily in 964 when Manuel Phokas (a young kinsman of the emperor Nikephoros) and his forces were lured into an ambush by the Arabs. When the inhabitants of the towns had scattered into the countryside to escape the Byzantine invaders, Manuel rashly set off in pursuit.²⁶

... now elated beyond reason by the preceding triumphs, he set off through those perilous regions in search of the fugitives. Straightway his army disintegrated in the rough terrain, and as it went along in disarray through hills and ravines, the barbarians set a trap in advance of the men, and with a clashing of arms and unintelligible cries they rose from their places of ambush and suddenly set upon them. They, panic-stricken at the unexpected attack, and prevented from seeing the sun's light by the dense overgrowth of the copses, turned to flight. The barbarians set after them and mercilessly cut them down like sacrificial animals, and they left off killing the men only when their strength and spirit gave out. Manuel himself was killed.

Failure to secure the route homewards was another punishing error. Kekau-
menos, who echoes the warnings in the treatises either to avoid returning by the same route or to leave a force behind to hold the exits from enemy territory, uses the fate of Michael, the *katepano* of Dyrrachium, as an example to illustrate the danger of overlooking these precautions.²⁷ To avenge the loss of Probatas' army, Michael led a second punitive expedition into Serbia against Stephanos Voeslav in 1042. The Serb renegade, however, avoided a direct encounter with the Byzantines, choosing instead to await them in the passes through which they had entered and were likely to return. Since Michael had neither given thought to his return march nor assigned units to hold the passes, "upon his return he found the defiles (τὰς κλησοῦρας) through which he had come occupied, and was taken prisoner. It is probable that he had another road to leave by without hindrance, but he was captured because of poor planning rather than in experi-

²⁵ Skyl. 409.⁸⁰⁻⁸⁶; as no enemy attack is mentioned, it would appear that Probatas' force fell apart through breakdown of discipline and want of supplies.

²⁶ Leo diac. 65.^{19-68.2}; cf. Skyl. 267.⁶³⁻⁷³.

²⁷ Kek. 168.⁷⁻²⁶.

ence." In another account of Michael's campaign, Skylitzes reports that the Serbs waited until the Byzantines were in the narrow passes and showered them with rocks and missiles from the heights. Unable to come to grips with their assailants and too crowded to defend themselves properly, the Byzantines were annihilated.²⁸

Overconfidence induced by the deceptive actions of a clever foe also led to the neglect of discipline and vigilance on the march. A glaring example of this heedlessness dates from 1045, when Constantine IX sent a force under Michael Iasites and Constantine Alanos against the former ally of Byzantium, Abul Aswar.²⁹ But Abul Aswar was "a most capable commander . . . with the ability to disrupt the enemy's military operations and intentions." Realizing that he was heavily outnumbered by the advancing Byzantines, Abul Aswar shut himself up in the fortress at Dvin and flooded the surrounding plain, making it into a quagmire. His actions were taken as cowardice by the unsuspecting Byzantine commanders, whose exercise of discipline over their men subsequently slackened. Abul Aswar meanwhile hid foot archers and other soldiers in the vineyards around the town, and when the Byzantines entered the roads through the vineyards in scattered groups and disarray (ἄτακτοι καὶ σκοπιάδην), he gave the signal to attack. The Byzantines, bombarded by arrows and stones, and with their horses unable to keep their footing in the mud, were routed with heavy losses.

The successes and failures of the campaigns cited above explain the tacticians' attention to the conduct of march, for these episodes demonstrate that marching was an aspect of warfare in which the penalties of incompetence outweighed the rewards of skill. A commander's efficient and resourceful handling of his forces on the march helped to make victory possible, whereas his lack of skill or experience was almost certain to lead to the dissolution of his army, reduce his chances for victory in battle, or cancel the gains of a battle won. The same was true when it came to the preparation and security of the expeditionary camp, the subject to which we now turn.

Part 2: The Byzantine Camp

The methods for preparing and defending encampments were well defined in the military treatises of the later tenth century.³⁰ The treatises prescribe the

²⁸ Skyl. 424.^{62-425.2}.

²⁹ Ibid., 437.^{30-438.60}; on the events leading up to this campaign, see Felix, *Byz. Islam. Welt*, 159-60.

³⁰ Previous studies of the Byzantine camp include: J. A. Kulakovsky, "Vizantiiskii lager' kontsa X veka," *VV* 10 (1903), 63-90; R. Grosse, "Das römisch-byzantinische Marschlager vom 4. bis zum

design and defenses of the Byzantine camp, the steps for pitching and breaking camp, and the tactics for an encamped army forced to confront the enemy. The historical sources contain several good descriptions of Byzantine camps which mirror the details of the treatises and illustrate the use of camps in contemporary warfare. This section on the Byzantine camp will begin with a review of the procedures for pitching camp outlined in the *Praecepta* and *De re militari*.


Pitching camp

We saw above that the *doukatores* used their knowledge of enemy territory to direct the army to sites suitable for encampments. Accompanying the *doukatores* in the performance of this task were soldiers called *minsouratores* ("surveyors"), expert in the selection and measurement of campsites. They searched for broad, level ground with a sufficient supply of water close by and, wherever possible, situated the camp beside a river or some other natural obstacle for protection on one or two sides (*PM* V.¹²⁻¹⁴; *DRM* 1.⁵¹⁻⁵⁹). Once having found a site, they proceeded to measure out the camp's boundaries and to mark the places of each unit.

Reduced to essentials, the preferred Byzantine camp groundplan was a square or rectangle bisected by centrally crossed roads (see Fig. 31).³¹ With this

10. Jahrhundert," *BZ* 22 (1913), 90-121; G. Kolia, "Περὶ ἀπλήκτου" *Ἐπ. Ἐτ. Βυζ. Σπ.* 17 (1941), 144-84. See now the excerpts on encampments published by C. Zuckerman, "Chapitres peu connus de l'*Apparatus bellicus*," *TM* 12 (1994), 359-89.

³¹ A square or rectangular camp with centrally crossed roads was the standard Byzantine camp plan from the sixth century onward. The *Strategikon* of Maurice (XII B 22) outlines a camp bisected by a single set of crossed roads (ἐν τῷ μέσῳ . . . σταυροειδῇ πλατείαν εἶναι), a feature clearly shown in the accompanying diagram (XII C). The anonymous *De re strategica* (conventionally dated to the sixth century, but quite possibly belonging to the tenth) also prescribes this pattern (28.¹¹⁻²³). This remained the standard plan until the mid-tenth century, when the treatises record an increase from one to two sets of crossing roads (cf. *ST* 22.8), the pattern in the *Praecepta*, while the camp plan of the *De re militari* calls for a further increase to three sets of crossing roads. What previous studies of the Byzantine camp have failed to note is that this groundplan differs from the traditional Roman pattern as defined by pseudo-Hyginus and shown in many Roman camps where the inner compound was dominated by the T-shaped intersection of the *via praetoria* and the *via principalis*: see H. Lenoir, *Pseudo-Hygin: des fortifications du camp* (Paris, 1979), and G. Webster, *The Imperial Roman Army of the First and Second Centuries A.D.*, 3rd ed. (Totowa, N. J., 1985), 167-230. The centrally crossed roads typical of Byzantine camps first appear in the late third century: M. Gichon, "The Plan of a Roman Camp Depicted upon a Lamp from Samaria," *PEQ* 104 (1972), 38-58; the growing diversity of camp layouts during the fourth and fifth centuries is noted by R. Fellmann, "Der Diokletianspalast von Split im Rahmen der spätromischen Militärarchitektur," *Antike Welt* 10 (1979), 47-55. It bears noting that the pattern of centrally crossed roads flourished mainly in the eastern half of the Roman Empire. The fifth-century rebuilding phase at Drobeta (Rumania) reveals that this new pattern was imposed over the older Roman one: cf. R. Florescu, "Les phases de construction du castrum Drobeta (Turnu Severin)," *Studien zu den Militärgrenzen Roms*, I, Vorträge



31. The standard camp groundplan: the general's tent is placed in the center, and the entrances are formed in the shape of a *gamma* (Γ)

basic pattern in mind, the *minsouratores* first chose a suitable place for the commander's tent and fixed his banner (φλάμουλον) there to mark the center of the camp. They then planted banners of the taxiarchs at a set distance from this spot, one to the east, west, north, and south, to mark the outer boundaries of the camp, at which point the banners of the remaining taxiarchs were planted along the perimeter to indicate the places of their units (*PM* V.^{4-10, 15-19}; *DRM* 1.⁶⁰⁻⁷⁰). Phokas issues these instructions: "they [the infantry] must pitch camp around the encampment, three taxiarchies in four directions, three to the eastern side, three to the western, three to the southern, and three to the northern, so that they enclose the whole of the encampment" (*PM* V.²⁰⁻²³). The author of

des 6. Internationalen Limeskongreß in Süddeutschland (Cologne-Graz, 1967), 149-50 and figure 6, while another example of this type is found at Feldioara: N. Gudea, "Bericht über die zwischen 1979 bis 1982 am Limes der drei Dakien und der benachbarten Provinzen Moesia Superior und Moesia Inferior durchgeführten archäologischen Forschungen," *Studien zu den Militärgrenzen Roms*, III, Vorträge des 13. Internationalen Limeskongreß (Aalen, 1983), 489-90 and figure 21.


the *De re militari* also recommends the same symmetrical pattern for an infantry force of sixteen taxiarchies or of twelve (*DRM* 1.7-32, 6.3-31).

Not only did this four-sided arrangement enable the infantry to protect the cavalry and baggage train within while securing the defensive advantages noted above in the discussion of the square battle formation, it also allowed the army to set up camp simply and quickly. Since, as we have seen, Byzantine infantry on the march maintained the hollow square formation, an infantry force about to encamp had only to move into the grid laid out by the *minsouratores*, with each taxiarchy halting by the banner of its taxiarch. According to instructions in the *De re militari*, as the army arrived at the designated campsite, the infantry units took their places along the perimeter of the camp and made way for the service units to set up the tents. The cavalry then made their way inside, leaving units on guard in front of and alongside the camp until the cavalry units bringing up the rear had arrived safely (*DRM* 10.64-72).

As they made camp, the foot soldiers in the taxiarchies ringing the encampment kept to the positions they held in the battle line so as to be ready to meet a sudden attack (*PM* V.23-26). For protection against enemy incursions, they fixed their spears in the earth and leaned their shields against them to make a "shield-cover" (σκουντάρωμα: *PM* V.48 / *TNO* 62.63-64), an easily improvised palisade cited as a characteristic feature of Byzantine camps by Byzantine and Arab writers alike and depicted in two illustrations from the Madrid Skylitzes (see below and Figs. 32 and 33). It was also common practice to surround the encampment with a deep trench, although Phokas advised taking this step only if an attack were expected, or if the army intended to remain in camp for some time, since otherwise it tired the men unnecessarily (*PM* V.52-58). When the army did dig a trench, the soldiers piled the excavated dirt along the inner rim to create an earthen rampart (*DRM* 1.88-90).

In addition to these defenses, the treatises recommend setting spikes, caltrops, and other traps around the camp and organizing a series of pickets and patrols (κέρκετα) through day and night to intercept the enemy (*PM* V.58-68; *DRM* 2.17-30, 3-4; *TNO* 62.72-83).³² Phokas also instructs that all foraging parties should go out during the day only, adding that they must have escorts to protect them, and that no one was to leave camp after sunset (*PM* V.58-59; *DRM* 22-23). As a further precaution, the baggage animals were to be kept well inside the

³² Leo VI (*LT* XI.26) describes a device invented by his general Nikephoros Phokas to defend his camps. This was a long spear set at an angle over a two-legged stand (or "lambda-shaped frame" [Λ]) to make a tripod with the spearpoint extending forward. He set these out around his camp at night against attackers; in his *Taktika*, Nikephoros Ouranos refers to the same devices set round the siege camp (*TNO* 65.69-70: τρισκέλια μετὰ τζιπάτων). See McGeer, "Tradition and Reality," 134-35.



32 and 33. Depictions of Byzantine camps with shield palisades (see p. 350)

encampment beyond the range of enemy arrows in case the enemy approached the camp at night and tried to cause a stampede (ἀλογόπτωμα) by wounding the animals (*PM* V.⁴⁷⁻⁵²).

There were two entrances on each of the four sides of the camp. They opened onto roads running through the camp "in the shape of a cross" (σταυροειδῶς) or, as Phokas explains, two roads running from east to west and two from north to south, which were to be wide enough to accommodate five cavalrymen abreast. The entrances, however, did not open straight onto the roads but were bent at a 90° angle—"in the shape of the letter *gamma*" (Γ; see Fig. 31)—to prevent the enemy from charging directly through the gates into the camp (*PM* V.^{36-46/TNO} 62.⁴⁶⁻⁶²; cf. *DRM* 1.⁷¹⁻⁸⁷). Since the camp entrances lay between the taxiarchies, the light infantry and *menavlatoi* made their quarters in the entrances and stood guard over them just as they did in the intervals in the square battle formation (*PM* V.³⁴⁻³⁶).

The *Praecepta* says little of the arrangement of the inner camp. It is evident from the camp plan that the alignment of the crossed roads formed a natural compound around the commander's tent, and Phokas' directions indicate that the highest officers and the units of the *tagmata* were grouped around him within this central section, "some to his eastern side, some to the west of him, others to the northern and southern sides" (*PM* V.⁷⁻⁹). Chapter 1 of the *De re militari* presents a more elaborate plan of the inner camp and of the imperial compound, but since this plan has been carefully reconstructed in previous studies of the Byzantine camp,³³ it need not be reviewed in detail here. The thematic cavalry was encamped on all four quarters of the imperial compound, while the *tagmata*, *hetaireiai*, and imperial retinue were assigned to places immediately beside or within the imperial compound. As did the infantrymen along the camp perimeter, the cavalrymen camped in the same order in which they deployed for battle and on the march (*DRM* 2.¹⁴⁻¹⁶).

Descriptions of camps in the historical sources

Passing references to Byzantine camps in the historical sources indicate that the defenses of a ditch and palisade prescribed in the treatises were standard practice during the tenth and eleventh centuries. Immediately upon landing on Crete in 960, Phokas "set up a strong camp which he fortified with a deep trench and wooden palisade," and later built a siege camp at Chandax "which he securely fortified on all sides with a palisade and trench."³⁴ He also constructed

³³ By Kulakovsky and Grosse (op. cit., note 30 above), and by Dennis in the diagrams appended to his edition of the treatise (*Military Treatises*, 334-35).

³⁴ Leo diac. 16.¹⁸⁻¹⁹; Skyl. 249.³³⁻³⁴.

fortified camps (χάραξ) before Tarsos in 965 and Antioch in 968.³⁵ That a trench and palisade remained standard defenses in Byzantine camps is shown by Attaleiates, who records that during his Syrian expedition of 1068-69 Romanos Diogenes fortified his camp at Hierapolis with a trench and palisade "in the customary manner" (κατὰ τὸ εἰθισμένον).³⁶

Arab sources also make note of the trenches around Byzantine camps. In his account of the Byzantine capture of Samosata in 958, Ibn Halawaih stated: "on dit que le Parakoimomène [Basil Lekapenos] partit avec 12.000 ouvriers chargés de creuser un fossé autour de son camp et qui marchaient toujours avec lui."³⁷ Yahya of Antioch reports that Basil II had a trench dug around his siege camp at Tripoli in 999.³⁸

The best description of a Byzantine camp appears in Leo the Deacon's account of John Tzimiskes' Balkan campaign of 971. As he prepared to besiege Dorostolon, the emperor had his men pitch camp in a commanding position which they fortified with a trench and palisade. Their preparation of a trench with an earthen rampart along the inner rim which they topped with a "shield-cover" conforms exactly with the defenses prescribed in the treatises:³⁹

As day was dawning the emperor fortified the camp with a trench and palisade in the following manner. Some distance from Dorostolon a low hill stands in the plain; here he encamped the army and ordered it to dig a surrounding trench. As the men dug out the earth he bade them place it on the rim of the trench ringing the camp. When the piled earth reached a sufficient height he had them plant their spears on top and lean their linked shields against them so as to provide the army with the trench and excavated earth in place of a wall. It would be impossible for the enemy to break through inside since their passage would be blocked when they reached the trench. It is standard practice for the Byzantines to arrange their camp in this fashion while in hostile territory. When he had fortified the camp in this manner, on the following day he arrayed his army and made an assault on the walls.

The combined defense of a trench and shield-cover, which Leo describes as standard Byzantine practice (εἰθισμένον δὲ Ῥωμαίοις), was singled out as a

³⁵ Ibid., 58.¹⁰⁻¹¹; 72.¹⁹⁻²¹.

³⁶ Attal. 109.³⁻⁵.

³⁷ Byz. Arabes II.2, 368.

³⁸ PO 23, 459.

³⁹ Leo diac. 142.^{1-143.11}.

distinctive trait of Byzantine camps by the Arabs. Yahya of Antioch records the steps taken by the emperor Romanos Argyros to fortify his camp during his expedition to Syria in 1030:⁴⁰

L'empereur avec son armée vint camper à Tubbal dans la région d'A'zâz . . . il fit entourer son camp d'un large fossé et disposer des fantassins (protégés) par des boucliers tout autour du fossé, comme c'était l'habitude chez les Grecs dans leurs camps.

Byzantine and Arab sources also refer to the deployment of the infantry force along the trench and shield-cover ringing the camp. Yahya's account, just cited, relates that the Arabs "s'attaquèrent à ceux des fantassins préposés aux boucliers qui étaient aux limites du camp,"⁴¹ while in his narrative of Romanos Diogenes' Syrian campaign, Attaleiates notes that on one occasion "the entire infantry contingent of the Armenians was ordered to spend the night around the trench along the palisade" (διανυκτερεύειν περὶ τὴν τάφρον ἐν προτειχίσματι).⁴² He also reports that on another occasion the emperor stationed javeliners and archers along the perimeter to fend off the Bedouin horsemen who were continually harassing his camp.⁴³

The use of camps in warfare

The standard Byzantine camp plan was well suited to the various purposes for which encampments might be used. It was simple enough for use by an army moving "camp to camp" (φοσσατικῶς) through enemy territory—the marching camp outlined in the *Praecepta*—but it could also be made into a semipermanent base for prolonged field operations or sieges—the fortified camp outlined in the *De re militari* and built by John Tzimiskes' army outside Dorostolon.⁴⁴

⁴⁰Canard, "Sources arabes," 305–6. In his translation, Canard gives "mantelets" instead of the literal "boucliers" (305, note 54), which I have restored on the evidence of the shield-cover mentioned in the treatises and Leo the Deacon's account of Tzimiskes' camp.

⁴¹Canard, "Sources arabes," 306.

⁴²Attal. 113.^{13–14}

⁴³Ibid., 116.^{20–23}

⁴⁴The use of camps as semipermanent bases is part of the wider context of Byzantine fortifications and strategy. In isolating the targets of their offensives, the Byzantines restored or built a number of fortresses to control vital points or routes. To cite two examples: during his advance through northern Syria in 966, Nikephoros Phokas repaired and garrisoned the monastic complex at Qal'at Seman to control the route between Antioch and Aleppo; see W. B. Saunders, "Qal'at Seman: A Frontier Fort of the Tenth and Eleventh Centuries," *Armies and Frontiers in Roman and Byzantine Anatolia*, BAR International Series 156 (Oxford, 1983), 291–303. Similarly, at the end of his 968 campaign in the environs of Antioch, Phokas built a stronghold (φρούριον) on a hilltop at

Above all, however, the square camp plan combined the advantages of security and battle readiness in the likely event that the army was attacked while in camp. In chapter 64 of his *Taktika*, Nikephoros Ouranos set forth the tactical prescriptions for an encamped army confronted by the enemy, an eventuality which he connected with the paradigm of battle situations outlined earlier in the *Taktika* (57.5–15 = *PM* II.3–13). It would be useful here to offer a brief synopsis of Ouranos' recommendations and then turn to a number of historical episodes illustrating the use of camps in warfare and the advisability of the measures listed in the treatises.

Ouranos opens his discussion with the scene of an army about to break camp in the presence of the enemy and presents three scenarios (which form a third paradigm of battle situations and are numbered here to facilitate reference to the first of the two paradigms reviewed above in Chapter IV). His prescriptions clearly show that the tactics for engaging the enemy from an encamped position or for beginning the day's march with the enemy in the vicinity were part of the general tactical system for giving battle. The infantry square, which doubled as a camp and a battle formation, served as the army's preliminary tactical disposition, providing a secure defensive base that allowed the cavalry to form up properly and go over to the attack:

3.1: *TNO* 64.^{1–16}: If the enemy force is a large one and advances seeking battle with the Byzantines, the army should remain in its encampment as the infantrymen all along the perimeter make ready for battle "exactly as we said earlier" (that is, in the discussion of infantry deployment and tactics: *TNO* 56.5–13 = *PM* I.5–13). The cavalry units should then make their way out from the camp and deploy for battle "just as we spoke of them above" (1.4: *TNO* 57.^{73–83} = *PM* II.^{55–66}). At the same time, javeliners, archers, and slingers on foot are to move out behind the cavalry units but remain close by the infantry (cf. *TNO* 57.^{102–110} / *PM* II.^{85–91}). If the enemy moves against the Byzantine force, the cavalry must then open battle with them "in the manner we described above" (1.6: *TNO* 57.^{95–113} = *PM* II.^{78–94}).

3.2: *TNO* 64.^{16–27}: If the enemy remains still and does not move to the attack, and by all reports is much smaller a force than the Byzantine one, the army, along with the baggage train, should proceed in good order toward the enemy.

nearby Bighras, where he left a force of 1,500 men to conduct raids against Antioch and prevent supplies from reaching the town which he intended to capture the following year (Leo diac. 72.^{18–74.23}; Skyl. 271.^{73–272.83}).

The cavalry units go ahead with the infantry force trailing them; if the enemy flees, the cavalry will conduct an orderly pursuit "in the manner we outlined in detail above" (1.5: *TNO* 57.⁸³⁻⁹⁵ = *PM* II.⁶⁶⁻⁷⁸). The army may then commence its march with cries of victory and imperial acclamations.

3.3: *TNO* 64.²⁷⁻⁴⁷: If a small enemy force appears in the distance, the army should not be deterred from getting underway, but should begin the day's march. The cavalry are on all four sides of the infantry who are marching in their square formation, protecting the baggage train on the inside, with each man keeping to his station in the battle line ready to meet the enemy (i.e., the order of march outlined in the first part of this chapter).

The tactics in the first scenario, which see the infantry stand as a defensive wall around the encampment while the cavalry prepared to attack the enemy, appear to have been those used by a Byzantine army compelled to fight from its camp. Attaleiates has left an eyewitness account of a battle fought by Romanos Diogenes in November 1068 against an Arab force led by the emir of Aleppo. On the previous day, the Arabs had badly mauled a Byzantine detachment, a defeat that left the main force, including Attaleiates himself, to spend a dispirited night as the soldiers contemplated their prospects for the morrow.⁴⁵

Day had not yet come and the enemy surrounded the encampment with all their forces. For upon learning of the previous day's success by his side, the emir of Aleppo came with his entire force to capture the emperor and the army with him at a single blow. They did not cease to cause great fear with their savage cries as they rode around us. The emperor, however, was in his tent drawing up a plan of battle [διαγράφων τὸν πόλεμον] and came out on horseback about the third hour of the day [i.e. mid morning] . . . without any trumpet blast proclaiming his appearance. Up went the standards and as the army made its way out deployed in good order, the enemy themselves began to gather on the side where they observed the Byzantines proceeding in rank and file. The magnitude of the contest and the nature of the outcome permeated their minds. Nonetheless, when the soldiers shouting the war-cry in the front ranks came to the clash of arms, the Byzantines prevailed, killing many of the enemy, and when the rest of the Byzantine host

⁴⁵ Attal. 113.^{8-114.22}.

rushed out at them an unstoppable rout ensued. Those chasing after the fleeing men killed many and took not a few prisoner.

Attaleiates' narrative shows the precepts of the tactical treatises at work in several stages. It would appear that despite being surrounded, the Byzantine camp, defended by the infantry along the perimeter and fortified with a trench and palisade (above, p. 354 note 42), was redoubtable enough to discourage a direct assault, thereby permitting the emperor Romanos to draw up his plan of attack. From this strong defensive position, the Byzantines made their way out in good order, exactly as the treatises had counseled in this situation, and once having routed the enemy, they capped their victory by conducting a relentless pursuit.

Other accounts from contemporary Byzantine and Arab sources also confirm that the criteria for choosing campsites were deeply rooted in practice. As all the treatises recommend, armies did seek out open, well-watered places in which to pitch camp, as in 821 when the rebel Thomas the Slav brought his army to the outskirts of Constantinople and made camp "in the plain called Diabasis . . . with an abundance of pasturage and sources of water," or in 979 when Bardas Skleros encamped his army near Pagkaleia in "a spacious and level plain very close to the river Halys."⁴⁶

But the very features that commended sites such as these might also enable the enemy to guess an invading army's intended place of encampment and seize it in advance, the strategy to which Romanos III Argyros fell victim in his disastrous expedition to Syria in 1030.⁴⁷ He had originally planned to pitch camp in the region of Azaz (near Aleppo), favored by the Byzantines because of its plentiful water and pasturage,⁴⁸ but discovered on his arrival that "les Arabes occupèrent les endroits où il y avait de l'eau et s'y installèrent à leur aise."⁴⁹ Forced to encamp in a dry, waterless place, Romanos dispatched a contingent under the *patrikios* Leo Choïrosphaktes to search for a better location—thus assigning them the role of *minsouratores*—but the Arabs intercepted and routed this party.⁵⁰ Trapped by the Arabs and suffering terribly from heat and thirst, the

⁴⁶ Theoph. cont. 66.¹⁸⁻²²/Skyl. 38.¹¹⁻¹⁵; Skyl. 326.⁸⁸⁻⁹⁰.

⁴⁷ Romanos Argyros' campaign is recounted in several Greek and Arab sources: Skyl. 379.^{75-381.37}; Zon. III, 576.^{8-578.4}; Psellos, *Chronographia* III.2; the Arab accounts are translated by Canard, "Sources arabes," 305-8, and V. Rozen, *Imperator Vasilii Bulgarobitsa* (St. Petersburg, 1883; repr. London, 1962), 315-22 (Kemal ad-Din). See also Felix's summary in *Byz. Islam. Welt*, 83-88.

⁴⁸ Attaleiates (116.^{23-117.4}) records Romanos Diogenes' decision to stay at Azaz because of the well-watered, amply provisioned surroundings.

⁴⁹ Canard, "Sources arabes," 305-6.

⁵⁰ Skyl. 380.⁹²⁻⁹³. Ambushing the *minsouratores* sent out by the enemy was a tactic recommended by Phokas in the *De velitatione* (XIII); cf. the warnings against the enemy doing likewise in the *De re militari* (1.⁴⁹⁻⁵⁰).

Byzantines saw no hope other than to fight their way out of the camp back to Antioch, but by then morale and discipline had sunk so low that no organized breakout was possible. Once the Arabs filled the ditch and began to press against the shield-cover, it became every man for himself; Romanos himself barely got away but lost both his tent and the rich train he had brought with him.

When issuing their instructions to see to the security of foraging parties sent out to gather supplies, Phokas and the author of the *De re militari* may have had some bitter experiences in mind. Shortly after his landing on Crete, for instance, Phokas sent out a detachment under Nikephoros Pastilas, the *strategos* of the Thrakesians. Despite Phokas' admonitions to remain vigilant, Pastilas and his men became careless and were ambushed by the Arabs. Pastilas was killed fighting and only a few of his men were able to escape and return to the camp.⁵¹ Five years later, during the siege of Tarsos, a foraging party sent out by Leo Phokas was caught unexpectedly by the Tarsiots in a night attack and massacred.⁵² And in 971, a group of Russians slipped out of Dorostolon and succeeded in slaughtering or driving off several Byzantine service units watering the horses and gathering wood and provender; Tzimiskes was so enraged at the commanders whose carelessness had allowed this to occur that he threatened them with death should the same thing happen again.⁵³

These were isolated incidents, but on other occasions such occurrences were symptomatic of a general collapse of an army's order and morale. Leo the Deacon offers a firsthand account of the disintegration of Basil II's army during his foray into Bulgaria in 986.⁵⁴ On its arrival before Sardica, the army prepared a fortified camp (τὸν τοῦ στρατοπέδου ἐπῆξατο χάρακα), where it remained for twenty days without embarking on any operations so that eventually "the army sank into indolence and inertia through the misconduct of the commanders." As a result the Bulgars were able to ambush the foragers who had gone out to gather supplies, killing many and seizing the animals, and later succeeded in burning the siege machines. Want of provisions subsequently forced the Byzantines to raise the siege and return home, but as the army struggled through the difficult terrain, the Bulgars set upon them and inflicted great losses while capturing the imperial tent and train. The scattered remnants of the army left their horses and baggage behind and fled along the mountain trails until they reached Byzantine territory.

⁵¹ Leo diac. 8.²⁰–10.¹⁷.

⁵² Skyl. 269.¹⁴–20.

⁵³ Ibid., 302.²¹–41.

⁵⁴ Leo diac. 171.¹–173.¹¹.

Finally, where a commander's application of the proper methods for pitching and defending a camp provided his army with a secure base for its field or siege operations, his failure to prepare and guard a camp correctly betrayed his incompetence and brought disaster on his army. Two examples will suffice. Kekaumenos relates the story of the *rhaiktor* Constantine, sent by the emperor Constantine Monomachos with a large army to fight the Patzinaks in 1049.⁵⁵ Emboldened by his teeming numbers, the inexperienced Constantine "neither made camp nor pitched his tent, nor rested his exhausted army," but hastily advanced against the well-rested enemy who annihilated the weary Byzantines with great loss of life. The most glaring waste of an army, however, was the loss of the impressive force sent with the eunuch Constantine Gongyles to Crete in 949.⁵⁶ All accounts agree in labeling Gongyles "an effeminate palace creature without military experience" who accomplished nothing on Crete. He neglected to construct a secure camp and to post sentinels to warn of enemy attacks, with the result that the Arabs bided their time before launching a sudden assault in which they overran the Byzantine camp and easily destroyed the mighty force sent against them.

When taken together, the tactical treatises of the later tenth century demonstrate that the formations and routines which the Byzantines preferred to use in battle, on the march, and in camp were closely integrated within the same tactical system. The square camp formation served as the army's preliminary tactical disposition in all situations, and by keeping the infantry units in the same battle order while in camp or on the march, the army was assured of a ready and secure defensive base from which to put its battle routines to work should the need arise. This system also enabled an army to proceed through enemy territory in a series of temporary encampments which could be as quickly departed as prepared. But although the methods for marching and camping were very simple in concept and execution, they did require discipline and endurance, and if a commander allowed his army's strength, vigilance, or morale to slacken, disaster was the likely outcome.

The historical episodes cited in this chapter show that the chroniclers attached considerable importance to a commander's technical competence.

⁵⁵ Kek. 162.¹²–28. Attaleiates (32.⁶–33.¹³) has a similar story of an unidentified eunuch and monk with the rank of *rhaiktor* who led a large army to defeat against the Patzinaks; on the chronology of these encounters and the conflation of the details in both accounts, see Litavrin's comments.

⁵⁶ Skyl. 245.³⁵–246.³²; Leo diac. 6.¹⁵–7.⁸; the inventory of the soldiers, ships, and equipment mustered for the Cretan expedition is preserved in the *De cerimoniis*, 664.⁴–678.¹⁰.

Part II: Historical Commentary

They regarded this aspect of leadership as a determining factor in the failure or success of a campaign, and it should be remembered that Leo the Deacon and Michael Attaleiates had themselves taken part in military expeditions and were therefore well aware of the value of a commander's skills in these areas. But the reasons for their interest go further than this. It would appear that the episodes which they record—Phokas' stern enforcement of discipline on the march, Tzimiskes' preparation of a fortified camp, Botaneiates' skillful handling of a difficult retreat—were included to magnify the heroes of their tales.⁵⁷ It is as though with the renewal of military science in the tenth century there came a keener appreciation of the role that technical skill played in warfare, so that a vignette portraying a commander's mastery of his craft did as much to enhance his reputation as one recording his vanquishing an enemy champion in single combat.

This brings us back to the question of military leadership. At the conclusion of the preceding chapter, we saw the importance of the commander's personal heroism as a source of inspiration to his men in battle, whereas this chapter on the conduct of march and the expeditionary camp has shown the importance of his technical competence in leading an army on campaign. In the eyes of veteran soldiers, a commander's efficient handling of his army, as proven by his ability to preserve discipline and security while remaining attentive to the welfare of his men, was of greater consequence than his martial valor.⁵⁸ In the section of his *Strategikon* devoted to military affairs, Kekaumenos supports his advice with a number of cautionary tales drawn from events of the recent past. What bears noting is that none of these stories has to do with the conduct of battle; instead, all tell of commanders whose armies came to grief "without battle" (χωρὶς πολέμου) as a result of errors, inexperience, or liability to the stratagems of the enemy.

⁵⁷ Leo the Deacon's account of Phokas' conquest of Crete is proof of this intent. A reminder of Constantine Gongyles' miserable failure of 949 precedes the introduction of Phokas in the narrative to highlight the contrast between the eunuch's incompetence and the true soldier Phokas' efficient disembarkation of his army and construction of a fortified camp. The juxtaposition is quite deliberate.

⁵⁸ See Verbruggen's comments on the attributes of the successful commanders in Western medieval armies, *Art of Warfare*, 54–56.

In this way, after seizing the Persian empire, the Turks became the neighbors of the Byzantines. But it is perhaps necessary to explain why they began to make war upon the Byzantines, although prior to this time they had been afraid to attack them, trembling with fear at the mere mention of the exploits of the three preceding emperors, by whom I mean Nikephoros Phokas, John [Tzimiskes], and Basil the Porphyrogennetos, for they believed that their valor and might still prevailed among the Byzantines . . .

Nikephoros Bryennios
History, 97.¹⁻⁹

AFTERWORD

Now that the tactical system prescribed by the *Praecepta militaria* and its companion treatises has been examined, it is appropriate to conclude with some general observations on Byzantine warfare in the age of Nikephoros Phokas, John Tzimiskes, and Basil II.

It has long been common to find in histories of warfare the Middle Ages, for all their military ethos and activity, dismissed as a retrograde period that knew little or nothing of strategy, tactics, or "the art of war." This opinion, which has in recent years been effectively refuted by scholars of the medieval West,¹ is plainly untenable with regard to Byzantium, whose emergence as a civilization distinguishable from its Late Roman ancestor is marked, among other changes, by the evolution of a new military organization and way of war during the sixth and seventh centuries; in turn, the consistency of Byzantine military doctrine is shown by the influence of the tactical principles and methods elaborated in the *Strategikon* of Maurice on the system developed in the tenth century. The existence of a standing army, with a tradition of training and discipline, and a solid core of professional soldiers, made possible the application of tactical theory to practice. But what truly sets Byzantium apart as a medieval state with a sophisticated and coherent art of war are the tactical treatises studied here, which combine to present a remarkably detailed exposition of contemporary warfare in its various aspects—battles, raids, sieges, and campaigning—drawn from the experience and expertise of the commanders who wrote them, and which have no parallel in western Europe until the time of the Hundred Years War.²

¹ Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, 208–37; see also J. Gillingham, "Richard I and the Science of War in the Middle Ages," in *War and Government in the Middle Ages*, ed. J. Gillingham and J. C. Holt (Woodbridge-Totowa, 1984), 78–91. On the other hand, Smail corrects many of the exaggerated conclusions reached by scholars who analyzed medieval tactics: *Crusading Warfare*, 3–17, 138–203.

² Ph. Contamine, "The War Literature of the Late Middle Ages: The Treatises of Robert de Balsac and Béraud Stuart, Lord of Aubigny," in *War, Literature and Politics in the Late Middle Ages: Essays in Honour of G. W. Coopland*, ed. C. T. Allmand (Liverpool, 1976), 102–21; C. T. Allmand, *The Hundred Years War* (Cambridge, 1988), 67–73, 151–63.

The features of the tactical system used by Byzantine expeditionary armies during the late tenth and early eleventh centuries do much to explain the military achievements of Phokas and his equally capable successors. On one hand, it was simple in design and purpose. As we have seen, in this system the infantry maintained the same strong defensive formation on the march, in camp, and in battle, serving as a base from which the cavalry force could carry out its principal tasks of reconnaissance, raiding, and attacking. But on the other hand, it was a system that required not only close cooperation between infantry and cavalry, but also the efficient coordination of the different units within the infantry and cavalry forces. For such a system to operate effectively at all levels, the thorough preparation of a field army before a campaign was imperative; hence the sequence of steps in the *Praecepta* listing the selection and training of men suited by their physical attributes and skills to certain roles, the organization of infantry and cavalry units according to their tactical responsibilities, and the specification of the equipment required by each type of soldier, followed by the drilling of each unit in the performance of its maneuvers and roles, and the rehearsal of the army in its routines in battle and on campaign. Above all, it was a system that delegated crucial tasks to specialists—*menavlatoi*, *prokoursatores*, *kataphraktoi*, *doukatores*, *minsouratores*—chosen for these roles by virtue of their particular talents or expertise.

The coherence and integration of Byzantine tactics for battle and campaigning are impressive by medieval standards; but ultimately of greater importance is the degree to which both the tactical treatises and the historical sources portray battles and campaigns as affairs of human beings, susceptible to any number of physical effects and competing emotional impulses. We have seen the measures by which Phokas sought to control his soldiers' inclinations during battle, with his repeated insistence on good order and discipline in the execution of their routines, his strict orders against plundering, and his instructions to the *kataphraktoi* to launch their attack calmly and deliberately so as to terrify the enemy. These combine with the advice and instructions on campaign procedures issued in the other treatises to reveal something of the collective behavior of the armies of the time, especially how the ebb and flow of stamina and morale, the greed for loot, and the ever present liability to fear and indiscipline always threatened to undermine their effectiveness. Not without reason do the chroniclers record the constant training and rigid discipline to which Phokas, Tzimiskes, and Basil submitted their men, for, in the final analysis, their success as leaders depended not so much on their ability as tacticians, but as disciplinarians capable of compelling and inspiring their men to overcome not only the enemy, but themselves.

APPENDIX

It was always one of the main objectives of Byzantine commanders leading campaigns along the eastern frontiers to acquire great amounts of booty, both as an incentive and reward to the soldiery, and a source of revenue to the state. Of the spoils of war "won by the spear" in these campaigns, captives formed the largest and most lucrative part. In the course of their campaigns in Cilicia and Syria, which saw the Byzantines systematically enslave or expel the Muslim inhabitants of conquered towns and regions,¹ the armies of Phokas, Tzimiskes, and Basil II returned home with great numbers of prisoners of war and captive non-combatants. While prisoners of sufficient wealth or prestige could hope one day to be ransomed or exchanged, the majority were either forcibly converted to Christianity and settled in Byzantine territory, or else sold as slaves.²

Since the subject is relevant to the study not only of Byzantine military history in the tenth century, but also to contemporary agricultural and demographic history, appended here are translations, accompanied by brief remarks, of two documents that describe Byzantine policy with regard to captives taken in war. The first is a short text, found in the *De cerimoniis*, that prescribes the subsidies and exemptions granted to Saracen prisoners who had been baptized and installed in plots of land or households.³ The second is a legal decree, issued by John Tzimiskes, regulating the imposition of the *kommerkion* (the 10 percent tax levied by the state on goods in transit) on prisoners sold or given as slaves by soldiers after a campaign.⁴

¹ Dagron, "Minorités ethniques," 179–86.

² Exchanges of Byzantine and Muslim prisoners were negotiated on several occasions: cf. *Byz. Arabes* II.1, 124–25, 182–84, 243, 254–56; see also Yahya of Antioch's account of an exchange of prisoners arranged in 966, in which the celebrated poet Abu Firas was released after several years in captivity: PO 18 (1924), 801–802.

³ *De cer.* 694.²²–695.¹⁴.

⁴ *JGR* I, 257–58.

Concerning Saracen Captives Baptized in a Theme

Take note that they must each one of them receive three *nomismata* from the *protonotarios* of the theme, six *nomismata* for their yoke of oxen, and fifty-four *modioi* of grain for their seed and provisions.

Note that concerning captives given as son-in-law to households, whether the household which the Saracen son-in-law enters is military or civil, it is exempted for three years from the land tax and the hearth tax. After the three years this household is obliged once more to pay the land tax and the hearth tax.

Note that when the captives or others are given land for settlement, they remain free from all service to the fisc for three years, and they pay neither the hearth tax nor the land tax. After the completion of the three years, they pay both the land tax and the hearth tax.

It is evident from the text that the conditions of Saracen captives converted to Christianity and settled in Byzantine lands varied considerably. As Oikonomides has noted, the recipients of the cash and grain allowances listed in the first paragraph appear to be little more than agricultural laborers in the service of landowners or the state, who belonged to a hereditary category of dependent peasant (*douloparoikos*, first attested during the reign of Constantine VII), and were obliged to render certain services and a portion of their harvests to their masters or the state.⁵ On the other hand, the second paragraph indicates that converted Saracens entering Byzantine households as sons-in-law (*γαμβροί*) brought with them the advantages of temporary tax exemptions and additional labor, and were not slaves or held in other forms of servitude. It was to the benefit of the state that they be used to contribute to the manpower and cultivation of the land; and it is likely that they were introduced into military households (*στρατιωτικοὶ οἶκοι*, that is, households subject to the *strateia*) to replace killed or absconded *stratiotai*, and so assumed the status of *stratiotai* themselves.⁶ Finally, as Lemerle observed, the third paragraph points to a policy of agrarian colonization. The text does not specify where the "captives and others" are being given lands on which to settle, but it is reasonable to propose that in this case they were being used to populate the Armenian themes, newly created

⁵N. Oikonomides, "Οἱ Βυζαντινοὶ δουλοπάροικοι," *Σύμμεκτα* 5 (1983), 295–302, esp. 301–302.

⁶Lemerle, *Agrarian History of Byzantium*, 133–35.

frontier zones into which the Byzantines transplanted not only Armenians but also Christian refugees from Muslim lands, Syrian Jacobites, and converted Saracens.

Novella of the Emperor John Concerning the Tax on Slaves Taken in War

As the subject of the tax coming into the treasury on slaves taken in war is undefined and undifferentiated, given that the law states that the captives taken by the soldiers and designated spoils of war are to remain untaxed, and as on some occasions prisoners captured by the poorer soldiers are instead being taxed, while on others those who should be taxed are being transported, likely by officers, free of charge and without payment, with the result that a loss is incurred to the common good on the one hand, and a loss to the entire army on the other, our Majesty, taking both issues into consideration, excising the unfair [tax], although superfluously, confirming the fair [tax] if lacking, and boosting the morale of the soldiery, wishes that from this day forward certain [captives] are to be taxed and others not, which the declaration below will set forth case by case.

1. We rule therefore that if one of the soldiers, a *droungarios* or a *bandophoros*, a *komes* or a *scholarios*, or another soldier of any kind, of low rank or high, a member of the *tagmata* or *themata*, sells or gives slaves to one of his comrades on the same campaign, or to the *strategos* or another high officer also taking part in the campaign, no one will have the authority to tax these.

If some of these soldiers, either a *strategos* or a *tourmarches*, or the rest of the tagmatic and thematic officers provide slaves to their men, and they send them by way of a gift to persons living in the imperial city or residing outside, or, as is often the case, the slaves are sent on by them to their own household and properties or even to relatives, these [slaves] will not be taxed either.

If, however, some of the soldiers who go out to the markets and villages in Byzantine territory sell slaves to the officials in the area, who were likely not among those on the expedition, and these men (the purchasers, that is) wish to sell or give them as a gift to other persons, they will furnish the tax.

If some of the officials who did not go on campaign send out their men for the purpose of purchasing slaves after the army's return from enemy territory, these [slaves] will be taxed, that is to say, with the purchasers providing the tax. These regulations apply to the cavalry soldiers.

2. Where the sailors are concerned, this is our ruling: those found to be besieging fortresses or going on raids with the cavalry army into enemy territory and capturing slaves will not pay the tax, whereas those entering the markets and villages who purchase slaves from merchants or Bulgarians, or acquire them by any other means whatsoever, or have them by means of a gift, will be subject to the tax.

If, while there is no war going on, some of the sailors fraudulently acquire slaves, not only will they furnish the tax to the treasury, but they are also subject to punishment.

If, as is often the case, there are sailors in the same place with the cavalry force, and some of the cavalry officers sell or even give slaves to some of the sailors, they will not be taxed.

As Tzimiskes' decree on the sale of prisoners of war has been the subject of detailed study,⁷ only brief observations pertaining to its military historical context need be offered here. That it was necessary to define the applicability of the *kommerkion* on captives sold or given as slaves is in itself testimony to the vast number of prisoners and captives taken by Byzantine armies in this time. To cite one well-known instance, Skylitzes records that after Leo Phokas routed Sayf al-Dawla's army at Adrassos in 960, "the number of prisoners was so great as to fill the urban households and the lands with slaves," but this was by no means an isolated incident.⁸ It is most likely that Tzimiskes found it necessary to issue the decree after his expedition against Nisibis in 972 or his advance through Syria and Palestine in 974–975, both of which netted large numbers of captives.⁹ At the same time, while the decree reflects the policy of the systematic depopulation of Muslim territories noted above, the regulations listed in section 2 bear witness to a constant stream of Byzantine raids into hostile lands for the purpose of gaining plunder and prisoners, small-scale campaigns reminiscent of the raiding and siege tactics outlined in chapters 63 and 65 of the *Taktika* of Nikephoros Ouranos.

⁷H. Köpstein, "Einige Aspekte des byzantinischen und bulgarischen Sklavenhandels im X. Jahrhundert. Zur Novelle des Joannes Tzimiskes über Sklavenhandelszoll," *Actes du premier Congrès international des études balkaniques et sud-est européennes*, III (Sofia, 1969), 237–47. On the subject of prisoners of war in Byzantium, see D. Letsios, "Die Kriegsgefangenschaft nach Auffassung der Byzantiner," *Byzantinoslavica* 53 (1992), 213–27. For the most recent discussion of slavery in Byzantium, with a useful bibliography, see Köpstein, "Sklaven in der Peira," *Fontes Minores* 9, ed. L. Burgmann (Frankfurt, 1993), 1–33.

⁸Skyl. 250.^{55–57}; see also Dagron's list of captives recorded in the sources in "Minorités ethniques," 182–84.

⁹Yahya, PO 24 (1932), 353, 368–69.

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Agarenoi Along with *Sarakenoi* and *Ismaelitai*, one of the usual Byzantine terms for the Arabs.

Arabitai Bedouin light horsemen, who operated as raiders or skirmishers.

Magaritai Former Christians who had apostasized to Islam.

Rhos, Rhosoi The Scandinavian, Slavic, and Finnic inhabitants of *Rhosia* (Kievan Russia).

bandon Cavalry unit of fifty men; division of a *tourma*.

bandophoros Ensign, standard-bearer.

cheiromanganon A device, mounted on a stand, that discharged arrows.

chiliarchy (also *taxiarchy*) Infantry unit of one thousand men, commanded by a *chiliarch*.

dekarch Infantry officer in command of ten men.

doukatores Guides and scouts who planned and conducted the army's advance.

droungarios Commander of a *bandon* and a subordinate officer of a *tourmarches*.

epilorik(i)on Sleeveless surcoat made of cotton or coarse silk and worn over mail or scale armor.

hekatontarch Infantry officer in command of one hundred men.

hekatontarchia Infantry unit of one hundred men.

kabadia Knee-length felt tunics worn by infantrymen; also the felt coverings hung from a mounted archer's belt to protect the legs.

kataphraktos A fully armored cavalryman mounted on an armored horse.

klibanion Sleeveless, waist-length cuirass, usually of scale armor.

komes Commander of a regiment within the tagmata (*scholai*); also an officer commanding a detachment within the themata.

kontoubernion Infantry unit of ten men; synonymous with *dekarchia*.

laisa A hut-like shelter fashioned from vines and branches; used in sieges to protect the attackers.

lorikion A waist-length mail shirt, worn separately or with padded armor.

menavlatos Heavy infantryman armed with a *menavlion*.

Glossary of Terms

- menavl(i)on* A heavy spear with a long blade, similar to a pike.
minsouratores Soldiers who selected and marked out the site of an encampment.
modion (also *modios*) Unit of measure; approximately 13 kilograms or 28 pounds.
mouzakia Boots worn by infantrymen.
nomisma The standard Byzantine gold coin.
o(u)rguia Unit of measure; approximately 1.8 meters.
pentekontarch Infantry officer in command of fifty men.
phoulkon Commander's escort.
prokoursatores Light horsemen operating as scouts and skirmishers.
protonotarios Chief notary of a theme, supervising fiscal and financial affairs.
scholarios A soldier enrolled in one of the imperial regiments (*tagmata*).
spithame Unit of measure; calculated at 23.4 centimeters.
strategos Commander of a theme or contingent from a theme.
tagma (pl. *tagmata*) The imperial (cavalry) regiments, recruited, equipped, and paid by the state.
taxiarchy (also *chiliarchy*) An infantry unit of one thousand men, commanded by a *taxiarch*.
thema (theme), (pl. *themata*) A province; the contingent of soldiers from a province.
topoteretes "Lieutenant," an officer seconded to the commander of a *tagma*.
tourma Division of a theme. (There were normally three *tourmai* in one theme.)
tourmarches Commander of a *tourma*.
tzerboulia Boots worn by infantrymen.
zabai Pieces of chain mail worn over the face and forearms.

INDICES

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